Favela, Network and Identity in a Complex City
A Comparative Neighbourhood Study in Rio de Janeiro

Richmond, Matthew Aaron

Awarding institution:
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Matthew Aaron Richmond
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This thesis is dedicated to my grandma Ruth Rubenstein and to the memory of my grandpa Arthur Rubenstein, who taught me to love learning and to care about what happens in the world

Abstract

Although they continue to suffer from high levels of poverty, exclusion, and stigmatisation, Rio de Janeiro's favelas have undergone significant processes of social transformation and diversification in recent years. Notable trends include rising incomes, increased state investment and changing patterns of security and violence. However, these trends vary significantly both within and between different favelas, presenting a major analytical challenge for researchers. In particular they raise the question of how to conceive the causal dynamics shaping social conditions and individual outcomes in favelas in terms of *scale*, *process*, and *agency*. This thesis seeks to respond to this question, presenting qualitative research undertaken in two contrasting favelas that exhibit diverse and contradictory trends. Using a 'relational comparative' methodological approach it conceives these case studies as both comparable and interconnected within common systems that shape them materially and symbolically.

While drawing on the insights from political economy approaches, the thesis proposes an 'urban social complexity' analytical model, which views favelas as shaped by complex interactions between various processes, both economic and non-economic, across different scales. This model mobilises the key analytical concepts of "complexity" – interactions between multiple entities that drive emergent and non-linear forms of development – and "assemblage" – the coming together of these entities into stable and knowable configurations. Using this framework, it is argued that Rio's favelas are powerfully shaped by a set of spatially sensitive "urban processes" that are interlinked but loosely assembled at the city scale, meaning they can intersect in unpredictable ways in different favelas. Although they transcend the local scale, these processes empower some local actors, like politicians and armed groups, to exercise influence over the neighbourhood. Residents, meanwhile, may seek to use their social networks to mitigate the risks and distribute the resources and opportunities that arise, albeit within tight constraints. At the individual level, resident identities appear to be tied in complex ways to the relationship between favelas and dominant power structures. These manifest in the formation of 'boundaries' within the neighbourhood, which have implications for social relations and individual trajectories. Overall, the spatialised nature of urban processes, social networks and identities asserts the need to see the neighbourhood scale as important, while still recognising its constant and complex interactions with more powerful structures and processes at higher scales.

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1.0 Introduction: An urban moment

1.1 Interesting times

It would be an understatement to say that the period between October 2012 and August 2013 was an interesting time to be carrying out fieldwork in Rio de Janeiro. I arrived in the city at a time when international media coverage was, for the most part, still offering up largely celebratory accounts of the apparent balance Brazil had struck between economic growth and inequality reduction (eg. Follath and Gluesing 2012). Rio de Janeiro's own economic "turnaround" (Urani and Gambiagi 2011) and various policy experiments – particularly those targeted at favelas, such as police pacification and a range of urban upgrading initiatives – were invariably the cornerstone of such narratives. With its double "coming out party" of the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics to look forward to, Rio's future seemed rosier than at any point in at least the last thirty years.

Such were the views I expected to hear from Cariocas (Rio's inhabitants) themselves, but what I found upon arrival was quite different. Rather than optimism, a mood of cynicism and growing frustration seemed to prevail, although at the time both its causes and its true scale were unclear. Endemic corruption among the political class, the rising cost of living, and the persistence of old problems of inequality, violence and underperforming public services, in spite of some modest improvements, seemed to vie for centre stage in the analyses I heard from Cariocas from across the political and social spectrums. Nonetheless, aside from relatively small-scale mobilisations by social movements and community groups resisting mega-event related favela evictions, the grievances did not seem to find clear political expression and business carried on as usual. Then in June 2013, as if from nowhere, mass protest erupted on the streets of urban Brazil. A small demonstration in São Paulo opposing a recent rise in the bus fare was met with a heavy-handed police response, and the public outrage that followed lit the touch paper of these dormant grievances. At its peak on 20th June over a million Brazilians across dozens of cities took to the streets. Rio de Janeiro – the city most drastically

affected by urban reforms – saw the largest mobilisation of all with an estimated 300,000 protestors (G1 Brasil 2013).

During the heady days of June and July the air was full of talk of a 'Brazilian Spring' and a 'new politics'. Politicians, whether hurriedly or reluctantly, moved to reverse local bus fare increases and President Dilma Rousseff made significant pronouncements on healthcare, education and public transport reform. And yet it appeared that the diverse and at times inchoate critiques that I had been hearing from individuals over the previous eight months were simply being reproduced on a mass scale. A cacophony of voices from both left and right, and from within and outside the political establishment, contested the ownership and meaning of the protests, and the result was a kind of unhappy deadlock. Over the following months a sense of normality, mixed with resignation, began to return.

A year on the World Cup passed relatively smoothly, as the nightmare scenarios of empty (or even collapsing) stadiums, transport meltdown and police battles with protestors or criminal gangs failed to materialise.[1] And yet there was an overriding sense of anti-climax (not helped, of course, by the Brazilian team's disastrous semi-final defeat to Germany). Three months later a dramatic presidential election seemed to offer a further boost to the *status quo*. After a short-lived poll surge by the self-styled 'change candidate', Marina da Silva,[2] the two big beasts of Brazilian politics, the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (Workers' Party, *PT*) and the *Partido Social Democrático Brasileiro* (Brazilian Social Democratic Party, *PSDB*) reasserted their dominance. In a tight and acrimonious run-off, the incumbent Rousseff narrowly defeated her rival Aécio Neves, likely ensuring a continuation of most of the core economic and social policies pursued by the *PT* over the previous years.[3] It is safe to

[1] The muted nature of protest during the World Cup was certainly influenced by the unprecedented levels of security and draconian anti-protest legislation (Nunes 2014)

[2] Da Silva stood for the *Partido Socialista Brasileira* (PSB). Originally vice-presidential candidate, her decision to contest the presidency was forced by the tragic death of presidential candidate Eduardo Campos in a helicopter crash just weeks before the election.

[3] Former Rio de Janeiro State Governor Sérgio Cabral of the *Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, *PMDB*) also saw his chosen

say that the tensions and contradictions that found expression in June 2013 have not yet fully played themselves out, though it is less clear whether, and if so how, they will now do so at all.

This thesis is not particularly concerned with politics, social movements or questions of governance. And yet it was in this context that it was conceived, researched and written, and it is thus indelibly shaped by the issues and the debates that surrounded the protests. More importantly, it was at this "urban moment" that participants in the research were asked to reflect upon their own lives and relationships, their hopes and fears, their views about their respective communities and about their city. Both their social circumstances and their personal preoccupations are products of this conjuncture.

1.2 Favelas, urban transformation and complexity

The topic the thesis does address concerns Rio de Janeiro's favelas, or informal settlements. These areas have witnessed dramatic, yet highly ambiguous forms of social change since Brazil democratised in the 1980s, and in particular over the last ten to fifteen years. As will be outlined in detail in Chapter 2, this includes falling poverty levels, rising incomes and consumption, increased state investment in infrastructure and services, and even some improvement in terms of residents' educational outcomes and access to higher-skilled occupations. On the other hand, favela residents continue to be disproportionately affected by poverty, remain excluded from various aspects of citizenship, are heavily stigmatised in public discourse, and are subject to different forms of violence and social control at the hands of both state and non-state actors. Moreover, while these contradictory trends affect all favelas to some degree, their impacts have been highly uneven, leading to growing diversity both *within* and *between* different favelas.

This thesis examines how and why these processes of transformation and diversification are occurring and with what implications for favela residents and for

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successor, Fernando Pezão, elected, despite the former's plummeting poll ratings in the wake of the protests.

wider patterns of urban inequality in Rio de Janeiro. Specifically it seeks to answer the question:

> **What are the relative contributions of structural, urban and neighbourhood-level factors in determining social conditions in favelas?**

This raises a series of important sub-questions, which the thesis also attempts to answer:

1) **How can "social conditions" in Rio's favelas be characterised and how do they vary across cases?**
2) **What is the relationship between *processes* at the *urban* and *neighbourhood scales* in the production of individual and collective outcomes?**
3) **What role do *social networks* play and, more generally, how much *agency* do residents exercise over these outcomes?**
4) **How does the neighbourhood contribute to the formation of resident *identities* and, through this, to the ways that residents relate to others both in and outside the neighbourhood?**

Given my interest in questions of causality and spatial scale, I initially approached this topic through two bodies of literature that speak to these issues. The first can succinctly be labelled the 'neighbourhood effects' approach to analysis of urban disadvantage and inequality (see Sampson et al. 2002). The central proposition of this approach is that urban space, for example by "isolating" the urban poor, plays a key role in aggravating and reproducing poverty. While some contributions focussed primarily on the relationship between space, poverty and social networks (eg. Wilson 1987; Sampson et al. 1997), others have theorised the role of the neighbourhood in far more expansive terms. The second area is less a body of literature than a general orientation to urban social analysis, which emphasises the role of political economy in generating urban inequalities. This includes Marxian critical urban theory (eg. Harvey 2008), focussed primarily on the role of capital accumulation in driving uneven urban development and social change, as well as

more 'structuralist' accounts (eg. Wacquant 2008), which conceive of macrosocial, economic and institutional factors as producing inequalities that become manifest in socio-spatial relations. What both approaches share is that they tend to see causal force as overwhelmingly exerted by processes operating at a higher spatial scales. By implication, conditions and forms of social organisation in the neighbourhood are seen as largely, if not entirely, dependent on these higher-level determinants.

As I will argue in the literature review that follows, both neighbourhood effects and critical/structuralist approaches prove to be of limited use when applied to Rio de Janeiro's favelas. Notwithstanding its useful insights about relationships between social networks and space in low-incomes neighbourhoods, much of the neighbourhood effects literature exaggerates the autonomy of processes within the neighbourhood and fails to acknowledge that these are heavily constrained by processes at the urban scale. In this regard critical and structuralist approaches offer a vital corrective. However, these suffer from their own problems. For example, they tend to flatten out differences within and between low-income neighbourhoods and to strip their residents of any potential agency (see Caldeira 2009).

Both approaches encounter further difficulties when applied to the context of urban Latin America. Distinct contextual factors, including widespread informality, institutional fragmentation, high levels of violence, and sharp patterns of segregation, all impact on dynamics at the neighbourhood and urban scales in ways that are not captured by models generated in the context of the Global North. While there has been little comparative research into social conditions in favelas that focusses directly on questions of causality and scale,[4] there is a rich urban literature on Rio de Janeiro – particularly addressing the themes of urban violence and the social, institutional and symbolic dimensions of the city's formal/informal divide – which sheds light on some of these dynamics. In particular, Lopes de Souza's (2000) account of 'socio-political-spatial fragmentation' helps to explain

[4] Perlman (2010a) is somewhat of an exception. See Section 2.2.3.

how processes such as the territorialisation of favelas by drug traffickers, militias and police and the self-segregation of elites into securitised condominiums have fundamentally altered social life across the city. This can be seen as linked to broader trends in Latin American democracies, which have tended to empower multiple violent actors both within and outside the state in what Arias and Goldstein (2010) describe as a system of 'violent pluralism'.

The shortcomings of both neighbourhood and critical/structuralist approaches in addressing the nuances of scalar relations and the distinct conditions of the Brazilian metropolis, then, suggested that an alternative model might be needed to answer my research question. This seemed to be confirmed as I went about selecting my case studies and eventually entered the field. As conditions in the favelas of Tuiuti and Asa Branca revealed, patterns of urbanisation, economic activity, state intervention, and security and violence in Rio de Janeiro are highly variegated across urban space and across different favelas. Furthermore although shaped in complex ways by wider power structures that transcend the neighbourhood, these processes seem to empower local actors – such as politicians and armed groups – to exercise considerable influence over local social conditions. Meanwhile, although largely disempowered by these different processes, residents can exercise at least some agency over their own outcomes through their social networks, by determining how the resources, costs, risks and opportunities that arrive in the neighbourhood are managed and distributed.

In light of these considerations, the thesis mobilises what is defined as an "urban social complexity" approach. Drawing on DeLanda's (2006) rendering of assemblage theory, this approach views neighbourhood conditions as the contingent product of processes and actors interacting across scales. This view retains the crucial insights of critical/structuralist models, by acknowledging the salience of higher-level political-economic factors. However, it also acknowledges that processes only indirectly linked to economic factors and operating at lower scales may also exercise important influence over local social conditions. Through the lens of urban social complexity then, the individual neighbourhood is understood neither as an independent causal unit generating its own outcomes, nor as a mere cog in a

machine whose levers are pulled somewhere else. Instead it is a complex and dynamic *assemblage*, produced and reproduced by varied processes that unfold across different scales and intersect in time and space in sometimes unpredictable ways. While subjecting Rio's favelas to common forms of exclusion, these dynamics also produce significant differences among them – for example in the availability of jobs, in access to public services, or in the likelihood of violent conflict in the local area. While these variations occur within the constraints of overarching, structured inequalities, they can have important consequences for the objective outcomes and subjective experiences of residents of different favelas.

1.3 The coercive field

My reflections on the literature guided my choice of methods and the general direction of my interviews. However, as in Geertz's memorable phrase (quoted in Flyvberg 2006, p. 235), the field proved to be "coercive", and "talked back" too loudly to retain an excusive, let alone neat, focus on these issues as I had originally conceived them. During my fieldwork it became clear that some questions were more important to my respondents than others. Acknowledging this, in both the interviews themselves and in the way I have analysed and presented my findings I sought to give these concerns the space and prominence they demanded. As indicated above, some of these emergent issues related to Rio de Janeiro's "urban moment" and the related changes respondents were observing in their own neighbourhoods. Thus the social impacts of police pacification in one of my case study areas, Tuiuti, is given considerable prominence in Chapter 7. Similarly, in the same chapter, the effects of the transformation of the housing market on social network dynamics in my other case neighbourhood, Asa Branca, is discussed at length. In both cases these changes complemented my focus on social networks and the way this overlap with questions of neighbourhood security. However, the decision to explore the role of networks through these specific lenses was a pragmatic decision based on their evident salience for residents.

Other content was even more heavily shaped by issues that emerged in the course of my fieldwork. In speaking to my respondents about the neighbourhood and their

personal relationships, it became clear that questions of identity and social distinctions could not be left out of the analysis. Pursuing these lines of enquiry opened up fascinating new terrains of discussion, including “big” questions of how attitudes and identities become formed and of what consequences this has for both local and wider social relations. However, this new material also created significant structural issues for presenting my material.

I have addressed these as best as I could using a tri-partite division of my empirical chapters, which I label as “Favela”, “Network” and “Identity”. The advantage of this is that they broadly capture a scalar transition from the urban to the local to the individual (and through the individual to the societal), and at the same time follow a rough analytical progression from the structural-material, to the social and, lastly, to the representational. The disadvantage is that this imposes a neat separation and ordering of scales and spheres where in fact none is justified. Structures, networks and identities are co-constitutive, and micro and socio-symbolic dimensions are always entwined in processes of change even where this seems to be driven by macro-level structural forces. Imposing structure for the sake of presentation is an unfortunate necessity, rather than a process of abstraction and logical ordering that captures all that is essential.

A final qualification relates to my own position within the research process. My interpretations of what was said to me, and the analysis I offer, are unavoidably those of an interested outsider – not only an outsider of the communities where I carried out my research, but of Brazil as a whole. I must therefore acknowledge that the research will lack some of the richness and nuance of language and implicit cultural expertise that a native would have brought to it. I can only hope that this is somewhat compensated by what is perhaps the only advantage an outsider really has – a certain distance, which allows us to see things as though they were not normal. Beyond this all I can offer are my own long-standing fascination with the city of Rio de Janeiro, a determination to understand the dynamics that shape it and the lives of its inhabitants, and a desire to represent the words of my respondents as I believe they were intended.

1.4 Thesis structure

In **Chapter 2** I provide historical and social context to current conditions in Rio de Janeiro and its favelas. I begin with a brief overview of Brazil's social, economic and political development over the course of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, showing how the country's development model of 'conservative modernisation' has sustained high levels of social inequality, notwithstanding some modest improvements in this regard in recent years. These national trends provide the overarching context for Rio de Janeiro's own historical development, though it also displays some distinctive features, particularly relating to the development of its socio-spatial structure and the relationship between this and questions of citizenship. I then map contemporary patterns of inequality in the city in terms of housing, employment, demography, and security, and the ways in which these manifest spatially. The chapter ends by introducing my case studies, the favelas of Tuiuti and Asa Branca, whose own histories and current conditions can be seen as embedded in these broader patterns of urban social development.

Chapter 3 reviews various bodies of literature focussed on cities, neighbourhoods and social networks in both the Global North and Latin America. It begins by looking at Marxian critical urban theory, and the important insights it offers about the role of capital accumulation in shaping urban development and social relations. However, it is argued that in the context of contemporary urban Latin America factors relating to democracy, violence and spatial processes of fragmentation must also be taken into account. The second part of the chapter looks at the literature on neighbourhoods, contrasting 'neighbourhood effects' approaches, which view neighbourhood disadvantage as produced, or at less intensified, by processes at the local scale, with Wacquant's (2008) concept of 'advanced marginality' which sees it as generated externally by macro-structural processes. It is argued that while structural accounts are more convincing, these need to be supplemented by analyses that account for heterogeneity in low-income neighbourhoods, particularly in contemporary Brazil. This leads to the final part of the chapter, which explores the explanatory power of social network analysis in both providing residents with a

degree of agency over individual and collective outcomes, while also leading to emergence of divisions within the neighbourhood.

Chapter 4 acts as a kind of conceptual framework for the empirical chapters to follow. It begins by outlining what I describe as an "urban social complexity" approach, mobilising the notions of "complexity" and "assemblage" as key analytical concepts. Based primarily on DeLanda's (2006) formulation of assemblage theory, this approach proposes that the social world is formed of 'relations of exteriority', meaning that the different entities that constitute it have the potential to interact in ways that generate *emergent* and *non-linear* forms of change. This stands in contrast to "reductionist" theoretical models that privilege particular types of processes at particular scales. However, this approach retains the key insights of critical and structuralist models by acknowledging that in a modern capitalist society higher-level political and economic processes are likely to exert profound top-down causal influence over the constitution urban social life. The second part of the chapter attempts to illustrate the potential of such an approach to Rio de Janeiro through analysis of four thematic areas that exhibit characteristics of complexity. These are: (1) the evolution of territorial conflict and violence; (2) the role of the state in the provision of urban infrastructure and services; (3) the social relations surrounding the city's formal/informal divide; and (4) the construction of place-based identities.

In **Chapter 5** I outline my research design, justifying my choice of methods, selection of cases, and approaches to interviewing and sampling. I also discuss the way I approached the complex issues of community engagement, cultural translation and inequality in the researcher-respondent relationship. This is followed by an exploration of the epistemological foundations of comparative case research and of the specificities of using neighbourhoods as cases. These discussions form the basis for my adoption of a 'relational-comparative approach' (Ward 2010) to neighbourhood comparison, which conceives cases as both comparable and at the same time linked through their integration in common structures and processes of various kinds.

Drawing on a mixture of interview and census data, **Chapter 6** attempts to situate Tuiuti and Asa Branca within four key "urban processes" that I argue play a fundamental role in shaping contextual variation across Rio de Janeiro's favelas. The Chapter thus shows how the city acts to generate local social conditions, without definitively determining individual and collective outcomes. The first process concerns the production and allocation of housing, which helps to "select" the population of a given neighbourhood. The second process is economic activity, which unevenly distributes access to jobs and other opportunities across the city. The third process is state intervention in the provision of infrastructure and services in favelas, which has a fundamental, though not always straightforward, impact on neighbourhood conditions. The final process is territorialised competition between armed groups, which produces differences in conditions of security and violence across the city. Although interlinked, these four processes prove to be loosely *assembled*, causing significant variations between the two case studies with important consequences for their respective populations.

Chapter 7 drills down to look at social relations internal to Tuiuti and Asa Branca. I begin by revisiting processes of community formation in the two areas, proposing that this has produced distinct network structures that underpin some apparent differences in patterns of social exchange. Despite these differences, however, there are also similarities, in particular a set of mechanisms common to both communities that serve to segment networks and disrupt the flow of resources, information and support across their respective populations. The second half of the chapter looks at the question of collective action, and specifically how network structures and neighbourhood conditions serve to facilitate or impede this. In Asa Branca, a recent transformation of the housing market has prompted a process of 'network diffusion', weakening the correspondence between resident networks and the space of the neighbourhood and making it more difficult to enforce collective norms. In Tuiuti, meanwhile, dense network ties have meant that police pacification has changed the balance of power in the neighbourhood without weakening drug trafficker influence over residents. This has resulted in a "bipolar" security regime

that may have, paradoxically, undermined resident influence over neighbourhood security.

In **Chapter 8** I go on to look at the relationship between the city, the neighbourhood and the construction of individual and collective identities from a variety of perspectives. The chapter begins by examining how residents experience different parts of the city, arguing that in spite of high levels of everyday mobility the mechanisms of symbolic violence and stigma that accompany Rio's high level of inequality serve to regulate the nature of exchanges between classes. It then goes on to look in depth at residents' experiences of social and territorial stigmatisation and the specific "accusations" perceived to accompany it – in particular stereotypes revolving around violence, disorder and lack of education. While stigma appears to be a universal phenomenon that no favela can entirely escape, dominant constructions do seem to present opportunities for individual and collective distancing. The final section moves beyond stigma to argue that distinct "socio-cultural" and "moral-cultural" schemas are at least as important in the ways favela residents define themselves. While both of these discursive frameworks serve to erect boundaries within the favela population and to reinforce aspects of dominant ideology, the contextual embeddedness of the moral-cultural order underpins independent positions that can, in some cases, translate into counter-hegemonic views.

In **Chapter 9** I provide a summary of the key findings of my research. I argue that the neighbourhood does indeed shape the lives of favela residents in important ways, but that this influence cannot easily be separated from the neighbourhood's own insertion into wider material, social and symbolic power relations across the city and society. I conclude with a discussion of the possible future lines of enquiry that my findings open up.

2.0 The production of an unequal city

Contemporary conditions of development and inequality in Rio de Janeiro are the product of the historical evolution and interactions of power relations at the global, national and city scales. This Chapter begins by offering a brief background to the development of Brazil's social, economic and political structures during the modern era. This shows how the country's path of 'conservative modernisation' produced a highly unequal model that has tended to exclude a large part of the population from the proceeds of growth. While recent years have seen a notable fall in levels of inequality, it remains high by global standards and it is not clear whether recent advances can be sustained beyond the current conjuncture.

The second part of the chapter then turns to Rio de Janeiro, identifying the historical evolution and contemporary dimensions of the city's social relations and inequalities with a particular focus on its favelas. It shows that while Rio's development model in some ways reflects broader national trends, unique factors relating to the city's geography and social relations have given it some important path dependent characteristics. For example, as the city's poor population have primarily been housed in favelas, they are denied important aspects of citizenship often accessible to residents of more regularised form of low-income housing. Rio's physical and social geography also underpins the unique and highly territorialised patterns of security and violence observed in the city. Furthermore, the close proximity of favelas to wealthy areas in some parts of the city has produced both extreme forms of socio-spatial inequality and segregation alongside significant levels of contact between social classes.

The last part of the chapter introduces my case studies of Tuiuti and Asa Branca. These can be seen as inserted in different ways into historical citywide processes of urban development and into contemporary patterns of urban inequality. Tuiuti is a historic favela near the city centre, which has been shaped in changing ways by its proximity to Rio's industrial sector, to formalised state structures, and to the territorial dynamics of Rio's drug wars. Asa Branca, meanwhile is a relatively young favela in the western suburb of Jacarepaguá. Its historical trajectory has been

shaped by its proximity to the elite neighbourhood of Barra da Tijuca, by a historic absence – though in recent years growing presence – of the state, and by forms of self-policing that grew up among favelas in this part of the city. In their different ways then, Tuiuti and Asa Branca reflect broader urban processes and the spatial irregularities these have produced.

2.1 Brazilian political economy and the rise and (slight) fall of inequality

2.1.1 Conservative modernisation

Brazil has long held the unenviable status of being one of the most unequal countries in the world. According to the GINI index, the most widely used indicator of income inequality, Brazilian inequality peaked at 0.63 in 1989 (Ferreira et al. 2008).[5] Although this had fallen to 0.52 by 2012, Brazil remained near the top of the global rankings alongside countries like South Africa, Namibia and several Latin American states (C.I.A.). While the Latin American region as a whole has historically exhibited high levels of inequality and saw these grow across the board during the 1980s and 1990s (see Portes and Roberts 2005, pp. 62-67), Brazil's particular path of 'conservative modernisation' has given it some unique characteristics (Gacitúa-Estanislau and Woolcock 2008, pp. 7-8). This development model and its unwinding during the crisis years of the 1980s and 90s underpin patterns of inequality in Brazil's major cities that persist to this day in spite of recent improvements, and thus deserve to be briefly recounted.

The deep regional imbalances that still characterise Brazil were entrenched by a shift in the country's economic centre of gravity away from the exhausted agricultural lands of the North East and towards the coffee growing region of the South East during the nineteenth century (Skidmore 1999, pp. 82-92). The prosperous economies to the south, in particular the cities of São Paulo and, to a lesser extent, Rio de Janeiro, were the obvious locations for the emergence of an incipient industrial sector which expanded as World Wars I and II and the Great

[5] The GINI index calculates the extent to which the distribution of income among households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution, with an index of 0 representing perfect equality (ie. even distribution of incomes between households), and 100 implying perfect inequality (ie. one household receiving all the income) (World Bank).

Depression interrupted the flow of basic consumer goods from the developed world (Baer 2001, pp. 25-42). Subsequently, the adoption of subsidies and protectionist tariffs by successive governments, both democratic and authoritarian, from the 1950s to the 1970s fuelled a process of Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI), heavily concentrated in the two major urban centres (*ibid*., pp. 47-89). This and population growth in the countryside prompted a dramatic process of urbanisation, mainly fuelled by migration from the poverty-stricken North East to São Paulo and Rio (Skidmore 1999, pp. 138-43).

At the height of the ISI period between 1968 and 1974 national economic growth averaged 10.9% per annum, second only to Japan over the same period and celebrated internationally as an 'economic miracle' (Skidmore 1999, pp. 171-80). Although a growing class of industrial workers benefitted from this growth through rising incomes and an expanding web of labour laws and protections, formal job creation could not keep pace with urban expansion (Baer 2001, pp. 75-84). As a result, a large proportion of new migrants ended up in low-paid, unprotected work in the informal sector, with little or no access to basic services. Memorably, economist Edmar Bacha described Brazil as 'Belíndia', combining in a single state (indeed in a single city like São Paulo or Rio) the small industrial society of Belgium, with the ocean of poverty and informality found in India (Bacha 1974). Similarly, Gacitua-Estanislau and Woolcock (2008, pp. 7-8), having observed trends in social mobility over several decades, argue that Brazil's social relations and model of development make poverty less responsive to economic growth than is the case for most other countries.

2.1.2 Crisis and stagnation: 1980-2002

Between approximately 1980 and 2003 several important changes altered Brazil's economic trajectory and, with it, the dimensions of Brazilian inequality. Notably, population growth and urbanisation slowed (Skidmore 2010, p. 79). After having transferred at high levels from north to south over several decades, regional populations stabilised, while the growth rates of many medium-sized cities

overtook those of Rio and Sao Paulo (Portes and Roberts 2005, p. 55).[6] In the economic realm a crisis unfolded, which eventually brought about the unravelling of the ISI model (Baer 2001, pp. 87-140). First the oil shocks of the 1970s tipped Brazil into a negative balance of payments, which the military regime attempted to resolve through a strategy of "debt-led growth". Sharp rises in interest rates in the early 1980s, triggered by hikes by the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank and Mexico's default in 1982, closed this door. As Brazil entered recession the government imposed austerity at the price of low growth and runaway inflation, not to mention rising inequality and enormous social costs.

Coinciding with a political process of redemocratisation,[7] successive governments attempted to get to grips with inflation through a series of stabilisation plans, combining measures of currency devaluation, wage and price freezes, and, in the later plans, the selling off of public utilities to the private sector. Only in 1994, after a decade and a half of economic instability and low growth, did new President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's *Plano Real* (*Real Plan*, named after the new currency it introduced), finally bring down inflation to manageable levels and stabilise the economy (da Fonseca 1998). In the process, large-scale privatisations and the removal of economic tariffs fundamentally altered the Brazilian economy. Notably, large parts of the industrial sector were destroyed (although it did survive in better condition than those of most of Latin American countries) and new growth came mainly in the service sector (Barros de Castro 2000). Further recessions in 1998-99 and 2002, emanating from the Asian financial crisis and the Argentinian crisis respectively, continued the pattern of instability and the periodic return to low or negative growth. However, the core planks of the *Plano Real* were able to hold firm.

Throughout the long period of economic instability Brazil's employment and class structures also changed dramatically. Although the economy vacillated between

[6] The most rapidly growing regions during the period were in fact the 'new frontiers' of the North (mainly taken up by the Amazon Basin), and the Centre-West, which was opened up by the shift of the capital from Rio to Brasilia in 1960 (Skidmore 2010, p. 79).

[7] It is widely agreed that the 1988 Constitution damaged the ability of Federal Governments to address the inflation crisis by decentralising budgets and introducing new rights and protections to public sector workers (da Fonseca 1998, p. 625).

recession and moderate growth, the impact of this was highly uneven. While the poor, working- and lower-middle classes were steadily hit by growing unemployment, stagnating incomes and rising prices, the wealthy classes were able to capture a larger slice of economic pie (see Portes and Hoffman 2003). One of the most notable features was the downward mobility of laid-off industrial and public sector workers, many of whom were relegated to the class of the 'new poor', forced to scratch out a living in the expanding informal sector (Portes and Roberts 2005, pp. 62-67; Gilbert 1996, pp. 57-73). Nonetheless, although poverty and insecurity rose over the period, by most measures *extreme* poverty fell thanks to gradual improvements in infrastructure and healthcare, and to a lesser extent education, in both rural and urban areas (Ferreira et al. 2008). Meanwhile falling relative consumer prices, declining fertility rates, and increased access to credit among the poor meant that per capita consumption was able to rise in during the 1990s despite poverty (defined as per capita household income of below half the minimum salary) increasing across much of the country (see Torres et al. 2006).

2.1.3 From basket case to BRIC (…and back again?): 2003-2014

Since 2003 the picture has changed dramatically. Between 2003 and 2009 – described by Neri as the "great little decade" – Brazil's economy grew steadily at an average rate of just under 3% per year (Neri 2010). Despite two quarters of negative growth with the onset of global recession in 2008, the Brazilian economy was one of the first to return to growth in the first quarter of 2009 (*ibid*., pp. 22-24). The country's strong economic performance over this period led to its inclusion alongside Russia, India and China in the 'BRIC' group of large emerging economies (Goldman Sachs 2007). While in the first half of the period this growth appeared to be evenly balanced across economic sectors, it became increasingly concentrated in the primary sector and oriented towards trade with China, which has overtaken the United States as Brazil's leading trading partner. While prompting fears of 'primarisation' among Brazilian economists, this was crucial to Brazil's success in, at least initially, weathering the global economic downturn (Barros de Castro 2009; Jenkins 2011).

Many attribute Brazil's economic success during the "great little decade" to the *Partido dos Trabalhadores*' (*PT*) hybrid macro-economic strategy, combining orthodox monetary and fiscal rules with 'neo-developmentalist' social, industrial and infrastructure policies designed to promote domestic production and competitiveness and boost demand among lower-income groups (see Morais and Saad Filho 2012). However, subsequent difficulties suggest that this hybrid model may have only been possible under the favourable global economic context of the mid- to late-2000s. Since 2010 Brazilian growth has slowed in the face of negative global headwinds, with the country falling into a technical recession in 2014, and both inflation and the public debt creeping upwards (Financial Times 2014). This was the economic context to the bitter election campaign of 2014, with the opposition accusing Rousseff of economic mismanagement in the form of excessive stimulus spending, lax inflation targeting, and a lack of market reform (*ibid.*).

Despite the recent slowdown, the strong economic growth overall since 2003 has had dramatic effects on Brazilian society. Unlike the previous period when the proceeds of growth were disproportionately captured by the elite, they now seem to be more evenly distributed across the population. Using the so-called "Brazil criteria" (Scalon and Salata 2012) of income bands divided according to the distribution of household incomes across the population, Neri et al. (2010) argue that the last decade has seen the emergence of a 'new middle class'.[8] The basis of the claim is the fact that between 2003 and 2009 Class C (that between the median and the ninth income decile) increased its both its size and share of national income faster than any other group (see Figures 2 and 3). Meanwhile there has been a comparable reduction in Classes D and E and slower growth in Classes A and B. The problem with such an analysis is that a measure based solely on income fails to capture other key dimensions of class such as labour market position, employment relationship, and degree of autonomy in the workplace, all of which have a strong influence over both quality of life and class identity.[9] Using a more expansive

[8] See Figure 1 for the income thresholds of the different class bands in 2010, when the study was published.

[9] Scalon and Salata (2012) note that these criteria were central to C. Wright Mills' identification of a 'new middle class' in the United States during the first half of the

definition of class, Scalon and Salata (2012) find that there has been little significant change in Brazil's class structure over this period.

Figure 1. Upper and lower limits of income bands (in Brazilian Reais) (Source: Neri et al. 2010, p. 44)

	Inferior	Superior
Class E2	0	420
Class E1	420	705
Class D2	541	802
Class D1	802	1126
Class C2	1126	1888
Class C1	1888	4854
Class B2	4854	4902
Class B1	4902	6329
Class A2	6329	9366
Class A1	9366	0

Figure 2. Changing relative size of income bands 2003-2009 (Source: Neri et al., 2010 p. 44)



twentieth century, with the decline of small business ownership and a huge expansion of administrative and technical white collar occupations.

Figure 3. Changing proportion of national income by income band 2003-2009 (Source: Neri 2010 et al., p. 45)



Even if the transformation of Brazil's social structure has been over-exaggerated, the marked fall in poverty in itself constitutes a significant development. An important contributory factor is the expansion of various social programmes by the Lula (2002-2010) and Rousseff (2010-) administrations. These include most notably *Bolsa Familia* (Family Purse), a conditional cash transfer (CCT) programme which offers stipends to low-income families on condition of school attendance and regular health check-ups (Soares et al. 2010). This may have been decisive in pushing many poor families from Class E into Class D (*ibid*.; Haddad 2009). More importantly for the C1 and C2 bands, formal job creation and a steady rise in the minimum salary have ensured a liveable wage for those in low-paid formal employment (Lavinas 2013). Time will tell whether these trends prove sustainable in the long run and perhaps even lead to a long-term fall in inequality towards international norms. The opposite scenario is that the "great little decade" represents just a temporary upswing and that Brazil will continue on its historical path of high inequality, economic instability, and persistent economic and social exclusion of the poor.

2.2 Favelas and urban inequalities in the *cidade maravilhosa*

2.2.1 Rio de Janeiro's historical development

Brazil's changing social and economic relations have constituted the broad structuring conditions within which Rio de Janeiro's modern development has

occurred. As such Rio displays some similarities to other large Brazilian cities, and indeed, to the extent that similar conditions prevail, to other cities in Latin America and the Global South more broadly. However, the Rio's changing position within Brazil's urban system and its own historical and geographical peculiarities have given its urban development some distinct, path dependent characteristics.[10] This Section will summarise this history before moving on to look the contemporary forms of inequality in the city.

Fischer (2014) notes that collections of shacks inhabited by freed slaves, migrants and other poor and excluded groups had existed in the city long before the "invention of the favela" (Valladares 2005). The appearance, around the turn of the twentieth century, of both the term itself and the belief that it designated a distinct "category of urban pathology" (Fischer 2014, pp. 13-14) resulted in part from the growth of these settlements under the twin impulses of accelerated urbanisation and state-led urban restructuring (see Abreu 1987, pp. 35-69; Ribeiro 1996, pp. 173-76).[11] However, more than this changing reality, it was driven by changing elite perceptions produced by "Brazil's integration into international debates about poverty, sanitation, racial degeneracy and urbanism" (Fischer 2014, pp. 13-14). Indeed it was the view that Rio fell badly short of European aesthetic and hygiene standards, and even lagged behind other cities in the region, that fuelled Mayor Pereira Passos' radical urban reform agenda in the years 1906-1909 (Abreu 1987). This programme of city-centre *haussmanisation* sounded the death knell for the *cortiço* (slum tenement) – the precursor to the favela as the primary form of housing available to Rio's urban poor. However, the wanton displacement of *cortiço* residents simply accelerated the shift towards a path dependent form of urban

[10] By "path dependent" I mean a process that generates increasing returns, thus raising the cost of switching to an alternative path (see Pierson 2000).

[11] The birth of the favela is usually associated with the settlement of the Morro da Providência by soldiers returning from the Canudos conflict in 1897, although it seems that other hillsides had already seen similar processes of settlement by that point (see Valladares 2005, p. 26). Either way, it was the name of "Favella" that the soldiers gave to the hill (after a plant they had seen while campaigning in the Northeast) that by the 1920s had become the generic term used to describe Rio's proliferating informal settlements (*Ibid.*, p. 29).

development that would lead to the steady proliferation of favelas across the expanding city over the coming decades (see Abreu 1987; O'Hare and Barke 2002).

From the years following Passos' transformative administration up until the end of Getúlio Vargas' Estado Novo in 1945 several important dynamics were established that decisively shaped both Rio's urban development and the dimensions of urban citizenship among the lower classes. Despite regular calls among elites for the destruction of favelas, and the development of the comprehensive Agache Plan in 1928 proposing to do just that,[12] favelas had, by this time, become tightly interwoven with the city's political and economic power structures. Local politicians would defend individual favelas from threats of removal in exchange for votes, while landowners with dubious real estate claims would make enormous profits from allowing the growth of informal settlements while at the same time protecting their investments within the country's rickety legal system (see Fischer 2008). The result was that, notwithstanding periodic removal campaigns, favelas were allowed to multiply and expand throughout the period.

Widespread tolerance of this process probably owed as much to the lack of any viable alternative as to the advantages it offered to powerful interest groups. From 1911 onwards, successive governments experimented with varying forms of social housing provision (see Burgos 1998; Globo 2011), however these were never sufficient to cater to the rapidly growing population. In any case, the state's prioritisation of the needs of formally employed industrial and public sector workers meant that even these efforts overwhelmingly excluded the very poor (Fischer 2008, p. 70). In this way housing opportunities were both tied to and reflected Vargas' other civil and social reforms, which increasingly separated a documented working class that was able to access various forms of legal and social protection, from the undocumented poor, who came to resemble refugees in their own country (Fischer 2008).

[12] With Vargas' rise to power in 1930 the Plan was indefinitely shelved, but it nonetheless formed the basis for many subsequent legislative and policy developments (Fischer 2008, p. 45)

Over this period urban growth had also come to exhibit clear *spatial* trends (see Map 1 for reference). The areas to the south of the city centre, and particularly the more distant coastal zones of Copacabana, Ipanema and Leblon, rapidly became the destination of choice for the upper and middle classes, their incorporation into the urban fabric facilitated by developer and state profiteering on rising land values (Abreu 1987, pp. 80-92). During the pre-War years, and more spectacularly thereafter, Rio entrenched its international reputation as the "*cidade maravilhosa*" ("marvellous city"), with the spectacular growth of its tourist industry and surrounding entertainment industries centred on these beachside neighbourhoods. In a symbiotic process, new employment opportunities in the growing service sector led to the appearance of several favelas in the South Zone (Abreu 1987, pp. 96-115). Meanwhile, a much larger expansion of informal settlements was occurring to the north of the city centre, under the guidance of zoning regulations that oriented industry and low-income housing in that direction (*ibid.*). During the 1940s, and especially the 1950s, the urban population grew exponentially as a result of both endogenous population growth and rapidly accelerating migration, particularly from the Brazil's impoverished North East. Despite the increasing prevalence of low-income *loteamentos* (semi-formal subdivisions of land)[13] in peripheral areas and more ambitious social housing policies by a series of populist governments (see Burgos 1998; Abreu 1987, pp. 115-135), the favela population continued to grow drastically, now covering much of the city's North Zone and beginning to act as a constraint to further elite development in the South Zone.

[13] *Loteamentos* were typically built by landowners (sometimes with questionable claims to ownership) in order to profit from increasing demand for low-cost housing. They were often built without authorisation (*loteamentos clandestinos*), or with permission, but in contravention of planning regulations (*loteamentos irregulares*), and paid for with long-term mortgages. See do Lago (2003).

Map 1. Rio's administrative zones and neighbourhoods (Source: IPP)[14]



It was in this context that Brazil's twenty-year military dictatorship came to power in 1964. In the years that both immediately preceded and followed its establishment, dramatic favela removal campaigns were executed, overwhelmingly targeted at the favelas of the South Zone and city centre (for a detailed account see Brum 2012, pp. 50-118). During this period an estimated 139,000 people were evicted from favelas and re-housed in poorly built, often unfinished *conjuntos habitacionais* located in distant areas of the North and West Zones and Jacarepaguá, far from family members, transport links and employment opportunities (Burgos 1998, pp. 34-39).[15] Despite these unprecedented efforts to 'defavelise' (*desfavelisar*) Rio de Janeiro, the campaign had largely ground to a halt by the mid-1970s. Among various contributory factors, the high cost of the programme, the "opening up" of Barra da Tijuca to elite westward expansion, and the mobilisation of favela residents' associations and other organisations against the removals were all significant (Brum 2012, pp. 103-118).[16]

[14] AP1 = Centre; AP2 = South Zone; AP3 = North Zone; AP4 = Jacarepaguá; and AP5 = West Zone.

[15] One such *conjunto habitacional* is the Cidade de Deus (City of God) area in Jacarepaguá, the setting of Paulo Lins' (1997) eponymous book, and film.

[16] The prohibitive cost of removal clearly fits with the concept of path dependence by rewarding inaction, despite the best efforts of the dictatorship to reverse this historical process.

The return of democracy in the subsequent decade led to dramatic changes to institutional, political and economic conditions in Rio, with far reaching social consequences. On the one hand government became more responsive to some of the demands of lower-income groups, particularly in the provision of urban infrastructure. Piecemeal favela urbanisation and land regularisation programmes pursued by populist state Governor Leonel Brizola during the 1980s evolved into the more comprehensive approach epitomised by the *Favela Bairro* programme after 1994 (see Perlman 2010 2010, pp. 273-83; Riley et al. 2001). Over several phases the latter reached 168 favelas and *loteamentos* across Rio, upgrading basic infrastructure and sanitation, and, in later phases, expanding to include social infrastructure like community and health centres, and efforts at land titling (Perlman 2010, pp. 274-83). Such policies seemed to indicate a broad shift in consensus among the political classes away from removal and towards on-site upgrading of favelas. On the other hand, the chronic economic turmoil that the city experienced throughout the 1980s and 90s produced major social dislocation. As industry and the public sector shrank and bouts of hyperinflation struck, parts of the city fell into physical decay, poverty and homelessness increased, and the favela population once again began to rise, swelled by the 'new poor' of laid-off workers (O'Hare and Barke 2002).

This period also witnessed the emergence of novel and insidious threats to the expansive concept of citizenship that social movements had mobilised during the democratic transition. Firstly, political clientelism reasserted itself as a key mechanism connecting low-income populations to the state (see Gay 1994). As many favelas remained excluded from new infrastructure and service development policies they instead sought improvements through personalistic channels, delivering votes to political patrons in exchange for usually small investments that coincided with the electoral cycle. Secondly, the city began to undergo a diffuse process of "socio-political-spatial fragmentation of the urban fabric" (Lopes de Souza 2000) that had further implications for social and political relations. Drug traffickers operating in the city's rapidly growing cocaine trade began to "territorialise" favelas to use as their base of operations. This entrenched a highly

territorialised system of conflict between rival groups and police, generating extraordinary levels of violence and leaving favela residents caught in the crossfire. It also further undermined the functioning of democratic and institutional processes as traffickers gained influence over local representative bodies and interfered in the implementation of public policies (Lopes de Souza 2005). Meanwhile elite residents increasingly "self-segregated" in gated condominiums, interfering in not dissimilar ways with democratic process and the rule of law in these privatised spaces. Remaining urban areas that were unsupervised by armed groups came to be seen as insecure "neutral territories" (Lopes de Souza 2000, pp. 195-96) that urban residents feared to frequent, hastening what Caldeira (Caldeira 2000) described with reference to São Paulo as an "implosion of public life".

During the last ten years or so several new dynamics have shaped Rio's pattern of urban development. The long-term trends that characterised the crisis decades have seen a reversal, with steady economic growth (bolstered by the discovery of large offshore oil fields in 2006) and falling violence. In the political sphere Rio's three tiers of government came into alignment for the first time since the return to democracy in 2008, with Mayor Eduardo Paes and Governor Sérgio Cabral of the centre-right *Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, *PMDB*) aligned nationally with the ruling *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (*PT*). The mega-event-led development strategy embarked upon by this coalition achieved its core objective in 2009 when it was successful in its bid to host the 2016 Olympics.[17] These favourable circumstances prompted much talk of a "turnaround" ("*virada*") in the city's fortunes (Urani and Gambiagi 2011).

However, the social and political consequences of these shifts have been highly ambivalent. Major urban regeneration programmes – including the large port regeneration project *Porto Maravilha*, the Maracanã stadium and Olympic Park developments, and a range of major transport projects – have been accused of overspending on vanity projects while enriching unaccountable private contractors (see Richmond and Garmany, forthcoming). Meanwhile, the flagship favela

[17] This was in addition to the 2014 World Cup, for which Rio was one of eight host cities.

"pacification" policy, aimed at establishing permanent police presence in favelas, has been marred by high-profile abuses, and infrastructure projects in favelas have resulted in widespread, summary evictions (*ibid*.). As such, increased investment and new approaches in areas like transport and security do not seem to have addressed the underlying institutional weaknesses and social inequalities that have made these such explosive political issues. While the protests that swept Brazil in June and July 2013 were national and encompassed a diverse range of grievances, in Rio they were certainly connected to the urban and social impacts of the mega-event-related policies and the perception that these have been used to reproduce, rather than reverse, the city's democratic deficit and historic patterns of inequality.

2.2.2 Housing inequalities

According to the 2010 census the municipality of Rio de Janeiro has a population of 6.3 million, while the greater metropolitan area, taking in thirteen smaller surrounding municipalities, has a population of approximately eleven million (IBGE @Cidades). It is estimated that twenty-two per cent of the population of Rio de Janeiro municipality now resides in a favela,[18] falling to fourteen per cent in the greater metropolitan region. UN data based on the 2000 census calculated that twelve per cent of the population of Rio municipality lived in *conjuntos habitacionais*, and that a further six per cent lived in *loteamentos*, taking the overall population of Rio's informal, semi-formal and social housing settlements to around forty per cent (Perlman 2010a, p. 34). Favelas are widely distributed across the city, including in the wealthy Zona Sul, although the largest concentrations of favela residents and many of the largest favelas and favela complexes are located in the Zona Norte (see Maps 2 and 3). *Loteamentos* are mostly found in peripheral areas in the Zona Oeste (see Map 3), while *conjuntos habitacionais* are found both on the western periphery and in more built up areas (often close to favelas), particularly in the Zona Norte.

[18] Favelas are officially defined by the *Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estadística* (IBGE) as "Collections of at least 51 housing units, most of which lack essential public services, which occupy or have until recently occupied publicly or privately owned land, and are characterised by disordered and dense occupation" (IBGE 2010).

Map 2. Location of favelas by population size (Source: Cavallieri et al. 2007, p. 7)



Map 3. Location of favelas [red] and loteamentos [orange] (Source: Cavallieri et al. 2007, p. 7)



Housing markets in Brazil operate with a high level of informality even for the wealthy (Perlman 2010b, p. 9-10), but for the poor housing informality acts as a major barrier to both social mobility and the full realisation of broader forms of citizenship (Fischer 2008). *Loteamentos* and *conjuntos habitacionais* are in theory

legally owned by their occupants, at the point of purchase or through a private or public mortgage (Perlman 2010a, pp. 31-35). However, illegal subletting and subdivision are rife, often creating doubts about legal ownership and placing tenants in positions of great vulnerability (*ibid.*). By definition, however, the legal status of favelas is most precarious. In Rio favelas usually occupy government, Church or military owned land, although in some cases they are located on private land, often with disputed ownership (Perlman 2010b, p. 12).[19] The lack of formal land title prevents residents from taking out loans against the value of their houses and tends to act as a disincentive to investment. Nonetheless, since the end of the era of mass removals and the return of democracy most favela residents have felt relative security of tenure, creating the conditions for vibrant buyer and rental markets to appear in many favelas (Perlman 2010a, p. 8).

Part of the reason for this is that in piecemeal fashion during the 1980s and in a more structured way during the 1990s, the state has made significant efforts to upgrade and expand service provision to favelas and other low-income neighbourhoods (Perlman, 2010, pp. 274-78; Riley et al. 2001). Major strides have been made in improving access to piped water and drainage so that most of Rio's favelas, if not always their entire populations, have access to these in some form (Neri et al. 2010; Preteceille and Valladares 1999). Although still far from universal, there have also been improvements in the provision of other urban services and infrastructure like waste collection, street lighting and recreational facilities. Quasi-official procedures have grown up around this increased state presence in favelas. For example, under the *Favela Bairro* programme '*Habite-se*' documents are awarded to houses deemed structurally secure and well connected to vital infrastructure networks, which raises their value (*ibid*.). In the case of an agreed sale unofficial housing titles are drawn up in favela residents' associations and signed by the elected residents' association president and other witnesses (ibid., pp. 16-20). Despite this, the parties in fact have no recourse to the law in the absence of *de jure* land ownership.

[19] While some efforts have been made to regularise land ownership by favela communities, in the vast majority of cases it remains unresolved (Perlman 2012, pp. 295-301).

Abramo (2003) identifies the distinguishing features of the urbanisation process and housing market in favelas. In contrast to housing produced by the public or private sectors, both the motivation and "instrumentalisation" of the construction of favela housing is shaped by a "logic of necessity". This means that social networks – both among favela settlers themselves and between them and powerful economic and political actors – play the key role in the appropriation of land and production of the neighbourhood, rather than market or democratic/bureaucratic mechanisms. For these reasons many favela populations remain dominated by those who originally settled them and their descendants, and by kinship and community networks that can be traced back to the settlement process and even, in the case of migrants, to places of origin (de Almeida and D'Andrea 2004; Telles 2004, p. 201). Once established, access to favela housing might then move towards a market logic, albeit one limited by constraints on the realisation of value resulting from lack of legal tenure. However, it continues to be conditioned by core features of weak market power and a continued centrality of social networks (Abramo 2003).

Writing in 2003, Abramo found the favela housing market to have the characteristics of a 'single market' across the city, largely separate from the price structures of formal areas (Abramo 2003, p. 7). The study suggested that the "endogenous logic" of the favela market seemed to be heavily shaped by the fact that purchases were most commonly made by existing residents seeking to remain in the area, and discovered through informal channels of information. On the other hand, within the favela market there were clear variations in price according to factors like location, quality of infrastructure, and level of violence, suggesting a degree of selective mobility of residents between different favelas and between favelas and formal areas. As noted by Cavalcanti (2014), although favelas may not have become meaningfully integrated with the formal urban housing market during the 1980s and 90s, they often did affect the value of surrounding formal housing, on what she calls the 'threshold'. She describes how such areas frequently became devalued as a result of both rising violence and growing stigmatisation of favelas, often permitting wealthier favela residents to purchase these formal properties.

Since Abramo's study in the early 2000s the favela housing market has changed significantly, with growing price disparities between different favelas and rapidly growing buyer and rental markets in some areas. In 2010 average favela house prices varied by up to a factor of ten, from about R$15,000 (US$ 7,500) in the cheapest peripheral favelas, to as much as R$150,000 (US$ 75,000) in admittedly atypical favelas in the South Zone like Vidigal and Santa Marta (Perlman 2010b, p. 16). Such processes are tied to changes in Rio's formal housing market, that seem to be reversing the process identified by Cavalcanti of favela residents expanding into the 'threshold'. Rapidly rising prices in the formal housing sector in central and beachside areas have made favourably located favelas an appealing alternative for some. Meanwhile various state policies, especially pacification but also infrastructure projects, have contributed to rising property values both in favelas and surrounding areas (see Frischtak and Mandel 2012). Meanwhile, the marketisation of previously uncommodified aspects of favela life, for example access to electricity and cable television, is placing a squeeze on the budgets of existing favela residents (Freeman 2012; Fleury 2012). As renters and those on the lowest incomes have been hit by such processes, David Harvey's (2008, p. 12) prediction of favela residents gradually being displaced from valuable areas seems to be coming true. The scale and pace of such processes should not be exaggerated: at present clear signs of gentrification are for the most part limited to favelas in the South Zone, while elsewhere in the city house price increases have been far more modest and countervailed by rising incomes among much of the favela population (Índice FIPE-ZAP; G1 Economia 2013). Nonetheless, after the hiatus of the post-democratisation period, housing seems again to have become a key field in which Rio's urban social and economic inequalities are becoming manifest.

2.2.3 Poverty and employment

Because of their official illegality and their status as the territorial stronghold of Rio's drug traffickers, favelas tend to be seen as a "locus" of exclusion and poverty, where most people are poor and where most of Rio's poor people live (Valladares 2007; Preteceille and Valladares 1999). The weight of the evidence contradicts this assumption. Using census and household income panel data from the 1990s

Preteceille and Valladares developed a measure combining education and income of household head to test the distribution of groups across the city (Preteceille and Valladares 1999, p. 478-81). They found that while favela residents mainly fell into bands below the city average, some twelve per cent were actually above it while in the bottom band they were underrepresented. Furthermore, despite their concentration in the lower bands they didn't form the majority in any of them. This suggests that most poor people in Rio, including a majority of the very poorest, live outside of favelas. More recent research by the *Fundação Getúlio Vargas* (*FGV*) points to a long-term process of convergence between favela and non-favela areas. They found that while absolute poverty in the favelas fell from 18.6% to 15.1% between 1996 and 2008, over the same period it actually grew in the city as whole from 9.6% to 10.2%, accounted for by a rise of 7.9% to 9.4% in non-favela areas. Consequently Rio's GINI score roughly stands at 0.57 whether or not the favelas are included (Neri et al. 2010, p. 7).[20]

Perlman reaches a quite different conclusion based on her study of intergenerational mobility in low-income areas (Perlman 2010a, pp. 220-45). She traced the trajectories of respondents she originally surveyed in the late 1960s and found that those who had remained in favelas had considerably lower scores on a 'socio-economic status' (SES) index than those who had moved to, or always lived in (in ascending order) *loteamentos*, *conjuntos habitacionais* and low-income formal neighbourhoods[21] She concludes that the constraints and stigmatisation that accompany favela life impede social mobility, despite the fact that many of the most able favela residents choose to stay. While favela stigmatisation is certainly an important factor shaping social relations and will be discussed at length in Section 4.2.4, Perlman's choice of case studies may skew her findings somewhat. The favelas in her sample – Nova Brasília in the Complexo do Alemão and Vila Operária in Duque de Caxias – face quite extreme (though certainly not unique) levels of poverty and violence. Meanwhile, the *conjuntos habitacionais* of Guaporé and

[20] The national fall in inequality also means that now Rio is now more unequal than Brazil as a whole.

[21] Perlman's SES index used indicators of years of schooling, household consumption and overcrowding, so not purely a measure of material poverty.

Quitungo seem not to have conditions comparable to so-called 'favelised' areas of social housing such as Cidade de Deus (Zaluar 1985) and Cidade Alta (Brum 2012). It may be that diversity within the categories of 'favela' and '*conjunto habitacional*' is more significant than the differences between them.

Analysis by Pero et al. (2005) may resolve the paradox between the lower social mobility among favela residents found by Perlman and the apparent process of convergence in poverty levels between favelas and non-favela areas. They find that there is indeed a 'favela cost', with favela residents on average earning less than non-favela residents in every part of the city. However, the favela cost follows two separate spatial dynamics. In the South Zone the relative difference is greater as favela residents earn far less than the majority wealthy population. However, in absolute terms they earn considerably more than favela residents in every other region and almost as much as non-favela residents of the most distant parts of the city. Following this pattern, the favela cost falls the further the area is from the city centre, so that at the far edge there are high poverty rates for the whole population and small income differences between favela and non-favela residents. Since the study was conducted, the rise in poverty in the formal city and the growing diversification of the favela category may have furthered this process of convergence.

Employment patterns also reveal diversity between different parts of the city. Contraction of industry and the public sector as a result of economic restructuring during the 1980s and 1990s led to a major transformation in Rio's socio-occupational structure (Tolosa 1996; Ribeiro 2000).[22] Notably the industrial working class and the middle class, defined by Ribeiro as clerical, technical and service workers, shrank, while the number of semi-skilled and unskilled service workers and formally and informally self-employed increased. At the top the professional elite grew slightly and the managerial elite remained constant.

[22] Unlike São Paulo, where Brazil's automobile and other consumer durable industries are concentrated, Rio's industry is based in sectors like metallurgy and shipbuilding that have been vulnerable to technological change. The city has also traditionally had a high level of public sector employment (Ribeiro 2000).

Measuring the distribution of these groups across the city, Ribeiro developed a set of eight area types each with different combinations. For example, in elite areas, like those of the South Zone and Barra da Tijuca in the West Zone, a heavy presence of managerial and professional elites was contrasted with a significant proportion (twenty-nine per cent) of informal workers living in favelas or as domestic workers in residence. The second and third rings of the city in the North Zone contained neighbourhoods dominated by middle-class and working class groups respectively, both of which had seen a flight of elites and a rise in unskilled and semi-skilled workers during the 1980s. "Popular" areas in the outer rings of the North and West Zones contained a majority of semi- and unskilled and informal workers, with a minority of working-class residents. "Peripheral popular" areas, such as the distant suburbs of the North and West, were similar, but with fewer skilled workers and a higher proportion of informal workers. These patterns clearly reflect the broad centre-periphery pattern in the city, blurred to some extent by the downward mobility of middle- and working-class areas during the 1980s and 90s and by socio-occupational polarisation in elite areas.

Measurements of poverty based on indicators of income, employment and occupation do not capture its multiple dimensions, and it is when these are taken into account that some differences between favelas and other low-income neighbourhoods become more clear. For example, using an index based on Sen's capability framework, Kerstenetzky and Santos (2009) find that although residents of Vidigal are not poor in terms of income, housing or infrastructure and services, their capability to achieve desired functionings are limited in a number of ways. These include high levels of fear and constraints on movement due to violence, poor educational provision, low levels of associative participation and feelings of stigmatisation. As will be discussed, these more subtle dimensions of inequality can shape individual identities and life trajectories in fundamental ways.

2.2.4 Race, gender and age inequalities

Clear patterns can be observed in the distribution of racial, gender and age groups between favelas and the formal city and in outcomes between them across a range

of social indicators. The issue of race has become increasingly contentious in Brazil in recent years, crystallising in controversial and heated debates over affirmative action policies in higher education. Brazil's history of miscegenation between indigenous, European and African populations produced a gradation of racial classifications contrasting strongly with the 'one drop rule' of black ancestry and the system of legalised segregation that developed in the United States (Telles 2004, pp. 78-81).

In his seminal work *Casa Grande e Senzala* ('The Master's House and the Slave Hut'), Gilberto Freyre (1967), traced the history of race relations in Brazil and developed his theory of 'racial democracy' to explain the supposed harmonious assimilation of the three main racial groups. Although this idea took root among Brazilian elites and, subsequently, in the popular imagination, academic research and the black rights movement in Brazil have consistently demonstrated the persistence of extreme levels of inequality, which cannot be fully accounted for by social or class differences alone (Cleary 1999). There are regular patterns of inequality between whites and non-whites across fields of income, wealth, education, health and employment, with *pretos* ('blacks') often fairing worse than those in the large intermediate category of *pardos* ('browns') (see for example Telles 2004, pp. 107-38; Lovell 2000).

Race is also linked to patterns of urban segregation. In Rio there is a clear correlation between race and favela residence, with *pretos* and *pardos* comprising 59% of the favela population and 36% of the non-favela population, compared to 41% and 64% respectively for whites (Zaluar 2010, p. 12). Given the considerable variation within the 'favela' and 'non-favela' categories discussed above, this does not tell the whole story. Although the census does not further disaggregate the data Telles has been able to calculate racial composition of different parts of the city at the relatively large scale of districts containing on average 257,000 people (Telles 2004, pp. 198-205).[23] Based on this data he finds that Rio has a relatively low dissimilarity index of 37, white exposure to non-whites of 32 and non-white

[23] This is problematic not least because it groups the South Zone favelas with the wealthy areas, indicating a far higher level of residential integration than is in fact the case

isolation of 50 (*ibid.*, p. 203). In terms of segregation this compares favourably to most other Brazilian cities and is far lower than the level observed in the major U.S. cities.[24] Supporting the evidence of relatively low deliberate racial segregation is the general historical absence of racially discriminatory practices in the housing market by government or the private sector, and the high level of self-reported willingness among whites to have *preto* or *pardo* neighbours (*ibid.*, p. 206). On the other hand the segregation of whites rises dramatically further up the income scale, particularly in the top category which is nearly all white, confirming the importance of socio-economic inequality between racial groups as a driver of residential segregation (*ibid.*, p. 211).

In terms of gender and age there are significant differences in the populations of favela and non-favela areas. In the 2000 census thirty-seven per cent of favela residents were under seventeen compared to twenty-seven per cent of non-favela residents, while just thirteen per cent of the favela of population was aged over fifty, compared to twenty-five per cent of the non-favela population (Pero et al. 2005, p. 5). These differences contribute to material conditions within individual households. Because they are usually in education and also have higher levels of unemployment than older age groups, young people are less likely to be able contribute income to the household, increasing the risk of poverty. Poor elderly people are also likely to be dependent on younger family members or to have to survive exclusively on the minimal state pension with similar consequences. By contrast, elderly people in the wealthier parts of the city are likely to be self-sufficient, living on accumulated savings, incomes from rented properties and private pensions (Pero et al. 2005, pp. 7-8).

Gender distributions across the city present an interesting conundrum. Despite poorer male health and far higher levels of male homicide in the poorer parts of the city, it is actually the areas predominantly or entirely consisting of favelas, like

[24] For example the equivalent figures for New York (the American city with the lowest level of black-white segregation) are: Dissimilarity – 75; white exposure – 6; black isolation 63. In Chicago (the most segregated city) they are: Dissimilarity – 92; white exposure – 4; black isolation 83 (Telles, 2004, p. 203)

Complexo da Maré, Complexo do Alemão and Rocinha, that have the most equal gender distributions (Carneiro 2001, p. 3). This seems to be because wealthier areas have higher life expectancy, leading females to naturally outnumber males.[25] More equal gender distributions are usually associated with higher rates of labour market participation and therefore lower levels of poverty, but clearly this does not apply in Rio. The most obvious reason for this is extreme income and wealth inequalities, which higher levels of labour market participation in poor areas cannot correct for.[26] Another reason is the far higher proportion of female-headed households with dependents in poorer areas (Carneiro 2005, p. 12), which, when combined with income inequality between the genders, contributes significantly to household poverty. Lovell finds that whereas labour market discrimination – lower pay for the same work – is the main cause of inequality higher up the income scale, for low-paid populations it is the segmentation of women into the least valued jobs, particularly in cleaning and domestic service (Lovell 2000).[27]

2.2.5 Security and violence

Latin America consistently exhibits the highest levels of violence in the world outside of conflict zones, and, despite its size and wealth, Brazil's rate of 25 homicides per 100,000 people lies towards the upper end of the regional distribution (UNODC 2013, p. 24).[28] Rio de Janeiro's own homicide rate, after peaking at 63 per 100,000 in 1998 and hovering around 50 for most of the 2000s (Waiselfeisz 2011), had, by 2011, fallen below the national average to 23 (Waiselfeisz 2014). Nonetheless, this was still almost double the rate of 12 per 100,000 in the São Paulo metropolitan region – the result of an even more dramatic fall since the turn of the decade (*ibid.*). A range of factors seem to account for

[25] The exception to this is Barra da Tijuca, which despite its affluence has a far younger population than the South Zone.

[26] Favela populations are far more dependent on employment for their income, while rents and pensions comprise a larger proportion of the incomes of the wealthy (Pero et al. 2005, pp. 7-8; de Melo et al. 2010, p. 6)

[27] On other forms of gender inequality affecting female favela residents see Goldstein 2003.

[28] Although in many ways an inadequate measure (see Jones and Rodgers 2009, p. 2), in this brief overview I use official homicide rates as a proxy for "violence" because it constitutes the most reliable indicator in a region where reporting of crime is extremely low (see Portes and Roberts 2005, pp. 67-70).

varying levels of violence across Brazil and the wider region, encompassing socio-economic conditions, social and racial inequalities, the effectiveness of criminal justice systems, and the structure – and degree of centralisation – of a particular national or urban criminal marketplace (see Portes and Roberts 2005; Kruijt and Koonings 2009).

At the national scale, race, gender and age are all important determinants of vulnerability to violence. Statistics suggest that the dramatic rise in violence in Brazil since the 1980s can almost entirely accounted for by its rise *within* the 15-24 age group (Waiselfeisz 2011). Whereas adult homicides remained stable between 1980 and 2008 at around 21 per 100,000, youth homicides rose from 30 to 53 (*ibid.*, p. 75). As a result, Brazil is now the seventh most dangerous country in the world to be a young person (Waiselfeisz 2014), and homicide is the leading cause of death for 15-24 year old Brazilians (Waiselfeisz 2011, pp. 66). Among victims, and notwithstanding rising rates for women over the same period (see Waiselfeisz 2012), the vast majority, 91%, were male.[29] Meanwhile, a disproportionate number were *preto* or *pardo* (Waiselfeisz 2011, pp. 62).[30] In fact, whereas murders of white youths fell from 39 to 30 per 100,000 between 2002 and 2008, for *pretos* and *pardos* over the same period they rose from 62 to 71 (*ibid.*, pp. 58-60). This means that in 2002 *preto* and *pardo* youths were 58% more likely to be killed than *brancos*, but by 2008 were 134% more likely to be killed (*ibid*.).[31]

Against this wider backdrop, Rio de Janeiro's levels of violence seem closely tied to the transformations accompanying the cocaine trade since the 1980s, and specifically to the system of territorial competition between gangs, police, and,

[29] It should be noted that the perpetrators are overwhelmingly likely to also be male. Furthermore, women suffer high rates of non-deadly physical, sexual and psychological violence (see Waiselfeisz 2012, pp. 21-25).

[30] The *Mapa da Violencia* uses the classifications *branco* (white) and *negro*, which groups the census categories of *preto* (black) and *pardo* (brown).

[31] A crime survey carried out in Rio in 2005-06 found that while 3.6% of white respondents had had family members murdered, the figure rose to 5.7 for *pardos* and 8.5 for *pretos* (Zaluar 2007, pp. 6-10).

more recently, militias that it gave rise to (see Section 4.2.1 below).[32] This dynamic, centred on the city's favelas, exposes parts of the urban population to a high risk of victimisation by armed groups, whether or not they have any involvement in illegal activities. Such vulnerability tends to reach extreme levels in areas with territorially fluid conflicts between rival groups, such as the large favela complexes of Complexo do Alemão and Maré in the mid-2000s, where twenty or more residents per 100,000 died before the age of 30 (Zaluar 2007, pp. 6-10). In the wealthy districts of the Zona Sul, meanwhile, the rate was as low as 4 (*ibid.*).

As will be discussed in Sections 4.2.1 and 6.5, despite the greater risk to residents of favelas and some other low-income territories, variations in dynamics of conflict and territorial control make some such neighbourhoods significantly less dangerous than others, without actually providing their residents with what could be described as meaningful "security". Furthermore, the socio-economic, geographic and racial risk factors associated with violence should not lead us to the conclusion that most young black and brown men from favelas are involved in the drugs trade. Despite the various threats and privations they face and the financial rewards of drug trafficking, studies estimate that no more than 15% of young favela residents become involved in any capacity (Zaluar 2010, p. 20).

2.3 The case studies

As these discussions of Rio's historical development and contemporary social inequalities suggest, contextual conditions vary markedly across the city, including between its different favelas. This section introduces the case studies where my research was conducted, situating them within these historical and geographic contexts. As such, it highlights how the case studies exhibit some of the variations found across Rio de Janeiro and its favelas more generally. As will be discussed in Section 5.4.3, the cases were selected on the basis of a 'relational-comparative' approach that views them as both comparable and interconnected, materially and

[32] Zaluar estimates that 70% of murders committed in Rio are related to the drug trade (Zaluar 2007, p. 15). While other illegal activities and forms of violence not related to the drugs trade are also widespread, Rio's criminal marketplace appears to be less diverse and more territorialised than São Paulo's, for instance (Arias 2006, pp. 170-72).

symbolically, through their integration into common processes. By implication, the similarities and differences between them were expected to be able to reveal important features about the cases themselves and favelas more generally.

The first of my case studies, Tuiuti, is a "historic", centrally-located hillside favela in Rio's inner North Zone, which has been the subject of substantial state intervention in recent decades (see Maps 1 and 4). It also has a long history of dominance by the *Comando Vermelho* (*CV*), Rio's first and largest major drug-trafficking faction. The second, Asa Branca, is a relatively young favela, established on flat forestland in the peripheral suburb of Jacarepaguá in the 1980s (see Maps 1 and 4). It has, until recently, been almost entirely neglected by the state, and although it has no history of drug trafficking, it lies in a region that, over the last decade, has increasingly fallen under the domination of militias.

Map 4. Topographical map of Rio de Janeiro, with locations of Tuiuti (blue dot) and Asa Branca (red dot) (source: IPP)



Despite these clear differences, however, more detailed analysis of these two favelas reveals the limitations of viewing them as fitting into neat categories of "central"/"peripheral", "state presence"/"absence" etc. Instead, as will be argued in Chapter 6, the differences are far more multi-faceted than this and are tied to dynamic urban processes, as well as more stable structural factors. Tuiuti and Asa Branca should not be seen as 'types' of favelas then, but as products of diverse,

interacting processes that combine to produce a far more varied range of outcomes than can be captured by such an approach.

2.3.1 Tuiuti: The hill that tells the story of Rio de Janeiro

Tuiuti (pronounced "Too-ee-oo-chi"), with a population of 5,718 residents (IBGE 2010), is one of Rio's oldest and most centrally located favelas. It lies within the administrative region (RA) of São Cristóvão, north of central Rio, close to its boundaries with the RAs of Benfica and Mangueira (Map 1). The favela covers most of the Morro do Tuiuti (Tuiuti Hill), along with the "Minhocão" ("Big Worm") and low-rise formal housing lots that occupy the lower slopes to the north and east. The *Instituto Pereira Passos* (IPP)[33] treats three different areas of informal housing on the hill as separate favelas – Tuiuti, Parque dos Mineiros and Marechal Jardim. However, they share a single residents' association and are seen by residents as one community with a shared history and identity (Image 1).

Image 1. Aerial photo of Tuiuti, with three sub-neighbourhoods identified (source: UPP Social)



[33] The research institute of the Rio *Prefeitura*.

Physically, the favela is typical of Rio's older hillside favelas. The irregular housing and street layout betray an incremental process of construction, verticalisation and densification of housing over many decades (Images 2 and 3). However, unusually for a densely occupied hillside favela, much of Tuiuti can be traversed by car along the Rua Marechal Jardim (Image 4). Furthermore, unlike the larger and steeper neighbouring favela of Mangueira, the hill has been fully concreted over, with the last wooded area having been cleared by the *Favela Bairro* upgrading programme during the mid-1990s.

Images 2 and 3. Tuiuti's dense and irregular housing pattern[34]

[34] Photographs are my own unless otherwise stated.

Image 4. Rua Marechal Jardim

2.3.1a Origins

Urbanisation of the São Cristóvão region was precipitated by the arrival of the Portuguese monarchy, in flight from Napoleon's invading army, in 1808. By installing the Palácio de São Cristóvão as the new seat of imperial power, the area established itself as an attractive option for aristocratic settlement and earned its nickname of the '*bairro imperial*' ('imperial neighbourhood'). Urbanisation got underway after mid-century, aided by the opening of a train line in 1858, and the new *bonde* (tram) system in 1870. Although the informal occupation of Tuiuti hill began a few decades later, some residents believe that during this period there were *palafitos* (wooden houses on stilts) at the foot of the hill, housing slaves of the royal estate.

The *Instituto Pereira Passos* (IPP) dates the beginning of formal settlement of the hill to 1914, when lots were divided and sold (SABREN). It suggests that informal settlement proceeded thereafter as new arrivals began construction of shacks on unoccupied areas of the hill. Local accounts in Tuiuti suggest earlier origins, however, dating the first wave of settlement to the period of Pereira Passos' urban reforms in 1906-09. According to this version of events, the first arrivals were construction workers who rebuilt much of central Rio, many of them newly arrived

migrants from poor rural areas in the interior of Rio de Janeiro state and neighbouring Minas Gerais. Either way, by the 1920s the favela was well established. One 97-year-old resident recalls arriving on the hill soon afterwards (1923 according to her calculations), having moved from a small town in Minas Gerais at the age of seven with her mother. They built a wooden shack at the end of a mud path where a few were already standing, and beyond which lay open grassland.

This was at the start of an incipient process of industrialisation in Rio de Janeiro that would fundamentally transform São Cristóvão, physically and socially (Abreu 1987). Wealthy Cariocas had already begun to shun São Cristóvão in favour of the new beachside neighbourhoods to the south of the city centre. The sturdy buildings and transport infrastructure they left behind, as well as the proximity of the city port, made São Cristóvão the obvious place for the new small-scale industrial sector to establish itself in the 1930s. Over subsequent decades, and particularly as industry expanded in the post-War years, large factories and warehouses began to dominate the landscape.

2.3.1b Growth, economic decline… and renewal?

The '*bairro industrial*' ('industrial neighbourhod'), as São Cristóvão now became known, was a magnet for low-income employment, benefitting Tuiuti's growing population. As Rio reached its peak rate of urbanisation in the 1950s, with the population growing at a rate of over 4% per year (Perlman 2010, p. 55), Tuiuti and other nearby favelas quickly filled up and favela growth spread northwards. In the late 1940s and 50s governments attempted to respond to the seething housing question with sporadic efforts to construct low-cost *conjuntos habitacionais* (social housing projects). The *Conjunto Mendes de Moraes*, popularly known as the '*Minhocão*' ('Big Worm'), which stands at the north end of Tuiuti Hill, was built in 1948 to house low-income employees of the City Council (Image 5). With its quality building standards and integrated school and leisure areas, it was widely seen as an exemplar of public housing provision. It thus stood out against a backdrop of public housing policies that failed to stem the proliferation of favelas during this period.

Image 5. The Minhocão ("Big Worm") housing project, viewed from street level

In Tuiuti, until the arrival of the '*Favela Bairro*' favela upgrading programme in the 1990s (see Chapter 6), it was residents themselves who gradually constructed the favela's housing and other neighbourhood infrastructure. They incrementally rebuilt their wooden huts with permanent materials and then added additional floors and extensions to accommodate growing families. Meanwhile, they engaged in practices in of '*mutirão*' (collaboration) to clear paths and connect their houses to running water and other utilities. Such improvements were undergirded by São Cristóvão's industrial economy and widespread access to low-paid, but stable employment. However, this advantage began to ebb away in the 1980s as Brazil entered a period of prolonged economic crisis and the area also began to undergo a long-term process of deindustrialisation. It was in this context of economic turmoil that Tuiuti became one of the first favelas to experience violent conflict related to the emerging drug trade, and to fall under the control of the *Comando Vermelho* ("Red Command", *CV*) drug-trafficking faction.

In recent years Tuiuti and São Cristóvão have experienced several important changes. After a long period of economic decline and social dislocation, São Cristóvão began to see some signs of recovery in the middle of the last decade. Since then mega-event related renewal projects in the nearby Maracanã football stadium and the city port have further contributed to increases in formal job creation and rising property prices. Nonetheless, the neighbourhood still has a predominantly working-class population and unemployment remains a problem in

both favela and non-favela areas. A further change was brought about by the pacification of Tuiuti and neighbouring Mangueira in late 2011, driving the drug trafficking gangs that had dominated the two communities for three decades underground. As will be discussed in Section 6.4.1b, a range of other transformations and policy interventions have followed in the wake of pacification, with varying degrees of impact.

2.3.2 Asa Branca and the encroaching city

Asa Branca is a favela of approximately 3,295 residents (IBGE 2010). It is located within the *bairro* (neighbourhood) of Jacarepaguá, at the edge of its boundary with the neighbourhood of Curicica, both of which lie in the administrative region of Jacarepaguá (Maps 1 and 5). As is typical in many of Rio's newer, more peripheral favelas built on flat land, Asa Branca has an relatively orderly layout, with (for the most part) equally sized plots and principal streets that are wide enough to access by car (Images 6 and 7). Nonetheless, the density and irregularity of the housing and prevalence of untreated red bricks clearly mark out the informal character of the settlement process.

Images 6 and 7. Asa Branca's orderly street layout (source: Catalytic Communities)

Asa Branca, as it is defined by the *IPP*, is in fact seen by some (though not all) residents as comprising two separate communities, each of which has its own residents association (Image 8).[35] The larger part of Asa Branca, occupies the southern two-thirds of the favela and about three quarters of the total population. It is subdivided between a large central area and a more recently settled strip running along the Pavuninha River. The smaller part of the favela to the north-east is known as "*Brisa do Mar*" ("Sea Breeze"). It has a separate entrance with a permanent security guard, and noticeably larger and more elaborate houses (Image 9). As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the status of this area and its relationship with the main part of Asa Branca is contested.

[35] A small favela called Abadianas, which sits on the other side of the Avenida Salvador Allende, is regarded as an entirely separate entity.

Image 8. Aerial photo of Asa Branca (source: IPP)

Image 9. Brisa do Mar (source: Catalytic Communities)

2.3.2a Rio's march to the west and the birth of Asa Branca

The region of Jacarepaguá in which Asa Branca is located, has undergone complex and contradictory processes of urbanisation dating back to the 1950s. The natural barriers of the mountainous Tijuca forest and the sea kept the entire Jacarepaguá

region largely isolated from the city of Rio de Janeiro for most of its history. Nonetheless population growth produced some increased demand for housing in the region by the 1950s, prompting some large landowners to sub-divide and sell off their estates to create low-income *loteamentos* like the neighbourhoods of Curicica and Gardênia Azul. In the following decade the neighbourhood of Cidade de Deus was built by the city authorities to re-house residents removed from favelas in the city centre and South Zone in poorly built public housing projects. At the time these different neighbourhoods remained largely disconnected from one another and from the city.

A more sustained process of urbanisation got underway only after 1970, following the construction of a complex system of tunnels and elevated roads that connected Barra da Tijuca[36] to the Zona Sul by car for the first time. By opening this large, undeveloped coastal area to middle-class occupation, population pressures on the older beachside neighbourhoods were eased contributing to the decline of favela removal programmes (Brum 2013, p. 190). Subsequently, Barra da Tijuca underwent an explosive process of elite-oriented development (Image 10). By the turn of the millennium it had been transformed into a saturated mega-neighbourhood covered by high-rise gated condominiums, shopping centres and strip malls. Meanwhile the Jacarepaguá lowlands to the north underwent a symbiotic process of urbanisation. Poor residents from other parts of Rio and other regions of Brazil were attracted by proximity to jobs in Barra's growing service economy, either settling in its semi-formal neighbourhoods or establishing new favelas.

[36] Widely referred to as Barra (pronounced "Ba-ha")

Image 10. The urbanisation of Barra da Tijuca (source: Carvalho Hosken)



Asa Branca itself was formed in this way through a co-ordinated land invasion in 1986.[37] A few years later the residents fought a successful legal battle against a private individual who claimed ownership of the land, but was unable to produce a title. This paved the way for an expansion of the favela in the early 1990s to accommodate the growth of the original population. Around the same time *Brisa do Mar* was subdivided, apparently by settlers with significantly more initial capital for construction, allowing them to build larger and more elaborate houses. The initial establishment and expansion of the favela was accompanied by the creation of a local self-defence group, or "militia". This served to protect settlers from rival groups with designs on the land and to enforce rules within the community, including preventing drug trafficking, in the absence of any police presence (see Section 6.5.2).

A final invasion was carried out in 2001-02, extending Asa Branca along the Pavuninha River to the southwest to incorporate the area now known as the *Quinta dos Infernos* ("Hell's Farmyard"). As shown by Images 11 and 12, this process was highly co-ordinated. It was led by the residents association and involved both

[37] At this time a few formal houses already existed along the Rua Salvador Allende, and the IPP and local accounts suggest a strip of *barracas* (wooden huts) had been built as early as 1981 along the river Pavuninha (SABREN).

existing residents, who claimed plots to rent out or sell on, and some outsiders, who were sold empty plots. Huts were quickly erected with temporary materials, to improve the chances of the initial invasion avoiding immediate removal. Subsequently, sewerage pipes were laid down, the level of the ground was raised to reduce risk of flooding and houses were rebuilt with bricks. Although this area remains the poorest part of Asa Branca, its level of consolidation is now similar to that of the rest of the favela. This entire process of urbanisation was carried out without any efforts by the *Prefeitura* to upgrade the favela.[38]

Image 11. Temporary huts constructed during the 2001-02 invasion (source: Catalytic Communities)

[38] I am grateful to Theresa Williamson of Catalytic Communities for kindly sharing her photos and explaining the process of the 2001-02 invasion to me.

Image 12. Permanent houses in construction and sewage pipes laid following initial invasion (source: Catalytic Communities)

2.3.2b New urbanisation trends in Jacarepaguá

Since the 1990s, and particularly in the last ten years, Jacarepaguá's urbanisation has taken a dramatic change of course. As the territory of Barra da Tijuca has approached saturation point, real estate developers have shifted their attentions north, reclaiming and developing large areas of forest and swampland to construct neighbourhoods of gated condominiums on the Barra model. This process has accelerated since 2009, driven by the planned development of the future Olympic Park on the site of the former *Autódromo Nelson Piquet* racing track (Image 13). This has spurred a ferocious process of development in the area immediate south of Asa Branca: dozens of high-rise condominiums have been built in this area between 2011 and 2013. A short distance to the east, an area of five squared kilometres, the *Centro Metropolitano da Barra*, is being developed into an entirely new district of condominiums, shopping centres, hotels and leisure facilities.

Image 13. Architects' projection of the future Olympic Park (source: Cidade Olímpica)[39]

While these developments show continuity with the established *laissez faire* model of urbanisation in Barra and Jacarepaguá, the state has also become a key player in various ways. One of the key elements of Rio's Olympic bid was the construction of a three-line bus rapid transit (BRT) system, which is centred on the Jacarepaguá. This will provide the region with an integrated public transport system for the first time as well as connecting it to other parts of the city. The general development of the region also seems to lie behind the state's belated "arrival" in Asa Branca at the end of 2012, with the City Council carrying out comprehensive upgrading works. On the other hand, the increased interest of the City Council in Jacarepaguá has also brought negative consequences for favela residents, with many smaller favelas and a few houses along the edge of Asa Branca threatened with removal to make way for BRT routes and Olympics infrastructure.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to situate the discussion of Rio de Janeiro's favelas, and the case studies where my research was conducted, in a broader economic, political and social context. Beginning at the national scale, it has argued that Brazil's model of conservative development has produced a system of social and economic relations characterised by high inequality and widespread poverty, that stands out

[39] Note the faintly visible inclusion of Asa Branca behind the clutch of high-rise condominiums.

even when compared to other semi-peripheral capitalist economies. Although measures of both poverty and inequality began to improve slowly from the early 1990s and more markedly after 2003, they remain formidable challenges and it is not yet clear whether recent advances represent a long-term shift towards a more inclusive growth model, or a temporary upswing permitted by favourable economic and political circumstances.

These national structures have provided the context for Rio de Janeiro's own historical development, although the city's trajectory also displays aspects of path dependence. Specifically, it has been characterised by extreme inequality, both in social and economic conditions and in access to substantive citizenship rights, alongside, in some parts of the city, spatial proximity between wealthy neighbourhoods and favelas. Despite increased government intervention in low-income areas since democratisation and Rio's improving economic performance since the mid-2000s, such inequalities persist, and encompass not only inter-class relations, but also dimensions of race, gender and age. These become manifest in a wide range of domains that have a fundamental bearing on individual quality of life, namely access to adequate housing, public services, opportunities for employment and consumption, and security.

The complex forms of geographical variation produced by Rio de Janeiro's unique process of urban and social development can be seen clearly in the histories of my case studies: the favelas of Tuiuti and Asa Branca. Tuiuti exhibits relative "centrality" in terms of access to public policies, however it suffered economic "peripheralisation" as a result of the deindustrialisation that hit São Cristóvão during the 1980s. Meanwhile it remains highly integrated into the geography of drug-trafficker and police conflict that extends across much of central Rio. Asa Branca, by contrast, began as a "peripheral" favela, entirely neglected by the state, though enjoying a degree of economic centrality owing to its proximity to wealthy Barra da Tijuca. On the other hand, the development of the surrounding region in preparation for the 2016 Olympic Games has increased state presence in and around Asa Branca, though with ambiguous implications. These complex and fluid variations between the case studies encourages us to view them the products of

diverse processes, rather than through a dichotomous lens of centrality and peripherality. These observations inform both the theoretical model of 'urban social complexity' that will be outlined in Chapter 4, and the 'relational-comparative' methodological approach adopted in Chapter 5.

3.0 Cities, neighbourhoods and social networks

Having provided contextual background on Rio de Janeiro and introduced my case studies, this chapter will look at the broader theoretical literature on urban inequalities and neighbourhoods. The starting point for this discussion is Marxian critical urban theory, which offers important insights into what drives urban development and the production of urban inequalities in capitalist societies. While acknowledging this contribution, it is argued that in the contemporary Brazilian metropolis various other contextual factors must also be taken into account, including democratic institutions, violence and processes of urban fragmentation. In particular I suggest that Arias and Goldstein's (2010) concept of 'violent pluralism', which reconceives the role of plural state and non-state violence in democratic Latin America, and Lopes de Souza's (2000) analysis of 'socio-political-spatial fragmentation', which identifies the transformative impact of urban spatial processes over urban social life, help to provide a fuller picture. They also evoke ideas of "complexity" that will be taken up in Chapter 4.

The second part of the chapter drills down to the scale of the neighbourhood to examine different theories about how urban poverty and inequality are produced. While the 'neighbourhood effects' school proposes that deprived neighbourhoods generate influences that constrain the opportunities of their residents in various ways, structuralist accounts like Wacquant's (2008) concept of 'advanced marginality', attribute neighbourhood deprivation to political-economic processes external to the neighbourhood. While the latter provides a far more convincing account, it is argued once again that an argument based entirely on the foundations of political economy is unable to fully capture dynamics in informal and peripheral neighbourhoods in urban Brazil. Instead I argue that processes of social stratification and differentiation in low-income neighbourhoods are more nuanced than Wacquant's model implies and that Feltrán's (2011) approach of seeing these areas as socially diverse and riven with 'frontiers of tension', which residents must navigate in their everyday lives and relationships, offers a more productive approach.

Pursuing these themes of social connections and of agency, the final part of the chapter examines the potential contribution of social network analysis. The concept of the network, particularly when linked to questions of social exchange, provides a valuable analytical tool for exploring relations within the neighbourhood. However, to be of use it must be placed firmly in context. As I argue, social networks are constructed and maintained in particular cultural and spatial contexts, and these conditions, and transformations of them, can serve to alter network structures and dynamics. Networks are also highly sensitive to economic context, because it determines the resources that are made available for maintaining patterns of reciprocity. These insights bring together the *bottom-up* processes of network formation with the *top-down* structural factors emphasised by Wacquant (2008), to show how these interact in sometimes unpredictable ways.

3.1 Capital, the state and the city

3.1.1 Critical urban theory in Global North and South

According to Harvey's (1982; 1986; 2008) foundational account, urbanisation plays a fundamental role in the process of capital accumulation. As the capitalist quest for profitable returns on investment in production rub up against barriers to accumulation, the city provides an outlet for over-accumulated capital. By reconfiguring the built environment capitalists can continue profitably reinvest while at the same time producing infrastructure that ensure the continued circulation of capital over the longer term. However, this obdurate form of 'fixed capital' also produces its own barrier to further accumulation at some point in the future when the requirements of capital have shifted and technological and/or organisational changes have rendered existing infrastructure inefficient. Under the right conditions capitalists may then seek to bring the area back into productive use with a new round of creative destruction. However, this frequently necessitates the displacement of low-income populations who have made use of an existing configuration of the built environment via the process that Harvey describes as 'accumulation by dispossession' (1982). At the wider urban scale (and indeed beyond) the effect is a process of uneven development as the changing demands of capital continually drive it to seek out new transform new territories.

An important question for this model is what role the state plays in the urban circuit of capital accumulation. Harvey argued that what he described as the "human resource complex" – a particular configuration of the urban environment for society's needs at a given moment – could not be seen as "mere reflections of the requirements of accumulation" (Harvey 1982, p. 400). Instead, these are refracted through key state institutions, such as legal and planning systems and subject to the various political, legislative and consultative processes required under representative democracy. Depending on political conditions, the state may thus be able to resist attempts at accumulation by dispossession and provide de-commodified public goods like social housing through taxation of capitalists' profits.

On the other hand, recent decades have seen a shift towards increased state acquiescence to the demands of capital under the pressures of globalisation and insurgent neoliberal ideology. Since the 1980s, urban governance in Western societies has been neoliberalised in various ways, with an increased emphasis on urban global competitiveness, shifts away from the direct provision of social housing, privatisation of utilities and services, and, in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, radical austerity measures (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Peck et al. 2013). Such policies are likely to have disproportionate effects on lower-income urban populations who are more dependent on state-provided housing, services and social benefits and less able to defend themselves through the political process. It is no coincidence that processes of gentrification in many cities in the Global North have accelerated alongside shifts towards neoliberalisation, as states have been disciplined by global capital and increasingly abandoned mechanisms that protect lower-income populations from being displaced from appreciating urban territories.

For the purposes of this thesis, the key question is whether such ideas have the same applicability in urban Latin America as in the cities of the Global North. In fact, around the same time as Marxist ideas were becoming influential in geography departments in the West, Latin American writers working within the framework of dependency theory were also developing models based around capital circulation (Valladares and Coelho 1994). Rapid processes of urbanisation across the region during the 1950s and 60s had led to theories of 'over-urbanisation', whereby poor

migrants settling in informal settlements were viewed as surplus populations who could not be absorbed into the urban economy and as a result remained socially and culturally "marginal" (eg. Hauser 1961). Critics challenged these claims, arguing that in fact migrants and informal populations constituted a mass reserve army of labour who were productive to the functioning of semi-peripheral capitalism (see Nun 1969; Cardoso 1971). In Kowarick's (1980) influential book *A Espoliação Urbana* ("Urban Despoliation"), the state was identified as an active agent in preserving such conditions, to a far greater degree than in the critical literature in the Global North. Not only did Latin American governments fail to raise living standards in poor and informal urban territories, but they also played an active role in repressing organised labour and social movements, thus holding down the cost of reproducing the urban labour force.

Following democratisation and the relatively large amounts of investment directed towards urbanising low-income settlements through programmes like Rio de Janeiro's *Favela Bairro*, claims of urban despoliation lost some of their force. However, persistent gaps in the provision and quality of services for low-income urban populations and trends towards neoliberalisation of urban governance have subsequently reinvigorated forms of analysis centred on the role of capital. Rio de Janeiro has been a privileged site for such approaches in recent years, in the wake of new urban development policies associated with the World Cup and Olympics. Pinpointing the city's first strategic plan in 1993 as a key turning point, Vainer (2011) argues that Rio underwent a shift from a 'managerial' to an 'entrepreneurial' model of governance (Harvey 2001). This had borne fruit by the late-2000s, when a new coalition emerged committed to a policy agenda constructed around the mega-events. For Vainer the latter provided a convenient "emergency", which allowed the authorities to create a 'state of exception' and bypass democratic and legal protocol to carry out contested policies like favela removals. Similarly, Freeman (2012) argues new policies targeted at favelas embody a process of accumulation by dispossession, with favela pacification acting as a "visible hand" protecting elite investments, much like the repressive actions of the military regime in Kowarick's earlier analysis.

These accounts shed light on important links between economic processes, governance trends and the nature of key urban policies. However, they risk simplifying what is in fact a more complex picture. Brazil's multi-tiered system of government means that many important policies coming from the federal level, such as the infrastructure development programme *Programa da Aceleração do Crescimento* ("Programme for the Acceleration of Growth", *PAC*), contain elements that would more appropriately be described as 'neo-developmentalist' (eg. state-led spatial planning, a focus on stimulating effective demand) than 'neoliberal' (Ribeiro and Santos Júnior 2013). Even at the municipal and more local levels there are powerful actors and structures that operate according to different "grammars", including clientelism, corporatism and patrimonialism (*Ibid*.). While the neoliberal part of this equation has gained strength in recent years, it is still obliged to work alongside and often through institutions that may resist, moderate or transform neoliberal aims (see also Richmond and Garmany, forthcoming). These alternative forces may counter the negative impacts of neoliberal policies on low-income communities, but may just as frequently intensify them, as in the case of *PAC* projects that have led to the eviction of large numbers of favela residents (Sanchez and Broudehoux 2013). The key point is that to accurately capture current dynamics analysis must embrace a wider range of factors than an exclusive focus on neoliberalisation, and perhaps even capital accumulation, will permit.

This touches upon a larger point in the international literature on comparative urbanism. Proponents of neoliberalisation theory have been sensitive to the diversity of neoliberal restructuring projects across different national contexts. This is embodied in Brenner and Theodore's proposition that "actually existing neoliberalism" both strays from its ideological commitment to free markets and varies dramatically across different cultural, institutional and political contexts and the path dependent forms of evolution these generate (Brenner and Theodore 2002). However, others have argued that given the diverse urban conditions found outside of the Global North, and of the role of factors like informality, violence and alternative forms of authority in structuring these cities, it may be time to "decentre" analysis from neoliberalisation altogether (see Roy 2009 and 2011;

Parnell and Robinson 2011). While retaining the insights of critical theory and recognition of processes of neoliberalisation in the urban Global South, this entails expanding analysis to acknowledge a wider and more complex range of factors shaping their development.

3.1.2 Democracy and violence in urban Latin America

If neoliberalisation theory is unable to provide a full picture of urban development processes in the Global South, it seems other interpretive lenses are needed to understand the contemporary Latin American city. Since the process of democratisation that swept across much of the region in the 1980s the most influential approaches have tended to focus on democratic institutions, violence and segregation and on the relationships between them. These themes have gained salience for very good reasons. After the mass mobilisations that accompanied democratisation, initial optimism about the potential of representative democracy to tackle deep-rooted social problems over time gave way to widespread disillusionment (Rodgers et al. 2011). Newly democratic states typically saw the emergence of new forms of clientelism and corruption, which undermined the ability of democratic institutions to empower and respond to the needs of citizens, especially the poorest segments of the population. During the same period levels of violence spiralled across the region, giving Latin America the highest homicide rates in the world and having dramatic effects on the social life and spatial form of many of its cities (*Ibid*.). The apparent connection between these different processes prompted a line of argument that became the dominant framework for understanding violence in Latin American cities in the post-democratisation era, and by implication important aspects of urban change over the same period.

The so-called 'democratisation school' (Arias and Goldstein 2010) contends that it is "institutional failure" that is primarily responsible for the rise of violence that has plagued many Latin American countries, and particularly urban areas, since the 1980s. O'Donnell offers what is perhaps the paradigmatic account of this argument (1993). He identified the appearance of 'brown areas' in newly democratic state – that is territories (both urban and rural) of low state penetration, where despite the

formal trappings of democratic governance (such as elections, official elected representatives etc.) power was in fact exercised through personalistic machines. This structure, he argued, had "invaded" democratic and bureaucratic institutions, preventing the state from enforcing its legality and producing a form of "low-intensity citizenship" in which citizens did not expect to meaningfully participate in the political system, or for it to respond to their demands.

Like those involving political representation, the institutions responsible for public security and criminal justice are also widely regarded as having failed. Koonings and Kruijt (1999) argue that the transition to democracy was accompanied by a "democratisation of violence", as the most repressive practices of the authoritarian era were ended at the same time as the region became integrated into the rapidly growing international drugs and arms trades. These coinciding processes facilitated the rise of non-state armed actors that were able to undermine the state's monopoly over the legitimate use of violence in significant parts of the national territory (Koonings and Kruijt 1999, pp. 11-12). The security forces, now usually in the form of armed police rather than the military, retained their sense of impunity and instinct for suppressing "threats", but whereas under military rule these had been directed at political opponents, they now targeted criminal organisations and marginalised groups like young black and brown males, residents of informal neighbourhoods and the homeless. Meanwhile the ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system more generally led many to pursue restitution and to attempt to resolve disputes outside of formal channels, leading to the growth of vigilante groups of various kinds (see Adorno 2002, pp. 102-07).

Clearly many democratic and criminal justice institutions in Latin America today do not function as those who designed them would have hoped, and there is no doubt that key state institutions across the region have little *de facto* presence in some territories. Nonetheless, Arias and Goldstein convincingly argue that "institutional failure" is not the best way to understand these conditions (Arias and Goldstein 2010; Arias 2010). Instead, they argue, violence and contestation are in fact integral to the way that many democratic states function. Violence can be employed as an effective means for different groups, whether within or outside the formally

democratic state, to pursue their political and economic objectives. As they do so they can entrench "fairly static degrees of violence and human rights abuse" that are distinct from both authoritarianism and ideal-type notions of democracy as 'polarchy' – that is, a system of institutions that functions sufficiently to guarantee the civil, legal and political rights of the population, and in turn ensures their ability to participate in those same institutions (Arias and Goldstein 2010, p. 10-13). One important way in which this occurs is through the deployment of extra-legal tactics against criminal or otherwise marginalised groups by democratically elected governments possessing strong political mandates, in "acquiescence to popular opinion that condones "order" outside the parameters of the "law"" (Jones and Rodgers 2009, p. 9). Similarly, local non-state actors and informal organisations may be empowered to represent or provide security for parts of the population outside of formal institutions.

The tendency to view violence in Latin America as evidence of institutional failure, Arias and Goldstein argue, results from two key problems with the approach of the democratisation school. Firstly, they argue that the view of polyarchy as the only form of democracy is based on a "developmentalist fallacy" that sees developing nations as evolving towards classic Western models of liberal or social democracy in spite of the very different social and cultural contexts in which they are set. Secondly, and by extension, they argue that the dominance of political science approaches to the study of democracy, with its almost exclusive focus on institutions, has meant the absence of more grounded anthropological understandings of the ways social relations and democratic processes interact. While analysis of institutions is important, they "must be understood in a much broader political and social context, one that includes the operation, distribution and structure of state and non-state violence in the region" (Arias and Goldstein 2010, p. 19).

3.1.3 Urban fragmentation and the spectre of ungovernability in Rio de Janeiro

The concept of violent pluralism also has important implications for analysis of specifically urban issues, in particular the role of state and non-state actors in

driving intensified violence and segregation in cities like Rio de Janeiro. Lopes de Souza's idea of a "socio-political-spatial fragmentation of the urban fabric" (Lopes de Souza 2000; 2005; 2008) takes forward this theme in illuminating ways. In his account, economic crises, rising crime and violence, and growing environmental problems drove a process of 'metropolitan deconcentration' during the 1980s as both middle-class residents and potential migrants began to shun cities like Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in favour of more "liveable" smaller municipalities. Simultaneously these metropolitan centres underwent a kind of socio-spatial splintering. Armed drug trafficking groups began to "territorialise" informal and low-income settlements while, in a not dissimilar way, elites started to self-segregate in 'fortified enclaves' (Caldeira 2000): gated housing complexes guarded by fortress-like walls, surveillance technologies and ubiquitous private security guards. The failure of ineffective, violent and corrupt police forces to secure the remaining areas of the city meant they came to be seen as "neutral areas" – a kind of no-man's land controlled by no armed group and therefore vulnerable to the activities of common criminals. In these ways fear became a driving force behind various forms of socio-spatial development in Rio de Janeiro and other Latin American cities (Lopes de Souza 2008; Caldeira 2000).

The way these processes have played out in favela territories has been the subject of a large and diverse body of literature and merit further elaboration. While street gangs are prevalent across Latin America, some cities like Rio de Janeiro have seen the emergence of more heavily armed and organisationally sophisticated criminal organisations. As noted by Lopes de Souza, the city's cocaine trade is divided between two relatively autonomous stages or "sub-systems" (Lopes de Souza 2000, pp. 55-73). The import-export-wholesale sub-system is dominated by "*matutos*", who transport drugs across borders and the national territory (Gay 2010), and relies on the acquiescence of many corrupt agents within the state (eg. border police, port authority functionaries, toll road operators). The retail stage, meanwhile, is divided between drug dealing occurring in the formal city (in middle-class apartments, nightclubs etc.) and the highly territorialised drug trade of the trafficking factions based around control of "*bocas de fumo*" (literally "mouths of

smoke"), or drug sale points, in favelas. Despite the diverse actors involved in this highly diffuse and complex system, favela-based drug traffickers are widely perceived as being solely responsible for the drugs trade and the violence it produces.

This disproportionate attention is partly the product of sensationalist media portrayals and populist grandstanding by politicians (see Novaes 2014). But it is also the result of real and visible impacts of drug and police violence on the city and especially its favelas, which have their own distinct dynamics. The first major drug trafficking faction, the *Comando Vermelho* ("Red Command", *CV*), had come to dominate the rapidly growing cocaine trade by the end of the 1980s and had established the favelas as their base of organisation, storage and distribution (Gay 2010, pp. 206-07). These territories offered a number of advantages, such as their impenetrable and therefore defensible physical terrain, and proximity to key supply points and consumer markets (*ibid.*). As such, the *CV* established a model of territorial organisation centred on the favelas that subsequently became generalised across the city (see Penglase 2008). As the *CV* splintered into rival factions over the course of the 1990s, territorialised conflicts over control of *bocas de fumo* intensified, while police also became further embroiled in ongoing conflict with traffickers through the use of violent and largely ineffective counter-insurgency tactics.

These dynamics of territorial contestation had important consequences for urban residents. It became common for gun battles to break out unpredictably in many parts of the city, while in highly contested favelas conflict became perpetual and fluid, infusing daily life with fear and unpredictability (Perlman 2010, pp. 93-146, 165-99). However the presence of drug traffickers also served to both regulate and complicate favela life in more run-of-the-mill ways. In order to ensure coexistence with favela residents traffickers adopted the so-called "good neighbour" policy (Penglase 2008), providing a degree of security for residents by preventing non-trafficking related crimes like theft and domestic abuse and, in some cases, investing in local amenities and services (*ibid*.). In exchange they would expect residents to observe the "*lei do morro*" ("law of the hill"), obliging them to remain

silent about trafficker activities. This implicit bond between traffickers and residents also had the effect of making it difficult for favela residents to visit friends or relatives in areas controlled by rival factions, as they risked being viewed as enemy combatants or informants (Lopes de Souza 2000, pp. 194-95). At the same time, residents remained subject to various forms of state and police surveillance producing what Alvito described as a form of "double panopticism" by both traffickers and agents of the state (Alvito 2000, pp. 106-10).

The influential role of traffickers over favela life led Leeds (1996) to claim that they had become 'parallel powers', who had gained legitimacy among favela populations because they provided basic services – including security and dispute resolution – that the state failed to deliver. However, the nature of trafficker control is more complex than this formula implies and the degree of trafficker "legitimacy" varies markedly from favela to favela. Whereas some favelas are controlled by so-called "*bandidos formados*" ("considerate" or "educated" traffickers), perceived to have the community's interests at heart and to provide residents with a degree of transparency and predictability, in others traffickers are widely regarded as abusing their power (see Zaluar 1985; Machado da Silva and Pereira Leite 2007). However, even in favelas dominated by *bandidos formados*, power is ultimately unaccountable and rules are inconsistently enforced. Arias and Rodrigues (2006) note that traffickers often take advantage of hierarchies and divisions within the local population to maintain their authority, while Penglase (2009) adds that they often favour residents with whom they have close personal relationships. Even when they strive for equanimity, the overriding aims of protecting territory and sustaining the illicit flow of profits ultimately take precedence and these can negatively impact on communities in various ways. For example, in many favelas traffickers exercise *de facto* control over residents' associations, subordinating these bodies, which should supposedly represent the interests of residents, to their own ends. Lopes de Souza, meanwhile, notes that traffickers have frequently impeded the implementation of urban upgrading programmes, where they saw these as threatening their local sovereignty or as presenting opportunities for further financial gain (Lopes de Souza 2005, pp. 11-12).

Rising crime and violence and different forms of territorialisation, alongside other trends – economic stagnation, environmental problems like traffic and pollution, unregulated spatial development (including the appearance of new favelas and rampant property speculation) – have fed a sense among both residents and also many scholars that large semi-peripheral metropolises like Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo have become "ungovernable" (Lopes de Souza 2000, pp. 221-47). While such a view risks fuelling alarmist claims, there are some narrowly analytical ways in which the "ungovernability thesis" has some value. Rather than concentrating solely on supposed failures of *governance*, as in the approach taken by the democratisation school, *governability* refers both to institutions and to what is governed (*ibid*.). In this way it helps to reveal that in fact the lines between governance and what is governed have in many ways become hopelessly blurred, for example in the case of police acting as militias, or in the role played by clientelist politicians in articulating the state in favelas (*ibid*., pp. 241-42). More generally it suggests that it is not only that institutions are falling short of meeting the challenges they face, but also that aspects of the social, political and spatial configuration of the contemporary semi-peripheral metropolis defy simple solutions.

An advantage of Lopes de Souza's overall approach is that it partially complements the view of critical urban theory by recognising the key role of economic inequality in driving urban and social development. However, it also acknowledges that other factors – such as institutions, social groupings and urban space itself – also exercise agency. This observation, he argues, is particularly relevant to the semi-peripheral metropolis and makes "economistic" analyses that assert the homogenising effects of globalisation – such as 'global' or 'world city' models – unsuited to such contexts (Lopes de Souza, pp. 218-19). While cities in the core countries may have seen the emergence of a 'new poverty' and rising crime during the 1980s and 90s, the problem of territorialisation of large areas by armed groups in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo represents a qualitatively different phenomenon. This is partly the result of the lesser capacity of semi-peripheral states to mitigate poverty and exclusion (Lopes de Souza 2000, p. 219), but is also because in a given national or urban

context conflict between armed groups, sectors of society and the state may escalate through "positive feedbacks" that assume their own autonomous dynamics (*ibid.*, p. 48). More generally, he argues that after surpassing a certain size a semi-peripheral metropolis may undergo "bifurcations" or "qualitative ruptures", giving rise to "contingent and unforeseen elements" that cannot be analysed with the same tools as either the "Northern" city or smaller cities in the same national space (Lopes de Souza 2000, p. 31). These insights highlight the potential of complexity theory to shed light on important processes in contemporary Rio de Janeiro – a theme I will explore in depth in Chapter 4.

3.2 Neighbourhoods and urban inequality

3.2.1 Neighbourhood effects research at the crossroads

Having stressed the important overarching differences that characterise the semi-peripheral metropolis, this section will explore the literature on *neighbourhoods* in both the Global North and Latin America. Of course urban neighbourhoods and their populations cannot be neatly bounded in any context (see Section 5.4.2) and, as indicated in Chapter 2, low-income urban areas and especially favelas in Brazil have physical, social and symbolic characteristics that depart radically from the conditions in sites where much of the theoretical literature on neighbourhoods has emerged (typically the United States and to a lesser extent Western Europe). Nonetheless it is argued that the concept of "neighbourhood" retains analytical value independent of context in its ability to highlight spatially varying densities of relations, practices and forms of collective behaviour (Suttles 1972). In any case, instances where conceptualisation of the neighbourhood fail to "translate" to Brazil will be highlighted throughout.

According to Small et al. (2012) the neighbourhood was "rediscovered" by American sociologists in the late 1980s. Neighbourhoods had been a central object of analysis in the Chicago School's model of 'ecological succession', but were increasingly neglected after the 1960s as structuralist models of urban inequality gained ascendancy (see Savage et al. 2003). The trigger for this rediscovery was William Julius Wilson's (1987) influential book *The Truly Disadvantaged*, in which he argued

that deindustrialisation and the departure of middle-class black families from US inner cities was producing a 'new poverty' in which a majority of residents in some particularly affected neighbourhoods had become isolated from the labour market and "mainstream" social norms. Subsequently, a generation of researchers in both the US and Europe embarked on the challenge of identifying "neighbourhood effects": the theorised impact of the neighbourhood over residents' outcomes independent of any other individual or collective attributes they might have (see Sampson et al. 1997). For the most part this research effort was undertaken by quantitative social scientists who developed various statistical approaches for measuring outcomes like employment, health, education and crime. However, it has also included qualitative and theoretical contributions and has influenced policy in the form of often controversial housing dispersal programmes (Slater 2012).

Despite the volume and influence of neighbourhood effects research, however, it has ultimately failed to convincingly substantiate its core proposition that "where you live affects your life chances". Indeed, according to Small and Feldman (2012) neighbourhood effects research has reached a "crossroads" and must address some fundamental shortcomings if it is have any continued relevance. This comes in the wake of the 'Moving to Opportunity' (MTO) housing mobility programme in the United States (see de Souza Briggs et al 2010), which threw into doubt many widely held assumptions. As part of MTO residents of high poverty neighbourhoods in five American cities were given housing vouchers so they could move to areas with lower levels of poverty. Both 'movers' and 'stayers' were subsequently monitored so their outcomes across a range of indicators – (1) 'economic self-sufficiency'; (2) mental health; (3) physical health; (4) education; and (5) and 'risky behaviour' – could be measured and compared. As such, it is widely regarded to be the closest approximation of a randomised control trial to test for the existence of neighbourhood effects. Contrary to expectations, the results were highly ambiguous. While there were clear improvements in movers' reported satisfaction with the neighbourhood and psychological wellbeing, for example, there was very little difference in educational outcomes. Furthermore, while risky behaviour and

physical health among females improved, among men they actually worsened (de Souza Briggs et al. 2010).

For Small and Feldman (2011) the surprise that greeted these results reflects the fundamental methodological and theoretical weaknesses that have characterised neighbourhood effects research. A first problem they identify is a weak understanding of 'heterogeneity' in deprived neighbourhoods. Rather than being homogeneous, the populations of these areas are extremely diverse and individual-level attributes are therefore likely to mediate any effects of the neighbourhood in different ways. This may mean variation according to ascriptive characteristics like social class, gender, ethnicity/race or age, or in terms of social circumstances, such as conditions of employment, income, housing or family structure. Small and Feldman (2011) argue that the failure to perceive these factors as important reflects the disproportionate weight of quantitative research in the neighbourhood effects literature and a mindset of proving or disproving the importance of the neighbourhood, rather than of asking *under what circumstances* it might be important. As such they call for more input from ethnographic researchers both in substantiating or rejecting the claims of quantitative studies and in generating hypotheses in the first place.

Moving To Opportunity not only highlighted the heterogeneity of low-income neighbourhoods, but also raised questions about causality. Quantitative studies have struggled to demonstrate a causal relationship, as opposed to simple correlation, between the neighbourhood and resident outcomes. A major issue in this regard is that residential sorting through the housing market tends to concentrate people with shared characteristics into particular neighbourhoods, making it more or less impossible to separate out the neighbourhood from those other factors (see Section 3.2.1). It is thus necessary to propose the *mechanism(s)* by which the neighbourhood may be argued to influence the individual. Wilson's (1987) original interest in the neighbourhood, for example, was linked to a concern about the increasing isolation of inner-city residents' social networks, particularly from the labour market. However, the subsequent neighbourhood effects literature has added a great many more potential mechanisms to the discussion, creating

significant analytical confusion in the process. These problems can be seen clearly in fourfold typology of mechanisms proposed by Galster (2011), one of the leading proponents of neighbourhood effects.

Galster's first group are labelled 'environmental' mechanisms, and consist of those that supposedly inhere in the physical *environment* of the neighbourhood, rather than in its internal or external *social relations*. The classic formulation of an environmental mechanism is Wilson and Kelling's (1982) 'broken windows' theory. This posits that signs of physical deterioration and neglect such as broken windows, graffiti and litter, serve to reduce residents' sense of influence over the neighbourhood environment and therefore remove an important social barrier to various forms of anti-social and criminal behaviour. However, this claim has been strongly disputed by those who argue that environmental degradation is a symptom rather than a cause of 'social disorganisation' in the neighbourhood (eg. Sampson 2012, pp. 126-29; Thatcher 2004, p. 381).

At the opposite end of the spectrum, two of Galster's groups of mechanisms – which he labels as 'geographic' (though would perhaps more appropriately be described as economic) and 'institutional' – might better be described as supra-neighbourhood processes whose fundamental dynamics operate beyond the local scale. Thus, for example, the absence of locally available low-skilled jobs can be seen to disadvantage residents in the form of higher unemployment, while a lack of resources and/or competence within local public services bears directly on health and education (among other) outcomes. Such observations seem to counter the critique that the neighbourhood effects literature tends to neglect factors external to the neighbourhood. However, Galster does so in an unsatisfactory way. By using what is essentially an equilibrium model (Kain's (1968) spatial mismatch hypothesis) he implies that the source of economic marginalisation (in aggregate) of a geographically defined population is a geographical disruption of the smooth functioning of the supply and demand of labour, rather than that population's subordinate position within the labour market as a whole (see Slater 2013). Similarly, the reference to public service failure does not address underlying causes in the US context, in particular "white flight", gerrymandering of district boundaries,

institutional discrimination, and, of course, economic inequality, which leads to large spatial disparities in the tax base. In both cases the city only emerges as an inconvenient afterthought in an approach that is determined to find the causes of neighbourhood disadvantage within the neighbourhood itself.

On the other hand, a final group of mechanisms which Galster labels as 'social-interactive' and which encompasses various aspects of informal social organisation and interaction, do operate at the scale of the neighbourhood and can conceivably be said to contribute to individual and collective outcomes. This includes models based around the idea of *collective socialisation* – the establishment and enforcement of norms through social pressures; and those based on analysis of *social networks* – the ties that connect individuals and the ways in which resources, information and knowledge circulate through them. Wilson's (1987) concern with contacts in the labour market constitutes one example of such a mechanism. Sampson et al.'s (1997) concept of *collective efficacy* – whereby residents collectively assume responsibility for preserving neighbourhood security and other shared aims – is another. Such models do not reject the role of outside influences, but rather see local social dynamics as having the potential to exercise an intermediate influence over individual and collective outcomes. These ideas are of substantial importance to the question of neighbourhoods and urban inequality. However, they open up other large bodies of literature that deal with these issues beyond the contextual setting of the low-income urban neighbourhood, and are thus taken up in Section 3.3.

3.2.2 Social structure and the state in marginalised neighbourhoods

Critics of neighbourhood effects have typically argued that outcomes in low-income neighbourhoods are heavily over-determined by structural political and economic factors. Slater (2013), for example, draws on the tools of critical urban theory to turn the slogan of neighbourhood effects on its head and argue that "your life chances affect where you live". That is to say that neighbourhoods are homogenised by the mechanism of residential sorting, making them primarily manifestations, rather than generators, of social inequality. By extension, Slater

argues that structural mechanisms which serve to reproduce class and racial inequalities, such as educational and labour market exclusion and the unequal distribution of state resources, rather than those inherently tied to urban space, should be seen as paramount (Slater 2013, pp. 378-82).

However, it is Wacquant (2008; 2010) who offers the most developed and influential structuralist account of urban deprivation in post-industrial societies. At the heart of his analysis lies the evolution of capitalism in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, which, he argues, unleashed four interlinked processes that have had far-reaching consequences for low-income neighbourhoods (Wacquant 2008, pp. 262-72). The first of these is a *macrosocial* dynamic of occupational dualisation, as the production of a large number of high-skilled, knowledge-intensive professions, coincided with a decline of industrial jobs, only partly replaced by deskilled service jobs. Secondly, and related to this, there has been an *economic* dynamic of a 'desocialisation of labour', as labour market change and the decline of working-class bargaining power have led to deteriorating pay and conditions at the bottom and rising inequality overall. Thirdly, there has been a *political* dynamic of retrenchment and 'disarticulation' of the welfare state, particularly through the steady downgrading of social security. Finally, there has been a *spatial* dynamic whereby poverty, which was formerly distributed across working-class districts, has become concentrated in residualised "repositories" for the most excluded, leading to both a weakening of internal bonds within these neighbourhoods and an intensified form of "territorial stigmatisation" in the way they are viewed by wider society (also Wacquant et al. 2014). Together these dynamics constitute what Wacquant labels 'advanced marginality' – a new form of socio-economic and symbolic exclusion, not fully captured by Wilson's (1987) more restrictive idea of a 'new poverty' in advanced capitalist economies.

Subsequently, Wacquant (2010) has argued that advanced marginality also has important consequences for the way the state treats residents of marginalised neighbourhoods. Given its precarity and declining access to social protection the post-industrial working class now needs to be "managed" by other means. For Wacquant this involves a shift of resources and emphasis from functions associated

with the “left hand” of the state – such as public services, welfare, protective regulation – to those of the “right” – responsible for enforcing economic discipline through budget cuts and deregulation. In particular, it involves the strengthening of the penal arm of the state and its fusion with the means of economic disciplining. Under this dynamic the increased spatial concentration and state penalisation of marginalised populations feed rising ‘territorial stigmatisation’ of marginalised neighbourhoods, and this is in turn used by populist politicians to justify intensified policing of those same neighbourhoods and their populations.

For Wacquant, territorial stigma also leads to a transformation of the social relations of these neighbourhoods as residents are forced to choose among a limited range of possible coping strategies for dealing with their collective exclusion (see Wacquant et al. 2014). These can broadly be divided into strategies based on either “submission” – accepting the basis of stigma, but seeking to distance oneself from its reach – or “recalcitrance”, whereby stigma is directly rejected or reappropriated in some way. The net result, Wacquant argues, is an internal social fragmentation of the neighbourhood, as residents seek to distance themselves from one another and/or adopt different individualised strategies for managing the burden of their collective stigmatisation.

Taken together Wacquant’s analyses offer a useful macro-level guide for interpreting broad changes in urban social relations and state restructuring in recent decades, and in particular of their implications for those towards the bottom of the social ladder. However, the model runs into trouble when applied at a more local level. As portrayed by Wacquant, urban change appears largely to be a manifestation of interlinked macrosocial, economic and institutional processes, rather than being imbricated in them itself. This is visible in the way his spatial dynamic appears to be entirely causally dependent on the others, with the post-industrial working class “fixed” in space and “stigmatised” by society. As a result, the unevenness and continual interactions of key processes like capital circulation, political contestation, and social and cultural change *with* urban space are lost. This also seems to lead Wacquant to underplay both heterogeneity *within* low-income neighbourhoods (a shortcoming his analysis shares with the neighbourhood effects

school, despite their fundamental differences in other respects) and variation *between* low-income neighbourhoods according to their differentiated socio-spatial relationships to the city.[40]

Perhaps Wacquant's powerful macro-structuralist model of urban inequality would be strengthened if were supplemented by a more bottom-up focus on how social networks and organisational and cultural innovations respond to, and to some extent may also contribute to, urban social change. For example, Smith (2010) identifies important differences in the way black and Mexican communities in inner-city Chicago react to labour market exclusion as a result of different historically generated cultural practices (see Section 3.3.1). Caldeira (2009), meanwhile, makes a powerful case for acknowledging the agency of marginalised urban populations. In São Paulo's peripheries, she argues, although the decline of the Fordist mode of production has undermined a culture and identity based on labour, these have become articulated in new ways, such as through social movements, NGOs, religious organisations, and various emergent forms of cultural expression. The practices of these actors are not captured by analyses based entirely on macrosocial, economic and institutional factors, but, for Caldeira, to ignore them "is to miss the strength of their inventiveness and the signs of emergent articulations that take them (and us) beyond the entrapments of advanced marginality" (Caldeira 2009, p. 852).

Caldeira's critique also highlights the question of how far Wacquant's analysis applies across different national contexts. A particular strength of his model is its sensitivity to the role of distinctive national political and social configurations. Indeed *Urban Outcasts* is primarily framed as a critique of fashionable claims of "transatlantic convergence" in patterns of urban exclusion, and emphasises important differences between the United States and France – in particular the

[40] Caldeira may be right in identifying Wacquant's methodological approach – of generalising from two case studies of deprived neighbourhoods (in Chicago and Paris respectively) based on research carried out in the late 1980s – as the reason for his dubious claims of uniformity. In this way he seems to commit the same offence of which he accuses others: of judging all low-income neighbourhoods on the basis of seemingly extreme and probably unrepresentative examples (Caldeira 2009, p. 850).

former's legacy of racial segregation and the latter's surviving welfare state institutions. Nonetheless, he argues that the "generic mechanisms" that produce advanced marginality are transnational and can be understood "once one takes caution to embed them in the historical matrix of class, state and space characteristic of each society at a given epoch" (Wacquant 2008a, p. 2). This, he argues, also applies in the Global South (Wacquant 2008a, p. 286). Indeed he has suggested that Brazil represents a "living laboratory" for observing advanced marginality and the penalisation of poverty. This is because, "unnoticed features of punitive containment emerge fully into view as it travels from the First to the Second World, for there it can unfold without the strictures usually entailed by a bureaucratic state operating according to minimal legal standards and by the institutionalization of bourgeois conceptions of physical integrity and personal rights" (Wacquant 2008b, p. 58).

Wacquant's ideas certainly have important contributions to make to the study of urban inequality in Latin America. Auyero (1997) notes that the combined focus on the role of labour market change, state policies and symbolic denigration have great relevance in the region. Müller (2011), meanwhile, echoes Wacquant's observation of intensified policing of urban centres, dramatic increases in incarceration rates and harsher sentencing across Latin America. However, there are important conjunctural differences that also indicate the limitations of the approach. Perlman identifies the key ones with regard to Rio de Janeiro and its favelas (Perlman 2010a, pp. 158-61). While inequality in the city remains extremely high, it has not grown since the early 1990s. Furthermore, over that period, and particularly the last decade, average incomes, rates of formal employment, and state-provided social protections have actually grown, albeit from much lower levels than found in the Global North. As a result of these trends the favela population has become more, not less, socially diverse, and residential mobility into and out of favelas has grown, running counter to the idea of "residential fixation". On the other hand favelas are the subject of intense stigmatisation, though this appears to be deeply historically

embedded rather than a novel phenomenon (see Brum 2013).[41] Müller makes a similar point with regard to the criminal justice system, which in Latin America always functioned quite clearly as a means of controlling subaltern groups (Müller 2011, pp. 63-64). These differences relating to contemporary conditions in the semi-peripheral metropolis suggest that while some parallels can clearly be drawn, it may not be appropriate to view them simply as different manifestations of the same "generic mechanisms".

In light of these issues, Feltrán (2011) offers an alternative approach that retains Wacquant's insights about the macrosocial and economic drivers of current transformations while placing the apparent contradictions of Brazil's current conjuncture at the heart of the analysis. Based on research in a peripheral neighbourhood in São Paulo, Feltrán (2011) identifies long-term trends of deindustrialisation, labour market diversification and an "expansion of the world of crime" as having a transformative impact over the social structure and social life of the neighbourhood. Until the rupture of the 1980s and 90s, family and community life were built around low-paid, but secure male employment, gendered household divisions of labour, and gradual improvements in living conditions that underpinned the widely held belief that children would grow up to be better off than their parents (Feltrán 2011, pp. 96-97). Subsequently, however, deindustrialisation, the diversification of the labour market and the "expansion of the world of crime" have led to less predictable and more individualised life trajectories. While some have successfully transitioned into São Paulo's formal service economy, others have been condemned to low-paid casual or informal work or unemployment. Meanwhile the precipitous growth of the illicit and illegal economies, in everything from the black market retail of electronics to car theft and drug trafficking, have created various new potential sources of revenue for those in situations of economic precarity.

The "expansion of the world of crime", then, has brought the activities of *bandidos* (criminals) and other illegal actors closer to the world of the *trabalhador* (worker) (see next section). This has produced various local "figurations": ranging from

[41] What could be described as novel is a shift in the *content* of that stigma from perceptions of poverty and backwardness to an overriding association with violence (eg. Novaes 2014).

households that have managed to retain licit sources of income and to avoid close contact with criminal actors at one end, to those who become drawn into the activities of *bandidos* at the other. The relations of these households with both the world of formal work and with the state (and particularly the police) are constituted as 'frontiers of tension' that serve to both separate the periphery from the centre, and, at the same time, regulate the necessary flows between them. They also produce tensions in the relationships between neighbours and even family members caught up in these different economic circuits and social realms. These frontiers do not "fragment" the population of the periphery in the straightforward way implied by Bourdieu's model of territorial stigmatisation, although stigma is certainly implicated in these processes. Rather they produce both divisions and dependencies between different residents, resulting in everyday complications and risks that must be navigated with great care.

3.2.3 Stratification and boundaries at Brazil's urban periphery

Feltrán's view of peripheries and favelas not as "repositories" of the postindustrial poor, but as socially diverse territories riven by frontiers of tension raises important questions about new forms of stratification in Brazilian cities and the symbolic relationships that accompany them. An appropriate starting point for examining this issue is offered by Bourdieu's important contribution to the study of class culture and social reproduction.[42] According to Bourdieu individuals internalise the class structure through the construction of a '*habitus*' – a set of "dispositions" and "generative classificatory schemes" cemented over time through exposure to others of the same class, and in relational opposition to those of other classes (Bourdieu 2000, pp. 165-71). Such processes can be facilitated by the construction of more socially homogeneous institutional and spatial contexts (like the school or the neighbourhood) that incubate the process of social reproduction (see Bourdieu 1993, pp. 123-26).[43] An example of this is the private school system, which operates as a site of elite social reproduction infusing high levels of cultural capital that can

[42] This is particularly appropriate given the influence of Bourdieu on Wacquant's own work (Wacquant 2008, pp .9-10).

[43] Bourdieu emphasises the predominance of social (ie. institutional) over physical "space" in this process (quoted in Wacquant 2008, p. 9).

then be converted into economic capital upon pupils' entry to the world of work (Bourdieu 1985, pp. 24-26).

Bourdieu's insights were developed in the French context, where deeply institutionalised and finely graded class differences could be linked to the aesthetic tastes of the members of different class fractions, thus revealing their varied possession of 'cultural capital'. In Brazil, however, there are issues that complicate the stratightforward application of the model. Goldstein (2003) finds Bourdieu useful for identifying processes of social distinction between the privately educated elite and informal poor. This is symbolised by an example she provides of a domestic maid whose patron gives her the opportunity to attend adult education classes. However, she fails to take advantage of this opportunity because she spends an unnecessary amount of time obsessing about her handwriting (Goldstein 2003, pp. 90-93). The ridicule the family subject her to fits with Bourdieu's notion of 'symbolic violence' as characterising the relationship between those possessing higher and lower levels of cultural capital.

However, there are distinctive aspects of such relationships that the idea of cultural capital does not fully capture and which relate to class power and the historic development of the Brazilian social order, with its historical roots in slavery. In spite of Brazil's formal system of democratic equality, DaMatta (1991) highlights important authoritarian dimensions that underpin social relations. These are revealed by the "ritual use" of the phrase "Do you know who you're talking to?", which is mobilised periodically by those of high status to reassert their position over others (DaMatta 1991, pp. 137-97). Whereas in the United States the question "Who do you think you are?" would be used to reassert equality in the face of snobbery, in Brazil it has the exact opposite function – of reminding the recipient of their ultimate inferiority within the social system (*Ibid.*, p. 147). If the notion of cultural capital can be mobilised to analyse class relations in Brazil, it must therefore be placed alongside these more direct and authoritarian means by which hierarchy is continually reconstituted.

Another question about the applicability of Bourdieu's ideas to Brazil concerns social distinctions between "fractions" of the working classes. Despite the size and diversity of this group, the institutional structures (eg. schools, jobs, housing markets) for reproducing cultural differences within it are weakly developed, meaning that intergenerational transmission of higher and lower levels of cultural capital is less straightforward than in the context of a country like France.[44] This issue has received little attention in the literature on social distinctions within favelas and peripheries in urban Brazil and deserves greater exploration, particularly as rising incomes among Brazil's lower classes have led some to detect the emergence of a 'new middle class' in Brazil (Neri et al. 2010). Indeed there are also signs of rising educational attainment and socio-occupational diversity within the traditional working class, which may be expected to shape socio-cultural stratification in these neighbourhoods in new ways (see Perlman 2010, pp. 254-55; Valladares 2010). At present, however, it seems difficult to sustain the claim that distinctions at the urban periphery are primarily the product of clearly structured and socially reproducible differences in levels of cultural capital. Instead it may be more helpful to conceive these as the result of broader hierarchies of *status* that incorporate cultural capital, but also rest on other vectors of differentiation.

Lamont's concept of 'boundary work', to identify the ways in which group identities form through in-group/out-group comparisons, is useful for bringing these ideas together (Lamont 2000; Lamont and Mólnar 2002). Such a conception has the benefit that while it can encompass the kinds of class-based cultural differences stressed by Bourdieu, it also allows for other bases of identification, such as race/ethnicity, religion or gender. It also connects processes of differentiation to concrete cultural and historical context, in contrast to Bourdieu's largely context-independent conception of class stratification. Thus, for example, in a large qualitative study, Lamont (2000) found that white working-class Americans often drew on racial stereotypes to draw boundaries between themselves and black American workers by emphasising their commitment to cultural tropes of hard work and "playing by the rules". At the same time they would also distinguish themselves

[44] I am grateful to Eduardo Marques for this observation.

from the professional middle classes with reference to moral criteria, such as dedication to family or religion, rather than on the basis socio-economic grounds, which would place them in an inferior position. In a different example, Smith (2005) explains how black job seekers in inner-city Chicago would distinguish themselves from those they perceived as exhibiting "ghetto" behaviour, understood as a sign of social inferiority. In these examples, while class and race became tools for differentiation, these were mobilised through reference to specific moral, cultural and/or ideological reference points specific to a particular society.

In Brazil's favelas and urban peripheries residents also draw distinctions based on culturally specific criteria. Arias and Rodrigues (2006), for example, identify a range of ideal-type personifications that are either socially esteemed or denigrated within favelas and which shape the differential treatment individuals receive from other members of the community. So, for example, "*mulheres de idade*" (elderly women) and "*pais de família*" (male heads of families) may be afforded an elevated status, "*bêbados*" (drunks), "*viciados*" (addicts), and "*vagabundos*" (layabouts) are likely to be stigmatised and excluded in various ways. The most prominent distinction of this kind, however, is that between the *bandido* (criminal) and the *trabalhador* (worker). *Bandidos* are defined as those who have made a decision to enter the drugs trade and to accept the risks and rarefied status that this entails. While motivated by a wide range of factors (see Perlman 2010, pp. 173-87; Zaluar 2010), this decision is generally centred on perceptions of the value, both moral and pecuniary, of other more socially legitimate forms of work. Zaluar describes the opposition concisely:

> For the *trabalhadores*, the *bandido* is the person who is attracted to easy money, who doesn't want to work, who has vices compared to the *trabalhador* […] For the *bandido*, the *trabalhador* is a "sucker", who works more and more to earn less and less. The conflict seems to be, in this way, between the work ethic, which […] is the source of material and moral satisfaction of the *trabalhador*, and the negative conception of work that associates it to slavery (Zaluar 1985, p. 145).[45]

[45] Own translation

This distinction places the *trabalhador* above the *bandido* in moral terms, even if the *bandido* has superior economic status. Therefore, young favela residents who "rebel" (*revoltar*) against a future of monotonous, low-paid work must also rebel against dominant moral norms within the community. In this way the boundary constructed by *trabalhadores* resembles those drawn by Lamont's (2000) "dignified working men", in the way it places emphasis on moral rather than socio-economic criteria.

However, these internal boundaries in the favela are not only shaped by local interactions, but also by wider societal constructions. Even if the *bandido*/*trabalhador* distinction can be seen as culturally embedded in the favela context, the importance it carries is more a product of external forces. The grave consequences of the decision to enter the world of drug trafficking are in part a product of the exceptional way in which the *bandido* category is constructed in wider society. As Misse explains, the mainstream construction of the *bandido* is of someone who lies completely outside legitimate society, creating an *a priori* justification the way the state treats anyone deemed to fall in this category (Misse 2010, p. 24).[46] Despite the extreme way in which it is framed, the category of *bandido* can have a tendency to expand and encompass others (namely young, dark-skinned men from poor neighbourhoods) who have not chosen the path of drug trafficking (Misse 2010, p. 33). This expansion of the *bandido* category thus raises the stakes in contestation over individual identification. If the favela resident who is mistreated by the police can demonstrate that he is a *trabalhador* and not a *bandido*, his demand to be treated as such will be more difficult to dismiss (Feltrán 2011, p. 165).

The picture this paints is of a reified opposition between *bandido* and *trabalhador* that only vaguely corresponds to its embedded contextual meaning within the favela, but which is reinforced by external incentives and punishments that invite favela residents to reproduce the distinction. Fischer provides a similar account of the interaction between favela residents and the authorities during the Vargas era

[46] These criteria distinguish him from other kinds of criminals such as corrupt politicians, non-violent criminals like thieves, and middle-class drug dealers.

(Fischer 2008, pp. 98-115). In public protestations at the time favela residents learned to adopt the hegemonic language of "work, family and nation", but at the same time imbued these concepts with more contextually relevant meanings. For example, informal and low-paid, but honest workers would refer to themselves as *trabalhadores* despite not being recognised as such by officialdom. This reappropriation of official language as the basis of staking claims echoes Gramsci's (1971) notion model of hegemony, as definitions formulated at the centre are incorporated into the world of the favela at the same time as the latter continues to assert significant influence over the construction of commonsense understandings of the world (see Section 4.2.4).

If such socially constructed differences can be seen as contributing to processes of boundary formation in favelas and other low-income communities, it is not necessarily clear what the net results are either at the individual or the collective levels. Largely top-down models like that outlined by Wacquant (2008) imply that such processes are purely responses to exclusion and would have little impact in themselves over life trajectories. Feltrán's (2012) model may leave more room for variation to emerge between individuals and perhaps sub-groups within the neighbourhood, although always accompanied by "tensions" and, ultimately, within the constraints determined by broader social conditions. The approach of social network analysis, meanwhile, attempts to identify the interactions between structural conditions and more *bottom-up* processes of social organisation. It can thus offer valuable tools for theorising socio-relational processes at a more granular level, and establishing whether, and if so how, these have any importance at the level of causality.

3.3 Social networks

3.3.1 Social exchange and culture in networks

Social network analysis (SNA) has a long history within social theory, having emerged in the 1950s and 1960s as a rejection of both "individualist" models of social action (like rational actor theory) and those based on "static" social structures (Mützel 2009, p. 873). Its central proposition is that relationships, rather than

individual characteristics or 'essences', structure social life and should therefore be the primary focus of social research (Carrington and Scott 2011; Emirbayer 1997). The distinction is clear when the concept of networks is compared to the related idea of 'social capital', which refers to the ability of social connections to furnish valuable resources and opportunities (see Portes 1998). In Coleman's (1988) influential works social capital was seen as a *group attribute*, which could grow or shrink depending on internal group dynamics. In Bourdieu's (1985) conception by contrast, social capital was an *individual attribute* relative to a structure and therefore "convertible" with other forms of capital (namely cultural and economic). While both views have some value, the conception of capital as an attribute loses sight of concrete relations, either in the way they are shaped by social and economic context (in the case of Coleman and Putnam) or of their specific cultural dynamics (in the case of Bourdieu). Instead, Lin (1999) proposes seeing social capital as something an individual has in relation to a concrete network of relations, which operate according to situated dynamics with independent influence, but also within the constraints and pressures of a wider social context.

SNA's methodological formalism and tendency to see social networks as real world phenomena rather than as a metaphor for social life have rightly prompted criticism (Savage et al. 2006, pp. 128-29), however as a set of analytical tools it retains considerable force and can offer useful insights for analysis of interpersonal relationships at the level of the neighbourhood. At the most basic level, individual relationships between two people, or *dyads*, can be modified by the extent to which their wider networks also overlap. A high level of network *density* can, on the one hand, lead to higher levels of inter-personal trust and cohesion and to a greater capacity for the collective enforcement of norms (Uehara 1990).[47] On the other hand, it can impose stifling forms of collective surveillance over members, cause individually and collectively held resources to be rapidly diminished, and lead to the circulation of redundant information (Uehara 1990; Granovetter 1973). Where high density is combined with high *encapsulation* – relative isolation from outside ties –

[47] A situation of 'network closure', where every member of a network knows every other member, will intensify this dynamic (Uehara 1990).

these problems can be further compounded (Uehara 1990). By contrast, Granovetter (1973) demonstrated the counter-intuitive advantage of having 'weak ties' to those outside one's immediate circle, which would be more likely to provide useful information about job opportunities. Similarly, Burt (1992) emphasised the importance of 'structural holes' – gaps within information and resource flows that can be strategically filled by individuals and groups. All of these observations place individual action within the structured context of the social network that may either facilitate or constrain the pursuit of particular objectives.

Notwithstanding its clear benefits, this kind of network modelling is often a blunt tool for understanding how network ties are maintained as relations of exchange, because the simple existence of network ties cannot simply be assumed to translate into the circulation of socially valued goods (Uehara 1990). Indeed, despite its claims to seeing group dynamics as inherently social and relational, network analysis risks falling back on an individualistic rational action model if it cannot identify the social mechanisms by which relations of exchange are constructed, sustained and, at times, ruptured (*ibid*.). With its roots in the anthropology of Mauss (1967), exchange theory can help address this issue with the concept of the *reciprocity structure*. Unlike network structure, this identifies actual patterns of exchange among members of a network (see Uehara 1990; Molm 2010). Molm (2010), for example, distinguishes *generalised exchange* among many network members from *restricted exchange*, which is limited to two. Which of these two patterns prevails within a network will clearly have an important impact on the range of resources that network members can access. Uehara (1990) highlights another key distinction: between *structured exchange*, which involves explicit terms of reciprocity between exchangers, and *diffuse exchange*, where there are no assumptions of direct reciprocity and 'accounts' are only vaguely audited by participants.[48] In both cases the reciprocity structure can affect the development of the network structure through the patterns of trust and cohesion that it fosters. As with network structure though, more generalised and diffuse forms of exchange can

[48] These more open exchange dynamics are typically found in systems of *generalised exchange*, whereas the *structured* approach is more often (though not exclusively) a feature of bilateral *restricted exchange*.

carry risks as well as benefits, as they can lead to the rapid depletion of members' resources (Uehara 1990).

As useful as the concept of reciprocity structure may be, adding another formalistic layer to network analysis does not fully solve the problem of understanding the *cultural content* of relationships. Graeber (2011), for example, highlights the limits of viewing the circulation of goods between social actors exclusively through the lens of exchange. He observes that even the most "diffuse" forms of exchange assume a kind of existential equality between participants that is expressed in a "constant process of interaction tending towards equivalence" (Graeber 2011, p. 103). However, not all social relations are maintained on this logic. The relationship between parents and children, for example, or the way a community may treat an elderly or disabled member, do not assume a need for reciprocity. Instead these have a logic of what Graeber defines as 'baseline communism', operating on the principle of "from each according to their abilities, to each according to their needs" (*ibid.*, pp. 94-102). Similarly, 'hierarchical' (for example feudal or patrimonial) systems also do not operate on a logic of exchange, but typically of 'protection' based on obligations bestowed by tradition or some other kind of implicit contract (*ibid.*, pp. 109-113). This suggests that networks are divided *a priori* into relations of either exchange or these other logics. This takes us beyond the analytical capacities network and reciprocity structures, instead requiring analysis of the social and cultural context in which network development actually occurs.

Coleman's (1988) model of social capital introduces culture as a *productive* aspect of social organisation. Whereas Bourdieu saw social capital as an individual attribute determined by its convertibility with cultural and economic capital within an overarching social structure, Coleman saw it as as possessing largely autonomous dynamics. The circulation of resources, information and support, he argued, was primarily dependent on the group's ability to ensure that individuals contributed to the collectivity. This always risked being undermined by the problem that group members might rationally decline to invest their time and resources if they didn't stand to benefit directly themselves. Cultural dynamics may therefore be seen as decisive in determining the willingness of members to observe collective

norms. Coleman offered the example of New York's closely-knit community of Jewish diamond traders, who he argued were able to collectively benefit from their high levels of trust and strict observance of norms of reciprocity (*ibid.*, pp. S98-99). Smith (2010) provides another example from Chicago, distinguishing between strong levels of mutual support among Mexican migrant labourers on one hand and a culture of individualism among low-income black workers on the other which preventing individuals from requesting support from friends and family. In both cases, group culture can be seen as either facilitating or impeding the initial generation of resources and their subsequent circulation around the group.

This indicates that culture is an important aspect of social exchange in networks and may generate significant differences in outcome between groups with otherwise similar social characteristics. However, diverse studies of the dynamics of social network under conditions of poverty confirm the fundamental importance of economic context. Offer, for example, argues that, for the poor, assistance is often "unreliable, sporadic, and characterised by high relational tension" (Offer 2012, p. 789), and frequently provokes processes of withdrawal or exclusion of others from individual networks. Such processes can be seen in González de la Rocha's (2001) description of the impacts of Mexico's default and subsequent recession on low-income households in the city of Guadalajara during the 1980s. While mutual support between extended family members often eased the strain of increased unemployment and lower household incomes, this often came along with more cramped living conditions and extra dependent mouths to feed, placing great strain on relationships (González de la Rocha 2001, p. 86).

Depressed economic conditions can also cause the contraction of networks across communities more broadly. González de la Rocha (2001) notes that when neighbours lack the resources to sustain reciprocal relationships with others, they may begin to avoid each other and for fear of receiving burdensome requests. Even where patterns of mutual support survive thanks to strong cultural cohesion, this is unable to compensate for a paucity of material resources. Portes and Landolt (2000) note that despite strong, collectively enforced reciprocal relations among informal garment makers in Guatemala, underpinned by their shared Mayan culture and

identity, the limitations of the market in which they operated meant they remained trapped in poverty (Portes and Landolt 2000, pp. 537-42). By contrast, Jamaican food processors exhibited low levels of trust as a result of a history of cutthroat competition and corrupt practices, which clearly inhibited the potential growth of the sector (*Ibid*.). However, occupying an economic niche based around the export of a particular commodity to Jamaican communities in the North America and Europe, many were able to survive with reasonable profit margins. The comparison demonstrates that while social networks can be useful in managing poverty, they can only make use of what is made available within the wider economic context.

3.3.2 Social networks and urban space

Just as networks must be viewed as culturally constructed, so they must be seen as inherently constructed in space. Debates over the relationship between social life and space have a long history in social science. At the height of European industrialisation writers like Simmel (1997) and Tönnies (1957) argued that modern urban society exhibited a new way of life characterised by weak, instrumental social ties and blasé attitudes, contrasting starkly with the intimate, multi-stranded bonds of the rural village. Such views predominated until the post-War era when classic studies documented the day-to-day routines of tight-knit, working-class and ethnic communities that were still very much alive in large cities (eg. Young and Wilmott 1957; Gans 1962). Wellman (1979) labelled these two views, respectively, as 'community lost' and 'community saved' paradigms. In both cases, social networks (although not described as such) are inherently tied to space. In the case of 'community lost' the density and anonymity of the modern city is seen as overwhelming long-established modes of human interaction and organisation. For 'community saved', it is the convergence of ethnic or class-based culture and identity with the spatial boundaries of the neighbourhood that engenders and sustains affective inter-personal bonds.

Wellman (1979) posited that the relationship between social networks and space was again being transformed towards the latter part of the twentieth century. As suburbanisation, access to private transport and advances in communication

technology gathered pace from the 1960s onwards networks became increasingly "liberated" from spatial constraints. This did not mean community had disappeared, but that it now took the form of "sparsely knit, ramifying structures" spread across the metropolitan area and beyond. These new structures continued to exhibit elements of the 'community saved' model, with dense clusters of communication and support focussed around the family. However, they had undermined the strength of place-based communities and the ability of neighbours to make claims on one another (Wellman 19979, pp. 1226-27). Blokland and Rae (2008) argue that this process can be equated with a shift towards 'privatised communities', in which social interactions are primarily the product of instrumental action rather than the kinds of chance encounters common during the era of the 'sidewalk republic'.

This view of the reconfiguration of social networks across urban space has far-reaching implications, for low-income neighbourhoods in particular. While the networks of middle-class groups may have become somewhat liberated from space and privatised, evidence from the United States suggests that lower-income neighbourhoods often continue to exhibit the characteristics of the 'community saved' model (eg. Oliver 1988; Fernandez and Harris 1992). However, collective exclusion of the kind broadly outlined in different ways by Wilson (1987) and Wacquant (2008) ensures that although the mutually supportive networks of residents of these areas often provide the kinds of support that allow them to "get by", they do not provide the influential and non-redundant connections needed for them to "get on" (De Souza Briggs 1998). This seems to support Wilson's claims about the way that space, in the form of 'concentrated disadvantage', compounds problems of labour market exclusion in the US inner city, by isolating the social networks of significant numbers of residents from the labour market.

For various reasons, however, the relationship between space and social networks is likely to have very different dynamics in urban Brazil. Widespread poverty and informality, lower levels of automobile access, the relative spatial concentration of wealthier groups, and sharp forms of spatial segregation have, to some extent, constrained the "liberation" of networks. While this is the case across the social spectrum, it is particularly so for favelas, which tend to contain dense social

network structures (de Almeida and d'Andrea 2004) that are typically more spatially constrained and socially homogenous than those of higher-income areas (Marques 2012; Marques and Bichir 2011). Nonetheless it would be wrong to see favela residents' networks as highly encapsulated, or as isolated from contacts beyond the neighbourhood. Indeed, they are often highly mobile in their day-to-day lives, for example travelling long distances to work (Souza e Silva 2012). As such, their labour market outcomes are more plausibly attributable to structural factors than to the spatiality of their networks, which only play residual role (Marques REF).

Another important model concerning the relationship between social networks and space in low-income neighbourhoods is Sampson's theory of collective efficacy (see Sampson et al. 1997; Sampson 2012, pp. 149-79). Collective efficacy refers simultaneously to structural and substantive properties of resident networks. The structure of 'network closure', where everyone knows their neighbours (or might expect to know them at some point in the future), is conceived as ensuring a kind of collective surveillance of the neighbourhood as residents feel both empowered and obliged to intervene to stop anti-social behaviour. At the same time, such network structures can also foster collective socialisation, promoting established norms of behaviour and, where necessary, channels and modes of conflict resolution. It may also contribute to more general forms of collective action, for example by enabling political mobilisation. Sampson argues that collective efficacy exercises an important independent influence over crime rates in low-income neighbourhoods (Sampson et al. 1997).

At a general level the theory of collective efficacy makes a valid claim: that network dynamics are likely to have some effect on the ability of residents to shape various aspects of neighbourhood life. However, there are also important weaknesses, which become especially visible when the idea is applied to the Brazilian context. In particular, Sampson adopts a normative understanding of violence, seeing it as exceptional and the result of "social disorganisation", rather than, as in the concept of violent pluralism (Arias and Goldstein 2010), potentially a normative state in itself. In such a view, violent actors in the neighbourhood may have a degree of resident support and in fact be *empowered* by high levels of collective efficacy,

rather than being suppressed by it. On the other hand, if residents wish to use their collective efficacy keep violence to a minimum, they may only be able to exercise moderate, informal influence over such actors, if at all. This view is supported by Zaluar and Ribeiro's (2009) observation that it is in the areas of Rio de Janeiro that report the highest levels of trust that also have the highest homicide rates. This suggests that despite their strong networks favela residents are unable to activate their cohesion to prevent violence. "Collective efficacy", Zaluar and Ribeiro argue, "can only take place where local security conditions permit neighbour intervention" (Zaluar and Ribeiro 2009, p. 192). This does not rule out the potential importance of social networks in informally shaping conditions of security and violence in Rio's favelas, but once again highlights the need for such an approach to be carefully contextualised.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter has identified a range of key issues and ideas bearing on the theme of urban inequality and neighbourhoods, both in general terms and in the context of the contemporary Brazilian city. This discussion essentially revolves around how to conceptualise the production of socio-spatial inequalities in terms of scale, structure and agency. In this regard, the neighbourhood effects literature, which attributes significant causal agency to the scale of the neighbourhood (eg. Galster 2011), may be placed in opposition to critical (eg. Harvey 2008) and structuralist (eg. Wacquant 2008) approaches, which in different ways see the substantive features of the neighbourhood as entirely determined from outside by the circulation of capital and (related to this) the behaviour of the state. Given the chronic failure of the neighbourhood effects school to theoretically situate the neighbourhood within the city, critical and structuralist approaches provide a valuable corrective. However, there are two important ways in which such approaches themselves also struggle to provide an adequate account or at least need to be supplemented by other perspectives.

A first shortcoming concerns the application of capital-based and structuralist accounts to the Latin American context. While it is clear that both capital and the

state play fundamental roles in the development of Latin American cities, other factors not present in the urban Global North are also significant and exert independent influence over socio-spatial processes. At the urban scale the system of 'plural violence' (Arias and Goldstein 2010) that has emerged since democratisation has had visible impacts on urban social life and spatial structure in cities like Rio de Janeiro through the process of "socio-political-spatial fragmentation of the urban fabric" (Lopes de Souza 2000). Meanwhile, conjunctural differences in Brazil mean that favelas and peripheries cannot be viewed as "repositories" of 'advanced marginality' in the way suggested by Wacquant (2008). Instead Feltrán (2012) highlights that these spaces have become increasingly heterogeneous even as the influence of violent state and non-state actors has grown, causing them to be overlaid by highly fraught 'frontiers of tension'. The "emergent" and highly uneven nature of these different processes suggests that the notion of *complexity* may be a useful tool for analysing the contemporary semi-peripheral metropolis – a theme that is taken up in Chatper 4.

A second major issue with highly structuralist approaches is that they tend to neglect questions of how everyday life unfolds *within* low-income neighbourhoods and, specifically, of what potential agency residents may have in determining their own individual and collective outcomes. Between them, social network analysis and exchange theory provide useful tools for addressing these questions – specifically for understanding how valuable resources and information become distributed across populations, and what factors facilitate or impede various forms of collective action. However, in low-income neighbourhoods network dynamics are heavily shaped by economic and socio-spatial context, which can limit resources and undermine reciprocity. In these environments, I argue, it is essential to understand processes of *boundary formation* (Lamont 2000) as these are likely to affect patterns of co-operation and exchange among residents. These different tools reintroduce a degree of individual and collective agency to residents of low-income areas through the forms of sociability that they generate, while acknowledging that even these are heavily shaped by broader social forces.

4.0 Urban social complexity in Rio de Janeiro

Chapter 3 argued that, although they offer vital insights, critical and structuralist approaches are alone insufficient for understanding urban inequalities and the processes shaping low-income neighbourhoods in the contemporary semi-peripheral metropolis. Instead these must be supplemented with perspectives that acknowledge the ability of various social actors and groups, as well as space itself, to intervene in processes of urban social development. This chapter argues that the related fields of complexity theory and assemblage theory can provide valuable tools for conceiving how this occurs. As such it functions as a kind of conceptual framework for the empirical chapters that will follow.

Complexity theory is concerned with understanding how the properties of systems and their component parts interact to produce *emergent* and *non-linear* forms of change (O'Sullivan et al. 2006; Manson and O'Sullivan 2006). Unlike "reductionist" forms of social analysis, it does not assume that outcomes can be deduced *a priori* through the identification of causal drivers that are constant across time and space. Instead new causal dynamics may emerge in the process of interactions between different actors, processes and environments. An *assemblage* is a stabilised configuration of components brought together through such complex interactions (DeLanda 2006, pp. 10-12). While relative stability may give an assemblage a clear structure and identity, thus making it "knowable" to analysts and/or social actors, it nonetheless remains subject to transformation through the interactions of components both internal and external to it. As concepts then, both complexity and assemblage evoke a vision of the social world as dynamic, contingent and heterogeneous.

This chapter argues that complexity and assemblage constitute useful and flexible *heuristic devices* that can be deployed to elucidate important aspects of social life in Rio de Janeiro today. It begins by introducing the core ideas of complexity theory and assemblage theory, mainly through the contribution of Manuel DeLanda (2006), who brings these two distinct bodies of ideas together into a clear and unified ontological framework. It then looks at the ways in which complexity and

assemblage approaches have been used in urban geography, and in particular the question of how they relate to critical urban theory. In spite of their substantive theoretical disagreements, it is argued that the insights of both approaches may fruitfully be brought together at the level of empirical analysis in what I describe as an "urban social complexity" approach. In the second half of the chapter I attempt to illustrate the potential of such an approach to Rio de Janeiro through analysis of four thematic areas that exhibit characteristics of complexity. These are: (1) the evolution of territorial conflict and violence; (2) the role of the state in the provision of urban infrastructure and services; (3) the social relations surrounding the city's formal/informal divide; and (4) the construction of place-based identities. These sections put forward ideas about current dynamics in Rio de Janeiro that underpin the empirical analysis presented in Chapters 6-8.

4.1 Outline of an urban social complexity approach

4.1.1 Social complexity and assemblage theory

Although originating in the physical sciences, the insights of complexity theory have, directly or indirectly, informed various strands of social theory (see Manson et al. 2006; Manson and O'Sullivan 2006). In the work of DeLanda (2006) key concepts and terminology from complexity science are brought together with Deleuze and Guattari's assemblage theory (2004) to constitute a clear and integrated ontological framework. A core feature of assemblage theory, according to DeLanda,[49] is that unlike much of Western thought, it conceives of the social world as constituted by 'relations of exteriority' in which parts are sufficiently independent of wholes to be capable of interacting with one another (DeLanda 2006, pp. 8-9). Much of social theory (including Hegelian and Marxian notions of 'totality'), by contrast, assumes 'relations of interiority' in which nature and function of parts can be fully understood by reference to the wholes that contain them. The 'macro-reductionist' conceptualisation of society is reflected in the frequent use of "organismic" or

[49] In what follows I will draw primarily on DeLanda's version of assemblage theory, which departs in some ways from Deleuze and Guattari's (DeLanda 2006, pp. 3-4).

"arboreal" metaphors in Western thought.[50] By contrast assemblage theory adopts an imaginary of ecosystems formed of constantly interacting and evolving species and environments (DeLanda 2006, p. 10). Deleuze and Guattari's analogy of a wasp pollinating an orchid provides a paradigmatic example: despite the separateness and differentness of the two entities, they come together to form an *assemblage* that combines and yet does not subsume them, through a mutual "capturing of code" (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, p. 11). No force pre-determines this outcome; instead it emerges through the contingent co-evolution of two entities in interaction with one another and with their environment (DeLanda 2006, p. 5).

As well as rejecting "totalities", DeLanda argues that assemblage theory also stands opposed to the notion of "essences" (DeLanda 2006, pp. 26-46). Aristotle's "taxonomic essentialism" distinguished between genera, species and individuals, proposing these as discrete ontological categories. By contrast assemblage theory has a "flat" ontology in that it contains nothing but "differently scaled individual singularities" (DeLanda 2006, p. 28). DeLanda suggests that a species is "as unique and singular as the organisms that compose it, but larger in spatio-temporal scale" (DeLanda 2006, p. 27). In fact he goes as far to argue that organisms themselves are simply assemblages whose component parts (eg. organs) have become tightly integrated.[51] This is because "despite the tight integration between its component organs, the relations between them are not *logically necessary* but only *contingently obligatory*: the historical result of their close coevolution" (DeLanda 2006, p. 12). This conception entails a radically different mode of analysis: whereas *logically necessary* relations can be understood through deductive reasoning, *contingently obligatory* ones require empirical investigation.

[50] DeLanda also rejects 'micro-reductionism' (eg. rational actor theory), which conceives wholes as mere aggregates of atomistic units, and 'meso-reductionism' (eg. Giddens' (1984) structuration theory), which claims that it is the articulation between micro and macro that structures the social world (DeLanda 2006, p. 10). He argues that by privileging a particular scale, both of these approaches, in their different ways, also do away with the possibility of emergence.

[51] In this respect DeLanda departs from Deleuze and Guattari who distinguish *assemblages*, which are constituted through interactions of detachable components, from *species* (eg. 'strata' or 'lines of descent' in Deleuzian terminology), which have been genetically homogenised through natural selection (DeLanda 2006, p. 11).

If the interaction of components is constantly transforming assemblages and if their boundaries are inherently relative and unstable, how is possible to speak of them at all? For DeLanda this is the result of 'territorialisation' – the process that stabilises assemblages by homogenising them, sharpening their borders and/or strengthening their social identities (DeLanda 2006, p. 13). A clear example of territorialisation is the creation of nation-states from internally diverse and often weakly delineated populations, territories and pre-existing institutional arrangements. This occurred historically through *material* processes such as ethnic homogenisation (through uneven population growth, ethnic cleansing etc.), the establishment and fortification of national borders, and the creation of state institutions. However, it also involved *expressive* processes such as the emergence of national cultures and the codification of languages.[52] Although the nation-state has proved to be a resilient assemblage, it is also subject to powerful processes of 'deterritorialisation' – processes which reduce homogeneity, blur boundaries and weaken social identities. These may occur from within, through internal cultural differentiation or conflict for example, or from without, as a result of transnational migration, trade or external cultural influences. As such, assemblages must always be seen as contingent constellations of components that may be transformed, from inside or outside and by material or expressive processes, through interactions across different scales.

A final core aspect of DeLanda's framework concerns causality. *Linear Causality* proposes that causes *imply* effects, as in the logical proposition "if A, then B necessarily" (DeLanda 2006, pp. 19-20). While this may be the case for atomistic or simple events like mechanical collisions, it is woefully inadequate when applied to the social world. This shortcoming has been used to justify the conception of society as a 'totality', allowing proponents of this view to largely sidestep questions of causality by presenting social phenomena as surface manifestations of deeper interconnections that by definition cannot be demonstrated empirically. By contrast DeLanda proposes that causal effects need be neither atomistic nor linear. Because

[52] DeLanda conceives assemblages as constructed along a double axis of territorialised–deterritorialised and material–expressive (DeLanda 2006, pp. 12-13).

assemblages are characterised by relations of exteriority, internal changes to them may also be causal – hence the possibility of *emergence*. This understanding also introduces the possibility of *non-linear* change, because the internal organisation of a complex entity may contain thresholds or produce feedbacks, meaning that the same external cause could have radically different effects on different entities. Such a view reintroduces the possibility of analysis of the social world that accounts for its complexity while retaining an ontological commitment to non-reductionism.

4.1.2 Complexity and urban geography

According to Thrift, complexity theory is "preternaturally spatial"; indeed, "it is possible to argue that complexity theory is about, precisely, the spatial ordering that arises from injections of energy" (Thrift 1999, p. 32). Despite its clear relevance to urban studies and geography more generally, however, complexity theory has remained relatively marginal. Portugali (2006) attributes this to a bifurcation in the 1970s, which reproduced a division between "two cultures" within the discipline. On one side, the spatial sciences went on to apply complexity theory directly and used it in highly technical ways to analyse phenomena such as patterns of land use and the rank ordering of cities within urban systems. On the other side, structuralist, Marxist and humanist (SMH) geographers rejected complexity science altogether as an imposition of positivist concepts incompatible with the epistemology of the social sciences. Nonetheless, underlying this division are shared concerns about how to understand contemporary urban life. As such the "two cultures" may benefit from engaging in greater dialogue across the divide.

Over time the positivist approaches to urban research that Portugali (2011) labels 'Complex Theories of Cities' (CTCs) have developed increasingly complex simulation models for understanding various urban phenomena. However, in doing so they frequently violate one of the core principles of complexity theory by using "cognitively simple" agents as base units (Portugali 2011, pp. 95-109). In this way they reintroduce predictability and repeat the 'micro-reductionist' error of rational actor models. At the same time, modelling can foster the assumption that cities are stable and self-organising, like the 'fractal structures' found in nature, rather than

actually, in the long term, highly chaotic (Portugali 2011, pp. 95-109). This is because the application of such concepts from the natural sciences is typically *mechanistic*, rather than *adaptive*. Unlike snowflakes or trees, cities are not natural entities composed of molecules, but rather 'artefacts' produced by humans capable of intentional action. They must therefore be treated as such, using the full range of approaches to data collection and analysis that this demands. Portugali argues that the streak of scientism running through CTCs leaves them exposed to the kinds of critiques that that led SMH geographers to overturn 'quantitative-positivist' geography in the 1960s and 70s. This is a shame because it risks undermining the potentially powerful theoretical contribution of complexity theory to more qualitative forms of urban research.

If CTCs have failed to learn from the insights of qualitative researchers, structuralist, Marxist and Humanist (SMH) geographers have largely ignored complexity theory. Nonetheless, they have developed many ideas concomitant to complexity, albeit without adopting its terminology (*ibid.*). The concept of the 'production of space' (Lefebvre 1991), for example, acknowledges the ability of space to feed back and participate in processes of socio-spatial transformation, although the inherent privileging of capital as the driving force behind this process arguably retains an underlying "reductionist" logic (Portugali 2006, p. 653). Such is not the case, however, for assemblage theory, which has been taken up enthusiastically by urban geographers in recent years (see Anderson and McFarlane 2011; McFarlane 2011). A particular strength of 'assemblage urbanism' is its focus on providing thick description of the interactions of different actors (including non-human actors) in given contexts without the *a priori* use of theoretical schemata to define their relations (McFarlane 2011). This allows assemblage urbanism to avoid both drawing overly direct causal links between "underlying processes" (such as capital accumulation) and empirically verifiable social phenomena, and also to avoid conceiving such processes as occurring independently of the actors involved in them and the contexts in which they are situated (Farías 2011).

However, the growing use of "assemblage" as a concept has diluted its meaning and led to its being used in ways that can undermine rather than assist analytical clarity.

In particular it has led to a conflation of the approach mobilised by DeLanda, focussed on "comings together" and emergence in a general sense, with the ontological propositions of actor-network theory (ANT) and its radically decentred, materially and symbolically constituted networks of human and non-human 'actants' (see Harman 2007). In response to this, Brenner et al. reject an 'ontological conception' of assemblage, which they see as displacing the centrality of political economy (Brenner et al. 2011, p. 227-28). Specifically, they warn that in the absence of "theoretical assumptions and interpretive schemata" that can "animate" interconnections between different components of an assemblage, analysis descends into a form of "naïve objectivism" (Brenner et al. 2011). As a result, it becomes impossible to identify the relative significance of different actors and processes in the production of a given outcome (Brenner et al. 2011).

This is a valid critique that raises crucial questions of process and scale, and which I believe an urban social complexity approach can accommodate if mobilised appropriately. DeLanda proposes a largely *bottom-up* process of social transformation, but argues that this may also produce emergent hierarchies that can subsequently impose powerful *top-down* constraints on the actors and other entities involved in these processes (see DeLanda 2006, pp. 47-119; and 1996). For example, he argues that while peasant markets in early-modern Europe were populated by "price takers", subject to the forces of supply and demand on a given day, in most contexts capitalism has typically been dominated by "price setters", whose market share allows them to manipulate processes of production and exchange (DeLanda 1996). This economic power rests not only on possession of capital, but also on access to the means of violence, control of space, institutional relations and other factors. The ability of large firms to operate across time and space allows them to "replicate" in ways that reproduce centralisation and hierarchy and subordinate others to the "rules" that grow up around their power. This conception of process and scalar relations echoes Haken's (1983) 'slaving principle', which proposes that local interactions between components may establish a 'global structure' that can in turn "enslave" its components in a relatively stable state (see Portugali 2006, p. 652). In this way DeLanda offers interpretive

schemata that can “animate” interconnections, while still allowing for the possibility of emergent processes.

What this suggests is that ‘critical’ and ‘assemblage’ urbanism need not necessarily be mutually exclusive, at least at the level of empirical analysis. An urban social complexity approach can acknowledge, indeed place at centre stage, the role of political economy and see it as “enslaving” various urban actors and processes to its logic. As such it can satisfy Brenner et al.’s (2011) requirement that use of “assemblage” remain at the level of metaphor – of conceiving how diverse entities are brought together under political economic processes. At the same time, depending on the object of study, an urban social complexity approach can retain a broader focus by acknowledging how under some circumstances factors only indirectly linked to political economy may assume causal primacy over a given outcome. In Chapter 6 I will argue that such an approach helps to account for aspects of commonality and difference observed between my case studies of Tuiuti and Asa Branca. First, in the remainder of this chapter, I will deploy the concepts of complexity and assemblage to analyse various important dynamics shaping contemporary Rio de Janeiro.

4.2 Observing urban social complexity in Rio de Janeiro

4.2.1 Territorial violence in Rio de Janeiro as a complex system

Lopes de Souza suggests that from the 1980s onwards, rising violence and ‘socio-political-spatial fragmentation of the urban fabric’ produced a “qualitative rupture” that fundamentally altered dynamics of urban development and social life in Rio de Janeiro (Lopes de Souza 2000, p. 31). While economic inequality and social exclusion may have provided the context for this, the emergent conditions could no longer be seen as reducible to questions of political economy. This had particularly stark implications for favelas where a highly territorialised system of violent competition between armed groups took hold. This system has certain persistent features, in particular: the failure of police to command the trust of a large part of the population; the ability of armed groups to exercise domain over certain territories and their populations and to use this to pursue financial and other

objectives; and the orientation of these different groups to violently competing with one another for control of these territories. However, the way it has evolved over three decades also bears many of the hallmarks of a complex system that is highly subject to emergent transformation.

To recap, the *Comando Vermelho*'s (*CV*'s) establishment of favelas as territorial strongholds in the early 1980s proved to be a replicable model that had become effectively universalised by the early 1990s (at least in more central parts of the city). The police responded to this scenario with a doctrine of military engagement, launching frequent capture and kill operations in which favelas were treated as a kind of enemy territory (see McCann 2014, pp. 134-41). Meanwhile, internecine disputes and the emergence of rivals to the *CV*[53] reinforced a pattern of fluid, multi-polar territorial conflict across the city's favelas. Within this overarching structure local groups were able to accrue advantages by aligning with one or another of the drug trafficking factions depending on their shifting fortunes and the risks and opportunities these presented. In more covert ways they could also take the advantage of opportunities to collaborate with corrupt police. These features suggest the system established a 'global structure', which came to "enslave" the actors operating within it by requiring them to behave in particular ways (Haken 1983). However, this ignores two important sources of instability within the system. The first of these is the continual management of relations at a local level that is required to maintain the viability of the system as a whole. Secondly, the apparent stability of the structure is belied by more recent transformations resulting from the innovations of actors responding to its established dynamics (see Misse 2011).

As noted previously, drug traffickers developed the so-called 'good neighbour policy' to ensure constructive coexistence with favela residents. This has led some to see them as 'parallel powers' who gain local legitimacy by providing security and other services not delivered by the state (Leeds 1996). Such an interpretation is problematic in that it both exaggerates the isolation of traffickers from the broader power structures of the drug trade (see Arias 2006) and suggests that residents

[53] Namely the *Amigos dos Amigos* ("Friends of Friends", *ADA*) and *Terceiro Comando*, later the *Terceiro Comando Puro* ("Pure Third Command", *TCP*).

view them favourably, when in fact they typically see them as attracting unwanted violence to the neighbourhood and more generally as taking more than they give (see Perlman 2010a, pp. 187-92; Machado da Silva and Pereira Leite 2007). For the purpose of the current discussion it also assumes stability in trafficker-residents relations, whereas, as Penglase (2009) argues, these are in fact built upon *instability*. Traffickers must go to great lengths to justify their actions (indeed their very presence) in the favela by constantly encouraging the perception that police and rival gangs present an imminent threat.[54] As such they frequently create 'states of emergency' that allow them to break their own rules (*ibid*.). At the same time, they must be careful to work with hierarchies among favela residents, for example by not mistreating respected residents (Arias and Rodrigues 2006). When they fail to retain resident support in these ways they can lose the implicit support on which their position rests.

The importance of relations between armed groups and favela residents can also be seen in the emergence of militias, which over the past fifteen years have come to control a large number of favelas and also non-favela areas, especially in rapidly urbanising areas in the west of the city (see Map 5). The militia model originated in the large favela of Rio das Pedras in Jacarepaguá in the 1980s (see Section 6.5.2), when what was in effect a vigilante death squad run by off-duty police began to punish criminal activities, particularly drug trafficking, with summary "executions" (Zaluar and Conceição 2007). Subsequently, during the 1990s the *Polícia Mineira*, as they were known, improved relations with the community by making their "code of conduct" more transparent and their actions more predictable, and by increasing collaboration with the residents association and local politicians (*Ibid.*). Around the same time many smaller favelas in the West Zone developed similar, highly localised models of informal community policing and self-defence. These innovations can be seen as attempts by local actors (both armed and unarmed, state and non-state) to address perceived threats to local security against the backdrop of rising drug-related violence in the city – an emergent property within a complex system. The

[54] As Penglase notes, such concerns may be more prevalent in favelas where traffickers aim to rule primarily by consent rather than fear (Penglase 2009, p. 60).

ablity of the militia form to propagate owed to the perception among many militias members, local officials, and (though clearly with less say in the matter) residents themselves as a preferable alternative to the pattern of territorialised drug-related violence that had prevailed elsewhere.

Map 5. Favelas dominated by traffickers, militias and UPPs in 2010 (source: Zaluar 2013)[55]



If we conceive the establishment and transformation of Rio's militias as an emergent property within a complex system, the same might be said of a recent innovation by the state in the form of the favela pacification programme. Military-style engagement with drug gangs over more than two decades had succeeded in spilling a great deal of blood and reinforcing social, spatial and symbolic divisions between favelas and formal areas. However, it had failed spectacularly in its intended aims of reducing drug trafficking and, more importantly, the violence associated with it. In response to this, former Rio de Janeiro Governor Sérgio Cabral developed the favela pacification model, designed to establish permanent police presence in favelas, reduce the violence accompanying the drugs trade, and facilitate the strengthening of state provision of services in pacified territories (see

[55] Since this map was produced in 2010, the balance of power between armed groups across Rio's favelas has shifted considerably. Most significantly, all of Rio's South Zone and Central favelas and most of the North Zone favelas within the Avenida Brasil have now been pacified.

Cano 2012).[56] Initiated in 2008, at the time of writing thirty-eight *Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora* (Police Pacification Units, *UPPs*) have been established covering most of Rio de Janeiro's inner city favelas, and a few more peripheral territories.

Initial evaluations suggest that to date the programme has been successful in its primary aim of reducing violence in pacified favelas and surrounding areas (Cano 2012; Frischtak and Mandel 2012), although anecdotal evidence suggests that other forms of criminal behaviour, including burglary and domestic abuse, may have increased (Cano 2012). Critically, the programme has done little to challenge the fundamental dynamics of territorial competition. Although adopting a new approach supposedly involving community engagement, police are reproducing both the traffickers' and militias' model of territorial domination. As such many view pacification as a form of "social control", aimed at more closely monitoring favela populations, rather than freeing them from the surveillance of drug traffickers (eg. Melício et al. 2012; Fleury 2012). They are also reproducing the arbitrary and unaccountable nature of other groups' modes of control. For example, a major criticism of the programme relates to the large amount of discretion left to individual unit commanders over what tactics are employed and rules enforced in specific favelas, leading to significant variations in the way the programme has been implemented and received in different favelas (Fleury 2012).[57]

Alongside pacification, two important changes affecting both drug trafficking groups and militias in recent years account for overarching trends of violence and territorial competition in Rio. Firstly, in many favelas both have become more *disembedded* from the local community, which has reduced the ability of residents to influence their actions. Gay (2010) notes that over time drug traffickers in many favelas became progressively younger, more aggressive and less likely to hail from the local area, as the trafficking factions move their "soldiers" around to protect their

[56] Earlier attempts at similar approaches, most notably the *Grupo de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais* (Group for Policing in Special Areas, *GPAE*) piloted between 2001 and 2004, had failed due to a lack of political buy-in and institutional continuity (see Melício et al. 2012).

[57] Special measures adopted include powers of stop and search, house searches, curfews and banning of community social events, in particular *baile funk* parties (see World Bank 2012).

territories in different parts of the city. These traffickers are typically less observant of the good neighbour policy and more likely to act abusively towards residents (Gay 2010). A similar observation could be made with regard to militias, which in some cases have grown to cover large territories and to use this dominance to extract rents from the population (Zaluar and Conceição 2007). In these areas the "fees" they charge for providing security amount to little more than extortion, while they have also assumed monopoly control over basic services like the provision of gas cylinders, cable television and combi vans. In light of these changes dramatic differences have emerged between favelas with traffickers and militias that remain strongly embedded in the community, and those that are highly *disembedded* and far less (if at all) responsive to resident concerns.

The second important transformation, however, is that in the last few years both militias and drug traffickers in pacified favelas have reduced their visibility and overt forms of violence, even as their illegal and intimidatory activities continue unabated. Zaluar and Conceição note that, unlike drug traffickers, militias tend not flaunt their weaponry, and residents of neighbourhoods dominated by militias hear far fewer gunshots than their counterparts in trafficker-controlled favelas. In this way militias provoke less attention from politics and the media (Zaluar and Conceição 2007, pp. 96-99). In 2008, following the torture of an undercover journalist investigating a militia in the northwest of the city, a public inquiry was launched into the issue revealing widespread collusion within the state and finally elevating the issue in public realm (CPI 2008). According to Cano (2012) this prompted a change in tactics by militias, who further reduced the visibility of their activities. Similarly, rather than confronting the state head on, drug traffickers have reacted to police pacification by taking their activities underground. Research suggests that in the vast majority of pacified favelas drug trafficking still goes on and that traffickers continue to exert informal influence over residents, even as levels of violence have fallen. As such, the fall in violence observed in Rio de Janeiro over the last decade and a half seems to have little to do with a substantive weakening of non-state armed groups, nor of the system of territorial competition in which they are engaged.

4.2.2 Beyond urban despoliation: Complexity in the city and the state

Beyond the security domain, the state's relationship with the city in general and its favelas in particular also exhibit elements of complexity. Following the decline of the favela eradication programmes of the 1960s and 70s, and at the height of the social mobilisations surrounding Brazil's process of democratisation, Kowarick (1980) proposed his theory of 'urban despoliation', positing that the state played a central role in reproducing social inequality through its repression of the labour movement and unequal provision of infrastructure and services across the city (see Kowarick 1980, pp. 55-74). This analysis seemed to capture the urban policies of the military dictatorship, however since democratisation they have lost some of their explanatory force as state investment in favelas and peripheries increased and direct repression was curtailed. At the same time, however, persistence of conditions of precarity in many favelas and the resurgence of removals and other aggressive policies towards favelas in recent years suggest a continuation of at least some of the dynamics that guided state policies prior to democratisation. In order to understand such contradictions it is necessary to map sources of complexity in the way that the state interacts with urban space, and to political and institutional complexities within the state itself.

There are significant structural factors that shape unequal access to urban infrastructure and services across Brazilian cities, in particular a historic tendency towards pro-rich investment (see Abreu 1987). However, while such inequalities are clearly structured according to social class, they also have spatial dynamics that serve to produce significant variations even among lower-income groups and between different favelas. For example, Preteceille and Valladares (1999) found that favelas within the municipality of Rio de Janeiro were more likely to have benefited from upgrading programmes than those in suburban municipalities where budgets are smaller and capacity lower. Within Rio de Janeiro municipality itself Cavallieri et al.'s (2007) index of social development (see Map 4), based on a mixture of indicators covering access to urban services, living conditions and education/employment, found the lowest values to be in the most distant areas of the North and especially West Zones. However, beyond this broad centre-periphery

pattern they also found that while centrally located favelas were far more likely to have benefited from upgrading programmes, the pattern in the periphery is far less clear. This raises the question of what factors determine variable access to the state among different favela communities.

Map 6. Index of Social Development (Source: Cavallieri et al. 2007, p. 10)



Bichir (2009) has asked this question with regard to São Paulo. She also found 'macro-segregation' to be the key trend, with peripheral poor areas more likely to have deficient or inadequate services than intermediate or centrally located poor areas. When disaggregated, however, the centre-periphery pattern interacts with other independent factors like the average length of residence, age and income within a territory, and whether the settlement is a favela. She proposes two significant mechanisms that contribute to this differential access. The first is the role of economic agglomeration, which lowers marginal costs of investment in more central areas, for example by allowing water pipes to be connected to existing networks. The second key factor concerns the "visibility" of different poor neighbourhoods to policy makers. Visibility may result from a variety of factors, such as size, having a central or strategic location, proximity to policy makers' homes and places of work, media attention, and links to universities, NGOs and other influential bodies (Valladares 2007). Both factors arise in the interaction

between the state and the urban territory as a whole, introducing sources of unpredictability in the former's treatment of individual low-income neighbourhoods. The significance of these factors is thrown into relief when Rio is compared to the cities of the Global North where core services tend to be delivered on universalist bases and where, as a result, such mechanisms have far less influence.

Beyond these structural sources of variation in policy-making and implementation processes across the city, there are other features of urban complexity that relate to political contestation within the Brazilian state itself. Since 2008 Rio de Janeiro has been governed by a coalition of the *Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (Brazilian Democrtic Movement Party, *PMDB*), which has held power at the state and municipal levels, and the national *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (Workers' Party, *PT*) government, which both engages with state and municipal policies and also carries out its own urban interventions. While the two key partners disagree on many substantive issues, they have been broadly united around the Rio's mega-event led urban development strategy. Many critics equate the resulting policy agenda with a radical neoliberalisation of urban governance, pointing to its visible impacts of increased securitisation and highly uneven investments in transport and infrastructure, overwhelmingly oriented towards the mega-events, and the business and tourism sectors more broadly (Vainer 2011; Comitê Popular 2013). These have had particularly drastic implications for favelas, in the form of removals, pacification and the construction of monumental infrastructure (eg. cable cars) without resident consultation – what Freeman (2012) describes as "symbolic taming". In light of these policies, some have posited the return of the kind of policy logic described by Kowarick: of the state facilitating capital accumulation at any cost (Comitê Popular 2013; Brum 2013).[58]

However, although there have been clear processes of neoliberalisation this has not displaced other "grammars" of power within the state (Ribeiro and Santos Júnior 2013). Among these is 'neo-developmentalism' (or 'neo-Keynesianism', as Ribeiro

[58] See Richmond and Garmany (forthcoming) for a fuller discussion.

and Santos Júnior describe it), visible in major federal housing and infrastructure policies. While it can be argued that these policies also have neoliberal features, such as the use of public-private partnerships and progressive financialisation of the relationship between low-income groups and the state (see Saad Filho 2013; Lavinas 2013), their cost, scale and objectives, including an underlying focus on bolstering effective demand, make it highly reductive to label them as neoliberal. Even pacification cannot be straightforwardly defined as such. As much as the programme may serve to protect expanded circuits of capital accumulation, it also seems designed to "civilise" favela residents themselves through new forms of state intervention, an objective that is more consistent with a neo-developmentalist logic (see Rodrigues 2013).

Aside from neoliberalism and neo-developmentalism (and hybrid forms of the two), other grammars continue to dominate within particular parts of the state, largely as a result of its institutional configuration. These include 'corporatism' in the management of the public sector workforce, and 'patrimonialism' in various sectors, including Rio's notorious monopoly-run bus system (Ribeiro and Santos Júnior 2013). Meanwhile, in a more diffuse way the mechanics of clientelism play a fundamental role in distributing resources across the city. The re-emergence of clientelism in the post-democratisation era marked an important turning point in the relationship between favelas and the state as, following their central role in the social mobilisations and populist politics of the 1980s, residents' associations gradually lost much of their power and independence (see McCann 2006; 2014; Gay 1994). Notwithstanding the development of more comprehensive favela policies like *Favela Bairro*, clientelist networks subsequently became the main channels through which many favelas could access the state and its resources. As a result, the ability of favelas to access urban policies has often been the product of local political negotiations between politicians and individual residents associations (see Richmond and Garmany, forthcoming).

The mechanisms of agglomeration and visibility and the fragmentation of the state into different grammars of power introduce a high level of complexity to the distribution of resources across Rio de Janeiro's favelas. Several of these

mechanisms – agglomeration, visibility, and neoliberal (and to a lesser neodevelopmentalist) policy aims – tend to reproduce a centre-periphery dynamic by concentrating resources towards areas prioritised by elites. While in terms of investment in infrastructure this tends to *favour* more "central" favelas, it can also negatively impact them – for example favela removals and pacification units have been concentrated in more central areas (Comitê Popular 2013). However, the "spatial ordering" that arises from these diverse "injections of energy" (Thrift 1999, p. 32) is far less clear than such a formulation implies, with more peripheral favelas also potentially able to access resources, in particular through clientelist networks. Indeed, as noted by Roy, informality and the various distinct mechanisms it introduces may necessitate a shift from a "territorial imagination of cores and peripheries" to one of "fractal geometries" in which different systems of power are seen as interacting across the urban territory (Roy, 2011: 233).

4.2.3 Mapping the formal/informal divide

Complexity does not only emerge from the interaction between organised entities, like the state or armed groups, with urban space, but also in more diffuse economic and social relations across the city. This proposition may seem counter-intuitive considering the salience that is often given to a simple dichotomous formal/informal divide in Rio de Janeiro. However, while the divide certainly has a deep and pervasive significance at the symbolic level, the ways in which it actually shapes lives, livelihoods and trajectories across the city is far less straightforward. If Rio's formal/informal divide can be described as an assemblage – an identifiable constellation of entities, practices and meanings – it is a highly unstable one, requiring significant efforts by a range of actors to police its edges.[59]

[59] In what follows I will use the term 'border' to express a geographic separation between a favela and a formal area. I use 'boundary' to identify socially constructed distinctions between place-based 'in-groups' and 'out-groups' (see Lamont and Mólnar 2002). 'Frontier' I use in the way meant by Feltrán (2011) to denote the legal, economic and social structures that separate but also connect and regulate the flows between centre and periphery. 'Divide' I use as an overarching term to denote the unstable assemblage of borders, boundaries and frontiers that surround the lived and constructed distinction between the formal and informal.

The most obvious manifestation of the formal/informal divide in Rio is in the relationship between favelas and non-favela areas. This distinction expresses itself in various different ways. At the most concrete level, the distinction is a physical and visual one, related to the resource constraints and legal exclusion under which favelas were originally constructed and in many cases continue to exist.[60] Some aspects of this physical form seem to produce a stark symbolic identity marker. The staggered, incomplete *lajes* (flat-roofed homes), irregular streets, tight *becos* (alleyways) and knots of *gato* (pirate) cable wires overhead constitute a landscape that is identifiably distinct from the city's 'formal' neighbourhoods, meaning that entry into a favela seems to announce the entry into a distinct kind of space (see McCann 2014, p. 26). Both the familiarity with which favela residents navigate their neighbourhoods and the feelings of disorientation often experienced by outsiders can reinforce this sense of difference. Meanwhile the greater porosity (or at least appearance thereof) between domains of 'inside' and 'outside' seem to provide a stark contrast from the more clearly defined private and public spaces of formal neighbourhoods.[61] In these different ways the inequality of Brazilian society thus takes on a physical-symbolic manifestation, albeit a reductive and reified one,[62] that contributes to the construction and separation of collective identities.

However, the built form of favelas varies dramatically (see McCann 2014, pp. 25-26). Older, more central favelas tend to be located on hillsides – the only available space within the city at the time of their construction – and to have dense and irregular layouts as a result of the incremental process that characterised their settlement. In the suburbs of the North Zone, large favelas and complexes of favelas

[60] Brum (2012) evocatively describes the physical form of the favela as the mark of a kind of "original sin".

[61] Caygill describes similar observations made by Walter Benjamin and Asja Lacis about Naples in the 1920s: "The architecture of Naples does not occupy a monumental present since 'one can scarcely discern where building is still in progress and where dilapidation has already set in'. Within this temporally and spatially porous architecture Benjamin and Lacis also discover social porosity, between families, neighbours and strangers, in piazzas, in churches and in cafes." (Caygill 1998, p. 122). They contrasted this with the greater specialisation of spatial function found in the more fully "modernised" cities of Northern Europe.

[62] As will be discussed in Section 8.2.2a, important forms of distinction can be built up around perceptions of discontinuity in the built environment.

with similarly haphazard, though often less dense, built environments stretch out across hillsides and lowlands: the product of rapid mid-century urbanisation. Meanwhile, peripheral favelas in the West Zone and Baixada Fluminense typically have a more spacious and orderly appearance, usually having been built since the 1980s with centralised co-ordination often involving informal political patronage (see do Lago 2003). Favelas in the lowlands of Jacarepaguá in the west of the city are again distinct, with layouts similar to those found on the urban periphery, but often located on the banks of rivers and other environmentally precarious areas.

Within each of these geographical contexts, and often within individual favelas, there are also major differences in levels of consolidation. These span from areas of precarious shanty housing to highly consolidated neighbourhoods of multi-floor, brick homes that have received comprehensive upgrading interventions, often making them more or less indistinguishable from *loteamentos* or even formal working-class neighbourhoods. What supposedly unites favelas and distinguishes them from *loteamentos* is their *illegality*, as opposed to *irregularity*, in terms of fulfilment of legal obligations for urban incorporation. However, do Lago (2003) notes that this distinction has become increasingly dubious. In the wake of favela regularisation policies, the centralised co-ordination of occupation in newer favelas, and the comprehensive marketisation of housing in many favelas, such a distinction seems arbitrary and inadequate.

The physical and social distinction between favelas and *conjuntos habitacionais* is also highly tenuous. Brum (2012) describes the historical process by which a *conjunto habitacional* in Rio's North Zone, Cidade Alta, came to be widely regarded as a 'favela' by residents and non-residents alike. The settlement was built to house evicted favela residents, but like other housing projects constructed in this period was both poorly designed and subsequently abandoned by the state. The result was a process of so-called "favelisation" (*favelização*), with the emergence of an informal market in apartment sales and lettings, the widespread construction of "*puxadas*" (informal apartment extensions) and entirely new favelas surrounding the apartment blocks, and eventually the emergence of drug trafficking in the area. Despite being built by the state to offer "formal" housing to favela residents, the

social and symbolic relationship of the settlement with both the state and the city ended up reproducing conditions widely associated with favelas.

Loteamentos and *conjuntos habitacionais* may at least be seen as proximate to favelas in terms of the socio-economic profile of their populations and the role of informal processes in the allocation of housing. However, under certain circumstances grey areas can also appear on the borders between favelas and areas widely regarded as formal (and even middle-class). Cavalcanti (2014) describes the process by which formal housing in areas surrounding favelas – what she calls the 'threshold' – began to be devalued during the 1980s and 90s in a context of increased stigmatisation and rising violence in favelas. One result of this was that these formal properties became available to wealthier favela residents, who enthusiastically snapped them up. In recent years the process seems to have reversed in some areas as spiralling property prices in wealthy parts of the city along with favela pacification have made favela housing a viable alternative for prospective homebuyers accustomed to operating in the formal sector. Whereas previously the expansion of the threshold allowed some favela residents to enter the formal property market, its inversion is in some places leading to displacement, as poorer residents are hit by rising rents and utility costs. This uneven relationship between the geographical and legal borders that demarcate the favela and the dynamics of the housing market point, once again, to the instability of the formal/informal divide.

Urban borders also prove to be flexible, or "porous", in more everyday ways. In contrast to claims of the "isolation" of the urban poor, Souza e Silva notes that residents of favelas and peripheries "have always had to circulate around the city, in search of work, of leisure, of cultural activities" (Souza e Silva et al. 2013, p. 20).[63] This means that in spite of Rio de Janeiro's stark inequalities, there are high levels of everyday interaction between classes in the (usually elite) spaces where such opportunities are available. Fernandes (2012) explains this paradox by distinguishing between *mobility*, which is facilitated by the 'permeability' of urban

[63] See also Faustini (2013) for an insightful autobiographical account of how residents of the urban periphery circulate around the city.

borders, and *accessibility*, which is denied to low-income groups through processes of 'containment' that regulate their behaviour in some urban spaces. This, he argues, is realised largely through informal social mechanisms rooted in Brazil's culture of 'cordiality', of "intimacy or informality between unequals" (Fernandes 2012, p. 165), which ensures the poor *know their place* even when they are not *in it*. Carvalho (2013) makes a similar claim based on the history of Rio's Cidade Nova neighbourhood, which served as a point of inter-mixture between favela residents, samba musicians, middle-class writers, immigrant communities and others throughout much of the twentieth century. He argues that such porous urban spaces have served as key sites of encounter and intermixing between different social and ethnic groups, helping to explain how "a culture and self-image defined by mixture [can] coexist with stark socio-economic disparity" (Carvalho 2013, p. 10). While the city may have become more divided in some ways in recent times, such "doors" and "bridges" between different worlds continue to exist and to make such a paradox possible (Carvalho 2013, p. 12).[64]

If social relations regulate the behaviour of favela residents in different parts of the city, so do state institutions and armed actors. This is particularly important with regard to informal economic activity – a core component of the formal/informal divide and one that further reveals its instability. Telles (2009; 2010) notes that both the informal economy and its links to the 'world of crime' have grown dramatically at the same time that formal economic activity and consumerism have also expanded. This belies the claim that persistent informality is a product of Brazil's "incomplete modernity", rather than a core component of the country's increasing integration into the global economy. The functioning of the informal economy is tightly intertwined with both official legal and regulatory structures *and* the activities of illegal armed actors, and in the varied ways these are enacted in different parts of the city. Specifically, the informal economy in cities like São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro operates through the bribery of officials, payment of extortion money to corrupt police and criminal gangs, and dependence on complex networks

[64] Rio's beaches are often described as 'democratic spaces' of intermixing between classes. However, the highly regulated and often tense nature of such interactions suggest that they do not play such a sole (see Fernandes 2005).

of suppliers operating on both sides of officially designated distinctions of formal/informal and legal/illegal. The way in which these activities lead to the criminalisation and social stigmatisation of some parts of the population in certain areas of the city seems to relate more to 'power games' among the state and criminal actors who police such divides – arbitrary decisions about which practices are tolerated and which are repressed – than any consistently applied definition of what constitutes "formality" or "legality".

These diverse spatial, symbolic and social dimensions of the formal/informal divide point to it being a complex assemblage that draws actors into its logic at the same time as contradictory forces push them away. The divide is territorialised by discontinuity in the built environment, by the social containment of inequalities, and by the inconsistent ways in which various powerful actors behave in formal and informal areas. However, this assemblage is clearly also subject to powerful deterritorialising processes: as favelas themselves diversify and as non-favela areas are "favelised"; as porous urban borders produce sites of unpredictable inter-mixing; and as the formal and informal economies become hopelessly entangled under the propulsion of globalisation. In light of these powerful destabilising forces, the symbolic, or *expressive*, aspect of the divide, to which I turn next, seems fundamental to its preservation.

4.2.4 Identity and hegemony in the complex city

At a representational level *place* is often wrapped up in the way that communities are "imagined" (Anderson 2006). The strength of a collective place identity rests, in part, on self-identifying community members' shared sense of familiarity with and memory of particular physical landscapes, and on the retelling of stories about how they came to occupy it and have inhabited it over time (see Tuan 1978; Proshansky et al. 1983). Rio's historical process of urbanisation has produced a physical environment in favelas at a collective level that, while not entirely distinct from other kinds of neighbourhood, tends to function as a physical-symbolic identity marker for residents and non-residents alike. This appears to constitue a core

expressive component of the assemblage of the formal/informal divide in Rio de Janeiro, one which territorisalises the favela category as a whole.

At the same time, however, this urbanisation process also contributed to the construction of dense network structures and distinctive patterns of social cohesion in individual favelas (de Almeida and D'Andrea 2004). The fact that favela residents tend to use the term *comunidade* (community) rather than the more stigmatised *favela* – thus evoking a sense of internal social cohesion, rather than exclusion from the city – further reinforces a view of the individual favela as a kind of organic place-based community (do Lago 2003, pp. 121-22). Such is the intended meaning of singer Chico Buarque's lyric, "each ravine is a nation" (quoted in McCann 2014, p. 25). This suggests that individual favelas are also highly territorialised assemblages with strong social identities.

Such fusions of place and group identity can provide a powerful independent basis for processes of distinction between inhabitants of different neighbourhoods. Elias and Scotson's (1994) classic study of the English village of Winston Parva demonstrated how micro-processes of community formation, organisation and identification came to construct a formidable boundary between "established" and "outsiders" and their respective zones, even between socially indistinguishable working-class populations. Whereas established families had been in the community for three generations, and over this time developed significant internal social cohesion and influence over local institutions, the outsiders were recently arrived and disunited. As a result the former were able to use their greater organisational and symbolic power to elevate their own norms and at the same time denigrate the newcomers for lacking them, thus entrenching their superior status.

These examples evoke a sense of a highly "decentred" process of place-based identity construction through the formation of 'in-groups' and 'out-groups' occurring at highly localised scale (Lamont 2000). However, this would be to miss the powerful ways in which broader social and urban forces are already implicated in this process. Symbolic attachments to place are frequently promoted from above

by powerful actors and institutions seeking to control, protect, unify or separate different populations. Favelas, officially defined as 'subnormal agglomerations' and with specific channels to the state (eg. through residents associations, favela-specific state agencies etc.), offer a prime example of this. The community discourse surrounding favelas, for instance, caught on at a time when Rio's favelas were being carved up between competing armed groups (McCann 2014, p. 9). The language of *comunidade* could be appropriated by drug traffickers appealing for resident loyalty in the face of threats from rivals, while at the same time feeding into elite representations of favelas as 'parallel polities' that needed to be reclaimed by the state (Fernandes 2005). In this way the *decentred* place identities of residents – emerging from their own attachments to their neighbourhood and community – are tied up with more *centrifugal* processes, as powerful actors seek to ascribe identities to places in pursuit of their own interests (*ibid*.).

Neighbourhood identity formation may also relate to more diffuse distinctions that, while clearly linked to the ideological constructions of the state and other powerful actors, cannot be reduced to them. For example the discourses surrounding the division between Elias' and Scotson's "established" and "outsiders" also drew on broad and culturally embedded distinctions between the "rough" and "respectable", or "deserving" and "undeserving", poor. Similar processes seem to be at work in the way that Brum (2012) describes relational and contested processes of identity construction between the three different sections of the Cidade Alta complex in Rio's North Zone. While the three settlements officially designated as favelas are universally recognised as such, the "favelised" apartment buildings occupy a more ambiguous status, with some residents resisting the association. Nonetheless, the physical signs of informality and visible presence of drug trafficking lead a majority of residents to also identify their section of the complex as a favela. Meanwhile those living in an enclosed area of apartment buildings that have been maintained in their original physical form reject the label of favela altogether, referring to their section instead as a "condominium". The schema according to which these residents situate themselves comes from outside – that is the socio-symbolic associations attached to the favela category. In these

processes the favela seems to occupy a negative pole, which residents use as a yardstick for situating themselves.

This position of the favela in Rio de Janeiro's urban imaginary seems to fit with Wacquant's concept of 'territorial stigmatisation' (see Wacquant 2010; Wacquant et al. 2014). Using Goffman's definition of stigma as 'discrediting difference', Wacquant mobilises Bourdieu's notion of 'symbolic power' – the ability of powerful groups and institutions to make their representations "stick" (Wacquant 2010, p. 3) – to explain how such negative associations become attached to these places. While I have argued that Wacquant's analysis focussed on processes of neoliberalisation overstates the *novelty* of territorial stigma in the case of favelas (see Brum 2012), it is clearly a powerful force and has probably intensified in recent years while also becoming more closely associated with perceptions of violence (see Novaes 2014). However, Wacquant does not address the questions of who these holders of 'symbolic power' are, and of how their stigmatising representations become disseminated across the wider population.

Brum (2012) and Fernandes (2005; 2012) both argue that in the case of Rio's favelas the state has historically played a central role in the production of stigma. Both with its legal and institutional categorisation of favelas as a distinct and illegitimate form of settlement, and through successive generations of hygienist and 'removalist' policies, the state has used its symbolic and coercive power to brand residents as different and undesirable. In recent times, Fernandes (2005) argues, the state has reproduced favela stigma while shifting its focus from the hygienist objective of expulsion to a security logic of 'social control'. This fits with a broader trend of Latin American governments using stigmatising and warlike discourse to justify repressive "*mano dura*" policies against gangs, thus tainting the territories where they often live by association (Jones and Rodgers 2009, p. 8). However, favela stigmatisation by the state is not limited to outwardly violent policies. Even seemingly benevolent urban upgrading and social programmes, Fernandes argues, are constructed around discourses of favela differentness and guided by the aim of civilising and controlling the population (Fernandes 2005, pp. 16-17).

For all this, an exclusive focus on the state is unable to fully account for the production and dissemination of favela stigma. Brum (2013) describes the contribution of the print media and informal bodies representing the interests of the middle and upper classes, such as residents' groups and civic associations, in pushing forward removal policies both in the 1960s and also in recent years. Novaes (2014), meanwhile, charts the process by which print media portrayals of favela territories shifted from ignoring them altogether to presenting them as sources of violence endangering the formal city. In recent years cultural production, such as 'brutalist' depictions of favelas in popular film and television, may have further contributed to dominant association between favelas and violence in the public imaginary (Carvalho 2015). In a more subtle and indirect way, the role of marketers, property developers and other actors in the production of urban space might be seen as excluding favelas by omission, constructing and hegemonic notions of what constitutes a desirable lifestyle and living space (see Lefebvre 1991; Kipfer 2012). For Fernandes (2005), the convergence of these different actors around the production of favela stigmatisation is fuelled by shared pursuit of a 'conservative city project', designed to reproduce the spatial separation and economic and social privileges of the elite.

This idea of a state-media-elite nexus driving the production of favela stigma is persuasive. However, there are some important qualifications to make. Firstly, while dominant discourses may stigmatise favelas and their residents, the powerful actors who produce them may at the same time be deeply involved in systemic processes that offer favelas various forms of practical support and protection (Fischer 2008; 2014). A second qualification is that actors who are usually viewed as progressive, such as NGOs and other civil society organisations, are also frequently drawn into a logic that reproduces favela differentness. De Almeida et al. (2008), for example, use de Certeau's (1984) distinction between "tactics" and "strategy" to identify the process by which NGOs and community leaders must work within parameters defined at the centre in order to stake claims and achieve tangible improvements. When reversed this process evokes Gramsci's (1971, pp. 323-43) view of ideology being diffused in uneven and always incomplete ways through the

broad range of institutional and civil society actors assembled around the State. In-keeping with such an understanding, it should also be noted that while stigma may ultimately have its origins at the institutional and symbolic centre, non-elite residents of the city, including favela dwellers themselves, frequently reproduce elements of the stigmatising discourse.

Returning to the theme of complexity, favela stigma might be seen as a key *expressive* component of the assemblage of Rio's formal/informal divide. By providing a set of powerful associations it exerts a strong gravitational pull on the place-based identities of residents and non-residents alike, in spite of the more specific attachments to place and community that are also bound up in these. Such stigma is produced through a hegemonic system consisting of actors that benefit in different ways from cultivating a perception of "favela exceptionalism" – from populist politicians and sensationalist broadcasters, to NGOs appealing for public support by tapping into established narratives about favelas. In this way hegemony plays an important *territorialising* role in preserving the favela category.

4.3 Conclusion

In this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate the value of what I broadly describe as an "urban social complexity" approach to analysis of a city like Rio de Janeiro – that is to say a large metropolis in a democratic state at the global semi-periphery. This approach mobilises the concepts of complexity and assemblage as analytical tools for understanding how different entities are brought together or driven apart over time and space in dynamic and contingent ways. Although the urban social complexity approach is not exclusive to a context like Rio, it seems to have particular resonance there because economic and institutional processes are spatially complex and uneven. As a result, significant possibilities arise for *emergent* and *non-linear* forms of urban development.

While it keeps political economy at (or at least close to) the heart of analysis, the urban social complexity approach recognises that under some circumstances processes only indirectly linked to political economy, and therefore not entirely "enslaved" (Haken 1983) to its logic, may take causal precedence in determining

processes of transformation. In this way it challenges the view, implicit in critical and structuralist models, that economic processes, state structures and urban social change are so tightly bound to one another as to render processes and actors operating at lower spatial scales "causally redundant" (DeLanda 2006, pp. 36-7). Instead, such processes and actors can be seen to exert important influence over local conditions, and in some cases (most notably in the "replication" of drug trafficker and militia organisational models) to expand their impact beyond the local scale.

The second part of the chapter has proposed several ways in which an urban social complexity approach can be applied to the specific context of Rio de Janeiro. Section 4.2.1 argued that the *emergence* of Rio's system of territorial competition between armed groups injected a new causal dynamic – revolving around the ability of armed groups to control space in pursuit of their specific corporate objectives – which has fundamentally shaped the evolution of social conditions in favelas and the city more generally. Section 4.2.2, meanwhile, argued that the distribution of state resources and policies across Rio's favelas is subject to dynamics like institutional fragmentation, clientelism and the role of favela "visibility", which lead to major and sometimes unpredictable forms of spatial variation that cannot be reduced to analysis of capital circulation and deliberate state policy. The final two sections argued that Rio's formal/informal divide constitutes an assemblage that has been destabilised in recent years by diverse social, economic, and even spatial processes of transformation and convergence. Nonetheless it retains a powerful *social meaning* in part thanks to a diffuse system of hegemony that helps to sustain the widespread perception of "favela exceptionalism".

The ideas expressed in this chapter underpin the empirical analysis to be presented in the second half of this thesis. It is therefore important to note a few important implications that the urban social complexity approach has for how research and analysis are undertaken. Firstly, it demonstrates that empirical research at the scale of the neighbourhood is essential, because neighbourhood conditions cannot be deduced by knowledge of the city as a whole or on the basis of an assumed spatial correlation of economic, social and institutional processes. This also means that

analysis must be sensitive to questions of process and scale. Which actors and relationships are empowered to exert causal impact may be the result of structures and actions at other scales, which may also be liable to change and to have knock-on effects. Navigating such complexities requires a methodological approach that can maintain a view of dynamics at higher and lower scales simultaneously. The next chapter tackles this important issue.

5.0 Methodology

5.1 Research questions

As stated in the introduction, the main question this thesis seeks to answer is:

> **What are the relative contributions of structural, urban and neighbourhood-level factors in determining social conditions in favelas?**

This implies also answering a range of secondary empirical and theoretical questions raised by the literature, which can help to with formulating an answer. Specifically:

1) **How can social conditions in Rio's favelas be characterised and how do they vary across cases?**
2) **What is the relationship between *processes* at the *urban* and *neighbourhood scales* in the production of individual and collective outcomes?**
3) **What role do *social networks* play and, more generally, how much *agency* do residents exercise over these outcomes?**
4) **How does the neighbourhood contribute to the formation of resident *identities* and, through this, to the ways that residents relate to others both in and outside the neighbourhood?**

This chapter outlines the methodological approach I will adopt for addressing these questions. It begins by providing a detailed account of the research design and processes of data collection and analysis. This includes questions about the integrated use of qualitative and quantitative data, community access and engagement, and approaches to respondent sampling and interviews. It then goes on to look at tricky issues surrounding language and translation and subjectivity and power in the researcher-respondent relationship. In the final section I discuss the epistemological foundations of case-based research and present my strategy for comparative case analysis, based on Ward's (2010) argument for a 'relational comparative' approach.

5.2 Research design

5.2.1 Mixed-methods research

Although primarily based on semi-structured interviews with residents, my research incorporated a range of methods, including use of census data, some survey-style questions, participant observation and informal discussions with key informants. Such eclectic use of methods is not universally accepted among social researchers. In particular, proponents of the 'incompatibility thesis' (see Howe 1988) reject the mixing of quantitative and qualitative methods, arguing that their respective epistemological paradigms of positivism and interpretivism are irreconcilable. Howe (1988) rejects this dogmatic stance on both philosophical and practical grounds, arguing that the distinction between quantitative and qualitative research is more of a spectrum than a dichotomy. Quantitative measurements are ultimately derived from qualitative judgments, while qualitative data can often be quantified to improve comparability (Howe 1988, pp. 11-12). Furthermore the philosophical claims of purists on both sides – of an objective social reality that can be understood using rationalist methodological tools, or of an infinite number of equally valid subjective perspectives – ultimately break down both on their own terms and when applied to the practicalities of social research.

In view of these observations, Johnson and Unwuegbuzie argue that a 'post-positivist consensus' has emerged among social researchers (Johnson and Unwuegbuzie 2004, p. 16). This recognises the value- and power-laden nature of individual perspectives – indeed of 'reason' itself – but also acknowledges that evidence can vary in its validity even if it can never constitute ultimate 'proof'. This consensus complements the view of pragmatic philosophy that the pursuit of 'theories of truth' should be rejected in favour of contingent steps that work from the ground upwards, by examining the coherence of existing knowledge (Howe 1988, pp. 14-15). In this regard the research question itself, rather than an abstract paradigm, should determine the appropriate choice of methods.

5.2.2 Access and engagement

The fieldwork that provides the primary data for this thesis was conducted between October 2012 and August 2013, with most of the interviews taking place between March and August 2013. My research design developed over multiple stages before and after entry into the field, changing in response to key decisions on a range of issues, such as questions of access, sampling and data collection techniques. Given limitations of time and resources in the field I opted for two case studies rather than three as originally planned. I also decided to select only favelas as case studies rather than incorporating other 'types' of low-income neighbourhood, as I felt that this would permit a tighter comparative focus.[65] It also offered a potentially straightforward solution to the issue of access, as favelas have residents' associations (and often also NGOs) that are highly embedded in community life, whereas this is often not the case in other types of neighbourhood. Having made these decisions I selected my case studies on the basis of the comparative insights they were expected to furnish, as well as more pragmatic questions of access and logistics. Accessibility was a key consideration, in particular due to the weak integration of many of favelas into the city's transport network. In light of this – and fitting with the thrust of my research topic – I decided that selecting one centrally located favela and one more peripheral one would allow me to have relatively open access to both fieldwork sites.[66]

A second key issue to consider was security. While I was interested in comparing neighbourhoods with different security conditions, I had to consider whether problems of *insecurity* might impede the research itself. Accordingly, I decided to avoid favelas that were likely to be pacified during the period of the research, as this might have made fieldwork impossible for long periods and, by creating a highly dynamic context, produced difficulties for maintaining the thematic focus of the study. I opted to avoid areas experiencing extreme situations of conflict between

[65] I also sought areas of a comparable, if not necessarily similar population size – within the medium-sized category of favelas according to the definition used by the Rio de Janeiro *Prefeitura* of 500-2,500 dwellings (Burgos 1998, p. 49).

[66] During my fieldwork I lived in the city centre, which allowed me to have one direct bus route to each of the areas where I carried out my research.

rival armed groups for similar reasons, as well as for reasons of personal safety. This was also important for deciding whether to select a case study area controlled by a 'militia'. As noted by Cano and Loot (2008), residents of militia dominated areas tend to be less willing to participate in interviews than is the case with favelas controlled by traffickers, as the formers' greater desire for anonymity increases the risk of retribution against both researchers and participants. This situation has prompted the development of specific research methods, such as anonymous focus groups conducted outside the neighbourhood, which were not suited to my research topic. After seeking advice from experts, I chose to avoid areas dominated by particularly violent militias. I was also informed that the region of Curicica, in which one of my cases is roughly located,[67] is a "militia area", although it seems to take a less violent form there. In any case, upon expert advice I avoided asking directly about militia activity in interviews (see Section 6.5.2).

With a rough idea of the parts of the city I was interested in, I had to consider how to initiate access. In the case of Asa Branca this was facilitated through contact with the Rio-based NGO Catalytic Communities, which had a long history of collaboration with the local residents association. The president of the residents' association agreed to support the research, assisting me in approaching potential interviewees and broadening my network of contacts in the favela. I gained access to my other case study area, Tuiuti, by directly contacting the residents association, despite having no intermediary contacts. The president and secretary of the association kindly agreed to support the research in similar ways. Harper (1992) points out that the most willing respondents, such as those closely connected to mainstream institutions, are often atypical for the population as a whole. With this in mind I subsequently sought to diversify my points of entry using various techniques, including informal snowballing through individual interviewees and other contacts, and forming relationships with other significant institutions.

[67] Favela Asa branca is in fact just within the boundary of the Administrative Region of Jacarepaguá, although residents typically talk about the area as being in Curicica – see Section 5.5.2.

In Asa Branca I began regularly attending lunches and other community events organised by the *Lar São Francisco de Assis*, a Kardecist church and the only active NGO in the community, who work with many of its poorer residents. This became a primary source of recruitment of interviewees. I also attended a range of other community events, from meetings of the residents' association, to informal parties and matches of the Asa Branca youth football team, all of which offered informal opportunities for meeting and speaking to a wider range of residents.

As well as broadening my engagement with the community I also sought to deepen it, and to form relationships that were meaningful and productive in other spheres, rather than simply based around data collection. I covered the public inauguration of Asa Branca's upgrading works in December 2012 for the news website Rio On Watch (run by Catalytic Communities), publicising residents' views about the changes. Before completing my research I also worked on a project with Catalytic Communities to catalogue thousands of photos that they had taken in the community over the previous twelve years (some of which are included in this thesis). These included photographs documenting an "invasion" in 2001-02, which expanded the favela (see Section 2.3.2a), giving me valuable insights into long-term processes of urbanisation that had shaped Asa Branca's development. The project resulted in the production of a professionally printed photo book *Memórias da Asa Branca, 2001-2013* ("Memories of Asa Branca"), which we presented to the residents' association at the celebration of the community's twenty-seventh anniversary in August 2013. We also created a public Facebook page for Asa Branca displaying all of the photos and inviting residents to tag themselves and comment. We felt both of these resources would help to preserve and diffuse collective memory of the community's recent history, while also acting as tools that could be used in the event of future eviction threats of the kind faced by other favelas in the region.

Broadening access in Tuiuti was initially more challenging. I attempted to recruit interviewees through the local *Centro de Referência e Assistência Social* (*CRAS*, Social Assistance and Referral Centre) (see Section 6.4.1a) by putting up posters with contact details and asking the secretary to refer anyone who expressed

interest. However, this elicited little response. I was more successful with a small project to retrace Tuiuti's history, speaking with a few elderly residents and others with some knowledge of the topic. This was turned into an online article, which was widely read and disseminated by residents. Again I hoped that this might help to promote the collective memory of a community, which, despite being one of Rio's oldest favelas, is largely overlooked in the academic literature and public discourse on favela history.

Subsequently I was able to identify two NGOs that were active in the community, but which lacked resources to provide more than very basic services and activities in the neighbourhood. Both were very keen to provide free English lessons for residents, so, being a qualified English teacher, I volunteered to teach for both organisations during my last four months in the field. Although this produced an extra workload, it provided invaluable opportunities for spending time with residents of different ages in in a non-researcher capacity, and for recruiting interviewees. While some would question such active involvement with a community on the grounds that it provokes reactivity that can undermine the validity of findings, Burawoy points out that all research "disturbs" the field (Burawoy 1998, p. 17). Indeed, passive or shallow engagement may provoke greater reactivity if researchers are unwilling to engage in activities on their subjects' terms.

5.2.3 Data collection

Aside from the kinds of informal engagement and participant observation described above, my core data was collected in the form of semi-structured interviews with residents. Before starting I sought the assistance of a native speaker in wording my questions and I conducted two pilot interviewees after which I discussed and further refined my approach with my supervisors. The interviews were divided into five broad sections (see Appendices 1 and 2), covering: (1) Personal histories and circumstances; (2) Spatial practices; (3) Patterns of social exchange; (4) Perceptions of the community; (5) Attitudes towards current/recent changes in the area.

While I attempted to stick to the broad questionnaire structure and cover every topic in each interview, I also sought to give residents freedom to pursue their own

lines of interest where this was broadly relevant to the research. Interviews were generally held either in people's homes or in a private room in the residents association, so residents could feel relaxed and in a familiar setting. It quickly became clear that the typical 'meta-communicative norms' (Briggs 1986) within the favela context were going to require a degree of flexibility in the management of interviews. Instead of trying to enforce formalistic interview conditions, I adapted the format when circumstances required it. For example, on several occasions I conducted interviews with two, and on a few occasions three, respondents, when they expressed this preference. This created conditions in which conversations could flow naturally and respondents could interact with one another as well as the interviewer, producing some of the most useful data. On occasions friends and family members would appear and participate in parts of interviews. While I did not count these respondents as part of the interview sample I have drawn on their contributions and in a few cases quoted them.

My semi-structured and flexible approach was suited to getting rich, nuanced information about the different themes. However, there were two areas in which I hoped to get a slightly more structured set of responses and so adopted a more survey-style approach. Firstly, I sought to get information about what kinds of leisure activities people engaged in both inside and outside of the neighbourhood. For this question I provided a list of options, to make the responses quantifiable and to reduce the risk that respondents might struggle to identify their full range of activities (See Appendices 3 and 4). Secondly, I wanted to establish how often and with whom residents practised various forms of social exchange (see Appendix 4 and 5). These questions were incorporated into the interviews and were only conducted with the core sample of thirty interviewees in each community. As a result the findings are not statistically significant and offer only an *indication*, rather than evidence, of patterns of mobility and social exchange among residents.

On the subject of social networks and exchange, in both the survey-style and more open interview questions on the topic I decided against using established methods of social network analysis (SNA). These have been standardised as 'whole network' and 'ego-network' approaches (Marin and Wellman 2011). In whole-network

analysis, links are traced between multiple individuals, allowing analysts to delineate the macro-structure of a network. Meanwhile ego-networks – those surrounding individuals – are typically researched using a 'name-generator' approach, with residents asked to list multiple contacts and provide information about them and the nature of each relationship. Although there is a large methodological literature on SNA, which has helped to refine both approaches, they have also been criticised as labour-intensive, methodologically problematic, and suffering from a wide margin of response error (see Knox et al. 2006).[68] On the other hand, more conventional qualitative interviews can reveal a great deal about the structures and dynamics of resident networks. Rather than requiring that respondents provide ready-made data in the form of ego-networks, this involves translating 'thick', culturally embedded information about relationships into social network data, using the analytical tools of the approach. Such an approach is comparable to those of classic urban ethnography and social network studies (eg. Young and Wilmott 1957; Gans 1962; Perlman 1980).

Another key consideration was the need to produce a sample of interviewees that could be said to be broadly representative of each community (Schofield 1996). Besides diversifying points of entry through different local institutions and snowballing, I also sought to balance the sample across important demographic variables like age, gender, race and occupation. I achieved this by first analysing data from the 2011 to understand the demographic breakdown of Tuiuti and Asa Branca, and then seeking to maintain a balance as the sample grew. This sometimes involved asking for assistance from gatekeepers in identifying people of a particular age and/or gender, or changing the days and times when I conducted interviews to recruit respondents with different schedules. While I did not take a formal approach to sampling according to race/colour or occupation, I monitored the growing sample against census data to ensure I was not getting disproportionate numbers of

[68] Ego-network research in particular suffers from the demands it places on interviewees, which can lead to inaccurate or incomplete responses. Self-reporting of networks can also fail to pick up 'weak ties' that play an important role in the transmission of information (Granovetter 1973).

any particular group.[69] For example, there was a larger proportion of black (*preto*) respondents from Tuiuti than Asa Branca, reflecting the community's proportionately larger black population (see Section 6.2.1). Similarly, the sample from Asa Branca had more respondents employed in civil construction, reflecting the socio-occupational breakdown of the population.

While it was relatively straightforward to avoid major imbalances in the sample across these identifiable demographic characteristics, this was more difficult with regard to less formalised and subtler social differences. The most obvious gap in my sample is the fact that I did not deliberately set out to interview those involved in drug trafficking (or, indeed, with militia activities).[70] As such, while issues relating to drug trafficking are covered in detail, this is entirely from the point of view of residents who have no involvement in the drugs trade (except, possibly by association). Given my research focus, this gap in my data collection should not be a problem, as long as discussions are understood as expressing residents' subjective experiences of local security, rather than an objective representation of how it actually functions. Another issue is that while I believe I achieved a relatively balanced sample in terms of internal social differences, it was often those with more years of education and higher incomes who proved to be more "quotable". They may therefore have inadvertently gained greater prominence in the way I have presented material from my interviews. Although unavoidable, I sought to mitigate this issue by continually challenged myself to portray the views and experiences of less articulate residents in my analysis, even where this was not possible through direct use of quotes.

5.2.4 Quantitative data

My use of quantitative data had two primary purposes, one methodological and the other a core component of the research itself. As discussed, the use of census data assisted me in ensuring that my interview samples were broadly representative of

[69] I also opted against asking respondents to calculate their incomes so as to avoid making the interviews overly formalistic and intimidating. Instead I used family and employment histories as a rough proxy for household income/wealth.

[70] I also did not seek to interview police responsible for security in either case study neighbourhood.

the populations of Tuiuti and Asa Branca. By extension this and other data also indicate how far the two favelas are representative of the wider favela and urban populations, thus assisting in initial case study selection. However, this information also has a more substantive place in the analysis. As I explore in Chapter 6, quantitative data on housing, employment and infrastructure in each of the case study areas reveal important differences in local conditions, and suggest the ways in which the two communities are shaped by broader *urban processes*.

The main source of up-to-date quantitative data on Rio's neighbourhoods is the 2010 Brazilian Census, conducted by *Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estadistica* (2010). This is assembled by the Rio *Prefeitura* at the scale of the 'Administrative Region' (Rio Prefeitura). The *Prefeitura*'s research body the *Instituto Pereira Passos* (IPP) also collates data at a smaller scale, which are available on its Armazem de Dados website (IPP). Of particular use is the SABREN tool, which provides comprehensive information on individual low-income neighbourhoods. In its *Estudos Cariocas* section, the IPP website also brings together secondary studies based on census data that provide useful macro and comparative analysis of various urban issues.

A number of important issues accompany the use of official data, particularly the problems of patterned non-response and hidden populations. These problems tend to disproportionately affect marginalised social groups, thus perpetuating their invisibility and marginalisation (Schofield 1996, pp. 47-52; Bourgois 1996, pp. 2-4). For a number of reasons they are much aggravated in the case of low-income communities in Brazil, where the estimated populations of informal neighbourhoods are often subject to large variations (see Perlman 2010a, pp. 58-61). The boundaries of informal areas are imprecise, often leading census takers to miss out parts of a favela's population. There are also definitional problems, for example areas that have received land regularisation programmes and which are no longer considered by the authorities to be favelas, despite still being popularly perceived as such. Even where boundaries and definitions are clear, the populations of favelas and other low-income neighbourhoods are difficult to pin down with a high level of accuracy, due to widespread absence of formal addresses and property

registration, and the very high levels of sub-letting, multiple occupations and 'floating populations' in some areas. Furthermore, some favelas are difficult to reach, while others can be dangerous for census takers if they do not have permission from local traffickers to conduct their research. Finally, some residents involved in the illicit economy may have good reason to avoid detection, while many more are reluctant to co-operate due to their suspicion of officialdom. These shortcomings with census data highlight the need to triangulate official numbers with local knowledge. They also reinforce the benefits of adopting a mixed-methods approach in which quantitative data constitute one part of a wider investigation.

5.3 Translation, power and the politics of representation

5.3.1 Language and translation

An inescapable influence on my research was my status as a non-native Portuguese speaker and cultural outsider, with limited knowledge of the 'meta-communicative norms' of the population I was studying (Briggs 1986). Language is a 'conceptual scheme' that not only conveys culturally situated perceptions of reality, but also shapes them. This observation has led to pessimism in some quarters about the ability of non-native researchers to understand and translate their subjects' ideas at all, without imposing their own outsiders' conceptual scheme (Maclean 2007, pp. 785-86). As argued by Maclean, the view of languages as static and bounded structures ignores the dynamic processes of translation that go on continuously between different languages and different speakers of the same language, for whom other factors – such as local dialects, regional cultures and social class – permeate their own conceptual schemes. This more fluid understanding presents linguistic translation as just one, albeit particularly formidable, part of a larger problem of cultural translation, which can be equally (and at times more) problematic for native speakers.

There are certain measures non-native speakers can take in order to confront this challenge and reduce the risk of 'speaking *for* the other' (Maclean 2007, pp. 85-88). Firstly, they must familiarise themselves as much as possible with the cultural and linguistic practices and norms of the studied community, including their internal

variations and any changes they might be undergoing (Maclean 2007, pp. 785-86). As noted by Briggs (1986), this is particularly important in the interview process itself. Many communities are not accustomed to the communicative patterns of the interview, with its formalistic setting, focus on verbal over other forms of communication, procedures of turn-taking and largely interviewer-determined content. Failure to acknowledge such issues can lead researchers to undermine their relationships with respondents and, ultimately, the validity of the data collected. I took pre-emptive steps to avoid these issues, for example seeking the help of native speakers with wording my questions, approaching potential respondents through known intermediaries whom they trusted, and seeking to create relaxed settings for interviews. Inevitably there were some miscommunications, particularly in my earlier interviews. However, as my mastery of the relevant communicative norms and of the interview material itself grew over time I felt more able to avoid confusion and ensure that respondents felt comfortable.

5.3.2 Subjectivity and inequality in the researcher-respondent relationship

The challenges relating to language and translation touch upon much broader issues of subjectivity and unequal power in the researcher-respondent relationship. Post-structuralist theoretical critiques shook the foundations of qualitative social research, discrediting the 'myth of ethnographic authority' that had allowed researchers to believe they could 'remove themselves from the field' and leave disinterested scientific procedures to determine the selection and interpretation of 'facts' (Scheper-Hughes 1992, p. 23). Such critiques have forced researchers to become more aware of the cultural baggage they bring to the field, of the power they wield in structuring the research process and interpreting their findings, and of the role such distortions can play in perpetuating 'inferiorising narratives' about those they study (Bourgois 1996, p. 12).

Unfortunately, the post-modern turn has also had unintended, and far less positive consequences. The highly charged 'politics of representation' that has come to surround social research with disadvantaged and marginalised groups has had the

effect of discouraging many from taking up the challenge, in favour of studying groups whose social and cultural distance is not as great or problematic (Goldstein 2003, pp. xiii-xvi). This reduces the ability of social research to challenge ideologies that perpetuate such power inequalities by shutting down one of the few channels through which the voices of subaltern groups can potentially be heard and better understood by wider society. Many who do take up the challenge end up following a path towards a self-defeating cultural and moral relativism. Fear of joining a chorus of 'victim-blaming' narratives leads some to sanitise their representations of subject populations, which can paradoxically help to normalise the social injustice that produces their marginalisation (Bourgois 1996, p. 12). Others seeking to avoid inadvertently imposing neo-colonial narratives adopt an obsessive, even narcissistic, habit of open self-reflection – what Geertz described as the 'diary disease' (quoted in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 41). Such strategies tend not only detract from readers' understanding of the subject in its social context, but to remove much of the social and moral force of the analysis.

Together these challenges constitute a complex terrain for the researcher, which cannot be negotiated without having an explicit idea of his or her role and purpose. The researcher is not a blank canvas, but emerges from a social and cultural location that bears a dynamic, but specific symbolic relationship to those s/he studies. This relationship is influenced as much by the inherent 'intellectualist bias' that leads the researcher to see the world as a "spectacle", as by his/her personal background (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, pp. 36-46). While this relationship can transform during the research process, it does not simply melt away and allow the researcher to become a 'member' of the community in question. However as Zaluar (2009) points out, as much as this creates barriers, it also presents opportunities to build strong and sincere relationships based on mutually agreed expectations, which can lead to the researcher being accepted as a 'partner' in a dialogic process. In this way the researcher can act as a bridge between two worlds, translating participants' concepts and words into those of the academy to challenge dominant representations, while also challenging and being challenged by the participants themselves. Scheper-Hughes sums it up nicely:

> The anthropologist is an instrument of cultural translation that is necessarily flawed and biased. We cannot rid ourselves of the cultural self we bring with us into the field any more than we can disown the eyes, ears and skin through which we take in our intuitive perceptions about the new and strange world we have entered. Nonetheless, like every other master artisan (and I dare say that at our best we are this), we struggle to do the best we can with the limited resources we have at hand – our ability to listen and observe carefully, empathetically and compassionately. (Scheper-Hughes 1991, pp. 27-28)

5.4 Comparative case research

5.4.1 The purpose and uses of case studies

My topic is both case-based and inherently comparative, pursued on the assumption that analysing and comparing two neighbourhoods can yield findings that are relevant to wider questions of urban social organisation. The purpose and uses of case studies have been widely misunderstood in social research (see Flyvberg 2006; Buroway 1998; Ragin 1992a). Ragin points out that contrary to widespread perception virtually every social science study is a 'case' study (Ragin 1992a, p. 2). Unlike other discourses about social life, such as journalism or history, social science methodology assumes that inherently comparable cases can be identified within human society. What constitutes a case may vary from the individual to large organisations to abstract concepts like class structures or varieties of nationalism. Accordingly, research with the same group of participants could have as its object any number of possible cases. By subjecting their cases to rigorous comparison, repetition and/or analysis social scientists believe they can identify them as 'typical, or exemplary, or extreme or theoretically decisive in some other way' (*ibid*.), thus implicitly or explicitly making generalisations about a population of cases as a whole and of the position of the single case within it.

Where case study research does vary is in the number of cases involved, the methods of data collection and the claims researchers believe they can make based on their results. Typically quantitative studies opt for a large number of cases and collect a limited amount of standardised information about each case, while

qualitative researchers seek to gather detailed and often case-specific information about one or a few cases. Many see this use of 'small Ns' by qualitative researchers as inherently problematic on two separate grounds. The first is a presumed inability of researchers to arrive at broad generalisations about populations based on one or a few cases, and thus to contribute to the development of scientific knowledge (Flyvberg 2006). A softer version of this position is the view that while there is a place for case studies in social research, their specificities make them useful only for generating hypotheses, which must then be tested or developed into general theories using more 'reliable' quantitative methods.

Flyvberg persuasively argues that this position is based on misunderstandings both of scientific method and the role of the case within it. As there can probably be no predictive theory in the social sciences analogous to that found in the natural sciences, concrete, context-dependent knowledge is more valuable than general, context-independent theorisation in the development of theories about social life (Flyvberg 2006, p. 223). Indeed, even in the natural sciences it is through the careful use of exemplars constructed on the basis of existing knowledge that science advances. Such exemplars challenge salient paradigms through falsification, or seek to absorb anomalies to try and further refine existing theories (Burawoy 1998, p. 16). Accordingly, depending on the question being asked and the cases selected, single cases can be decisive in testing theories as well as generating hypotheses. This is attested to by the example that the observation of just one black swan would disprove the proposition "that all swan are white" (Flyvberg 2006, p. 228).

The second critique of small-*N* case methodology is that it contains a "verification bias", whereby the undisciplined subjectivity involved in selection and analysis of a case by a qualitative researcher is likely to lead to confirmation of their initial assumptions (Flyvberg 2006, p. 234). Lieberson (1992) connects this to the epistemological underpinnings of the different approaches. He argues that large-*N* studies are probabilistic in that they assume not all cases will have exactly the same 'causal configurations' and therefore recognise the limits to accurately identifying and measuring all possible causal factors. As a result they look for patterns and variations in outcomes across variables, which indicate, but cannot prove, the

existence of causal relationships. By contrast small-*N* studies are deterministic because they assume the explanation for the outcome must lie in the observed properties of the case itself. This can lead to tautological arguments in which the outcome is supposed to lead inevitably from the characteristics of the case.

Becker (1992) accepts the definition of qualitative case studies as deterministic, but rejects that quantitative approaches are any better at identifying causal configurations. Even using complex methods to identify interaction effects and temporal sequences, the view of variables as the indivisible, independent and equivalent potential causal components of an outcome, is inadequate to deal with the complexity of real world causality (Becker 1992). By contrast qualitative researchers, particularly of the more ethnographic variety, have the advantage that they can redefine "what is the case" and what questions they will ask of it as they undergo inductive exposure to, and reflect upon, their object of study (Ragin 1992a, pp. 4-5). This in fact reduces the likelihood of tautological arguments or subjective bias, because theories constantly need to be reworked, cases dissected and anomalies accounted for. Because the objects of a qualitative study have more opportunities to "talk back", the field becomes a "powerful disciplinary force: assertive, demanding, even coercive" (Geertz quoted in Flyvberg 2006, p. 235), making falsification at least as likely an outcome as verification. Accordingly, the determinism of the case study is always provisional, because the instead of trying to explain the 'whole', researchers constantly rework their answer to the question of what kind of 'whole' could encompass the 'part' being observed (Becker 1992).

5.4.2 Neighbourhoods as cases

There is a rich tradition of urban neighbourhood case studies dating back to the early work of the Chicago School of urban sociology (eg. Whyte 1999) and post-War studies in the US and Europe (eg. Young and Wilmott 1957; Gans 1962). These studies focussed on kinship networks, at a time when – at least for the immigrant, poor and/or working-class populations they studied – these tended to be spatially confined both by the internal glue of affective bonds and obligations and the external constraints imposed by these populations' weak positions in urban housing

and labour markets. Indeed, Young and Willmott's observation of the splintering of kinship networks through the re-housing of many nuclear families in peripheral housing estates is one important driver of the diffusion of social networks and the divergence of 'neighbourhood' and 'community' also observed by Wellman (1979). These early case studies probably overemphasised the homogeneity and social cohesion of their case neighbourhoods (Blokland and Rae 2008). Nonetheless, those seeking to conduct similar studies now face a range of more complex problems in delimiting and analysing their cases.

Despite the divergence between neighbourhood and community quantitative researchers have tended to persist with data derived from census tracts, electoral wards or other official spatial units in seeking to understand the characteristics of local populations. This is highly problematic for several reasons. Administrative boundaries rarely correspond meaningfully to the geographies of social life (Harper, 1992; Gomez 2010, p. 181). Where possible, adapting the data to fit with 'ecological' characteristics, such as patterns of demographic and ethnic variation and physical barriers like parks and major roads, can help to improve representativeness (Sampson et al. 1997, p. 919). However, approaches of this kind still risk falling victim to the 'ecological fallacy', whereby residents are assumed to share the average characteristics of the group in which they have been categorised (Gomez 2010, p. 180). In order to avoid these errors, quantitative data must be complemented by detailed understanding of how space is defined and used by residents themselves (Gomez 2010, pp. 187-89; Harper 1992).

This task introduces further challenges, as there are multiple overlapping geographies of the neighbourhood among local populations and even for individual residents. Resident folk models may reify the neighbourhood in much the same way as official boundaries and these may poorly reflect the way it is used and experienced by those who live there. For example, personal circumstances can help to determine an individual's orientation to the neighbourhood, with young children, the elderly and the poor often heavily constrained in their mobility, and thus more 'neighbourhood dependent' than others (Meegan and Mitchell, 2001: 2173). Residents also behave differently and hold different expectations of their

neighbourhood at different spatial scales. Suttles (1973) noted that parents would only allow children to play unsupervised at the scale of the 'block face'. Meanwhile, the 'defended area' of the surrounding streets was a source of collective identity and potentially a basis of community solidarity among residents. At a wider level the 'community of limited liability' did not command residents' loyalty to the same degree, but it could be the basis of collective action if interests and identities converged around a particular issue.

These multiple neighbourhood geographies complicate the direct comparison of different areas. However this apparent irreducibility does not mean that the neighbourhood has an infinite number of meanings, or no meaning at all. Neighbourhoods' physical and social characteristics are the product of historical processes: of construction and reconstruction of the built environment; of economic and social change; and of past and ongoing struggles over who gets to decide the neighbourhood's future. Furthermore, the different neighbourhoods of a city are economically and symbolically interconnected, which further serves to stabilise historically constituted place identities, without making them static or homogeneous. As Ward (2010) has argued for the comparative studies of whole cities, comparison of neighbourhoods requires a 'relational comparative approach' that recognises both interconnectedness and the ongoing social construction of place meanings.

5.4.3 Case selection and comparison

A relational comparative approach places 'differences', rather than 'ideal types', at the centre of analysis (Ward 2010, pp. 480-82). The distinction is a subtle but important one: with a focus on differences cases are not assumed to belong to a wider class of cases to which findings can be automatically be generalised. This does not mean generalisations cannot be made, but it means they are always provisional and must be continuously reworked as further differences emerge. A similar idea is Guba and Lincoln's (1982) proposal of replacing the positivist concept of "generalisability" with that of the "transferability" of hypotheses between cases, depending on the degree of contextual similarity. This places an onus on the case

researcher to provide "thick" and detailed information about the case and the setting in which it is found, without which "it is impossible to make an informed judgment about whether the conclusions drawn from the study of any particular site are useful in understanding other sites" (Schofield 1993, p. 206).

In light of the complex patterns of variation across Rio de Janeiro's favelas intimated in Chapters 2 and 4, an approach to case comparison based on differences and transferability seems appropriate. Nonetheless, despite rejecting the idea of 'ideal types' of favelas, certain factors shaping variation did help guide my selection of the cases of Tuiuti and Asa Branca. Key among these were the location and age of the settlement, local economic context, security situation and history of public investment. The logic of this approach is that identified by Flyvberg as a strategy of 'maximum variation cases', which seek to "obtain information about the significance of various circumstances for case process and outcome" (Flyvberg 2006, p. 230). Because these factors are to some degree interlinked (eg. central favelas tend to be older and, for this and other reasons, are more likely to have received government investment) and because other more local processes also shape variation, specificity cannot be generalised away. Nonetheless, some findings might be carefully *transferred* from the cases to other favelas (and indeed formal neighbourhoods) in Rio de Janeiro (and perhaps elsewhere) where similar conditions can be identified.

5.5 Conclusion

This thesis seeks to understand what factors, operating at which scales, exercise primary causal force in shaping conditions in Rio de Janeiro's favelas. It is based primarily on qualitative interview and ethnographic research conducted with residents of two contrasting favelas. Underlying the research is the assumption that a comparison of two favelas in Rio de Janeiro might yield insights about neighbourhood inequalities and processes of social reproduction that are applicable beyond the cases themselves. My approach to case comparison is based on Ward's (2010) concept of a 'relational comparative approach'. This recognises neighbourhoods as comparable and also interconnected through their common

integration into broader material, social and symbolic systems. Provisional generalisations can be made from a single case to the extent that findings are "transferable" to other contexts, rather than on the basis of assumed "generalisability" to a wider category of cases. The comparative analysis of two cases is therefore likely to reveal similarities and differences that can provide firm foundations for making assessments about wider transferability.

Alongside practical considerations, I selected my two cases of Tuiuti and Asa Branca on the basis that they embodied comparable, yet strongly contrasting contexts. While both are medium-sized favelas, they differ in terms of proximity to the city centre, age and settlement process, local economic context, history of public intervention and conditions of security. Although the comparison does not exhaust the different conditions of Rio's favelas (or, indeed, other low-income neighbourhoods) across these different dimensions, they provide a strong comparative lens for observing the interactions and impacts of these different factors in specific contexts.

Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will analyse and compare these cases across the three sub-topics identified in the introduction. The first empirical chapter, "Favela", looks at the way different urban processes become assembled in each neighbourhood to constitute a particular local opportunity structure. The second, "Network", looks at the ways in which residents' social networks respond to neighbourhood conditions and how these interactions serve to facilitate or impede the realisation of individual and collective aims. The third, "Identity", examines how resident identities take form through internal and external comparisons and different socio-symbolic and moral frameworks, and what consequences this has for social relations both within the favela and beyond. In the conclusion I provide an overall synthesis and summary of the key findings.

6.0 Favela

6.1 Situating Tuiuti and Asa Branca

This chapter seeks to locate my case studies, the favelas of Tuiuti and Asa Branca, within a set of important "urban processes" that I argue play a decisive role in determining their respective social conditions. Although the case studies are both favelas and thus subject to several shared processes and constraints, I argue that the spatial dynamics of these urban processes produce significant differences *between* them and across Rio de Janeiro's favelas more generally. These processes therefore exert a powerful *deterritorialising* impact on the favela category, while also revealing some of the structural or "material" factors that continue to *territorialise* it (DeLanda 2006, pp. 12-13).[71] At the scale of the individual favela the processes become entangled to form a kind of local opportunity structure, which heavily determines the opportunities, resources and freedoms that are made available to the local population. This also establishes the parameters within which actors and processes operating at lower spatial scales may exercise causal influence.

The urban processes I discuss have been identified based on key themes emerging from the literature explored in Chapters 2. 3 and 4. They are: (1) urbanisation and residential mobility; (2) economic development; (3) state intervention; and (4) territorial competition between armed groups. As has been discussed, questions of housing and employment, as well as patterns of state intervention, are central to the critical urban literature. Issues of security and violence and their relationship to urban segregation, meanwhile, have been a key focus of the Latin American urban research agenda since the 1980s. These four different aspects of urban social organisation are clearly interlinked in important ways. However, following on from the arguments made in Chapter 4 about urban social complexity, it is suggested that each unfolds according to a logic and spatiality that is ultimately irreducible – at least in any analytically meaningful way – to the others, or to any smaller set of pre-eminent factors. As such they must be disaggregated and understood on their own terms before they can be conceived collectively.

[71] The "expressive" factors that territorialise the favela category are discussed in Chapter 8.

Before exploring the differential impacts of these processes on Tuiuti and Asa Branca, a couple of important clarifications are needed. Firstly, "urban processes" identified are not necessarily equivalent in terms of their spatial and temporal dimensions. They unfold across different geographies, producing varied relationships and hierarchies between territories. While some may operate according to relatively short-term dynamics (eg. armed groups contesting territory), the effects of others may only be felt long after they first arise (eg. the long-term economic consequences of a particular configuration of the built environment). Second, each process is itself a composite category consisting of a range of more specific mechanisms. For example the informal housing market is here conceived as one component among several that contribute to the "urbanisation" process, while clientelist networks are understood as one among many shaping patterns of "state intervention". Clearly then, these urban processes should not be mistaken for neatly bounded, internally coherent categories. Rather, they are analytical constructs that are useful for addressing the specific question at hand.

The chapter works through each of the four processes in sequence, examining how they shape conditions in Tuiuti and Asa Branca and generate differences between them. Each section has a conclusion in which findings are compared and broader trends observed, indicating how these processes may be conceived at the wider urban scale. The overall conclusion attempts to bring the different processes and scales together to explain how general aspects of commonality and difference among Rio's favelas emerge.

6.2 Urbanisation and residential mobility

As the brief introduction to the case studies in Chapter 2 indicated, Tuiuti and Asa Branca were first established and have subsequently developed under conditions determined by the dynamics of urbanisation and the production of urban space in Rio at different historical moments. Urbanisation[72] is simultaneously a physical and

[72] "Urbanisation" is here used as a shorthand to refer to: (1) the initial process of constructing the urban environment on undeveloped land (its most common meaning); but

a social process. The materials and land available for the production of favela housing and the mode of their appropriation are, in the first instance, determined by the exclusion of settlers from meaningful forms of citizenship and social and economic participation. It operates according to what Abramo (2003) calls a 'logic of necessity' – distinct from the logics of the 'market' and of the 'state' that have dominated processes of urbanisation and the production of urban space in the 'central' capitalist countries. However, as argued by Harvey (1982: 399-400), the consolidation of a particular configuration of the built environment can also determine an area's long-term social condition. By locking in advantages or disadvantages it can either attract or repel market and state investment until such a time that a change in the requirements of capital or government policies lead to its social and/or physical transformation.[73]

Ending the analysis of urbanisation here would lead us to the conclusion that excluded places like favelas tend to attract excluded people while repelling those who have or are able to accumulate greater resources and/or achieve fuller citizenship. However, the picture is more complicated than this. For a variety of reasons, favelas are, at best, inefficient sorters of populations. Firstly, like most neighbourhoods where owner-occupation is the primary form of tenure (albeit in this case a peculiar form of 'ownership'), resident mobility is characterised by a high degree of inertia. Favela residents do not simply move away if the value of their property rises or if, on the other hand, they accumulate enough money to be able to buy a house elsewhere. Instead they weigh up various attributes of the favela relative to other areas, like proximity to work, family and friends and local social conditions. Secondly, Rio's favelas vary hugely in terms of the extent to which the logics of the market and of the state have come to influence the occupation of and production of space within the area.

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also (2) the subsequent transformation of urban space; and (3) the processes by which space is appropriated by different groups.

[73] This reveals the clear mutual influence between urbanisation and the evolving geographies of economic change and state intervention that will be discussed in the following two sections.

Processes of urbanisation in individual favelas are crucial to understanding the constitution of its population and, as the next chapter will examine, its internal network structures and dynamics. This section will analyse how the populations of Tuiuti and Asa Branca have been formed, through an overview of the two favelas' demographic profiles and analyses of residential histories of interviewees. This data then provides the basis for an assessment of the relative "selectivity" of the two neighbourhoods.

6.2.1 Case study populations: Demography and housing

The 2010 census reveals interesting similarities and differences between the populations of Tuiuti and Asa Branca, and to that Rio's favela population as a whole (IBGE 2010). As can be seen in Figure 4, the age structures of the two communities broadly conform to that of the favela population of Rio de Janeiro municipality, with one important caveat. Tuiuti's over-60 population is considerably larger than that of Rio's favelas, reflecting its long history and stability, whereas Asa Branca's, it being a relatively new favela, is slightly lower than average. The difference between the two is spread across Asa Branca's middle-aged and youth categories, which are all slightly higher than Tuiuti's, and giving it a larger working-age population. Interestingly Tuiuti has a slightly higher population below the age of 14, and thus closer to the favela average than Asa Branca.

Figure 4. Age structure (Source: IBGE 2010)



These differences are partially explained by the gender breakdown of the case study areas (Table 2). Tuiuti's relatively older population means that it has a higher

proportion of female residents – more so than is generally the case in Rio's favelas, though less than would be found in formal areas where life expectancy is higher. By contrast Asa Branca has a slightly higher level of male residents, most likely the result of its use as a base for disproportionately male migrants and temporary labourers, which also seems to account for the lower proportion of children.

Figure 5. Gender breakdown (Source: IBGE 2010)

	Male	**Female**
Tuiuti	47.5	52.5
Asa Branca	50.5	49.5
Rio de Janeiro (favelas)	48.8	51.2

As previously discussed, the indicators used by the Brazilian census to collect data on race are problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, the three primary categories used, of 'black', 'white' and 'brown', fail to account for Brazil's long history of racial intermixing and the spectacular diversity it has produced.[74] Furthermore, as responses are self-reported, they are likely to reflect personal identity as much as physical characteristics, and therefore to be shaped by subtle forms of discrimination around race.

Despite these qualifications, it is interesting to note differences in the racial composition of the two case study populations (Figure 4). Asa Branca is close to the Rio de Janeiro favela average, with close to half the population identifying themselves as brown, around one third as white, and about one sixth as black. In Tuiuti, by contrast, over 20% of residents declare themselves to be black, whereas the other two categories are proportionately lower than average. This reflects the historical settlement of Tuiuti by predominantly black migrants from nearby rural areas at a time when a significant proportion of Rio de Janeiro's favela population was likely to have been of African descent. This historical identity may also lead residents to more readily identify with the 'black' category and its cultural associations than residents of other neighbourhoods. By contrast Asa Branca's population has been constituted since the 1980s by arrivals from diverse points of

[74] The other two categories of 'indigenous' and 'yellow' (the term used for Brazilians of East Asian descent) have extremely low representation in Rio's favelas and the rest of the city.

origin, including cariocas of different backgrounds and migrants from different regions of the North East of Brazil, with their varied historical mixtures of European, African and indigenous populations.

Figure 6. Race/colour (Source: IBGE 2010)



These different historical processes of neighbourhood formation also clearly shape current dynamics in the housing market, which, as the next section explains, are in turn influencing emergent patterns of residential occupation. A clear and important difference between Tuiuti and Asa Branca is in the proportion of owners versus renters who live in each area (Figure 5). In Asa Branca almost 30% of residents rent, compared to just 17% in Tuiuti.[75] Even more notable is the change in this figure between the 2000 and 2010 censuses. In 2000 only 9.5% of Asa Branca's population rented (IBGE 2000), meaning the proportion of renters more than tripled in the space of ten years. Over the same period the population as a whole grew by over 50%, from 2,030 to 3,295 (IBGE 2000; IBGE 2010).[76] By contrast Tuiuti's population grew by slightly over one fifth and the proportion of renters only increased from 16.9% to 17.3%. A similar story was found by Abramo (2003, p. 12) who, in a large study of the favela housing market, found that Tuiuti had an unusually low number of sales and, accordingly, a unusually large number of participants who had inherited their current property.

[75] The 'other' category includes conditions of 'owned and in acquisition', 'ceded by employer', 'ceded in other form' and 'other condition'. Aggregated data for all of Rio's favelas was not available at time of writing.

[76] This means an absolute increase in the number of renters from under 200 to over 1,000.

Figure 7. Housing tenure (Source: IBGE 2010)



As these findings indicate, Tuiuti and Asa Branca occupy almost polar extremes in terms of their relative stages in the process of physical consolidation. Asa Branca continues to grow upwards (though no longer outwards), whereas in Tuiuti space for growth is effectively saturated. It also reveals the importance of relative economic dynamics in the regions surrounding two areas and the pull they exercise for potential migrants. These issues are taken up in the following discussion of residential trajectories and the tricky question of 'neighbourhood selection'.

6.2.2 Residential histories

6.2.2a Residential histories: Tuiuti

Although the interviewee samples cannot be assumed to represent the typical residential trajectories of the populations as a whole, there are recurrent trends that can help to explain whether – and if so what – significant differences exist between the populations of Asa Branca and Tuiuti, independent of their place of residence.

The vast majority of interviewees in Tuiuti, regardless of age, had grown up in the favela. The exceptions were three residents who had migrated to Tuiuti from Minas Gerais in their youth (two of whom were aged over sixty), and three other residents, (all in their twenties and thirties), who had moved from other nearby favelas in Rio in order to move in with partners who lived in Tuiuti. A final, apparently anomalous exception, was a resident who had previously rented a house in Favela Tabajares in Copacabana and recently moved to Tuiuti where, (he had been informed by a friend), he would be able to rent more cheaply. Of the remainder who had grown up in Tuiuti some could identify a parent or grandparent

who had moved there from elsewhere – usually from outside Rio, though in some cases from other relatively central favelas. For example:

> My mum came here from Méier[77] … she married and came to the hill. My dad came from Salgueiro. How they found out about this place, I don't know. I don't know if it it's because Salgueiro is across from here and they discovered another hill. *[Female 44, Tuiuti]*

To summarise, the most common reasons for moving to Tuiuti (among those who could identify one) were moving in with a partner who already lived in the favela, or following family members in migration networks from other regions. On the other hand, like the respondent quoted above, many could not say when or why their family had arrived there. These trajectories suggest a low level of *selectivity* in the formation of the population.

However, patterns in who *leaves* the favela may nonetheless have helped to shape the population in an indirect way. Given that former residents who have moved away did not constitute part of the sample this is difficult to infer with any kind of accuracy. Nonetheless, cases of respondents who had moved away and then returned (of which there were four in the sample) and respondents with family members who had moved away (of whom there were several), give some indication of the circumstances under which this may typically occur.

In most cases residents who left transitioned into formal home ownership in a distant suburb. While this may seem like evidence of upward social mobility among leavers, however, the explanation is certainly more complicated. The trade-off between having more space in a formal neighbourhood (or housing project) in the periphery and staying in a favela like Tuiuti is not straightforward. One resident's disagreement with her husband on this issue reveals the tension:

> I want to leave here.. I want to leave, to a place where I can have my own space and a bit of privacy. Even though Paciência is a long way from here,[78] you know

[77] Méier is a suburb in the inner North Zone

[78] Paciência is a neighbourhood in the far north west of Rio de Janeiro, the region where the majority of new affordable housing units are being built.

> … But my husband won't go. He likes it here. He says it's close to everything, it's calm, our family are around here. *[Female 50, Tuiuti]*

Many interviewees in well-paid jobs who could have moved out had consciously chosen not to do so, preferring to stay close to work and among friends and family.[79] Furthermore, when people had chosen to leave there was another conditioning factor. These included the inability to expand an existing family home in the favela to accommodate a family and/or when a resident married someone who already lived in another part of the city. In both cases the role of personal circumstances relating to the life-course seems more significant than any selective "sorting-out" of more able or ambitious residents.

6.1.2b Residential histories: Asa Branca

The residential histories of respondents in Asa Branca differed sharply from this, with all but one sixteen year-old resident having arrived to the favela from somewhere else. Many were interregional migrants originating from a variety of states, including Bahia, Pernambuco, Paraíba, Maranhão, Ceará and Minas Gerais. The vast majority of migrants said opportunities for employment were the main factor that had attracted them to Asa Branca and to Rio in general. For some, Asa Branca was their first point of arrival in Rio, either having family already in the area or because they had found out about opportunities to rent or buy through information networks stretching back to their place of origin. Others had first stayed with extended family in other parts of the city and then moved to Asa Branca to achieve independence or start a family.

The residents arriving from other parts of Rio de Janeiro, had typically arrived from elsewhere in Jacarepaguá, or otherwise from other suburban areas in Rio's north or west zones. These moves followed two broad trends, which can (perhaps simplistically) be defined as (1) necessity and (2) choice.

Most residents who took part in either the original invasion or subsequent expansions of the community were motivated primarily by the 'logic of necessity'

[79] This seems to be supported by data on income in the next section.

(Abramo 2003). One young resident, who as a child had taken part in the 2002 invasion, described a paradigmatic case of how this might occur:

> Before the invasion we used to rent. My mother had five children. It was just her with the five of us. My father had left. So for her to work, look after the children and pay the rent the cost was very high. So we came here, built a wooden hut… and we stayed. *[Female 21, Asa Branca]*

As this implies, this group includes a large number of people who moved from renting (whether in the formal or informal sector) to home ownership, albeit without land title and under conditions of extreme precarity – often starting out with a wooden hut and gradually rebuilding with solid materials.

Later arrivals, who bought rather than built their homes, may also be seen as operating under the logic of necessity. However, their ability to pay the up front cost of buying a house in a favela (as is almost always required), indicates a greater degree of "choice", albeit under highly constrained conditions. Among these residents most reported having chosen Asa Branca because of its proximity to employment opportunities and because of the absence of drug trafficking and violence in the area. For example, one resident who lived in an apartment in a *conjunto habitacional* (housing project) in Santa Cruz, chose to sell his apartment and buy an undeveloped plot of land soon after the 2002 invasion. He explained his reasons:

> It's the social environment. You really notice the difference… that you feel safe walking around here at night. Plus here we're close to everything.. the beach, the shops, work. *[Male 48, Asa Branca]*

One final, distinct type of residential situation was encountered in the interviews. This was the situation in which the adult children of residents of Asa Branca or of nearby Curicica had moved out from their parents' home in order to start a family, but were not in a financial position to buy a house there, and so were forced to rent. In this situation the necessity/choice distinction becomes even more problematic. These households have chosen to stay in the area, close to their social

networks and, in many cases, places of work. However they are unable to realise the benefit of home ownership that had motivated the original settlers. Nonetheless, according Abramo's schema, this situation clearly reflects a transition from the 'logic of necessity' to 'the logic of the market' in allocation of space within Asa Branca.

6.2.3 Neighbourhood selection?

The key factor that conditions the housing trajectories of residents of both Tuiuti and Asa Branca is weak market power. A distinction might be drawn between the absolute necessity of the original occupants of both communities – who established favelas due to their inability to secure housing through any other means – and those who have opted to move in (or in the case of some renters, stay) through the process of market exchange. However, all of these decisions are taken within the context of major financial constraints and where enormous trade-offs must be made – between proximity to extended family and home ownership, for example, or between employment opportunities and the decision to live in a favela rather than a formal neighbourhood.

However, beyond this fundamental similarity, which would apply to all favela residents, can interviewees' residential trajectories be said to demonstrate any consistent differences in terms of the kind(s) of people who live in Tuiuti or Asa Branca? Tuiuti's dominant characteristic is its residential stability. Beyond this, the only selective process likely to influence the composition of the population is the decision to *leave*. However, while it is impossible to rule out a selective sorting via this process, the limited and entirely anecdotal evidence available from the interview sample suggests that the decision to leave is more determined by questions of personal circumstances relating to the life-course, than some kind of "brain drain".

Given Asa Branca's diversity of residents it is difficult to generalise at all about processes of neighbourhood selection there. What is clear is that the favela has transitioned spectacularly from being dominated by original settlers and their descendents a little over ten years ago, to having an extremely dynamic housing

market, catering to a broad range of people and circumstances. Although the penetration of the market appears to have introduced a mechanism for selective sorting, it is doing so in a highly ambiguous way. Although clearly attracting some new residents with relatively greater market power, who favour the favela for its location and social environment, it is also attracting interregional migrants who are often poorer and less educated than the existing population. If anything, these residents are less selective about where they live – having often chosen Asa Branca based on limited information accessed through small social networks (although their status as migrants may mean they are the most able or ambitious individuals from their places of origin).

On the whole, there appears to be no unambiguous process of residential selectivity occurring, or at least none that would render the comparison of Tuiuti and Asa Branca pointless. If there is a difference it is in the greater presence of *selectivity* in Asa Branca in general. As will be discussed in the next chapter, this in itself has an important bearing on differences in patterns of sociability between the two areas.

6.3 Economic development

The second key urban process identified is economic economic development. Rio de Janeiro's economic geography and its transformation over time are determined by a complex range of factors operating at the regional, national and global scales. These include globalisation, technological advancements, government economic policy and the decisions of large and medium-sized firms. Within the city itself economic change is heavily influenced by the other urban processes discussed in this chapter – urbanisation, state intervention, and territorial conflict and control – just as it, in turn, helps to shape each of them.

The integration of individual urban residents into the urban economic geography is not solely determined by the insertion of their neighbourhood. Other important influences include: household divisions of labour according to gender and age; the existence of gender or ethnic/racial discrimination and segmentation of the labour market; the operation of informational and supportive networks in supporting entry into the labour market; and individual educational and occupational performance.

While such factors are important, this section will limit itself to exploring the way that local economic conditions around Tuiuti and Asa Branca have developed over time, and the way that residents have been affected by and negotiated these. It begins by looking at available data on income in each area, before analysing interviewee employment histories and consumption practices. This allows for a comparative analysis of way the two neighbourhoods are inserted into the urban economy, and with what consequences.

6.3.1 Tuiuti and Asa Branca: Economic profiles

Unfortunately the Brazilian census does not gather data on employment and occupation at the scale of the individual census tract or favela, so it is not possible to give an accurate breakdown of the occupational structures of Tuiuti and Asa Branca. However, household income, measured by minimum salary (MS) per head (Figure 8), is available at this scale, and alongside analysis of respondent employment histories (see below), can paint a rough picture of the economic and labour market conditions surrounding each community. This data reveals that household incomes in Tuiuti and Asa Branca broadly follow the structure found across Rio's favela population, with some moderate, but nonetheless telling variations. Around 58% of Rio de Janeiro's favela households earns between one half and two MSs per head, with about two thirds of this figure accounted for by the lower ½-1 MS band. For Tuiuti the overall percentage is very similar (about 60%), but the upper band of 1-2 MS is proportionately larger. With almost 66%, Asa Branca has a larger proportion of its residents in the ½ to 2 MS category, with a similar distribution between the two bands to that of Tuiuti.

Figure 8. Household income (Source: IBGE 2010)



However, it is at the higher and lower ends of the income ladder that the differences between the case study areas and the Rio favela population – as well as with one another – become clearer. In all three populations a far larger proportion of the population earns under ½ MS than earns over 2 MS. However, the numbers vary significantly. While a full 35% of Rio's favela households have an income of below ½ MS, the figure for Tuiuti is 29% and for Asa Branca lower still at 26%. At the other end of the spectrum, the percentage of Rio's favela households earning more than 2 MS is just over 5%, while for Asa Branca it is about 8%, and in Tuiuti over 10%. Furthermore, almost two-and-a-half per cent of Tuiuti's residents earn over 5 MS, compared to just over half a per cent for Rio's favelas and Asa Branca.

To summarise, the most common income is around one MS per head (½-2 MS), with well over half of the population in each case falling into this category. However, a large part of the population also earns less than ½ MS, ranging from about one quarter in Asa Branca to over one third across Rio's favelas, with Tuiuti in between. Finally, a small proportion earns over 2 MS, but this group is twice as large in Tuiuti as in Rio's favelas. This means that the populations of Tuiuti and Asa Branca are on average wealthier than Rio's favelas as a whole, though the differences are not huge. In Asa Branca the population is concentrated in the middle bands, with a significantly smaller low-income population and a slightly larger high-income population. In Tuiuti, the low- and middle-income bands are closer to the Rio

average, but are also slightly larger. However it has a significantly larger 'upper-income' population.

6.3.2 Employment histories

6.3.2a Tuiuti

In addition to the somewhat patchy official data on employment, occupation and income, the employment histories and trajectories of the interviewees give more insight into the way urban economic change has shaped the opportunities of residents over the life course. For the reasons outlined in the methodology section the patterns within the samples cannot be taken as necessarily representative. Nonetheless they reveal some of the important economic factors that have impacted upon Tuiuti and Asa Branca over several decades.

The sample from Tuiuti reveals significant diversity in terms of employment trajectories, which are strongly shaped by both gender and age cohort. In their younger years older respondents mostly worked in industrial, informal or domestic service jobs, often moving between these as their personal circumstances changed or opportunities arose. For example, one elderly respondent began her working life at 14 as a '*babá*' or nanny for a middle-class family. Then in her early 20s she got a better-paid job stacking crates in a *cachaça* factory at the bottom of the Morro do Tuiuti and spent most of the rest of her working life there.

During São Cristóvão's industrial heyday from the 1950s to the 1980s low-paid, but secure jobs in manufacturing were relatively accessible to residents of Tuiuti. There were also informal economic opportunities surrounding industry, such as textile piece-work and low-level wholesale operations. As described by González de la Rocha (2001), such activities allowed females in particular to supplement household incomes alongside childcare. One retired female resident recalled having to leave a stable job when her son was born in the early 1980s, but still being able to contribute to the household finances working as an informal saleswoman and shoemaker in Tuiuti:

> I worked like this, freelance, not within a firm. I did it like this, I sold clothes, I sold perfume … It wasn't door to door. People knew that I sold them and came to me. … And there was a shoe factory too, and I used to get the shoes to make at home and afterwards I took them back. I collected a bag of them at the beginning of the week, I glued them.. glued the soles on, and on Friday I took them in and collected the money. … My son, I took him to school, I'd come back, and to have my own money that's what I did. And after that everything stopped and I became dependent on my husband. *[Female 50, Tuiuti]*

The economic crises of the late 1980s and early 90s and the steady decline in industrial employment over the last thirty years, have altered the picture considerably. For some residents this shift occurred in the form of an economic shock that drastically altered their employment trajectories. This is illustrated by the particularly colourful story of one female respondent:

> *Respondent [Female 49, Tuiuti]*: My first job was when I was 18. I worked with diamonds. … I started like this, I weighed the stones, opened the door, made notes, I took the percentages. … And then my boss taught me to inspect the stones. … And I learned quickly. In one week I learned to inspect the stones. I don't know how. … I'd go to the factory, which only a few people did. … and when it (a diamond) came from the factory with defects I'd send it back to be fixed.
>
> *Interviewer*: And how long did you work in that job?
>
> *Respondent*: Twelve years. … My boss used to give bonuses to people who went a whole month without missing a day. … and I always got a bonus. I got paid almost five salaries and I had three kids, and I didn't have a husband.. I was separated, and I paid rent, so my life… it worked for me. But afterwards the government entered and started to reduce (the pay) and I ended up with a minimum salary. And I was desperate so I had to resign. But my boss wouldn't accept my resignation because he didn't want me to leave. But eventually the firm closed down … It was the crisis that caused it. And after that I went to work

> in the *Jogo do Bicho*.[80] … It was like this, there was no way for me to maintain my kids, with rent, earning the minimum salary. And the *Jogo do Bicho* paid… pays well.

This case is perhaps paradigmatic, but not typical in terms of how most interviewees, particularly younger ones, have experienced the impacts of economic crisis and deindustrialisation. This has instead manifested in a less direct, but equally pervasive sense of a narrowing of possible routes into employment and a dispersal of where those routes might lead. There were a large number of respondents who were unemployed at the time of the research. Apart from two older male residents with health problems and one female resident with children, none of these could be described as being in 'long-term unemployment'. Rather, they had been through cycles between periods of (usually low-paid) work and unemployment. These were strongly gendered. Female respondents typically worked in temporary secretarial positions or in industrial cleaning jobs – as opposed to the household domestic service jobs, which had been more common among older female residents. Males tended to work in security and construction (or related) jobs. This low-pay-no-pay cycle describes the situation of close to one third of the respondent sample.

Other respondents had gained a more permanent foothold in the labour market, and some had even prospered. A few of the men had amassed the skills and contacts to establish themselves within the short-term world of the construction sector. The proliferation of large construction projects in the city centre and inner-North Zone connected to the Olympics had certainly had some impact in this area. Two respondents had worked in both the Maracanã and port redevelopment programmes. In this way, one of them was beginning his career and had got his first experience as a scaffolder. Two other male residents had been able to establish themselves in secure service jobs – one as a manager in a security firm, the other as a newspaper deliveryman.

[80] The *Jogo do Bicho* is a popular, but illegal street lottery, which is largely tolerated by the police.

The female residents in relatively stable jobs were mainly working in semi-skilled white-collar positions, like administrative assistants or phone operators in telemarketing companies. Two had attained professional positions in the public sector – one as a social assistant and other as the manager of a *CRAS* in another favela. In both cases they had retrained through distance learning or evening educational or vocational courses. Other residents were also pursuing this strategy in seeking to up-skill and secure a better job. One female respondent in her mid-40s was coming to the end of a distance learning degree in the social sciences and had been carrying out an internship at a local social assistance centre. A male in his early-20s had recently completed an IT diploma and had begun looking for jobs in the IT sector, doing casual construction work with his brother in the meantime.

However, many have found that there is intense competition as well as major economic and social barriers to finding routes into professional or skilled white-collar jobs. One crucial one is Brazil's perverse higher education system. One respondent's son had achieved consistently high grades at school, learned to speak English and passed his pre-vestibular degree to study IT at a leading university. However, his pass grade was not sufficient to get him a full scholarship, and the family were unable to afford the tuition fees. Now in his late-20s he had spent close to a decade working in a variety of telemarketing and secretarial jobs and more or less given up on ever going to university.

> He completed secondary school and went to take his Pre-vestibular. And he passed, but he did the entrance exam for UERJ.. he did the entrance exam twice for UERJ and didn't pass. No, he passed, but he only got 50% of the scholarship money. And his father and I weren't in a position to pay. And he had taken so many pre-vestibular that eventually he gave up. He said "I'm not going to university." *[Female 50, Tuiuti]*

6.3.2b Employment histories: Asa Branca

In comparison to Tuiuti, the employment histories of Asa Branca's residents suggest a far less fragmented labour market structure. The absence of a significant industrial sector in Jacarepaguá means that Asa Branca's population has not been

directly affected by deindustrialisation. Furthermore, even during the crisis of the 1980s and 90s, the progressive expansion and elitisation of Barra da Tijuca meant that the construction and domestic service sectors continued to grow. This dynamic has only gathered pace with the Olympics driven construction boom of the last five years.

This local economic context appears to decisively shape the population's insertion into the labour market. Many older and retired male interviewees worked in construction and other non-industrial manual jobs for most of their working lives, and a significant part of the male population continues to do so today. Some have attained managerial positions within construction companies, providing them higher incomes and greater job security. However, most are casual labourers. Despite this no interviewees reported ever having had trouble finding work.

> *Respondent [Male 45, Asa Branca]*: There is always work. I'm working on a project in Recreio at the moment, but when that one finishes I'll find another one.
>
> *Interviewer*: Are they always in Jacarepaguá?
>
> *Respondent*: Yes. Recreio, Barra, Taquara… different places, but usually in Jacarepaguá

Domestic and industrial cleaning jobs seem to offer a similarly reliable source of casual work for the female population (although a couple of men in the sample also worked in this sector).[81] Half of the economically active female respondents worked in such jobs – often on a part-time basis so as to combine them with childcare. These jobs are typically casual and low-paid, but readily available, particularly with the growing number of condominiums in the immediate vicinity of Asa Branca. This high local demand for domestic labour, and, to a lesser extent, a growing tourism and hospitality sector, highlights a similarity of Jacarepaguá's favelas with those of the South Zone.

[81] The term '*serviço geral*' is used to refer to jobs with cleaning agencies as opposed to informal 'domestic' jobs cleaning family homes.

A third significant feature of Asa Branca's labour market is the presence of significant group of self-employed residents. Within the interview sample there were four residents who ran small businesses – two with family-run shops in Asa Branca and two freelance business (one a beautician and the other a barbecue chef catering for parties). The shop-owners had both previously worked as employees in the retail sector in Barra da Tijuca and had aspired to setting up their own businesses. In both cases they had managed to accumulate some savings to cover their initial start-up costs and then took the opportunity when shop premises became available for rent within Asa Branca. One of them had moved to Asa Branca from a smaller nearby favela to do so:

> *Interviewer*: Why did you choose to open a shop in Asa Branca?
>
> *Respondent [Female 42]*: Ah, because it was my dream, you know, to open a shop. So the opportunity was here. ... When this place appeared I moved straight here.

Since this resident had opened her clothes shop six years previously, the business's success had allowed her to take advantage of another vacancy and open a small snack shop. However, the growth of internal consumer demand in Asa Branca with its growing population had also prompted others to enter the market. Although both businesses were continuing to thrive, the owner had noticed increasing competition in the last couple of years.

The two other two small businesses owners were dependent on external markets for their services. The manicurist had worked in a beauty parlour for several years before going freelance. Since then she had used word of mouth to develop her clientele, which was now entirely based in the condominiums neighbouring Asa Branca. Her situation was similar to that of the domestic cleaners in terms of the proximity and flexibility, except that the skilled nature of her work allowed her to command a significantly higher price. The chef's clientele was far more dispersed and he worked across Rio, transporting his barbecuing equipment in his car. However, he was also taking a part-time course in administration and was exploring

ways of developing his business. He was similarly keen on tapping into the growing middle- and upper-class market on his doorstep:

> Take my tiny little business. If I can get just a small proportion of them [the condominium residents] interested in using my business that could be a hundred new clients. *[Male 45, Asa Branca]*

Notwithstanding the dominance of the construction and service sectors and the opportunities for self-employment, Asa Branca also has residents employed in white-collar jobs and some younger residents who have reached higher education. Two interviewees described themselves as 'functionaries' – one in local government and one in PROJAC, the production centre of *Globo* (Brazil's largest media company), which is located very close to Asa Branca. In both cases they were long-term employees, who had been gradually been promoted internally from entry-level positions.

Three younger residents studying in higher education. One, a male in his late-twenties, was completing an engineering degree while carrying out a work placement. Two female residents in their late-teens were also taking undergraduate degrees in universities in the West Zone, and working or interning in secretarial positions alongside their studies. This highlights a trend discussed by Valladares (2009), for a growing (though still small) proportion of favela residents proceeding to higher education and thus entering the labour market with entirely different prospects to those of their parents.

6.3.3 Consumption

Individual circumstances of employment and income are important determinants of patterns of resident consumption, although these also follow broader trends. The consumption habits and opportunities of many poor Brazilians has been transformed over the last decade. Consumer demand has been strengthened by policies to enchance low incomes, like the minimum wage and *bolsa família*, and by expanding access to consumer credit. Although the cost of living in Rio, particularly for essentials like food and transport, has largely risen in line with incomes, changing global trade dynamics and the availability of cheap imports from China has

made many consumer durables more widely available. The impacts of such changes are clearly visible in in both Tuiuti and Asa Branca, where mobile phones are ubiquitous, and even computers and widescreen televisions common. This has accelerated a longer-term change over several decades in which favela residents slowly accumulated expensive durables like fridges and televisions over time (Perlman 2010).

Despite this major shift, the integration of Tuiuti's and Asa Branca's residents into consumer society remains highly uneven.[82] A few residents in both favelas reported that they rarely go "shopping", except to buy food, and largely rely on hand-me-down clothes from family and neighbours. Other (typically older) residents, prefer to buy clothes and appliances in '*feiras*' (flea markets) than in high street stores or shopping centres. Most residents in communities, however, do participate in mainstream consumer activities. This often occurs with major constraints, with residents shopping around for the cheapest available stores and products, and paying for larger purchases with instalments. Others seemed to be able to exercise a greater degree of consumer "choice" and not simply choose their purchases based on price. As will be discussed in Section 8.1.2, these variations are reflected in varying geographies of consumption across the city.

6.3.4 The economic insertion of Tuiuti and Asa Branca

The preceding discussion of income, employment and consumption patterns in Tuiuti and Asa Branca reveals a range of important similarities and differences. The first observation is that the employment and income structures of both areas seem to correspond in the broadest terms to those of Rio de Janeiro's favelas as a whole. This is to say that residents who are in employment are primarily concentrated in low-skilled, low-paid jobs, while households typically earn in the region of ½-2 MS per head. However, a significant proportion of households in both favelas also earn less than ½ MS. This is the result of there being relatively fewer earners relative to household members, and/or earners being in lower-paid jobs or not in work. These

[82] The were no observable differences in consumption practices *between* Tuiuti and Asa Branca.

patterns are characteristic of all favelas regardless of their specific circumstances and histories.

Despite these similarities in the economic conditions of the two favelas, there are also important differences. A major contributor to extreme poverty in Tuiuti seems to be unemployment, primarily manifested in low-pay/no pay cycles, rather than long-term "worklessness". This is far less of a problem in Asa Branca, where even the poorest working-age residents are typically either in relatively stable low-paid employment or else, for some other reason, unable to work. Asa Branca also has opportunities in the small business sector due to the growth of both internal and external demand for a range of products and services. In Tuiuti, with its highly stable population and consolidated urban infrastructure, the small business sector is small and possibilities for entry, low. Meanwhile, the market context in the surrounding area is highly competitive, with the local high streets dominated by large companies or small businesses owned by wealthier residents from formal neighbourhoods.

A perhaps surprising finding is the comparatively large number of residents in Tuiuti earning over 2 MS, and the very high relative proportion (though low absolute number) earning over 5 MS. This seems to be composed of residents who have made successful transitions into skilled white-collar work – often in the public sector, which remains a major employer in central Rio.[83] Such jobs are less abundant in Jacarepaguá, although they do exist. The number of residents entering higher education in both areas has also grown. This includes both mature students retraining through distance learning or evening courses, and young people entering university directly from school. Nonetheless the economic and social obstacles to entering and successfully completing degrees are still huge and the proportion of residents who do so remains small.

[83] As discussed in the previous section, Tuiuti's centrality may make residents in such jobs reluctant to use their higher incomes to move into formal housing in more peripheral neighbourhoods, which would then mean a long commute to work.

These differences in employment, occupational and income trends clearly relate to the geographical locations of the two favelas. Deindustrialisation has transformed the employment landscape of Rio's inner North Zone, leaving only some residents able to achieve a secure transition into the competitive formal service economy. In stark contrast to this, Jacarepaguá's economy was sustained during the 'lost decades' of the 1980s and 90s by rapid urbanisation and elitisation – indeed it was this that led to the establishment and growth of Asa Branca and other favelas in the region. An acceleration of these dynamics in the last decade has continued to drive job creation in the dominant construction and domestic service sectors, and bolstered the favourable environment for small businesses. The role of geography also seems to be borne out by the fact that Tuiuti and Asa Branca are both slightly above average in terms of income. Their relatively economic "centrality" – of Tuiuti to the city centre and Asa Branca to Barra da Tijuca – means that very few residents need to travel long distances to their places of work, as is typical of more distant favelas.

Overall, the comparison of Tuiuti and Asa Branca suggests that two levels of factors shape their economic conditions. On the first level are those factors determining the economic insertion of favela residents as whole – such as historic inequalities in citizenship rights, housing, services etc., and the persistent economic, social and institutional obstacles to educational and occupational advancement.[84] On the second level, and within the parameters set by these determining factors, are those that are heavily influenced by an individual favela's insertion into the economic geography of the city, and by the opportunities and constraints for employment and income generation that this creates.

6.4 State intervention

Questions of uneven economic activity and change across the city raise the crucial question of the role of the state – the third key urban process. Analyses of urban governance and favelas in the 1970s, most notably Kowarick's 'urban despoliation'

[84] Although there is not space to do so here, the role of gender and racial inequalities would also primarily need to be analysed at this level.

model, identified the state as an active agent in the production of urban inequalities. In its more reductive forms the state was seen as little more than the "executive arm of the bourgeoisie", holding down the cost of labour through social neglect of favela residents while using favela removal programmes to enrich land developers and middle-class homeowners. As argued previously, during the 1980s and 1990s these analyses lost some of their force, as state spending on infrastructure and services in many favelas increased. Although inequality in fact grew in Rio over much of this period, the state seemed at least to play a palliative role. In more recent years the pro-poor spending of the Federal Government on social programmes has strengthened this view.

However, the last few years the debate about the role of the state has been reignited. Urban policies associated with the city's upcoming mega-events, and the 2016 Olympic Games in particular, have seen huge spending on urban infrastructure in some favelas, but also a large new wave of favela removals. Meanwhile, the underlying aims and likely impacts of the flagship security policy of the Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs) are ambiguous and fiercely disputed. These trends paint a highly fragmented picture, which simple models highlighting either state benevolence or oppressiveness seem insufficient to explain. This section analyses historical and current patterns of state intervention in Tuiuti and Asa Branca, using these as a basis for discussing the geographies of state intervention across Rio's favelas and the factors that determine it.

6.4.1 The presence of the state in Tuiuti

6.4.1a Infrastructure and services

As indicated by its history outlined above, Tuiuti has been an object of significant state intervention since democratisation. Tuiuti was included in *Favela Bairro*'s first phase in 1994-97, which brought several important changes to the area. Almost all streets in the favela were paved, stairways and handrails were added on steep inclines, drains were installed, and engineering works were carried out to stabilise areas vulnerable to landslides (Image 14). A number of community spaces were also constructed, including two concrete football pitches and a few small public squares

around the neighbourhood. The *de facto* centre of Tuiuti, lying at the top of the hill where the residents' association is located, received the greatest attention, and is now popularly known as "Favela Bairro". On the steep incline leading up to it a previously forested area made way for a viewing platform overlooking Rio's North Zone (Image 15), while immediately below, a winding road, the Rua Itaocara, was built to provide direct vehicular access to the Largo do Pedregulho below. Although a few areas have remained unpaved and some steep streets lack stairs, the condition of infrastructure is well above the average for Rio's favelas.

Image 14. Stairways, handrails and stabilising walls installed by Favela Bairro

Image 15. Tuiuti's viewing platform – one of several public spaces built under Favela Bairro

Favela Bairro also left a more permanent presence of state institutions and services. On the edge of the Rua Itaocara, a *Centro de Referência de Assistência Social* (a Social Assistance Referral Centre, or *CRAS*) was built (Image 16). This institution is responsible for administering *Bolsa Família* and other government welfare programmes, as well as providing a (limited) space for some community activities. The building also contains a crèche and a *Posto de Orientação Urbanística e Social* ('Social and Urban Orientation Point', *POUSO*) – a planning office that promotes safe and co-ordinated building practices by residents.

Image 16. Tuiuti's *CRAS* and crèche on the Rua Itaocara

Despite this legacy, major gaps have persisted in terms of service provision in Tuiuti. No progress was made towards legalising home ownership – one of the stated aims of Favela Bairro. Although Tuiuti is supposedly covered by the municipal rubbish collection service, collections are irregular and do not cover the whole community, meaning that much household rubbish ends up being fly-tipped in public spaces. Apart from a few short-lived projects, no sustained effort has been made by government to provide social or extra-curricular educational projects for young people in Tuiuti, whether directly, or in partnership with the two severely under-resourced NGOs active in the community.

In terms of access to more general services, Tuiuti's population is in the same situation as all poor residents of densely populated parts of the city. They have

nearby access to schools, health centres and hospitals, but the high level of local demand for these services combined with their low capacity and, typically, poor quality undermines the advantages of proximity.

6.4.1b Post-pacification state interventions

In late-2011 Tuiuti was occupied by a *Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora* (UPP), or 'Police Pacification Unit'.[85] In the wake of pacification a range of new forms of state intervention have emerged, in particular: (1) Provision of vocational training programmes; (2) The formalisation of electricity provision; and (3) the *UPP Social* service improvement and integration programme.

In the initial development of the pacficiation programme Rio de Janeiro's chamber of commerce, the *Federação das Indústrias do Rio de Janeiro* (FIRJAN), formed an agreement with the office of the State Governor (which co-ordinates the UPPs) to promote economic development in pacified territories. It has taken forward this commitment by establishing free vocational training courses for residents primarily through one of its subgroups SENAI (Professional education and Technological Solutions for Industry). Some residents have taken part and benefitted from such programmes. For example:

> Now not only is NGO the running... SENAI has entered too. SENAI offers some good courses, very professional. SENAI courses today are well considered. ... I registered on a soldering course. There's also high demand for soldering courses in the labour market. *[Male 24, Tuiuti]*

However, the impact has been limited. FIRJAN has no organisational presence in Tuiuti itself and just one representative (a former resident of Tuiuti) has been employed to promote participation, provide information about programmes and enrol participants. While some programmes are offered in the nearby favela of Barreira do Vasco, others are further afield, limiting the possibility of residents who are busy with work or childcare from taking advantage. Perhaps more fundamentally, the focus of the programmes in crowded and low-paid sectors like

[85] The impacts of pacification itself will be discussed in the next section.

car mechanics, hairdressing and food production seems unlikely to radically transform the employment prospects of a large proportion of residents.

A second change ushered in by pacification is the arrival of Light, Rio de Janeiro's electricity monopoly (which was privatised in the 1990s). A majority of Tuiuti's residents, like those of most favelas, have historically linked to the city's electricity grid via the use of clandestine connections (a practice known as '*gatonet*'), meaning that they do not pay for their electricity. One of the perceived benefits of pacification was that it would allow Light to recoup some of the hundreds millions of *reais* lost annually in favelas (Freeman 2012: 117).

Light began installing official electricity lines in Tuiuti and registering new customers via the residents' association during the period of the research, making it a major talking point in the interviews. Many residents were concerned about the impact an additional monthly payment would have on already tight household budgets. Although some government provision had been made via the *cadastro único* to provide reduced tariffs for those on low incomes,[86] this was not enough to compensate for the loss to the very poorest. In the words of one respondent: "If you can't pay for your light, life is difficult!" There had also been a few cases where people's initial bills, before they had understood the new requirements or – some believed – due to inaccurate meter calculations by Light, had come to hundreds of *reais*, which they were unable to pay.

A third major initiative that has followed pacification is the UPP Social programme, which was conceived as the major 'social' strategy that would accompany the security strategy of the UPPs. The programme's central aim is to upgrade and integrate community services through enhanced data collection and by promoting dialogue and co-ordination between the various government agencies and other organisations operating in a given favela. The three-person UPP Social team in Tuiuti (who also cover the pacified favelas of Mangueira, Barreira do Vasco and Providência) carried out a mapping exercise, identifying all existing services and key

[86] The *Cadastro Único* ('Single Registration') is an integrated welfare database which is used to calculate *bolsa família* and other state benefits owed to individual families.

community stakeholders. They were able to identify to some successes they had had in Tuiuti, for example repairing faulty street lighting and promoting collaboration between two NGOs operating locally.

However, very few residents were even aware of the programme and most public service providers and community workers who participated in the research felt its impact had been negligible. The main shortcoming seems to be the result of a major downgrading of UPP Social's scope between its original design and implementation. Soon after the programme was established it was moved from the State Governor's office to the IPP (the research department of the city *Prefeitura*) confirming its primary function as a data collection agency rather than an active co-ordinator of services. It was also decided that aside from the salaries of the UPP Social employees themselves, there would be no budget allocated to the programme to address the gaps identified in service provision. Instead the team are only able to 'articulate demands' to existing state agencies, meaning that resolution of such demands is subject to all the same kinds of delays and complications that affect the public sector as a whole. Overall, it is fair to say that post-pacification state interventions have had, at best very, limited positive impacts on service provision resident employability, while at the same time facilitating a major squeeze on household budgets through the formalisation of electricity provision.

6.4.2 State presence in Asa Branca

6.4.2a Laissez faire urbanisation in Jacarepaguá

When it originated, Asa Branca could be said to inhabit an isolated, under-served region on Rio de Janeiro's urban periphery. Subsequently the surrounding area has been transformed by urbanisation. Nonetheless, Jacarepaguá's *laissez faire* growth model has meant that access of Asa Branca's residents to core public services like healthcare, security and transport remains precarious. The availability of health services clearly illustrates the problem. Today the nearest hospital to Asa Branca is the *Hospital Lourenço Jorge* in Barra da Tijuca, while the nearest health centre is in Cidade de Deus. For the majority of residents who don't own a car, travelling to one of these would involve up to a 1km walk along a main road to catch a bus or combi

van, which, depending on the time of day, might be severely crowded and/or delayed. One female resident in her 40s put the problem in stark terms: “If you’re ill you have to go to the Lourenço Jorge. And if you’re really bad, you’re going to die. Lots of people have died on their way (to the hospital).”

In recent years Rio’s successful Olympic bid has catalysed increasing attention from the state in Jacarepaguá and its future development. However, this does not appear to have significantly altered the previous pattern, with remaining undeveloped land overwhelmingly allocated to ‘high-value’ uses like gated residential developments and mega-event infrastructure. Several respondents commented on the paradox that the region is ‘developing’ so rapidly, but with so little improvement in terms of availability of public services. For example:

> Every improvement that’s come isn’t for us. It’s aimed at something. What I call improvement is when you do something to benefit me, not when you do something for me for your own benefit. ... Who will it benefit? People who have cars and can pass from one side to the other. ... We didn’t ask for it, it just came. We have other necessities, other priorities. *[Female 43, Asa Branca]*

The major exception to this trend is the creation of the new Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system, an entirely new public transport network centred on Jacarepaguá that also connects it with the other regions of the city. Although the two lines that will intersect close to Asa Branca (the TransCarioca and TransOlímpica) were not completed at the time of writing, residents were generally enthusiastic, believing that they would offer a faster and more comfortable transport option. Critics have suggested that the routing of the network between Olympics zones and the airport, means they will not be of widespread use to existing residents (Comitê Popular 2013), but it is too early to make a clear assessment of this.

Whether or not it brings the desired benefits for the majority of existing residents of Jacarepaguá’s favelas, the BRT and other Olympic projects will have life-changing consequences for some. A few houses along the edge of Asa Branca are likely to be removed to make for widening of the Avenida Salvador Allende, while several small

favelas near Asa Branca have been marked for removal to make way for the TransOlímpica route. In a more widely publicised case, favela Vila Autódromo, which lies 1km to the south of Asa Branca, has fought a long battle with the Prefeitura to resist removal from the edge of the site of the future Olympic Park.

In all of these cases, communication from the Prefeitura has been poor, meaning that affected residents often don't know whether they will be removed or the reasons why (Comitê Popular 2013). In some cases, justifications for removal have changed multiple times, leading some to suspect that the policy is designed to "cleanse" strategic territories like Jacareapguá of their poor populations, rather than promote inclusive development, as the rhetoric surrounding the Olympic projects claims (Comitê Popular 2013). Although residents who will be removed have been promised that they will be re-housed within the Jacarepaguá region, the track record of the Prefeitura in other parts of the city does not instil confidence.

The vast majority of Asa Branca's residents will not be removed for the time being. However, the pattern of development in Jacarepaguá and the plight of neighbouring favelas has led many residents to believe that at some unspecified point in the future, for some as yet unknown reason, they may be. As one resident explained, this could mean losing the economic and social benefits of living in Jacarepaguá, and ending up in an even worse situation in terms of access to public services:

> Sincerely, I'm a bit scared. I can't see how the community can continue with so many buildings surrounding it… I'm scared that one day they'll decide to remove the community... and send us to Santa Cruz or Sepetiba...[87] where there's no transport, no healthcare, no education, nothing. That's my concern. *[Female 20, Asa Branca]*

6.4.2b The arrival of the state in Asa Branca

Paradoxically, the greater threat of favela removal in Jacarepaguá also seems to have been accompanied by renewed investment in favela upgrading. Unlike Tuiuti,

[87] These are neighbourhoods on Rio's distant North West periphery, where most new public housing – including that built to house removed favela residents – is being built.

Asa Branca was overlooked by the Favela Bairro programme.[88] However, during the last few months of 2012, through the *Bairro Maravilha* ("Marvellous neighbourhood") municipal favela urbanisation programme, public works were carried out in the favela for the first time. This included the paving of streets with raised pavements for pedestrians, and the instalment of drains and streetlights. As shown by Images 17 and 18, the transformation is stark. It is particularly noticeable at times of heavy rain, when roads had at times become impassable due to mud and flooding.

[88] The only favela in Jacarepaguá that was urbanised by *Favela Bairro* was the much older Vila Sapê in Curicica.

Image 17. Asa Branca prior to upgrading (source: Catalytic Communities)

Image 18. Asa Branca after upgrading (source: Catalytic Communities)

It is difficult to overstate how important this has been for residents' everyday quality of life. Respondents were unanimous in their praise of the works. It had given some a very favourable view of the Prefeitura and Mayor Eduardo Paes, who was formerly Sub-prefect of Jacarepaguá and is seen as investing more in the West Zone than previous Mayors. However, most residents focussed their praise on Cirão,[89] the long-standing President of Asa Branca's Residents Association.

[89] Pseudonym

> Cirão has already done so much for our Asa Branca. Everything that is growing here is thanks to him. He deserves to be congratulated. We have to ask God to bless him. *[Female 48, Asa Branca]*

Cirão was seen as a shrewd political operator who could negotiate effectively on the community's behalf. However, this also meant forming clientelist relationships with politicians, which carried their own risks.

The bargaining position of the community seemed to determine the nature of state engagement it could expect within Jacarepaguá's changing political context. As the largest favela in the area south of Curicica, Asa Branca has been able to secure major physical improvements and relatively minor impacts from mega-event projects in terms of removals. By contrast smaller neighbouring communities have been entirely overlooked and many threatened with removal. In the case of Vila Autódromo, the failure of political bargaining has led the Residents Association to pursue its aims outside mainstream political networks, enlisting the media, activists, NGOs and professional associations in its campaign to resist removal (Rio Times Online 2012).

However, Asa Branca's relative strength also has limits. The upgrading, inexplicably, left out a small corner of a few houses at the back of the favela, where pavements and lighting were not installed. The reforms also fell short in terms of the breadth of interventions. The Pavuninha Canal that borders Asa Branca is badly polluted and regularly becomes overrun with household litter. This itself is partly because rubbish is only collected at the front of the community and not door to door. However, rubbish collection and treatment of the canal were not included as part of the upgrading. Asa Branca also lacks any kind of public space, square or playground, except for an undeveloped field across from the canal where the community's children play.[90] There are also no community premises, apart from the rundown Residents Association, and, unlike Tuiuti, no crèche, health centre or CRAS.

[90] At the time of writing it was not clear whether this space would be developed for the benefit of Asa Branca's residents, or for some other purpose.

These concerns were persistently raised by residents in interviews and would have been highlighted by *Morar Carioca* – a participatory favela urbanisation programme originally conceived as the great "social legacy" of the Olympics (Guardian 2010). Asa Branca was included in the first phase of favelas to receive Morar Carioca. However, after a few initial meetings with the Residents Association, communication suddenly stopped and was never resumed. While there have been no public announcements media reports suggest that the programme has been shelved due to over-spending on other projects, or is perhaps being withheld by the Mayor for political reasons (Rio Real 2013).

6.4.3 The determinants of state presence in Tuiuti and Asa Branca

The comparison of Tuiuti and Asa Branca suggests a range of historical and emergent factors determining patterns of state intervention in favelas. The first of these is centrality. Favela upgrading has spread outwards over time from more geographically central to more peripheral favelas, embracing Tuiuti in the mid-1990s and only reaching Asa Branca recently. This has process displays various elements. As was discussed in Section 4.2.2, this seems partly to relate to questions of physical and economic agglomeration and the marginal costs involved in connecting new infrastructure to existing networks. It is also influenced by how integrated a favela is into institutional and political decision-making processes. This seems to be determined by concrete factors like a favela's size and how long it has existed, but also by its "visibility" to those able to influence policy. As Rio's economic "centre" has extended westwards, so has the visibility of Jacarepaguá's favelas and the land they occupy. Depending on what ambitions politicians and private interests harbour for a particular territory, and on the strength of individual favelas within political-clientelist networks, this newfound centrality can either lead to upgrading or removal.

This raises the question of universalistic versus arbitrary forms of intervention. Despite its limitations in both geographical scope and local impacts, *Favela Bairro* represented a uniform approach to the upgrading of favelas. Clear – if largely technocratic and non-participatory – procedures dictated interventions and many of

the individual interventions involved were seen as non-negotiable (Riley et al. 2001). Within the new generation of policies, approaches seem to have fragmented, bolstering the position of political-clientelist networks and private interests, (like Light, or land developers around the Olympic Park), in determining who gets what.

Two factors seem to account for this fragmentation. Firstly, the influence of the mega-events over policy-making is clear. The 'state of exception' surrounding the World Cup and Olympics has enabled policies like favela removals that would otherwise be far more difficult to justify and execute (See Vainer 2011). More generally, the equation of the interests of big business with those of the city as a whole has also shifted the focus of many favela-targeted policies, while bringing large companies to the heart of decision-making. Independent of private influence over public policy, the strategic demands of organising the Olympic Games in particular have clearly shaped the design and implementation of policies, leading to far more *ad hoc* outcomes than might otherwise be the case. This is seen both in the prioritisation of some favelas over others for receiving particular policies, and in the application of some policies rather than others in particular favelas. These decisions often seem to be guided more by the (perceived) requirements of the Games than by the needs of the affected communities.

However, the policy fragmentation seen in recent years is also a product of complexity and contestation within the Brazilian state. Although all levels of government have united around Rio's mega-event driven growth strategy, their policies have not necessary been guided by the same principles. For example, the original policy mix surrounding the mega-events contained more progressive favela policies like *Morar Carioca* and *UPP Social* that aimed to build upon the achievements of *Favela Bairro*. Nonetheless, intra-state politics seem to have steadily weakened these elements, much to the detriment of residents in favelas like Tuiuti and Asa Branca. While the current generation of favela policies may be shaped more by complexity and contestation within the state than direct despoliation, the current political conjuncture has all too often produced outcomes that strongly resemble this more straightforward logic.

6.5 Territorial competition between armed groups

The final urban process identified is the violent, territorial competition between armed groups that determines security conditions in different favelas. Poor and informal areas have historically been subject to bloody repression by state and private power in Rio, as in Brazil generally. However, as has been discussed, the emergence of a system of territorial competition between organised, armed and violent actors dates back to the 1980s, the rise of the drugs trade and the 'democratisation of violence'. This can also be seen as the point at which the production of security and violence emerged as a distinct axis of variation among favelas. Other 'deeper' urban processes, such as economic factors (eg. unemployment and inequality) and patterns of state intervention may have given rise to this system, but the institutional, social and territorial consolidation of rival armed groups has given it distinct and self-perpetuating dynamics of its own.

6.5.1 Tuiuti: 'Donos do morro' old and new

6.5.1a Drug-trafficker control

Drug trafficking arrived relatively early to Tuiuti. Residents recall a period of intense violent conflict in 1979 between two local street gangs competing over control of the emerging cocaine trade. In the early 1980s power became consolidated under the control of the *Comando Vermelho* (*CV*), a loose-knit alliance of mutually supportive local drug-trafficking gangs which expanded across Rio's favelas (Penglase 2008). Thereafter, drug-trafficking in Tuiuti achieved a relative stability, certainly compared to other favelas where heavily armed rival gangs began to vie for control and attract frequent military-style police incursions.

> (After that) there were no more problems. No-one killed any more. Whoever died was involved ... If you died from a bullet there, it was an isolated incident. It's not like that kind of thing where it's every day stray bullets. Like there in Maré every day.[91] *[Male 48, Tuiuti]*

[91] Maré is a large complex of favelas with a population of some 130,000 to the north of Tuiuti. At the time of the research Maré remained unpacified and was being contested by three rival factions as well as being subject to regular police operations.

The peace has occasionally been broken during disputes over succession, typically when '*donos*' (local drug bosses) have been imprisoned. There have also been periodic gun battles with police, which according to respondents, have generally resulted when traffickers from neighbouring Mangueira (also CV-controlled) have sought refuge in Tuiuti.

Interviewees had a range of theories for why drug trafficker dominance of Tuiuti had not been accompanied by the kind of violence seen in some other favelas. One was that the long-standing *dono* of Tuiuti (prior to pacification) had not wanted to attract police attention and so had avoided unnecessary use of violence or visible activities outside of the favela. Others commented that the relatively open layout of Tuiuti made it unsuitable as a defensible base for the kind of large-scale drug storage and processing operations that police and rival gangs would go to great lengths to disrupt. Similarly, its relative distance from key transport supply routes reduced its strategic value.

For these reasons, as well as its size, neighbouring Mangueira had apparently emerged as the main centre of CV operations and command in the region, with Tuiuti acting as a junior partner.[92] A further contributory factor is that the three neighbouring favelas of Mangueira, Barreira do Vasco and Arará have also long been controlled by the CV, whereas Complexo do Caju – the nearest favela controlled by a rival faction (the *Amigos dos Amigos*) – is far enough away that direct confrontation has been rare.

Despite the apparent stability and relatively low level of violence in Tuiuti, the threat and occasional use of different forms of violence became key elements in the strategy adopted by traffickers to maintain their dominance. Others include the establishment of loosely defined norms and rules, mediation of conflicts, *ad hoc* investments in community assets, and direct and indirect forms of surveillance. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, the cumulative effect of trafficker influence in these different spheres has shaped community life and patterns of sociability in the favela

[92] Mangueira sits next to a station on Rio's suburban train line – a key supply and distribution channel for the drugs trade.

in fundamental ways. It also has an important influence on individual life and social reproduction, particularly for young people. Interviews suggested that the presence of traffickers shapes perceived and real possibilities for daily mobility, exposes younger residents to highly visible role models and cultural influences, and establishes drug-trafficking as a feasible, if not necessarily esteemed, trajectory into 'employment'.

6.5.1b Pacification

The dynamics of security and violence established by traffickers over almost three decades were suddenly disrupted in late 2011 when Tuiuti was 'pacified' along with Mangueira. Following months of preparatory police operations (including one that led to a shoot-out along the main entry road into Tuiuti) BOPE and military police entered the two favelas on 3rd November. The UPP established three permanent bases, including one in the centre of Tuiuti next to the residents association (Image 19).[93] This was also the location that had previously served as the traffickers' *boca de fumo*, or drug sale point. This strategic and symbolic use of territory has been widely adopted in pacified favelas, leading some to interpret pacification as an attempt by police to establish themselves as the new '*donos do morro*', or 'bosses of the hill' (Cano 2012).

Image 19. The UPP base in Tuiuti

[93] The other two bases, including the main headquarters, were installed in Mangueira. Subsequently Tuiuti's UPP command was merged with that of Barreira do Vasco, established in March 2013

Pacification has brought important changes to Tuiuti. The local drug boss was forced to flee the area before the arrival of the police, and *CV* 'soldiers' no longer physically occupy parts of the favela openly flaunting their guns and selling drugs. Although official data was not available at the time of writing, experiences elsewhere would predict the homicide rate in the surrounding region to have fallen (Frischtak and Mandel 2012). Despite reports of tensions and some abuses, most respondents felt that the UPP had not been particularly aggressive in its treatment of residents, certainly not compared to some other favelas where curfews, detainments and other tactics had been used to impose order. In terms of feelings of security, respondents were unanimous in stating that they had never felt insecure walking around Tuiuti. Those who said there were places in the local area where they did all mentioned other favelas, or dark and abandoned streets in the surrounding area. Nonetheless, some reported feeling a greater sense of security since pacification, especially with the reduced likelihood of shoot-outs between police and traffickers.

However, at least as many of the respondents felt that pacification had brought little substantive change to the security situation. It was an open secret among residents and police that drug trafficking had continued more or less unabated and sometimes barely concealed. The continuing influence of the CV was laid bare in February 2013, when a UPP officer was robbed of his gun and two murders were committed locally in the same night (Werneck and Ramalho 2013). The following day businesses in Tuiuti and Mangueira closed their doors at the behest of the traffickers – a display of enforced deference that was commonplace prior to pacification, and clearly designed to send a message to the UPP.

Despite this continued influence, the presence of the UPP has clearly produced a new balance of power Tuiuti, bringing entirely new kinds of challenges for residents. Some respondents suggested that other, lesser types of crime, such as burglary and various forms of anti-social behaviour, may be rising. The CV's ability to monitor and punish such activities has been weakened, whereas the higher burden of proof required for the UPP to respond to such incidents means they are less effective at maintaining order. Furthermore, double surveillance from both the UPP and the

traffickers and a lack of clarity about what 'rules' now prevail in the favela had left many residents feeling less, rather than more secure. This crisis of authority will be discussed in Chapter 7. Suffice to say here that while *violence* may have fallen in and around Tuiuti, the question of whether it is now more *secure* for residents is open to question.

6.5.2 Asa Branca: The construction of an anxious peace

Asa Branca's context of violence and security differs starkly from Tuiuti's in several ways. For most of its history, local security in Asa Branca appears to have been far less institutionalised than was the case in Tuiuti following the *CV*'s takeover. Initially, during the early period of land invasions, there was instability and violence as rival groups contested control of the territory. One long-term resident explained:

> *Respondent [Male 53, Asa Branca]*: You know how an invasion works? For example, it's like this... "There's going to be a vacant plot of land", and people come, because everyone wants a place, no?
>
> *Interviewer*: But didn't they organise it [ie. the subdividsion of plots] amongst themselves?
>
> *Respondent*: They organised it, but lots of people died. Lots of people died because of the invasion. They came from outside to take a plot of land, you understand... In that era lots of people died. All people from outside, you know. In an invasion they want a plot, they want a piece of land and they settle and stay, you understand? But once it (Asa Branca) consolidated, it (the violence) stopped. It finished, you understand?

This account suggests that during the 1980s and 90s Asa Branca's insertion into Rio's evolving geography of security and violence was determined primarily by its small size and peripherality. Although public security was effectively non-existent in the region at the time, drug traffickers would have seen the territory as relatively insignificant. Interviews suggested that during thera various attempts were made by drug traffickers to install a *boca de fumo* (drug sale point) in the favela. However,

each time they had given up, determining that the open layout of the favela and the fact that it had only two exit points meant they would not be able to defend it.[94]

As well as the physical consolidation of the favela, it is likely that the establishment of a more permanent form of community self-policing would have brought an end the cycle of violence described above. This may have been led by residents who worked in public or private security in some capacity (and therefore had access to weaponry), although the police also seem to have played an informal supporting role. Such neighbourhood security arrangements were common among the new favelas sprouting up in Jacarepaguá in the 1980s, allowing vulnerable nascent communities to prevent attempted incursions by land invaders or drug traffickers, while at the same time enforcing certain rules amongst themselves (Zaluar 2007). It was a particularly violent vigilante force in the much larger favela of Rio das Pedras in the east of Jacarepaguá that went on to establish an entirely new model of informal security provision in the city.[95]

Research on militias is notoriously difficult, given the challenges it poses for protecting the safety of both researchers and participants, and the understandable reluctance of residents living in areas dominated by militias to discuss the topic (Cano 2012; Justiça Global 2008). For this reason my interviews did not directly address questions of possible militia activity in Asa Branca. Other research indicates that militias have dominated favelas and low-income formal areas in Curicica and the west of Jacarepaguá for several years (Zaluar 2013; Cano et al. 2012; CPI 2008). However, the relatively low murder rate in region suggests that this is not characterised by levels of violence found in many other militia-dominated areas. As noted by Zaluar (2007), the term militia may be misleading in this part of the city, conflating locally embedded informal security with the mafia-style paramilitaries found elsewhere.

[94] This was the account provided by one interviewee, although it is likely that active police and/or resident resistance would have played a part in preventing the entrenchment of drug trafficking.

[95] As noted by Zaluar and Conceição (2007), the term 'militia' is often used loosely, varying from amateur local protection groups to large, organizationally sophisticated and heavily-armed paramilitaries.

Although my interviews did not address the issue directly, some informal conversations with residents and the ways in which interviewees did discuss questions of violence and security help to outline some aspects of their local dynamics. These sources suggest that the lines between local security arrangements developed by residents, informal police activity, and more developed militias organisations are blurred, and probably highly fluid in terms of their interconnections. One resident spoke of an ongoing struggle between militias and police to control the favela, arguing that the police had asserted control, but that militias were trying to re-enter. Given that police do not have an active institutional presence in Asa Branca, and the fact that militias typically consist of off-duty police, this distinction appears to be a loose one – although it might be very meaningful in terms of the way power is exercised. Off the record, another resident explained that everyone in the favela was required to buy their gas cylinders from a single source and said that there were informal security protocols that everyone knew about:

> *Respondent [Male, 22]*: If someone steals something from you there's a guy you can go and talk to. But you have to have evidence, because if you don't have evidence there's nothing he can do.
>
> *Interviewer*: And what would he do if you have evidence that they stole it?
>
> *Respondent*: Probably just go and talk to you first and warn you. If it's bad they might expel you. A guy got expelled for beating his wife. If this was Rio das Pedras he would have been killed.

An interesting aspect of Asa Branca's security situation is the celebratory way in which residents speak about the lack of violence and their feelings of safety in and around the favela. Not a single interviewee said they ever felt insecure walking around the locality. When asked if there were any places nearby where they felt insecure, the only responses given were Cidade de Deus and Praça Seca – the two areas in Jacarepaguá that have historically been controlled by drug traffickers rather

than militias.[96] One respondent described Asa Branca as "the safest place in Rio", asserting that the last murder in the community had been seven years ago (and even that was a stabbing resulting from a bar brawl, rather than being gang or militia-related). Another resident suggested that if there were no militia there would be "a guy with a gun sitting on every corner", like in trafficker controlled favelas.

These attitudes point to a central conundrum faced by residents of favelas and other low-income areas where the police activity is largely non-existent and/or endemically abusive and corrupt. In agreeing to collaborate with informal security providers who maintain peace within the neighbourhood, they must accept parasitical rent-seeking practices and the threat of summary punishments if they happen to transgress unwritten rules. In a region like Curicica where militia activity is accompanied by relatively low levels of violence, it seems that a majority of residents are willing to accept this diminished freedom and citizenship in exchange for 'security' – although in the absence of accounts from residents who might have been victimised by (or otherwise oppose the presence of) militias, this can only amount to speculation.

6.5.3 Tuiuti and Asa Branca in Rio's evolving geography of security and violence

As should be clear from this discussion of Tuiuti and Asa Branca, patterns of security and violence across the city are primarily shaped by the actions of powerful (though not necessarily unified) armed groups and individuals. Drug trafficking factions, militias and police operate across urban space in pursuit of strategic corporate objectives, with individuals and sub-groups also taking advantage of these dynamics and institutional weaknesses to profit individually. The emergence of security paradigms like those used by the *CV*, militias and, most recently, *UPPs*, are contingent, historically specific responses to prevailing conditions in particular places. These paradigms have spread territorially depending on the organisational aims and capacities of different groups. By late 2013 this had produced a particular

[96] At the time of the research Cidade de Deus was widely deemed to have become safer thanks to the installation of a UPP, while Praça Seca was embroiled in an explosive conflict between the CV and a local militia.

balance of territorial power, with *UPPs* covering most of the favelas in the South Zone, city centre and inner-North Zone, drug traffickers still dominant in the outer North Zone, and militias controlling much of the West Zone (see Map 6). Current trends suggest that the situation is liable to change significantly in the coming years.

However, it is not only extrinsic, but also local factors that determine this geography, both by shaping those "organisational aims and capacities" and by the different responses that local communities have to these groups. As suggested by the two case studies, this has produced a highly varied and fluid range of situations of violence and (in)security across the city. In both Tuiuti and Asa Branca, once prevailing security arrangements became entrenched there has been less violence than is found in Rio's more volatile territories. In Tuiuti, this appears to relate to relative strategic and hierarchical subordination within *Comando Vermelho* operations, as well as the stability of both the *CV*'s local dominance and of the favela itself. Asa Branca's "peace", meanwhile, seems to rest on an effective system of local security provision that many residents seem to buy into, although the exact nature of the relationship between these local arrangements, the police and paramilitary-style militias operating in Jacarepaguá is unclear.

Despite this comparatively favourable position of the case study areas within Rio's geography of violence, this does not result in meaningful *security* for their residents. Even where favelas are controlled by local informal security providers or even *UPPs*, residents experience major constraints on their rights and freedoms. The apparently favourable view that some residents of Asa Branca and Tuiuti have towards their current circumstances are testament to the even worse security conditions that have prevailed previously, or that are found elsewhere in the city. The impact of these dynamics on collective life within both communities will be explored in the next chapter.

6.6 Conclusion: The transformation and diversification of Rio de Janeiro's favelas

As this comparison of Tuiuti and Asa Branca suggests, there are important commonalities across even starkly contrasting favelas. At the most basic level, both

communities were initially established by those unable to access housing through the formal market or the state. Notwithstanding the penetration of market logic into the allocation of favela housing, this overwhelmingly continues to be the case. The various ways in which housing informality reproduces exclusion – by denying access to other aspects of citizenship, and by depressing housing values for instance – serve to reinforce this boundary. Weak housing market power therefore represents a crucial sorting mechanism that continues to exert a homogenising effect and thus to *territorialise* the "assemblage" of the favela category.

Beyond this, the evidence from Tuiuti and Asa Branca suggests that favela residents collectively face a range of other challenges that impede social mobility and/or undermine their quality of life. For example, they encounter major structural barriers, such as poor quality public schooling, a lack of extra-curricular training and development opportunities, and social and financial barriers to higher education, meaning that a majority enter the labour market with limited employment skills. Efforts by the state to meet even the most fundamental needs of favela residents, like education, but also healthcare and basic infrastructure, are limited and inconsistent. Furthermore, all favelas must deal with the presence and lingering influence of armed actors oriented towards exercising territorial domain over the neighbourhood. To the extent that these different common characteristics act to constrain transformation, mobility and diversification within and between favelas, they can be seen as bounding, homogenising and *territorialising* the favela category as a whole.

On the other hand, the evidence from the case studies suggests that favelas do contain significant diversity and are currently undergoing major processes of transformation. Some of these processes are structural and spread broadly across the entire favela population. For example, rising incomes and consumption, falling poverty, and slowly increasing access to higher education and professional occupations among favela residents seem to be structural changes that are not inherently dependent on a favela's spatial location. In this sense they deterritorialise the favela category by blurring its border with non-favela areas.

Other transformations, however, appear to be shaped by factors that vary markedly across urban space. They thus deterritorialise the favela category by sharpening differences *between* favelas. The varied penetration of market logic into the allocation of favela housing is one such dynamic. Housing in Asa Branca has been rapidly marketised in recent years, introducing important dynamics of *selectivity*, while access to housing in Tuiuti remains primarily determined by non-market mechanisms. While the implications of this are still ambiguous, they may be expected to lead to greater differences between the two populations over time. Meanwhile, though they may be affected in similar ways by structural barriers and transformations in the labour market, residents of Tuiuti and Asa Branca are also significantly affected by geographic variations in labour market conditions. In particular, while unemployment seems to be a major contributor to poverty in Tuiuti, this is far less of a problem in Asa Branca thanks to high demand for low-skilled labour.

State intervention and patterns of violence appear to be even more sensitive to spatial variation and reveal more clearly the ways in which more local actors, in particular politicians and armed actors, may be empowered to influence neighbourhood conditions in various ways. Whereas Tuiuti has benefitted from some more universalistic forms of infrastructure and service provision that became available to favelas in more central areas following democratisation, Asa Branca has for most of its history been excluded from both mainstream and favela-specific policies. However, as the state has itself been transformed by neoliberalisation and the mid-decade mega-events, Asa Branca has been able to leverage resources for upgrading, albeit through the personalistic route of political clientelism. Meanwhile, the vagaries of Rio de Janeiro's system of territorial competition between armed groups has produced fundamental differences between Tuiuti, which has experienced domination by both the *CV* and now a *UPP*, and Asa Branca, which counts on the presence of a local militia. The fact that both areas experience relatively low levels of violence and conflict by favela standards is thanks to their comparatively favourable positions within citywide geographies of conflict and the

apparent *embeddedness* of the two non-state armed groups, which seems to reduce the risk of them coming into conflict with residents (see next chapter).

This chapter has sketched out the structural and urban processes shaping the transformation and diversification of Rio de Janeiro's favelas and indicated some of the ways in which they "touch down" in Tuiuti and Asa Branca. The next two chapters explore how life is experienced *within* the neighbourhood under these different conditions, and how residents, both individually and collectively, respond to the challenges they present.

7.0 Network

This chapter analyses the relationship between the neighbourhood and social networks in Rio's favelas. While the structural and urban processes outlined in Chapter 6 play a dominant role in shaping conditions in Tuiuti and Asa Branca, it is argued that social networks are often crucial in allowing residents to confront the challenges, and also distribute the risks and opportunities, that these processes generate. As such they may be seen as a "mid-level structure" (Marques 2012, p. 13) that mediates between such higher-level processes and individual and collective outcomes. The ways in which they do so are subject to various intervening factors relating to both the dynamics of networks themselves and the social, cultural and spatial contexts in which they are situated.

As proposed in the discussion of social networks in Chapter 3, networks are formed in space and the ongoing interaction between networks and space may be expected to affect patterns of social life in important ways. In the case of low-income urban neighbourhoods like Tuiuti and Asa Branca, Wilson's (1987) ideas about access to contacts in the labour market and Sampson's (2012) concept of 'collective efficacy' have particular salience, although, as discussed, both theories (and 'collective efficacy' in particular) are likely to play out in distinct ways in the context of Rio de Janeiro's favelas. At the same time 'boundary work' (Lamont 2000), based on instrumental, social and cultural factors, may also be expected to impact upon network dynamics in these contexts. The chapter will explore these different issues while linking them to current conditions within the two communities and some of the key transformations they are experiencing.

The first part of the chapter focuses on internal social network dynamics within Tuiuti and Asa Branca, highlighting the relationship between historical processes of community formation and the way in which social networks are configured in the two favelas today. Differences in these structures seem to underpin some notable variations in patterns of social exchange, with implications for the circulation of resources and the provision of different forms of assistance. However, dynamics of exchange in both cases seem to be more heavily shaped by structural features of

favela life, in particular material constraints and constructed social differences. As a result the processes of *network segmentation* that clearly arise in both communities seem to share a common *structural* origin.

The second section examines how network dynamics interact with institutions and broader urban processes to either facilitate or impede various forms of collective action. During the research the question of security emerged as a key issue for residents in both neighbourhoods and in both cases (though in different ways) residents' concerns about security were linked to questions of collective action. In light of this I explore how key recent transformations – namely population growth and the marketisation of housing in Asa Branca, and the installation of a Police Pacification Unit (UPP) in Tuiuti – have affected residents' ability to achieve collective security. What this reveals is that residents must adopt uncomfortable strategies to try and reduce uncertainty and achieve minimal forms of coexistence with other residents and with armed groups that are present in the neighbourhood.

7.2 Networks and social exchange

7.2.1 Network structure and sociability in Tuiuti and Asa Branca

Respondent data suggests that the different settlement histories of Tuiuti and Asa Branca have left them with contrasting network structures. Tuiuti's long history, slow growth and stable population seem to have given it a dense network structure, with residents likely to have lived in the neighbourhood for longer and to have formed strong webs of overlapping ties. By contrast Asa Branca's more recent growth and higher resident turnover, largely occurring through a process of market exchange, have produced a comparatively less tightly connected population.

When asked, respondents from Tuiuti tended to report having significantly more family members in the neighbourhood (see Table 3). One third reported having ten or more and almost two thirds having more than four. This is reflected in the way some of these residents described the tight correlation between kinship networks and the neighbourhood:

> I go around and everyone here is a relative, you know. Without trying to, I discover, without trying, that everyone's a relative. I've got relatives there on that side, I've got some round here, I've got some down the hill, I've got some in Favela Bairro, I've got some in Terreirão. Lots of people! *[Female 44, Tuiuti]*

> My husband has an immense family. Immense, immense, immense. Lots of people. […] Uncles, aunts, cousins, all right here. *[Female 53, Tuiuti]*

Figure 9. Reported number of adult, non-nuclear family members living in the neighbourhood

Family members in neighbourhood	Asa Branca	Tuiuti
0	9	5
1 to 3	9	7
4 to 5	7	4
6 to 10	2	4
10+	3	10

By comparison, almost a third of respondents from Asa Branca had no other relatives living in the neighbourhood, and just three had ten or more. Family structures were typically nuclear, or otherwise consisted of two generations branching out from an original nuclear household. These portrayals are generalisations. As Table 1 shows, there are very large extended families in Asa Branca and nuclear ones in Tuiuti. They also do not reveal more general aspects of network structure in each community, which would require a systematic process of 'whole network' analysis. For example, it is not necessarily clear how intense these different relationships are, nor the extent to which they overlap. Nonetheless they seem to be strongly indicative of a broader pattern. Kinship networks are typically the foundation of larger groupings of social relations in Brazil that include the families of godparents and other unofficial "extended family" members.

While it might be expected that these differences would produce greater 'sociability' – open displays of neighbourliness, such as conversations in the street – in Tuiuti, the matter is less clear-cut than this. Perhaps due to its morphology, its vibrant local commerce, or the historical absence of drug trafficking and overt conflict, Asa Branca has, if anything, the more lively street culture. In the absence of

clearly delineated public areas, residents appropriate whatever spaces are available – conversing on sofas and chairs strategically abandoned at the entrance of the favela, or setting up tables on narrow backstreets to drink and play cards. Children cycle, fly kites and kick footballs wherever they can find a small bit of space. Although residents bemoan the lack of allocated leisure areas, the compact and enclosed form of the favela seems to promote a sense of security and openness that is central to Asa Branca's self-identity. Although, as will be discussed, some residents felt inconvenienced by the noise and other signs of disorder that result from this, many spoke positively about the friendliness of their neighbours and the regular conversations they would have in the street.

Tuiuti's residents also enjoy conversing on doorsteps and in the community's small squares and children make good use of the two playgrounds on the hill. However, there is a less performative quality to public life and residents are aware of a lack of "movement" ("*movimentação*") compared to many other favelas. As argued by some, this may be to do with the geography of the hill and the absence of many shops or bars. It certainly also relates to the historic and continuing presence of armed groups. However, the density of Tuiuti's networks may, paradoxically, also contribute. The degree to which neighbours all know one another creates an expectation of predictability about what goes on within the neighbourhood, which allows residents to monitor what is within their control.

> If an outsider arrives it's… "Hey, so and so lives here, what are they doing here?" It's like that. If you see a strange person, as I was telling you, (someone) needs to introduce you. Because if you arrive to do an interview the people will be a bit like "Why?" They trust each other more, because they're born and bred here. The majority of people I know, all from here. *[Female 36, Tuiuti]*

> Here everyone knows each other. So if a piece of furniture arrives for you and I'm here it's "What's the name? Oh it's for Roberto. Ah, I know where he lives, I'll take you to the door of his house." And you go and help out. A pizza arrives, you know who it's for… Everyone knows each other. On the road (ie. in formal areas) no-one knows each other. *[Female 24, Tuiuti]*

This intimacy was viewed positively by these and many other residents. However, for others it provokes feelings of being monitored by neighbours, and far more respondents from Tuiuti complained about negative gossip circulating in the neighbourhood, than did those from Asa Branca. One resident felt particularly strongly about what she perceived as an invasive culture in the neighbourhood:

> The people who live here, what happens is they're like this… they interfere a lot in the lives of others. People don't like to see… not everyone… they don't like to see people doing well. People are against that. There's lots of gossip. They speak about everything, you understand. I don't like that. I think everyone should have their own life, no? *[Female 53, Tuiuti]*

Although a couple of residents in Asa Branca expressed similar concerns, many more felt they were able to live relatively private lives if they so wished. Despite the lively street culture, several respondents commented that what they liked most about the neighbourhood was that no one "bothered" ("*incomodar*") them.

7.2.2 Social exchange in Tuiuti and Asa Branca

As was argued in the literature review, although they are linked, network structures and the dynamics of social exchange are not directly coterminous. To get a better idea of the extent to which residents of Tuiuti and Asa Branca engage in important forms of social exchange, I asked interviewees to complete a short survey. The sample of thirty residents in each case is too small to assume results will be representative of the wider population, but they are at least suggestive of the kinds of norms and expectations of reciprocity that prevail in each neighbourhood.

Respondents were given a list of four forms of assistance: (1) lending a small household item; (2) looking after someone's children; (3) helping someone who is unwell; and (4) lending more than R$50. They were asked to identify the *frequency* with which they gave and also received each type of assistance, with possible answers of "frequently", "sometimes", "rarely", "never" and "not applicable".[97] The

[97] In the charts below the very small number of responses that were left blank have been included under "not applicable". These occurred in the first interviews when respondents were asked to complete the survey themselves. Subsequently, I conducted the survey

aim of this approach was to understand general patterns of exchange across each population, as opposed to a name generator approach (for example, asking whom people would go to for particular types of support), which would primarily reveal information about immediate personal networks. Nonetheless, more specific information about whom such favours are done for is also essential for understanding whether exchange is widely spread across a population, or divided into smaller network sub-regions. With this in mind, respondents were also asked to specify whom they would be willing to perform these favours for, with options of "anyone", "any friend", "only a good friend or relative" and "no-one".

As Figures 7 and 8 below indicate, certain similarities and differences seem to emerge between Tuiuti and Asa Branca in terms of exchange patterns. In both communities a large percentage of respondents said that they regularly ("frequently" or "sometimes") give and receive help during periods of illness.[98] In both Tuiuti and Asa Branca, most residents feel there are people in the community, themselves included, who would be ready to help in such a situation. As one resident of Tuiuti explained:

> If necessary. As has happened before, I've helped people. If friends of mine are ill I'll go there, tidy the house, make some food. That's what people here are like, you know. We do a lot of that. Here if someone gets ill the neighbours offers "I'll go to the hospital with you", isn't it? That happens a lot here. *[Female 49, Tuiuti]*

myself to ensure full response and to provide opportunities to hear the way answers were framed and follow up on any interesting responses.

[98] Results for this answer may be affected by the fact that illness is, for most people, an irregular occurrence, making the question of frequency a weak indicator of the ability to access help. This was implied by the way some respondents adapted the question, by explaining that they rarely or never had to deal with their own or another person's illness, but would offer and could access help if and when needed.

Figure 10. Social assistance given and received – Tuiuti[99]



Figure 11. Social assistance given and received – Asa Branca



On the question of looking after children results were more nuanced. The sample of respondents from Asa Branca had a large number of residents with children below the age of sixteen (thirteen, compared to only six in Tuiuti) and it was expected that this would encourage more intense exchange in this area. However, this appears not to be the case. In fact, a similar proportion of respondents from Tuiuti claimed to look after other people's children regularly, and more claimed to do so "frequently". This would imply that Asa Branca's residents are less likely to seek or provide help with looking after children. A likely explanation for this is that Tuiuti's

[99] The raw data for this and following charts are provided in Appendix 7.

denser kinship networks make caring for other people's children a more normal aspect of neighbouring than in Asa Branca, where a more nuclear family structure prevails.

The results relating to the lending and borrowing of material resources – small household items and money – are similarly ambiguous. "Low cost" lending and borrowing of small items is common in both communities, with over two thirds of respondents in both communities claiming to regularly lend such objects, and around 60% in both saying that they regularly borrow them. However, many more respondents from Tuiuti than Asa Branca claimed to "frequently" lend small items. On the other hand, while a similar number in both communities (around 40%) said that they regularly borrow more than R$50, around half the number in Tuiuti (a little over 20%) compared to Asa Branca said that they regularly lend such an amount. That is to say that while Tuiuti's residents seem to have similarly or more intense patterns of everyday social exchange, they appear to be more reluctant to lend a significant sum of money.

These results could easily be spurious, given the small sample size and differences between the samples (for example in the proportion of respondents with young children). However, Figures 9 and 10, showing for *whom* respondents said they would be willing to do these favours, suggest that there may be more to it than this. Respondents from Asa Branca seem significantly more open to the idea of lending small items to non-intimate acquaintances, while respondents from Tuiuti were more likely say they would only do such low-cost favours for close friends and family. For the more costly favours of looking after children and lending money the results are broadly reversed, with Tuiuti's residents more willing to help. This may suggest that in Tuiuti greater network density promotes a more *diffuse* system of exchange where residents feel they are able to make greater claims on one another without agreeing to specific terms of reciprocity. In Asa Branca, meanwhile, looser networks may mean that requests for favours are less frequent, and more likely to carry clearer expectations of reciprocity. The reluctance of Tuiuti's residents to lend money – and the almost apocryphal terms in which many discussed the issue – may

represent an attempt to limit their exchange networks to intimates and thus avoid the risks associated with *diffuse* forms of exchange.

Figure 12. For whom favours are done – Tuiuti



Figure 13. For whom favours are done – Asa Branca



These results suggest that network structures emerging from specific, historical processes of community formation have some bearing on patterns of social exchange in different favelas. However, these "internal" processes are not the only influences shaping dynamics of exchange. As the rest of this section will explore, structural similarities between Tuiuti and Asa Branca also seem to generate similar mechanisms that serve to regulate and segment patterns of exchange. These structural conditions are largely responsible for determining the volume and distribution of material resources that become available to low-income communities, and thus encourage the development of common strategies among individuals for management of their resources. Meanwhile, at a more symbolic level societal constructions of difference shape relations between neighbours,

influencing the way that they cultivate their networks and make decisions about whom to exchange with and on what terms.

7.2.3 Individual action and social differentiation

Individual agency and social differentiation are both important factors that shape patterns of social exchange in Tuiuti and Asa Branca. In both case areas there were examples of individuals who played a key role in providing support and disseminating information in the community. A Tuiuti resident, who worked locally for a public agency enrolling people on training courses, described giving constant information and guidance to other residents about finding work and dealing with bureaucratic procedures. The porter for Brisa do Mar (the gated section of Asa Branca), who is also a resident of the area, had a similar role. He described a wide range of services he carried out beyond those required of his role, from helping elderly residents with DIY chores to providing information about opportunities for buying and renting properties in the area. He had also helped many residents to find jobs:

> I'm like that, I help whoever asks. A girl just arrived here and asked, "Hey man, no-one's said they're looking for a cleaner have they?" I'm an intermediary for my friends. I'm always finding jobs for my friends. […] There's a guy who moved here. [...] He was already quite old, and unemployed. (He said to me…) "Hey you know I have to pay rent, can you help me to find a job?" I said "If you give me your CV I'll get you a job on the construction project they're doing over there." That was two years ago. I help lots of people. *[Male 54, Asa Branca]*

These individuals, owing to their specialised skills and/or privileged knowledge, seemed to act as 'nodes' of information and support within community. However, others with less formalised skills or positions can also play such roles. One female resident in Asa Branca, for example, said that although she had no formal medical training, neighbours frequently sought her out for advice when they were feeling ill, earning her the nickname of "Ambulância" (ambulance). A female resident of Tuiuti in her early fifties had a similar attitude about helping others to find work, including acquaintances beyond her immediate friends and family:

> I've always like to indicate people, I'm always indicating.[100] "Look, there's something there, there's something here". Courses, everything I know about [...] something good I know about, I will tell people about it. [...] I talk to people more from my circle, but if I had to talk to someone more distant I would, because I really like to help people. I really like helping, especially young people. *[Female 53, Tuiuti]*

By contrast to this, some residents seem to live more private, detached lives, for the most part only engaging in significant interactions and exchanges with small networks of close friends and kin. Unlike the examples of network withdrawal and bounding presented below, these appear to be lifestyle choices rather than deliberate attempts to (re)structure networks and patterns of social exchange. This can relate specifically relate to social exchange, as in the first quote, or to more generally to sociability with neighbours, as in the second:

> I think we all need to have our own things. When we don't have things we'll ask, I always try to get things myself. I've always been like that, when I want or need something I always want to get it for myself. I don't like to be always [borrowing things]. *[Female 53, Tuiuti]*

> I'm quite a private person. I don't smoke, I don't drink, I don't go to a lot of social events […] A lot of people converse just for the sake of it. I'm not like that. I'm quite a closed person, I don't seem it do I? But I only really converse with people when I feel like it. Most of the time I just stay at home. *[Female 42, Asa Branca]*

Although such individual characteristics and attitudes are important elements of network exchange dynamics, socially structured attributes like age, gender and household structure are also crucial. At a basic level, the kinds of support that people are likely to provide for others is clearly segmented along gender lines. For example, men were more likely to say they would help a neighbour with a DIY project, whereas women reported more frequently looking after other people's children. However, gender and, more broadly, household structure, may also be

[100] To "indicate" (*Indicar*) means to speak to an employer to try and help someone to get a job (see below)

important in determining the degree to which individuals and households are able to provide and, on the other hand, need to request assistance. Individuals from households with more earners and fewer dependents seem to generally receive more requests for assistance, probably for the simple reason that they are likely to have greater resources at their disposal. One Tuiuti resident offered this kind of analysis:

> My dad and I lend a lot of things. There are always people coming around asking to borrow things. It can be a bit of a pain. I think it's because we're both men living here and we have better conditions than most people. *[Male 41, Tuiuti]*

Another Tuiuti resident who also received regular requests to borrow things questioned why as a single women with an elderly mother also living in the neighbourhood, she should be expected to help others: "Why don't they have these things themselves? They should have them. They're married, and I'm not. I live alone".

Gender and age intersect as particularly important factors shaping social exchange patterns for older residents. As observed by Arias and Rodrigues (2006), older favela residents and households with ill and disabled members are typically afforded an elevated status in the community, which protects them from some of the dangers associated with the drugs trade. This is particularly the case for elderly female residents, '*mulheres de idade*', who tend to be treated with a certain degree of deference and greeted with the formal title of '*Dona*'. During several interviews with older residents in both Asa Branca and Tuiuti, younger family members and neighbours dropped in to chat or offer help and in interviews people described supportive networks surrounding esteemed elderly members of the community. For example, one Tuiuti resident described the help that neighbours gave his elderly mother before she passed away:

> They helped until the end. I had the help of neighbours to transport her, even to put her in the taxi down on the road below. She'd lost her movement, so we needed people's help. That solidarity exists, it still exists. If you fall, someone

> will help you up. I don't know, we're humans, no? That attitude of helping. *[Male 54, Tuiuti]*

This seems to indicate a general attitude of 'baseline communism' (Graeber 2011) towards vulnerable members of the community, with other residents taking on obligations for providing support without any expectations of direct reciprocity.

7.2.4 Network mechanisms: Withdrawal, bounding, exclusion

Although individual action and social differentiation shape social exchange in important ways, other processes more clearly related to the structuring of networks are also evident. One such process is *network withdrawal*. Although they each use slightly different analytical approaches and terminology, this is analogous to processes described by Smith (2010) and Offer (2012) among low-income black inner-city residents in the United States and González de la Rocha (2001) among poor Mexicans during that country's economic crises of the 1980s and 90s. All suggest that a desire to avoid overwhelming obligations and/or the shame of requesting assistance from friends and family tend to provoke individual withdrawal from social exchange, and a fragmentation of networks more generally. In this way poverty is seen to undermine rather than to promote social exchange, counter to the claims of the more celebratory social capital literature.

Despite the high reported levels of lending and borrowing of small household items in Tuiuti and Asa Branca, a few respondents did claim to have withdrawn from participating in such exchanges. These decisions were invariably the result of negative past experiences:

> My tools? No. You know what happened when I lent my tools? I lent a lot here in the community and people didn't return them... they disappeared… they were broken. So now I won't lend a single tool of mine. *[Male 38, Asa Branca]*

> Look, today I do it much less, I used to do it a lot, but now I do it rarely. […] No one has anything! Why do I have to have things that people don't have. It's like whisk, blender, iron… I lent that to someone who I know won't give it back. What's the point? *[Female 46, Tuiuti]*

Offer argues that it is poorer members of a network who may be more likely to withdraw from networks, as they feel unable to maintain reciprocity in social exchange (Offer 2012, pp. 797-98). However, these residents were drawn from among the better off respondents and seemed to be withdrawing because they believed others would not reciprocate. In fact, more vulnerable residents in both communities – including the majority of those who had had long periods out of the labour market and those who worked in casual low-paid occupations like domestic service – seemed to have more open exchange networks and more positive views about retaining relatively open systems of exchange. This suggests there may be some degree of withdrawal among those with greater consumption power, but there is little evidence of wider social fragmentation.

Besides total withdrawal there are other, less drastic strategies residents can adopt to improve the predictability of social exchange relationships. One approach is to more clearly structure exchanges by applying clearer terms and/or deadlines before making loans. One resident from Tuiuti, who possessed a credit card, (still fairly uncommon in the neighbourhood), found herself the subject of regular requests for loans from neighbours. Although inclined to oblige, she was keen to ensure that it would not compromise her ability to keep up with repayments.

> I've got a thing where I tend to give people the benefit of the doubt, you know. I'll take a risk, you understand. Because it's like this, if someone arrives and says "Ah lend me this", sometimes the person isn't trustworthy, you know. [...So, I only lend to] friends, who I'm confident will pay me. Because sometimes… let's suppose I have some money to put on my credit card, so it's just for when the person needs it. And they say to me "Ah […] do you have fifity reais to lend me? I'll say, "Look, I have it, but I need it back to pay the card on such and such a date", "No no, I'll give it to you by then." In that way I'll lend the money if I trust the person. If I don't trust them I won't. Because it's already happened… I have a credit card, so I buy a lot of things for a lot of people. But there are people who pay it back late, you know. *[Female 53, Tuiuti]*

Another alternative to withdrawal is the process I will describe as *network bounding*. This represents attempts by residents to remove individuals from their

exchange networks that they deem to be untrustworthy or otherwise undeserving of assistance. As in the example offered by the following respondent, this may be based on negative past experiences and interactions:

> I help whoever needs it. It's like this, helping is one thing, but continuing to help is another. It's like this, if you arrive here and you're like "God, I need this…", ok, that's fine, I'll help… If I'm able to help, I'll help. But then tomorrow you come and "Oh I need this", then it's "Damn, well ok." After that "No it's not going to happen". It's like this, I'll help, but I think a person wanting help all the time… I don't know, I don't have that patience." *[Female 41, Tuiuti]*

Network withdrawal and bounding could be explained using a rational choice model, such as that used by Coleman (1988) in his discussion of social capital. This would propose that they represent attempts by individuals to protect their resources from the risk of depletion by other network members who do not practice reciprocity (eg. Coleman 1988). While such considerations do seem present among residents from Tuiuti and Asa Branca, it is likely that more abstract socio-cultural processes of distinction are also involved. As will be discussed in the Chapter 8, the kinds of boundaries respondents draw are highly complex, relating to both internal social differences and broader categorisations, like the deserving and undeserving categories of favela residents identified by Arias and Rodrigues (2006).

As well as network bounding, such categories can also form the basis for more general processes of *network exclusion*, where members of a wider network all exclude an individual (Offer 2012). One resident of Tuiuti appeared to have suffered such a fate. A disabled, retired truck driver in his early sixties, he had mobility problems, no income and, it seemed, a drinking problem. Despite having a large kinship network in Tuiuti, his family relationships were strained. He explained that his four grown-up children living in the neighbourhood wouldn't let him enter their homes because they, wrongly, he claimed, accused him of stealing. Although they would occasionally give him some money, and his ex-wife would come and check up on him, he claimed he was largely dependent on begging for leftovers at the large food market at the bottom of the hill. In direct contrast to the baseline communism

(Graeber 2011) that structures relationships with some of the more vulnerable members of the community, this resident's categorisation in a stigmatised group, had, it seems, contributed to his isolation.

7.2.5 The labour market, job finding and network bounding

The exchange of information and assistance relating to the job market further supports a model of social exchange in which relations are socially constructed rather than purely instrumental. In theory, job referrals should be encouraged within a rational choice model, because they appear to be 'low-cost' for the referee, and have the potential to be transformative for the job finder. Nonetheless there are several factors that impede the activation of network ties in job finding. These relate to the structure of the labour market and of local social networks, but also in the way referees use normative frameworks to judge the personal characteristics and behaviour of others before they decide to provide assistance.

In line with a vast body of evidence from many countries and dating back over several decades (see Guimarães 2013), the majority of respondents from Tuiuti and Asa Branca who were in employment had attained their current job through the intervention of a friend, family member or neighbour with an employer. Residents of both neighbourhoods are fully aware of this, and attempt to exploit their networks instrumentally when seeking employment. As a 21-year-old female resident of Tuiuti explained: "These days it's very difficult for you to find a job without asking someone. It's more likely if someone is working, and they indicate you ["*te indica*"]."

As described for social exchange more generally, there are some individuals who act as key nodes in the circulation of information and advice about job finding. Despite their ability and willingness to assist, however, time limitations and scarce labour market opportunities constrain their ability to help other residents find work. The Tuiuti resident referred to previously who also worked as a recruiter for job training schemes described continual requests for helping people find work:

> *Interviewer*: Have you ever helped someone to get a job?

Respondent [Female 43, Tuiuti]: "Always. Always. Whenever I see something, because unemployed people are what we have most of here, no?… If I know about something I'm always telling people.

Interviewer: And do people approach you?

Respondent: Now, yes. Now I'm co-ordinating these courses people look for me all the time. Seriously, sometimes I'm not even thinking about work and people… Sunday night the telephone rings, and I have to politely ask people to come on Monday because otherwise I can't have my own life, you know. I can't relax, my head doesn't stop thinking about work, and it's not healthy.

As this shows, in a context of high need and limited opportunities, job-finding assistance is not a trivial matter and can place a great toll on those in a position to offer it. Although the respondent does not appear to be withdrawing from this role, her concerns highlight the error of viewing such assistance as "free" or even "low-cost".

Other respondents who had had negative experiences of helping others to find work did claim to have withdrawn entirely. As in the following discussion with two female residents from Asa Branca, these decisions tended to rest on the reputational risks to referees of referring people who might not perform effectively on the job:

Respondent 1 [Female 32, Asa Branca]: I've helped people before. I've helped a lot. But these days I don't help any more. Because I used to indicate the person, the person would go, and then they'd leave without… for the person who was relying on them they stopped going. It wasn't satisfactory. And it ended up that I was…

Interviewer: The person responsible?

Respondent 1: I ended up being responsible for the irresponsibility of that person.

Respondent 2 [Female 31, Asa Branca]: I've also indicated some people, and I also had that same problem. I lost face. I referred the guy and he left the person in the lurch.

> *Respondent 1*: The person cried and cried and cried saying that they needed a job and then when the time came they didn't have the self-management for the job and said they didn't want to stay. And that wasn't ok with me. So I don't indicate any more.
>
> *Respondent 2*: The person does what they want and at the moment when they were most needed, when the employer most needed them, and it goes wrong. Because often we'll refer people to work in the house of a family, to look after the kids, or for a job in a shop or a salon, and at the moment when the employer most needs them, the person doesn't need the job anymore, because they've paid their debt or found something else…

Although such examples of respondents claiming that they had entirely *withdrawn* from job referral networks were rare, these kinds of concerns emerged again and again in interviews. Making an unsuccessful referral can both inflict reputational damage on a referee and harm existing relationships if the employers or other intermediaries are also embedded in the referee's social network. On the other hand, dense networks also create pressures for those in positions of leverage to provide support. As a result, referees can find themselves in a difficult position, caught between the competing pressures of various obligations to make interventions where the outcomes are uncertain. As a result, residents who are in a position to provide assistance to others in the labour market adopt various strategies for minimising the risk of negative outcomes.

One such strategy is to moderate the degree of input offered. One 49-year-old respondent from Tuiuti distinguished between "indicating" (ie. putting a word in with an employer) and actually placing someone in a job, implying that he had that influence, but didn't not want to use it in case of a negative outcome: "If I see that the person is responsible (I'll get them a job). If not I can indicate ["*indicar*"], but I won't actually get them the job ["*arrumar*"]". However, even indicating carries reputational risks. One middle-aged male resident in Asa Branca who worked as a public functionary implied a graded scale of support he would be willing to provide:

> I'll tell you man, if I find out someone needs a job, if I can help I'll do the maximum I can to help. But I can't put them in the job, I don't have that power,

> but if I can help, indicate, I'll indicate… in quotation marks, you understand, because you can't even indicate to everyone, right? *[Male 56, Asa Branca]*

As this suggests, rather than blanket withdrawal, residents are likely to make selective choices about whom they will or will not assist and to what degree. Some felt the job searcher's *need* for income was an important factor. One 28-year-old construction worker in Asa Branca had recently intervened to get a female friend a secretarial position in his firm. He explained that the woman had found herself in a difficult position, paying rent with three children to support, and wanted to help. He also felt this need for work would ensure that she would make a good employee, stating more generally that he will help, "Only if the person needs, needs to work. Because they really need it. Not the person that gets to the point of starting to work and then disappears. That happens a lot here." Although need is emphasised, friendship also seems crucial to such decisions. Stronger ties allow referees to more accurately gauge whether a job seeker's motives and behaviour, minimising uncertainty. They are also likely to bind both parties to certain terms of exchange – that referees to provide assistance, while job seekers are in turn obliged to work conscientiously.

For others, however, need and even friendship were not sufficient guarantees. Instead, the characteristic of *trustworthiness* was seen as paramount. This was frequently discussed with reference to misbehaviour at work. A 55-year-old female respondent from Tuiuti explained, "It's like this, you need to know they're honest, no? That they won't rob, that they won't do something wrong at work, because this reflects badly on us." This question is particular concern for residents who work in domestic service – a sector in which recruitment happens almost exclusively via by word of mouth, where barriers to entry are low, and where both the opportunities for and consequences of misconduct are substantial. A female resident of Asa Branca who worked as a cleaner in the gated condominium that neighbours the community, highlighted the importance of trust:

> It's a question of trust… that the person won't do something wrong in someone else's house… it exists, no? With me it's never happened, but it happens. That

> the person goes to work, you don't know if the person is a cool ["*legal*"] person, not like whether she's a friend, but if she'd mess about in another person's house, which isn't right. *[Female 50, Asa Branca]*

While having an existing friendship with someone and "really knowing them" can help to create this trust, others felt this was not sufficient. Rather than depending on the strength of the relationship as assurance of conduct in work, these potential referees emphasised the character of the job seeker and in particular the quality of "responsibility". This point was made by a 46-year-old male resident of Asa Branca: "It's lots of responsibility. Sometimes you indicate a person thinking that they're one thing and when the person arrives they turn out to be the opposite. And you get your fingers burnt." A 28-year-old male respondent from Tuiuti who worked in a secretarial role with a public agency went further. Following some bad experiences of making referrals he claimed to now only make referrals for people he felt had particular character traits:

> *Respondent [Male 28, Tuiuti]*: I've tried [to get someone a job], but as you say in English "They blew it" […] Either they didn't show up or they showed up and did something wrong.
>
> *Interviewer*: So do you still indicate now?
>
> *Respondent*: I'll still indicate, but now I have many more criteria to do that.
>
> *Interviewer*: What are they?
>
> *Repondent*: Maturity and responsibility… I know a lot of people who need work, but don't have the mentality to work so I won't help them.
>
> *Interviewer*: And what if it's a friend or relative?
>
> *Respondent*: For me it's independent of the relationship. Relative or not, if they don't have the necessary maturity I won't indicate.

Others emphasised the related attributes of having a strong work ethic and being motivated by self-improvement, rather than short-term monetary gain:

> I think… I part from the principle that help isn't for everyone, unfortunately. Because there are lots of people who need help, but there are people that want

> to help themselves. It's very different, isn't it? And sincerely I think I have a tendency to look to help others. But I've always sought to help those people in whom I see a greater will, you know. Not because it's the easiest thing, like "ah it's easier (to help) who wants it more". It's not that. It's that I think it's really good to help people who will take advantage of the opportunity. *[Female 43, Tuiuti]*

These seem to be examples of deliberate network bounding based on perceived characteristics of network members. When making decisions about providing a key form of social exchange, residents weigh up the risks and possible benefits of helping others using normative categories of "responsibility", "maturity" and having a strong work ethic. Although frequently negative, residents do not mobilise stigmatising labels equivalent to the "ghetto" behaviour identified as a barrier to network activation by Smith's (2005) respondents in inner-city Chicago. Nonetheless it does suggest that network bounding is subject to societal influences that construct dominant "legitimate" modes of behaviour and accompanying characteristics. This question will be taken up in the next chapter.

An important final point to emphasise is that such decisions all take place within the context of labour market structures and inequalities that strongly limit the possibilities of both referees and job seekers. As described by both Guimarães et al. (2013) and Smith (2005) individual, network and labour market factors all interact in the way that social networks connect individuals to job opportunities. Formal sector occupations requiring higher-level skills and credentials, for example, are characterised by very different network dynamics. A 31-year-old Asa Branca resident who worked as an engineer explained that he was he was rarely asked for help by neighbours because most sought work in lower-skilled and informal occupations with which he could not assist. By contrast, he was able to help friends and colleagues who were also qualified engineers without worrying about their job performance. His cousin and a friend, who were also present in the interview, identified this as a direct result of his position in the labour market:

> *Respondent 1 [Female 31, Asa Branca]*: It's because his job is a good job. Generally people have to have completed a course for that, they're already

> qualified to do it and it's a good salary, you understand. So the person already wants to go to a good firm.
>
> *Respondent 2 [Female 32, Asa Branca]*: […] If you went to work there it's because you like to work. [Because you are…] a person who knows what they want, that it's going to be a long-term thing.

Although in a different way, another sector that seems to be characterised by a lower level of anxiety about job referrals is the construction sector. Respondents who worked in construction described constant networking to find both jobs and labourers. A Tuiuti resident who worked as a scaffolder summed it up:

> We do everything through contacts. These days, it's like […] I have a contact from work, a friend, and later he ends up unemployed, and then it's, "Hey man here's something". Everyone helps everyone else. *[Male 37, Tuiuti]*

The structure of the construction industry, where most workers are employed on casual contracts, necessitates constant networking. At the same time, the frequent need for short-term labourers often means employers can be more flexible about whom they will recruit. This creates a situation where potential referees can more easily assist neighbours and acquaintances to find temporary work. A painter from Tuiuti said he had helped many people from the community to find work, including former drug-traffickers – a group which faces enormous difficulties in entering the labour market:

> People from the community who need help, who have families, ask me to help, so I go have a chat and get them the job. […] People who are from round here, I'll get them work as labourers. […] People who pay rent, others trying to get out of trafficking. I don't think there's anyone I wouldn't help. *[Male 54, Tuiuti]*

Such an attitude seems to be somewhat of a luxury in the context of a neighbourhood with high unemployment and many residents lacking skills and long-term employment experience. Indeed it is only possible because of the specific, relatively open and casual structure of the construction sector.

7.2.6 Social exchange and network mechanisms

To summarise, the network dynamics of residents of Tuiuti and Asa Branca are shaped by factors relating to both internal network structures and, more importantly, external pressures and influences. The network structures of the two communities differ as a result of contrasting historic processes of neighbourhood formation, which have left Tuiuti with a significantly more densely connected population than Asa Branca. This appears to have promoted more intense patterns of social exchange in Tuiuti, although these are relatively high in both communities, at least when it comes to relatively "low-cost" forms of assistance.

At the same time both communities are subject to conditions of material scarcity and to forms of social distinction within the low-income population that transcend individual favelas. These influences internally structure and segment networks and practices of exchange. In particular, social exchange in both communities appears to be affected by a degree of withdrawal among better of residents, the strategic "bounding" of networks, and perhaps also processes of network exclusion. These different mechanisms appear to contain an element of rational choice, whereby residents seek to reduce the risks of their material resources being depleted with regard to lending and of suffering reputational damage in the case of job referrals. However, they also appear to be tied up with culture-specific normative frameworks that residents refer to when making decisions about network development and exchange. Chapter 8 will look in more detail at how residents draw upon and adapt these categories in the construction of individual and neighbourhood identities, as well as the underlying social and ideological tensions and instabilities involved in such processes.

7.3 Collective action, security and the neighbourhood

In addition to exchange, another important aspect of the relationship between the neighbourhood and social networks concerns the question of 'collective action', that is the way in which residents act together to pursue collective aims. Although rarely conceived as such (at least not with regard to neighbourhoods), collective action can, like social exchange, also be understood as a network process. Sampson

et al.'s (1997) concept of *collective efficacy* provides a useful model for understanding how the property of network density (and in some cases 'closure') can help to establish agreed norms and modes of enforcing them within a community. However, as discussed previously, it is problematic to apply such a concept to Rio de Janeiro's favelas, where institutional weakness, high levels of violence and the territorial power of armed groups seem to impede collective efficacy translating into neighbourhood security. This section will analyse the interaction between network structures and security conditions, arguing that networks can at times play a mediating role in reducing violence and uncertainty, albeit under conditions that are overwhelmingly determined by the 'urban process', discussed in Chapter 6, of territorialised competition between armed groups.

7.3.1 Asa Branca: Enforcing norms in a changing neighbourhood

7.3.1a Population change, network diffusion and the problem of collective action

Sustaining established modes of collective action and agreeing upon and enforcing behavioural norms have become major challenges in Asa Branca in recent years. This is most immediately apparent in the situation of the favela's residents' association. As evidenced by the upgrading of 2012, the association has been highly successful in lobbying the city council for public intervention in recent years. However, the failure of the long-awaited *Morar Carioca* participatory urbanisation programme to materialise indicates that much-needed further improvements are unlikely to occur. Unlike Tuiuti, Asa Branca has no state institutions, public spaces or sports facilities at all in the local area. During interviews these emerged as universal demands, making them clear objectives for collective action. Although such infrastructure and service improvements are beyond the scope of the residents association, it is keen to realise smaller projects that might compensate somewhat for these larger gaps in service provision.

However, such projects have proved difficult to get off the ground. The association is currently unable to fund any services or community activities and even its building has fallen into disrepair. The association's president Cirão bemoans the fact that despite the large number of construction workers in the community, no-one is

willing to work for free to help with the latter's refurbishment. Echoing a common view amongst older residents, he put this down to a decline in community spiritedness that had characterised earlier practices of *mutirão* (community self-help projects – see Image 20). In the absence of resident mobilisation and fed up with depending on unreliable channels of political clientelism, Cirão is exploring the possibility of leveraging funding from the private sector. One idea being floated was for the association to form a relationship with a major Brazilian airline to help finance community projects.[101]

Image 20. Photograph of residents laying drains in Asa Branca in the 1990s – an example of a *mutirão* project (source: Catalytic Communities)

At the time of the research the association was struggling to co-ordinate even core services like rubbish collection. The reason for this was that despite the growing population in the neighbourhood not enough residents were paying the small monthly tax to the association. There is no way of enforcing the tax and the association has traditionally relied on a collective willingness to pay – a simpler task when residents of the community all knew one another directly. Most long-term residents continued did to pay, but many of the newer ones do not, perhaps not feeling obliged to, or simply not seeing the value in it. This had caused some

[101] The president hoped to cash in on the growing numbers of Northeastern migrants residents flying back for holidays to their place of origin. The association would refer residents to the airline, and in exchange it would receive a fee to help fund its projects.

frustration amongst older residents who felt they were getting less value for money as environmental problems were aggravated in the neighbourhood. One resident who had lived in Asa Branca since it was first established was considering stopping his payments to the association altogether:

> If I pay a tax to the association and there's rubbish everywhere, and I can't drive into the community because someone's blocking the entrance.. because people who don't even pay the tax have no respect.. What am I going to do? I'm going to complain to the association. Or maybe I'll just stop paying the tax myself. I don't have two guns in my belt, so there's nothing I can really do. *[Male 62, Asa Branca]*

This suggests that the weakening correspondence between resident social networks and the space of the neighbourhood, driven by rapid population growth and the marketisation of housing, has unsettled established patterns of collective action. While creating frustration for some, however, it does not seem to have produced clear divisions between different segments of the population. This seems to be because although long-term residents of Asa Branca are conscious of being locals, this does not correlate with any other category that might give this more salience as a collective identity.

More established residents seem to be on average wealthier than newcomers (although there is no data to measure this), but not to the extent that they constitute a different social class or even income group. Greater wealth, better housing conditions and, in some cases, higher incomes among established residents seem to overwhelmingly be the product of having more stable circumstances, and often of being older in age. By contrast there seem to be no clear patterns of segmented educational or employment paths, or consumption practices. The above respondent, for example, was a retired street hawker whose main income came from renting out two kitchenettes ("quitinetes", self-enclosed apartments within a larger favela house) he had added to his home. If anything he felt that other locals were benefitting more from the influx of new arrivals. "I have two Kitchenettes that I built on my house," he explained. "There are people here with

ten, twelve kitchenettes, even more than that. It's only me who isn't making any money out of it."

Similarly, while some perceive cultural differences, these do not take the form of sharp ethnic and racial distinctions, as is often the case in urban neighbourhoods that receive large number of transnational migrants. There are important reasons for this. Firstly, the newer residents are a diverse group. Although predominantly originating from the Northeast of Brazil, they are from a range of different regions, and are racially and culturally diverse. Some interviewees (both older and newer residents) talked of a general 'Northeastern culture', symbolised by the popularity of *forró* music that is played loudly in neighbourhood bars favoured by newer migrants.[102] However, even this is not a clear dividing line, partly because Northeastern cultural influences are widespread in Rio and *forró* music also popular amongst Cariocas. Even more importantly, many of Asa Branca's older residents, including a large number of those interviewed, are themselves Northeastern migrants, or the children of migrants, who had arrived in previous waves. Regional culture, then, is not a boundary that becomes clearly articulated, or *territorialised*, as a dividing line between residents.

In the absence of clearly articulated inter-group tensions, many interviewees believe that new migrants are being well integrated into the community. A 17-year-old male respondent who had moved to Asa Branca from the state of Bahia five years previously said he found the first few weeks difficult, being new to the city and not knowing anyone. However, he felt he had quickly become integrated and did not perceive any divisions between old and new residents. Most of the older respondents expressed similar views about the integration of new arrivals, usually along the lines of "everyone gets along here".

Rather than the kind of polarisation of identities between "established" and "outsiders" described by Scotson and Elias (1994), residents who have lived in Asa Branca for more than a few years tend to express a more elusive sense that the feel of the neighbourhood has changed, without, for the most part, pointing the finger

[102] *Forró* is a type of popular folk music and dance from the Northeast of Brazil.

directly at a clearly definable group. Most respondents who could be regarded as long-term residents tend to view most newcomers whom they know on personal terms positively. However, they also report seeing more faces they do not recognise and increasingly feeling that they do not know what is going on in the area. This has not undermined conviviality as such, and Asa Branca retains its vibrant street culture. However, there has been a weakening of the correspondence between the space of the neighbourhood and resident social networks. This has important implications for informal practices of coexistence and collective action in the neighbourhood beyond the institutionalised sphere of the residents association.

7.3.1b Security and norm enforcement

One important result of the diffusion of networks in Asa Branca is that some residents perceive new threats to be lurking in the neighbourhood. For many respondents, the discussion of neighbourhood change and the appearance of new residents quickly led to discourses about violence and crime. A recurrent claim in interviews was that "*bandidos*", or criminals, were probably now present in Asa Branca, unknown to the rest of the population:

> *Interviewer*: Have you noticed the presence of new residents here in recent years?
>
> *Respondent [Female, 31]*: Yes, suddenly I'm seeing lots of people I don't recognise... It's fine, it's just that you don't know who they are so you never know if it might be a *bandido* or something like that.
>
> I think there are lots of fugitives ["*gente foragida*"][103] in our community. You don't know the past of your neighbour. You only know what you can see, that I'm here and that I seem like a good person. But if that person is arriving who we don't know, what is lying behind those people? You need to know [...] It could be someone who already killed someone, who is a fugitive that's gone to [hide out in] a *comunidade*. It could be someone who's a drug addict, who was

[103] The term '*foragido/a*' is used broadly in Brazil to describe criminal actors who might be on the run for any number of reasons (including fleeing other criminals), and not solely people who have evaded the criminal justice system.

> in prison. We don't know, and we can't find out from anyone else. *[Male 40, Asa Branca]*

Despite his suspicions, this resident was quick to emphasise that the majority of new residents were good people, but that the problem was "having no way of knowing". This kind of anxiety about new neighbours seems to represent a concern that Asa Branca's security settlement, and the relative success it has had in isolating itself from the conflicts and violence that affect favelas elsewhere in the city, are under threat. In particular, the penetration of market logic into the allocation of housing in the neighbourhood creates an opening through which such problems can enter. Some residents identified this relationship explicitly:

> Look here. It doesn't bother me especially, but I'm not going to lie to you, it's not cool ["*legal*"]. Because today you don't know who is who, where people are coming from, you understand. Lots of people are coming from the North.. to work here, you understand. They don't bother us, that's the important thing, right? But it's really a lot of people. Lots of people. People pass and it's like "I've never seen those people", "God, he's strange, that guy, strange". But it's just that. They don't bother us. [...] For me this thing of renting isn't for communities. That's something for the street [ie. formal areas], not for favelas. *[Female 43, Asa Branca]*

Another resident made a similar point, distinguishing between letting arrangements in which some discretion or vetting process had been involved and others where ability to pay was the only requirement:

> The problem is there are big groups who are always arriving and leaving. There's an employer who houses his workers down the road and he always gets people who are respectful, a select group. But there are other cases where you don't know if you'll get good or bad people. *[Male 41, Asa Branca]*

While at neighbourhood level the presence of unfamiliar faces creates some feelings of anxiety, this suggests that there are different dynamics operating at the scale of the street or between next-door neighbours. Here familiarity is will usually be established quickly through daily greetings and interactions. This is likely to assuage concerns about the possible criminality of neighbours, but can have more concrete implications for neighbourly coexistence.

This highlights the second important implication of the process of network diffusion in Asa Branca, which is that that many respondents felt that previous norms of acceptable public behaviour have become blurred, leading to more problems of low-level conflict. It is interesting to note that all of the respondents who reported such issues, and those who were most concerned about the changes, all lived in a particular part of Asa Branca. This is the Quinta dos Infernos ("Hell's Farm") section which sits at the back of the community, off the Rua do Canal, which runs along the Rio Pavuninha. It is the area that was occupied during the 2001 invasion, which remains the poorest looking and least consolidated part of Asa Branca. Although renters and new migrants have settled across the whole neighbourhood (including inside the gated area of Brisa do Mar), it is in the Quinta dos Infernos where they are most numerous. Perhaps more importantly, this area has developed into a kind of nightlife hub, with four bars along the Rua do Canal alone that hold regular *forró* parties and play loud music late into the night.[104] Disposal of waste into the adjacent Pavuninha river has also aggravated long-standing environmental problems, as the river periodically becomes blocked up with waste, harming air quality and attracting insects (Image 21).

Image 21. Accumulated litter in the Rio Pavuninha at the edge of Asa Branca (source: Catalytic Communities)

[104] Although the name "Quinta dos Infernos" predated the establishment of this part of Asa Branca, one resident remarked that it was an apt name considering what the area had become.

Some residents felt the situation on the *Rua do Canal* had created an 'anything goes' environment, in which people pay little attention to the needs and rights of existing residents:

> It's a lack of respect of one person for another, a lack of consciousness of people's rights [...] You think "Here I am, it's the weekend and I'm going to enjoy myself, I'm going to drink, I'm going to litter, without caring that the other person works on the weekend. I and lots of the other girls who live here work on the weekends. *[Female 42, Asa Branca]*

> It's difficult coexisting here […] Because the education of the community in terms of coexistence, respect of one neighbour for another, there are very few who have this respect. They don't know, they don't have a notion of respecting where their rights start and where they end to think about mine. [...] It's rubbish on the floor… it's not suitable, just because I live in the community I have to be here looking at rubbish on the ground, seeing those things? *[Male 38, Asa Branca]*

Some framed this behaviour as resulting from a "lack of education", a recurrent theme that will be explored further in Chapter 8. However, one female resident in her late 30s saw it as resulting from the new residents' lack of commitment to the neighbourhood. For her it was the status of being a renter, rather than any individual predisposition, that led to a callous attitude towards neighbours and the local environment:

> *Respondent [Female 42, Asa Branca]*: They don't have a commitment to the place. They don't have a commitment either to the area or to the community, because it's not theirs, so how can they know? Because they don't have roots here it doesn't matter to them. They don't come to contribute, but just to pass through.
>
> *Interviewer*: They don't stay for very long?
>
> *Respondent*: It's not even that they don't stay very long. The worst thing I see is that as they're not from here they don't have any commitment. When they become property owners then they start to change, because then they start to

> think, now I'm worried, now I have to look after things. But with the majority of renters, they don't have a sense of looking after the place.

This respondent reported having got into lots of conflicts about these problems, as she was unwilling to tolerate what she saw as unacceptable behaviour. She stated that she opposed the commonly held view that "in the favela, everything is acceptable". However, ultimately she didn't feel as though she could have an effect on the behaviour of her neighbours. A 45-year-old male resident living in the same part of the community had become reluctant to intervene in such disputes. He felt that with new neighbours he could no longer predict how people would respond to requests, saying: "you don't know if you have some kind of normal neighbourly disagreement how the guy will react, whether he might be a violent guy."

A third resident, living on the Rua do Canal itself had taken a different approach. After getting involved in one conflict, he decided to install a CCTV camera on the front of his house, arguing, perhaps optimistically, that if someone wanted to do something to his house he didn't want to "hit the guy", but instead show it to the police so they would "do something about it". However, he also believed that this probably wouldn't be sufficient to protect him.

> I've installed a camera on my house, but that won't protect me. It won't protect my family. I think that even if you put in a security system, if a person's going to kill you, they're going to kill you. If they're going to do something cowardly ["*se vai fazer uma covardia*"], they're going to do something cowardly. There is no security against a malicious person. *[Male 38, Asa Branca]*

7.3.1c Asa Branca's anxious peace in context

The problems surrounding conflict resolution and growing feelings of insecurity in Asa Branca must be placed firmly in Rio's wider context. The problems raised in interviews mainly relate to environmental issues like noise and littering, which could be found in most of Rio's favelas and many of its formal neighbourhoods. More serious conflicts or cases of criminal activity were barely commented upon. A few interviewees asserted that underground drug dealing did go on in the community and during the period of the research disturbing rumours also circulated that a local, underage girl was working as a prostitute for a clientele of construction

workers who had recently moved to Asa Branca. However, the fact that most respondents seemed unaware of these issues suggests that it does not affect a majority of residents.

Given the likelihood of militia influence over some aspects of life in Asa Branca, including repression of drug trafficking and other serious forms of criminality, it is difficult to interpret the lack of discussion of crime in the neighbourhood. It could be that violent crime (perhaps committed by militias themselves) goes on regularly but is underreported due to fear of militia reprisal. However, this does not fit with the extremely positive way in which residents generally discuss the security situation in the neighbourhood and the willingness of some respondents to discuss the matter openly. A more likely explanation is that the local security regime is, in the words of one respondent, "less dictatorial" than in favelas dominated by paramilitary-style militias. While it probably deters serious criminality with the threat of violence, it appears not to intervene in low-level conflicts such as those described.

Barring a change in this institutional security context, Asa Branca seems unlikely to be affected by the kinds of violence seen elsewhere in the city, even as established modes of conflict resolution among neighbours are eroded. In this way the institutional configuration of security can be seen to override the importance of network structures in determining neighbourhood security. However, this does not prevent increased anxiety among residents. For them, the failure of some new residents to observe established norms of coexistence in the neighbourhood is a source of daily frustration and concern. Meanwhile the possible penetration of '*bandidos*' and seems to present a constantly looming threat undermining feelings of security, even if the attendant risks are somewhat reduced by the local security regime.

7.3.2 Tuiuti: Pacification and the emergence of a bipolar security regime

7.3.2a Network cohesion and trafficker control

As outlined earlier, the conditions shaping patterns of collective action and security in Tuiuti contrast sharply with those in Asa Branca. Tuiuti is a traditional *Comando*

Vermelho (Red Command, *CV*) stronghold, where drug traffickers oversaw a relatively predictable security regime. Furthermore, unlike Asa Branca, Tuiuti's population has remained relatively stable over recent years. However, there has been one dramatic change in the neighbourhood: the instalment of a *Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora* (Police Pacification Unit, UPP) in Tuiuti in 2011. This has radically altered the context in which residents individually and collectively seek to establish conditions of security. Put in the simplest terms, while the factors underlying community cohesion in Tuiuti have largely remained unchanged, the relationship of the community with the state, and specifically the police, has been transformed. This change has had far reaching implications for local security dynamics, resident relations with both police and drug traffickers, and processes of conflict resolution within the community.

In order to analyse the transformation, it's essential to understand what preceded it. As described previously, Tuiuti fell under the control of the *CV* in the early 1980s, bringing to an end a period of instability and violent conflict between rival local gangs. Subsequently, the *CV* enforced a set of broadly acceptable rules governing resident behaviour in the neighbourhood, in exchange for their tolerance of drug trafficker activities. What marks out Tuiuti's trafficker regime as a paradigmatic case is the influence of the community's residential stability and dense webs of social and kinship networks, ensuring that traffickers became deeply embedded in community life. While a negligible number of residents have had any meaningful involvement in the drugs trade, gang members are known to all and are likely to have large numbers of relatives in the neighbourhood. This has had the double-sided effect of deeply entrenching and routinising trafficker influence, while at the same time strongly incentivising traffickers to try and maintain positive relations with residents. One resident described this relationship prior to pacification:

> Like I told you, those of us who have lived here a long time end up knowing even the people who are involved in those things. And so, despite their involvement, as we've known them a long time, we have that "security", in quotation marks, that they will respect us, because they know us. That's really what happens. If it was a person coming from outside alone, before I would

> have had a certain fear to say "yeah go up there". Because, it's like this, a person from outside, they might think "What's this guy doing? Why's he looking?" *[Female 36, Tuiuti]*

The dense network ties stretching across the divide between *bandidos* (drug traffickers) and ordinary residents had the, perhaps counterintuitive, effect of reinforcing the separation. Instead of drawing residents into the business of drug trafficking, it apparently promoted a consensus among traffickers to respect the neutrality of those not involved in the drug trade. One resident explained:

> Here the little guys ('*carinhas*') just wanted to sell drugs [...]. It was never to mess with the community, with people, residents. [...] When the traffic was worse here... There are always some who are more cunning, you know? The ones who work for someone but think they'll get rid of them, and then they realise. And God they tried it and the guy knocked them off. But it was just with them and not with the family, just with the people who were actually working in it. The family itself, he never went to get the family like you hear in other places, to kill the family, or expel them, you understand. *[Female 46, Tuiuti]*

Network density in this sense could be conceived as having promoted a restricted form of collective efficacy in Tuiuti, where a thick web of overlapping relationships and obligations to some extent acted as a check on the indiscriminate use of violence and arbitrary exercise of power by the local *CV* command.

However, this should not be over-exaggerated. Ultimately, trafficker relations with the community were dictated by the perverse priorities and violent *modus operandi* of the drugs trade, and resident access to "justice" remained inconsistent and determined by unaccountable channels of personal influence. One resident described how a family member who had become addicted to drugs had been murdered by the *CV* in the early 1990s. Despite being from a respected local family they were unable to intervene to prevent the "execution". Several residents reported the arbitrary requisitioning of public spaces and buildings in the community by traffickers against the will of residents. Similarly, while Tuiuti remained relatively peaceful in the years prior to pacification, its ties to traffickers

in Mangueira meant that it became embroiled in *CV* conflicts with police when gun battles spilled over into Tuiuti. Clearly, any civilising effect of community cohesion on trafficker behaviour could quickly be overridden by the imperatives of maintaining power and the flow of illicit profits.

7.3.2b A change of regime

Pacification dramatically altered the balance of forces in Tuiuti. Before the police entered, senior *CV* members, including the local *Dono*, fled the community. Subsequently, the UPP base was installed in the most visible and symbolically potent location possible – next to the resident's association in Tuiuti's central square, on the site of the former *boca de fumo* (drug sale point). Although this is the only permanent police base in the neighbourhood, UPP officers carry out regular patrols by foot and by car around Tuiuti and the surrounding streets.

While the UPP is expected to sustain a dialogue with the community through meetings with the residents' association and other local service providers and organisations, like elsewhere the local UPP commander has enormous discretionary power. For example, he is able to decide on whether to allow parties and other community events to take place, based on whether these might lead to public order issues. Across Rio's pacified favelas this has become a controversial issue, particularly in the case of funk parties, or *bailes*, which police tend to associate with drug trafficker culture, but which are legitimately and peacefully enjoyed by young people living both in and outside favelas (see World Bank 2012, pp. 69-73).

As elsewhere, tensions of this kind developed in Tuiuti following pacification, and on a couple of occasions have boiled over. Several residents described an incident when a party was forcefully shut down by the UPP. According to one respondent, who had helped to organise the event, the police saw the preparations taking place but did not intervene until the party had actually started, stating that it did not have the appropriate clearance. When guests refused to leave police dispersed the crowd using pepper spray. For this respondent the police action went against the grain of established practice in Tuiuti, where there was a general agreement among residents that parties would continue until 2 or 3 in the morning and then the

sound would be turned off. The same respondent also reported incidents of young male residents being harassed by officers without cause and of a general feeling of fear among younger residents towards the UPP.

> It's like this, my daughter can't even see a UPP officer, because she's too scared. She has a lot of fear. Because every time they pass it's to, like, punish a kid, or something like that. They don't come and say "good night", "good day", they don't say anything. So every time that she's around, when they pass, they do something, mess with some kid or I don't know what. They think they're the authority. Ok, but they have to be polite. *[Female 24, Tuiuti]*

This account supports the view of pacification as the enforcement of an aggressive new regime of social control, designed to repress favela populations and in particular the young men who have traditionally filled the ranks of the drug trafficking gangs (eg. Fleury 2012; Cecchetto et al. 2013).

Notwithstanding the clear tensions that exist between police and some parts of the community, however, a majority of interviewees did not share this interpretation. Well over half of the respondents from Tuiuti felt that the police were not particularly aggressive and for the most part didn't "mess with anyone". Several residents reported barely noticing any difference, offering variations on the general theme of "they go about their business, and I go about mine". Some went as far as to say that the comparatively peaceful situation in the community prior to pacification meant that there was no need for it to occur at all, and that things had more or less continued as previously, with the UPP taking the place of the CV in overseeing an essentially peaceful neighbourhood. Others described a process of transition in which a "phase" of initial tension between the police and residents had subsided as they had come to understand one another better:

> *Respondent [Female 36, Tuiuti]*: It's improved, it's improved a lot, you know. It's like this, when the UPP entered there were some problems, some confusion. Because people didn't want to accept them, to get used to them, and it was complicated…
>
> *Interviewer*: Confusion like what?

Respondent: Ah, it's that they prohibited people from doing lots of things.

Interviewer: Like the *bailes*?

Respondent: Yes that's it. "Ah there's a party in your house, the noise is too loud, you have to turn it off", you understand? So it was like they arrived like that without knowing the rhythm of the community. Now it's good.

Among those who felt things had improved with pacification, a few framed this in expansive terms, describing a sense of enhanced security, particularly with the reduced likelihood of shoot-outs in Tuiuti:

> With the UPP, with this business, things have improved a lot. Look it's peaceful here now […]. I think the community... even though there are people who think they're against it, which you're always going to have, no? But there are people who feel secure now. […] There won't be gun-fights between police and *bandidos*, that's the main thing. *[Female 41, Tuiuti]*

Another resident went further, arguing that pacification not only meant greater security, but also greater freedom due to the reduced influence of traffickers over residents' lives:

> You can sit outside your door without that insecurity that something might happen, that there might be a shoot-out, that the police are chasing someone. […] But the other thing is I feel that people are a bit freer, you know. […] Damn, now if I want to do something, I don't have to give satisfaction to anyone. It's mine, it's my money, it's my work, that I'm going to have for myself. I'm not worried that someone will take it away. Because sometimes that happened if the person didn't agree. And having to ask to do this or do that, as if we were children, you know. People were treated like children for their whole lives, you know. Like, you can only go if this guy let's you. It's a good thing, really good, what I'm seeing here. *[Female 43, Tuiuti]*

Most, however, stopped short of such unqualified assessments even if they had a broadly positive view of the UPP. These respondents tended to focus on narrower aspects of improvement relating to daily life. Some residents explained that they could now access formal services, like household deliveries and repairs, from

companies that would previously refuse to enter Tuiuti. More widely commented upon was the reduced *visibility* (as opposed to *incidence*) of criminal activity in the neighbourhood. Flaunting of weaponry, drug dealing and other criminal activities carried out or permitted by the drug traffickers had been pushed underground following the arrival of the police. As one male resident, whose house looked out onto the former *boca de fumo* (now the site of the UPP base) put it: "It's a big improvement. The guys used to sit over there with their guns out. Now they've gone." The reduced visibility of arms and drug dealing was particularly welcome for respondents with young children, who they believed had been negatively affected by the influence of such activities in the neighbourhood:

> "Lots of things changed, because you don't get this business anymore of the guys selling drugs in front of you, because it's ugly when you have kids, when the kids are growing up (around that). […] These days, no. Today you don't see that anymore... That's a good change."

Although seeing pacification as a qualified success, however, these residents believe it has improved but not solved the difficulties residents face with both drug traffickers and the police. Indeed others believe that in certain ways it has in fact aggravated them.

7.3.2c Double panopticism at close quarters

Although some traffickers had left the community prior to pacification, it was an open secret that others had continued to operate under the noses of the police. The persistence of trafficker influence was laid bare in February 2013 when two gang murders were committed in the area surrounding Tuiuti after armed men had robbed the gun of a police officer next to the UPP base (Werneck and Ramalho 2013).[105] The following day small businesses closed their doors, ostensibly under the orders of the traffickers – a practice common prior to pacification.

[105] Competing rumours went around that this was either connected to an internal dispute within the Mangueira *CV* hierarchy or that the robbery and murder were committed by traffickers linked to the rival *Amigos dos Amigos* faction from the Cajú Complex, which was about to be pacified.

Some residents spoke about the continuation of drug trafficking and related activities as a failure by the UPP to tackle the problem. One elderly male resident complained:

> To be honest with you, nothing has changed. The only difference is that we have police as well as drugs now. The drugs are there, but the police don't do anything. It's pacified, but the drugs continue, the *bandidos* continue. *[Male 56, Tuiuti]*

A middle-aged female resident, meanwhile, believed the traffickers were "having a party" with the UPP, and that the problem would only be solved if a more aggressive force, like the BOPE (the special police) or the army, came in to expel the traffickers once and for all. Although a minority view, this contrasts sharply with the established literature to have so far emerged on the UPP programme, which portrays residents as either cautiously approving of pacification (eg. World Bank 2012; Cano et al. 2012) or largely critical of its militarism and the constraints it places on resident social life (eg. Fleury 2012; Cecchetto 2013).

A more convincing explanation for the continuing criminal activity in Tuiuti than simple police ineptitude is that what has emerged from pacification is not simply a new form of unipolar social control exercised by police in place of traffickers. Instead there is now a bipolar security regime in which both police and traffickers are present in the neighbourhood in a diminished form. Drug traffickers could not resist pacification directly and have had to reduce their visibility to adapt to the reality of police occupation. On the other hand the police do not have the necessary resources or political capital within the community to flush out what remains of the drug trade. Any attempt to do so would inevitably entail human rights abuses that would undermine relations with the community while also provoking trafficker retaliation. Instead both traffickers and the UPP are pursuing their corporate aims with the means at their disposal, but with these aims and means modified to adjust to the unavoidable presence of the other.

As a result many residents are highly aware of being under a system of bipolar surveillance, where the "*lei do morro*", or "law of the hillside" (the observance of

omertá with regard to trafficker activities) has taken on a new and more complex spatial configuration. Residents must now be able to both *see* and *not see* the activities of both police and traffickers in order to avoid unwanted attention from both sides. One resident described the challenge of coexisting with police without befriending them for fear of trafficker surveillance:

> I respect them. I say hello, greet them, you understand… But we can't have any interaction with them. We can't because of the *bandidos*. If a *bandido* sees us having a conversation they're going to think that we're… we can't. You can't offer them a cup of water. You can't offer… if you're having a barbecue, to give them a little plate, you can't. Because they will see us there and think that we're with the police. *[Female 53, Tuiuti]*

But despite the increased – and now two-sided – surveillance in the neighbourhood, the extent to which either group can act to maintain low-level order in Tuiuti is limited. Indeed, the bipolar security regime is one in which a significant *security gap* has emerged. Despite their special powers and recorded instances of abuse in other pacified favelas, police must for both legal and reputational reasons operate with a higher threshold of evidence than traffickers when punishing criminal behaviour. This means they are a less effective deterrent to low-level crime and anti-social behaviour that is not conducted in plain view. They may also have made operational decisions not to pursue such behaviour so as to avoid provoking community anger. One resident, for example, claimed that she had complained to a UPP officer about young people smoking marijuana outside her house, but had been told that they were "interested in catching dealers, not users" of drugs. On the other hand, traffickers are no longer able to openly mete out summary justice with impunity as they had previously.

This new balance of forces in Tuiuti has therefore reduced violence, but created a space in which some previously uncommon forms of criminal behaviour have been able to emerge. One resident felt this had actually worsened day-to-day life in the community:

> I was really in favour of the UPP. Before I was really in favour of the UPP coming here. God, for me it was a dream for them to come here. […] I was in favour of them coming because I thought that lots of things were going to change. Even though it wasn't violent before, I thought it was going to improve. But I think it got worse. With the entry of the UPP the *dono* here left. He left and we ended up without law, you understand. So those other petty criminals ("*bandidinhos"*) started to cause lots of trouble. They started to rob. They started to smoke marijuana close to us. Sometimes the smell enters my house, you understand, and you can't complain. *[Female 53, Tuiuti]*

The same respondent explained that a convicted criminal who was out on parole living back in Tuiuti was rumoured to have burgled the houses of several other residents. However, although a group had gone to the UPP to complain they had been told that the police couldn't do anything due to a lack of evidence. Under these conditions, she felt that the overall effect of pacification was reduced security in the neighbourhood:

> Today I'm… (here), my son is working, my husband is working, I won't leave the window open any more […] because I'm scared. When it was the *bandidos* (in charge) I left it open, because people are more scared of the *bandidos* than of the police here, you know. After the UPP arrived the trouble started ("*virou bagunça*"), you understand. *[Female 53, Tuiuti]*

For their part, the traffickers have also been diminished and appear to be relying on less encompassing and "softer" forms of power. As the UPP has taken on primary responsibility for order maintenance in the community, the *CV* seems to have largely relinquished this role. Its primary aim now seems to be maintaining the viability of the drugs trade and, by implication, ensuring that residents continue to observe the *lei do morro*. This entails new tactics of control given the reduced capacity for force. The veiled threat of violence that maintained their position among residents seems to have receded further from view. This has been replaced by a kind of reputational capital that rests on both residents' knowledge of past (and assumed, though largely undemonstrated present) capabilities for violence, as

well as a discourse of community loyalty, evoking the strong networks ties and identity that characterise Tuiuti, to discourage resident co-operation with police.

However, the continued interest of the *CV* in retaining the complicity of residents creates a residual space in which they can peddle influence. Specifically, as one respondent explained, they can still exercise a restraining effect on potential low-level criminal behaviour in the neighbourhood:

> They are still here, the people who made people afraid to commit crime, they still live here. We know who they are. The police know who they are too. But it's like this, say people who have served time (in prison), and apparently aren't committing crimes anymore… there is no way of proving that. So if everyone lives here together it maintains a certain order, because they're the people who the young people respect. So it's worth maintaining a relationship with them, because they can help to improve things. *[Female 34, Tuiuti]*

This implies that traffickers not only have some continued use to residents, but also that they might be of use to the *UPP* itself. Some residents suspected that, unable to provide the kind of public order that residents had got used to under trafficker rule, the police might be deliberately "turning a blind eye" to trafficker activities in order to allow them to continue to play such a role. Although if such a scenario has materialised it has probably does so as a pragmatic response to the post-pacification security gap, a few respondents suspected that more systematic forms of collaboration between traffickers and police might be occurring. One articulated this view in stark terms:

> It's got worse since the police entered, I think. That's my opinion. Why? Because the police… It's the police with the *bandidos*. Us citizens see them pass the *bandidos* and they can't do anything, and that, for me, is why it's got worse. […] The situation has left us hostages to both sides. […] It was bad (before pacification), but not as bad as now. Because before the *bandidos* had an order, there was someone in charge… unfortunately. There was someone in charge and unfortunately you had to submit to the order of that person. Then it's like the police arrive and you think that order will end, and you'll be free, but it's not like that. There is the domain of the police, there is the domain of the

> *bandidos*, and we don't know who… […] We're hostages of both sides. Because we know we can't trust in the *bandidos*, clearly, but we also can't trust the police. […] We don't know if you speak to the police if they're going to deliver you to the *bandidos*. We don't trust them, we don't have that trust. *[Female 40, Tuiuti]*

To be clear, there is no reason to suspect that the apparent willingness of the UPP to coexist with continued trafficker influence is any more than an inevitable product of the limited ambitions of the pacification programme. In Tuiuti the programme appears to be achieving its primary aim of reducing violence and visible signs of trafficker influence and many, probably most, residents view this as qualified improvement. Nonetheless, some perceive the new pattern of double surveillance and the emergent security gap as having undermined their freedom and even security. Whatever its success in achieving its primary aims, the longer-term goal of ensuring access to public security and the right to circulate freely and without fear still seem a long way off for the residents of Tuiuti.

7.3.3 Networks, space and security in Asa Branca and Tuiuti

Although focussed on different themes, this comparison of the relationship between social networks, space, and security in Tuiuti and Asa Branca reveals some consistent features. Specifically, in both cases networks are implicated in both residents' perceptions of security and in the ways they seek to guarantee it. In Asa Branca, it is the diffusion of networks that underpins growing anxieties about possible threats within the neighbourhood. Meanwhile, some propose mechanisms that might serve to fuse and stabilise networks as possible solutions. Ideas along these lines include the use of social (rather than market) mechanisms to "vet" who moves into the neighbourhood, and increased owner-occupation in place of renting, which might encourage greater commitment to the neighbourhood and community among new residents. In Tuiuti, meanwhile, the continued presence of drug traffickers within the community's dense social networks helps to fuel tension among many residents in the post-pacification era and may also partially account for the failure of the *UPP* to become more deeply embedded. At the same time, residents, and ironically perhaps the *UPP* itself, continue to look to the traffickers to

play some kind of role in tackling the kinds of low-level criminality that have risen since pacifciation and which the *UPP* seems unable to prevent.

While these observations highlight the importance of social networks, a broader perspective points to the ultimate primacy of the urban process of territorial competition between armed groups in determining security conditions in the neighbourhood. The apparently hands-off approach of both Asa Branca's local security providers and Tuiuti's *UPP* to repressing anti-social behaviour seem to be symptomatic of general security conditions in each neighbourhood, which do not obligate armed actors to act more aggressively in order to preserve their position. This seems to confirm Zaluar and Ribeiro's (2009) argument that it is macro-level factors relating to institutions and the activities of armed groups that primarily account for varying levels of violence across Rio, rather than 'collective efficacy' (Sampson et al. 1997) at the neighbourhood level. Nonetheless, social networks are tied up in the way these larger structures take root in the neighbourhood and allow residents at least the possibility of reducing the uncertainty that accompanies the activities of armed groups.

7.4 Conclusion: Networks and the neighbourhood in Rio's favelas

This chapter has argued that social networks play an important mediating role between broad structural and urban processes on the one hand, and individual and collective outcomes on the other. The way they do so is partially affected "from within" by historical processes of community formation and the distinct ways that these shape network structures. For example, network density in Tuiuti seems to have produced more *generalised* (ie. between many) and *diffuse* (ie. open) patterns of reciprocity. Meanwhile, more diffuse network structures in Asa Branca appear to underpin more *restricted* (ie. bilateral) and *structured* (ie. with pre-agreed terms) forms of exchange. These may have important implications for resident access to assistance, particularly non-monetary forms like support with childcare, which appears to be more readily available in Tuiuti.

Network density has also contributed to the deep embeddedness of the *CV* in Tuiuti, which persists in spite of pacification. Although Asa Branca's local security

providers also appear to be highly embedded, increasing network diffusion is leading to a sense among some residents that they do not know what is going on in the neighbourhood and causing concerns about security. This sense of "not knowing" is conspicuously absent in Tuiuti, despite it being significantly bigger in size and population and having the confirmed presence of drug traffickers. This is because the relationship between networks and space there remains tightly fused, so that the behaviour of others within the space of the neighbourhood is generally legible to residents, even if the actions of armed groups remain inherently unpredictable.

Despite these internally generated differences, in many regards external factors relating to social structure appear largely to override internal factors of internal cohesion and reciprocity structure, leading to observable similarities between the two communities. Higher expectations of reciprocity in Tuiuti might be expected to lead to a greater distribution of resources across the population. However, material scarcity within the community and the high demand this creates for various forms of assistance typically leads those of greater means to regulate their exchanges so as not to see their own resources depleted. This also occurs in Asa Branca, though the lesser claims residents seem to make on one another makes this a less uncomfortable process. Job referrals are also heavily affected by wider social structure, in that potential referees must consider their own (usually weak) labour market positions before taking the risk of making potentially risky referrals. There is also an important socio-cultural dimension to such processes of network segmentation, for example in the way that normative constructions of "responsibility" make some residents appear as more deserving recipients of support than others.

The discussion of collective action also indicates that external forces largely override social networks in the production of outcomes relating to security and violence. Although many of Asa Branca's residents express concerns about security and while low-level disputes between neighbours seem to be rising as the population grows and housing is increasingly marketised, they unanimously view the community as remarkably safe by favela standards (see next chapter). This

appears to be largely due to the fact that the community is less contested by armed actors than those in other parts of the city, and thus can be controlled by a relatively "hands-off" local militia. Although formally contested by the *CV* and the recently installed *UPP*, the secondary importance of Tuiuti within the geography of the drug trade means that both can also adopt non-confrontational tactics in their dealings with one another and the community. The relatively favourable position of both communities within this wider geography of drug trafficking has historically allowed non-state armed groups to be more responsive to resident demands than elsewhere. Ironically, however, by creating a *bipolar* power structure and leading to the emergence of a *security gap*, pacification may have reduced the informal influence Tuiuti's residents can exercise over conditions of security in the neighbourhood.

In terms of patterns of exchange and collective action then, social structure and urban process may be seen as *enslaving* (Haken 1983) local networks by exerting various pressures that ultimately force residents to adjust their network practices. The various forms of network segmentation observed in patterns of exchange support the view proposed by González de la Rocha (2001) and Portes and Landolt (2002) that networks serve primarily to distribute a largely fixed stock of resources and opportunities and can thus be weakened by economic constraints. At the same time it contradicts the view implied by Coleman's (1988) model that networks can "generate" such resources on the supply side by fostering cohesion and trust. Similarly it supports Zaluar and Ribeiro's (2009) argument that collective efficacy cannot be activated in contexts of high violence and institutionalised conflict, although residents do seem to be able to exert residual influence over armed groups where conditions allow. As the Chapter 8 will explore the complex interaction between structure and space that serves to constrain social networks also shapes the formation of individual and collective identities in various ways.

8.0 Identity

This Chapter examines the relationship between identity and place for residents of Tuiuti and Asa Branca. Identity is crucial to the question of neighbourhood outcomes for various reasons. By shaping subjectivity, identity affects individual perceptions, attitudes and decisions, influencing residents' relationships to institutions, to urban space, and to others both within and outside the neighbourhood. In a highly unequal city, identity might thus be seen as playing a central role in either opening up or closing down various opportunities for individual social and spatial mobility, for cultural consumption, and for other forms of self-realisation. At the same time, identity can have important impacts on the social life of the neighbourhood by segmenting social networks (as discussed in the previous chapter), and more generally contributing to processes of boundary formation between residents. To the extent that identity contributes to the formation of individual attitudes on political and social issues, it might also be seen as implicated in the construction of hegemonic discourses – such as those that exclude and stigmatise favelas – which ultimately help to reproduce urban inequalities.

This chapter will explore these issues from various perspectives. It begins by examining how resident networks and everyday mobility patterns across the city contribute to the construction of relationships and comparisons with other neighbourhoods, particularly those of higher social status. This gives rise to a tension between *porous borders* – the significant levels of mobility and interaction across territorial divides – and the *glass walls* of social inequality and stigma, which constrain and regulate the nature of such exchanges. It then goes on to look in depth at residents' experiences of social and territorial stigmatisation and the "accusations" perceived to accompany it. While favela stigma appears to be a universal phenomenon that no favela can entirely escape, the varying conditions across Rio's favelas, such as those identified in Chapter 6, offers some favelas and some favela residents important resources for distancing themselves from stigma, though usually at the cost of reasserting its fundamental logic.

The final section moves beyond stigma to argue that alternative socio-cultural and moral schemas are at least as important in the ways favela residents define themselves. These alternative frameworks, which emphasise personal attributes and qualities instead of attachment to place, offer more positive resources for identity construction, although they also contribute to the formation of internal 'boundaries' within the community. Such boundaries may be seen as implicated in the construction of hegemonic discourses that reproduce urban inequalities. For example, some residents are able to achieve a form of socio-cultural distinction by demonstrating socially "legitimate" forms of knowledge, though in the process reproduce discourses about their neighbours "lacking education". However, the context of the favela also appears to generate its own moral-cultural order that cannot be straightforwardly incorporated into dominant ideological constructions, producing autonomous positions that can, in some cases, also prove counter-hegemonic.

8.1 Porous borders and glass walls

8.1.1 Local mobility, networks and urban borders

Evidence from Tuiuti and Asa Branca suggests that the social networks of most residents stretch beyond the favela and, in many cases, far afield. In each community, twelve out of thirty interviewees claimed to regularly visit friends and family outside of the favela, while more claimed to do so occasionally. These networks have been shaped in part by the patterns of residential mobility described in Chapter 6. In Asa Branca many residents had previously lived in non-favela areas in Jacarepaguá and retain family and friendship ties in these other areas. Despite its older process of settlement and denser social network structure, the networks of Tuiuti residents also extend beyond the neighbourhood. This includes former Tuiuti residents who now lived in formal suburban neighbourhoods on the urban periphery. However, as one respondent pointed out, it also included residents of the formal houses surrounding the favela itself – what Cavalcanti (2014) calls the 'threshold' – which some former Tuiuti residents were able to acquire when property prices in São Cristóvão were depressed during the 1980s and 90s:

> People who live outside, on the slopes of the hill, are people who lived here and went down the hill to the street [ie. formal housing]. So there's no discrimination or anything like that. *[Female 36, Tuiuti]*

As will be discussed below, many other respondents from Tuiuti dispute the claim that residents are not stigmatised by those in the surrounding area. Nonetheless, this view speaks to the significance of networks stretching across space and beyond territorial limits of the favela. This is not only the result of long-term dynamics of residential mobility, but also of the construction of relationships between residents of formal and informal areas. As several residents emphasised, schools, other institutions, bars and leisure spaces bring together people from the favela and the "street", laying a basis for the development of affective bonds:

> I see a lot of people who live here, [and] people who live in the street and hang around together. I don't think there's much difference. I have friends here and I have friends on the other side too. *[Male 17, Tuiuti]*

> Those people who live below, they come up here a lot too. Everyone gets on, there are no problems. People who were raised there below… I was raised here above, but as we say here… [instead of] "raised on the asphalt" [ie. in a formal area], but we're "raised everywhere". So for me there isn't any difference, there's no difference. *[Male 54, Tuiuti]*

This speaks to an important point that others made about the formal/informal divide in São Cristóvão. Whereas in the South Zone this is overlaid by stark social inequality, in the working-class North Zone the 'social distance' (Ribeiro and Lago 2001) is far less pronounced, thus creating more possibilities for the development of social ties (see Image 22).

Image 22. Formal working-class housing surrounding Tuiuti (the road on the left leads up to the favela) (Source: Literatura e Rio de Janeiro)

Others argued that Tuiuti's borders had become more porous in recent years with more outsiders entering the favela. While pacification helped to enhance outsiders' perceptions of security in Tuiuti, new public services and facilities gave also gave non-residents more positive reasons to enter. The Social Assistance Reference Centre (*CRAS*) and children's crèche in particular are both widely used by non-residents:[106]

> If you live below you have to come up, because these days everything is up here! *[Female 36, Tuiuti]*
>
> *Respondent 1 [Female 20, Tuiuti]*: I think people like it [ie. the area], because lots of people come from outside to put their kids in the crèche that they have there. They trust to leave them there.
>
> *Respondent 2 [Female 26, Tuiuti]*: There are lots of people from the street too who come to the crèche at the top. And before you didn't see that, but now you see it a lot.
>
> *Respondent 1*: There are people who don't live here who we know who say it's a tranquil place.

In Asa Branca, the absence of government provided services or leisure facilities means that there are fewer reasons for outsiders to enter. However, from my experiences of attending parties and other community events, it seems that it is not

[106] I would add to this my own experience of teaching English at two NGOs in Tuiuti. Many pupils lived in the area surrounding Tuiuti, but came in to attend the lessons.

uncommon for non-residents to enter for social purposes. Furthermore, as opposed to the more fragmented way in which Tuiuti's residents tend to describe the North Zone, residents from Asa Branca typically describe Jacarepaguá as a relatively integrated region. This is likely to relate to the absence of overt drug trafficking in the region (with a few notable exceptions), but also its lower residential density and relative social homogeneity. The exception that seems to confirm the rule is the abrupt change social and physical change encountered at Asa Branca's immediate southern edge (see Images 23 and 24). This separation marks the beginning of a landscape stretching across Barra da Tijuca, which is dominated by high-rise condominiums and shopping centres. One resident drew the distinction in stark terms:

> *Interviewer*: What would you describe as your area?
>
> *Respondent [Female 19, Asa Branca]*: I think it's the whole of Jacarepaguá
>
> *Interviewer*: And Barra da Tijuca too?
>
> *Respondent*: No, not Barra da Tijuca. That's on a different level.
>
> *Interviewer*: A different level in what sense?
>
> *Respondent*: The people have more spending power, you know. They have more income. It's not very far, just the other side of the road. Up until the wall you see communities. You pass to the other side of the wall and today you have buildings, you have swimming pools, its totally different from here […]
>
> *Interviewer*: So you do think right here is where your neighbourhood ends?
>
> *Respondent*: Yes exactly. Where the *comunidade* ends is where you have that division. For me I live in the poor part… where there are *comunidades*, the part more in that direction. Where you have the buildings is where the part of the city where you have the condominiums starts… the rich parts where it's just buildings, buildings, buildings.

As with the comparison between Tuiuti's relatively porous formal/informal divide and that experienced by the favelas of the far more unequal South Zone, the most meaningful border in the region surrounding Asa Branca seems to be that

separating wealthy Barra da Tijuca from working-class Jacarepaguá as a whole, rather than between the favela and nearby low-income formal areas.

Image 23. The single wall marking the border between Asa Branca and a large area of condominiums (source: Catalytic Communities)

Image 24. The growing number of high-rise condominiums bordering Asa Branca (source: Catalytic Communities)

8.1.2 "Feeling at home": Space, cultural capital and stigma

If notions of the "isolation" of favela residents ignore the spatial breadth of their social networks and the highly porous nature of favela borders, they are even more tenuous when it comes to the question of favela residents' mobility around the city. As explained in Chapter 6 the relatively favourable locations of Tuiuti (close to the city centre) and Asa Branca (close to Barra da Tijuca), mean that, unlike those living

further from such major employment hubs, most residents do not have to travel long distances to their places of work. Nonetheless, several of the respondents from Tuiuti make daily commutes to jobs in the South Zone, while respondents from Asa Branca reported working across Jacarepaguá as well as in Barra da Tijuca and Recreio. Mobility patterns were similarly varied in terms of leisure activities. Over half of participants from each community claimed to regularly engage in leisure activities beyond the locality.[107]

Resident geographies of consumption are particularly revealing with regard to what factors shape mobility across the city (see Map 7). When buying clothes and household items Tuiuti's residents were most likely to go to Norte Shopping, a large, mid-range shopping centre located in the neighbourhood of Del Castilho, a short distance to the north of Tuiuti. A significant number reported travelling to Madureira, a major suburban shopping hub, with a larger and more affordable range of consumer goods. A smaller number meanwhile reported using the similarly cheap shopping district in the city centre, while a few did most of their shopping at local *feiras* (flea markets). For residents of Asa Branca, the most common answer given was the nearby area of Taquara, which contains a variety of affordable shops, but no shopping centres. Beyond this a similar proportion opted for either Madureira or the higher-end option of Barra Shopping. As with Tuiuti, a small number of mainly older residents reported primarily using *feiras* in nearby Curicica or Cidade de Deus.

[107] Responses included the sports, music or dance activities, going to the beach, going to the cinema, and going to restaurants or bars.

Map 7. Resident mobility for purposes of consumption (thicker arrows represent more frequent journeys)[108]

Bearing these qualifications in mind, it nonetheless seems that the consumption (and mobility for consumption) of favela residents is partly shaped by factors relating to 'cultural capital', broadly conceived. This was especially apparent in discussions that emerged among residents of Asa Branca about where they prefer to do their shopping. Located on the edge of Barra da Tijuca, with its modern, "global" consumption infrastructure of shopping centres and strip malls (Herzog 2013), Asa Branca's residents are likely to have more frequent exposure to such spaces.[109] For some residents the possibility of using shopping centres was dismissed outright, whether for financial or social reasons. One 58-year-old male respondent put it bluntly when he stated, "Shopping centres are for the rich, not for the poor". Similarly a 47-year old female resident offered a clear verdict on Barra Shopping (the largest shopping centre in the region), saying, "People with money go to Barra Shopping to buy expensive clothes. We go to Taquara." An 18-year-old female respondent revealed the way in which social relations are tied up in the meanings attached to different consumer spaces when she explained that she didn't like Barra Shopping because it was full of "*Patricinhas*", a vaguely derogatory term for young women from the upper-class.

[108] I am grateful to Michael Chetry for the idea of mapping resident geographies of consumption.

[109] The North Zone also contains several large shopping centres, but these typically cater to a lower-income clientele and so do not carry the same exclusive reputation.

Others who expressed similar views about shopping centres spoke about their personal experiences of them, usually comparing them other kinds of consumer spaces. Several respondents made the point that Barra Shopping contains affordable as well as high-end shops, highlighting the limits of a model of mobility-for-consumption based purely on a simple cost/distance formula. One respondent made this point, but emphasised that she preferred to travel much further to Madureira, where she felt more "comfortable".

> *Interviewer*: Do you go to the shopping centres in Barra much?
>
> *Respondent [Female 42, Asa Branca]*: No, that's difficult
>
> *Interviewer*: Difficult because of the prices?
>
> *Respondent*: No, it's not a question of price, because these days you'll see lots of cheap shops in shopping centres, where you can buy more… in the cheaper ones. There's C&A there [for example]... It's a question of the people, the space inside the shopping centre. It's not like that in Madureira. It's like an addiction after going there for years. I'll give you an example, if you frequent a place for years that's sufficient… […] Madureira's further to go and everything, but it's a question of comfort.

While this respondent only vaguely alludes to the social milieu of the two spaces, another drew a far more explicit distinction. She argued that Madureira, with its less exclusive feel and less wealthy clientele, offered a more "relaxed" shopping experience. This is partly due to the snobbery she believes she has encountered in Barra Shopping, but also because she feels that in Madureira she is surrounded by similar people, implying a sense of shared culture, tastes and attitudes:

> I prefer Madureira, because I feel more at home. I think like this, you see more poor people there… Not that Barra Shopping is only really rich people, because sometimes you see people who aren't that rich. […] But Barra Shopping I think there are lots of snobby people there, you know, and I don't feel good. I prefer to go to Madureira, because I feel at home, everyone there is poor, […] and I feel more relaxed. *[Female 31, Asa Branca]*

The experience of snobbery in Barra Shopping could be interpreted as a form of symbolic violence, whereby wealthy shoppers assert their superior cultural capital compared to poorer shoppers within the (spatialised) '*field*' of the shopping centre. However, Bourdieu's relational model may be insufficient to fully account for the negative attitudes that favela residents feel they encounter in places like Barra Shopping. Another respondent felt she had been socially profiled and ignored (rather than actively mistreated) by sales assistants, who assumed she wouldn't be able to afford to buy anything:

> If you arrive in Barra Shopping in flip-flops, like we are here, they'll ignore you. But if you go to Madureira they'll say "Hi, good morning, good afternoon, good evening, do you want anything, can I help you with anything?" [In Barra Shopping] the people think if you're walking around in flip-flops you don't want anything, that you're just looking because you can't afford to shop there. *[Female 32, Asa Branca]*

While dress can certainly be considered a manifestation of cultural capital, the example of flip-flops suggests a less subtle form of social differentiation. Flip-flops are the default footwear for Rio's poor, while for the middle and upper classes they are interchanged with more expensive footwear depending on the context. Thus the wearing of flip-flops in a shopping centre is not a *faux pas* resulting from a lack of cultural capital, but a basic signifier of income. By extension, the invisibility of the poor to shopping centre sales assistants suggests that these symbols trigger an *a priori* form of social categorisation and assertion of hierarchy (DaMatta 1991), rather than a Bourdiesian 'field struggle' that unfolds organically through the interplay of symbols and their deeply internalised social meanings. Although it did not emerge as an issue in interviews, the widespread racial and social policing of young people in elite spaces like shopping centres speaks to the same dynamic. As will be discussed in the next section, such social stigma seems to shapes class relations in Rio at least as much as more subtle processes relating to cultural capital.

Such negative attitudes towards shopping centres were not universal, however. When asked if she ever went to shopping centres in the South Zone, a resident of

Tuiuti offered a similar view to those already presented. However, she also explained that her husband was quite different and felt quite comfortable in such environments:

> *Interviewer*: Do you ever go to the shopping centres in the Zona Sul?
>
> *Respondent [Female 53, Tuiuti]*: Oh no, I don't like going to those.
>
> *Interviewer*: Why not?
>
> *Respondent*: I don't like the people... I like to go to places with people who are the same as me, you understand.
>
> *Interviewer*: Is it the prices or more the atmosphere that's important to you?
>
> *Respondent*: Both things. But look, my husband, he is more, like, sure of himself. He's more like, he'll enter in any environment and he's not bothered, you know. Not me. I prefer simpler things… If he was in a place, if he had the money... for example, let's suppose that tomorrow he has a load of money, he'll go to those places. Me, even if I've got the money, I won't go. I prefer the places of my origins, you know.

While this suggests individual variation is an important factor, there was also evidence of more structured grounds for differentiation, particularly on the basis of age. The perception of shopping centres as exclusionary places seems to be predominantly, though not exclusively, held by older residents. Teenagers and those in their twenties, by contrast, tended to see them far more positively. This generational difference was clearly expressed in an exchange between a grandson and grandmother from Asa Branca:

> *Interviewer*: Where do you go to buy clothes?
>
> *Respondent 1 [Male 18, Asa Branca]*: Barra Shopping
>
> *Respondent 2 [Female 71, Asa Branca]*: You go to Barra Shopping? [...] I just go to the *feira*. He buys more expensive clothes than I do… [laughs] He's more *chic*!

> *Respondent 1*: They have cheap clothes there too. But some shops are expensive. [... But] when we go to Barra Shopping it's more just to have fun […] the Cinema, arcades, that kind of thing."

Another teenage resident expressed a similar view:

> I love Barra shopping. It's the place I go to most. I don't just go to shop, I go to the cinema, to have lunch, to hang out with friends, to see people. *[Female 19, Asa Branca]*

Such a view of Barra Shopping as a "fun" place could be interpreted in two ways. The rise of consumerism in the last decade or so may have made some (though not all) younger favela residents begin to feel comfortable in environments that still feel very alien to their older family members. Such a historical development would challenge Bourdieu's relatively immobile conceptualisation of class-cultural relations (see Jenkins 1992; Burawoy 2012). On the other hand, it is possible that such attitudes are primarily the result of an 'age effect' rather than a 'cohort effect'. Perhaps shopping centres appeal to young people with a small amount of disposable income, but become less attractive in later age as family takes precedence and the management of a household budget becomes more of a challenge. A respondent from Tuiuti made just such a point:

> *Respondent [Female 26, Tuiuti]*: I like them [shopping centres], but now I have a child I can't afford to like them anymore.
>
> *Interviewer*: Why not?
>
> *Respondent*: Because it's expensive. For me it will be very costly. Because if I have some money am I going to get something expensive for myself, or for my son. I need to think about him now.

Another intriguing possibility also presents itself. Despite their high-tech security systems, the common use of racial and social profiling, and more subtle forms of class-cultural symbolic violence, it may be that with rising incomes and the expansion of consumer society, shopping centres have become more accessible to favela residents. One young female resident of Asa Branca described Barra

Shopping in terms reminiscent of the clichéd vision of Rio's beaches as socially mixed 'democratic spaces':

> *Interviewer*: Do you like to go to shopping centres?
>
> *Respondent [Female 19, Asa Branca]*: Yes, I'm going there shortly! [...]
>
> *Interviewer*: And do you like the atmosphere in Barra Shopping? What do you think… because before you said that Barra [ie. the neighbourhood] is like a different world, a different neighbourhood.
>
> *Respondent*: It is... But inside the shopping centre you manage to... In Barra da Tijuca there's Barra Shopping, which is a big shopping centre. There are designer shops, but it's more of a popular shopping centre. Next door there's Village Mall, and there they only have clothes that you can't... I'd say that if you had to buy clothes there... you couldn't buy clothes there because the people are on a different level. But in Barra Shopping I feel good. You see that it's diverse there because there are people from here, people from Cidade de Deus, people who live there in Barra, people who live in the Zona Sul go there. It brings everyone together.

Once again this points to the diversity of the favela population and the fact that parts of it have been incorporated into some "mainstream" social and cultural practices. However, given the forms of subtle and not-so-subtle discrimination that other favela residents experience it does not make sense to describe Barra Shopping as having become one of Carvalho's (2013) 'porous spaces'. Indeed where some residents slip through porous borders, others seem to bump into glass walls.

8.2 Favela stigmatisation and resistance

8.2.1 The accusation of violence and collective distancing from stigma

While some interviewees felt they were personally stigmatised in shopping centres based on their appearance, there was a more widespread view among residents that they are collectively stigmatised by association with the favela itself. This supports a view of favela residents suffering a powerful form of 'territorial stigmatisation' (Wacquant et al. 2014). However, the form that favela stigma takes and the ways in which residents respond imply a less universalising process than

that implied by Wacquant et al. (2014). The "accusations" (Brum 2012) that accompany favela stigma are quite specific, most notably in the powerful association between favelas and violence. Actual local security conditions and the comparative geographies in which these are located thus create possibilities for residents to collectively reject the accusation of violence. In this way, collective identities can display some of the geographical complexity of the urban processes described in Chapter 6. However, this is countervailed by the disembedded nature of the association between favelas and violence across contexts. This means that although residents can achieve a degree of collective rehabilitation by distancing themselves from such stigma, it is impossible for them to escape it entirely.

In Asa Branca, several respondents believed that their community would be stereotyped as a dangerous place. Again, though, this perception was expected to be far more prevalent among wealthy condominium residents than lower-income groups in the surrounding area. This partly relates to the fact that many of the condominium residents were new to the area so were expected to have brought with them broad generalisations about favelas. Some residents believed that when they got to know the community they would recognise it as a peaceful place. An elderly woman and her grandson who were emphasising their feelings of safety in Asa Branca expressed contrasting views when asked if they believed residents of the neighbouring condominiums would feel the same way:

> *Respondent 1 [Female, 71]*: If this was a dangerous place… with gunshots… they'd have a different perception. But it isn't.
>
> *Respondent 2 [Male, 18]*: Maybe people who have come from far away and don't know the place think like that.
>
> *Respondent 1*: Yes that's true. But it's good here.

Whether or not the condominium residents views about Asa Branca change over time, their initial assumptions alone speak to the role that social distance plays in 'disembedding' the association between favelas and violence. As one middle-aged male resident put it, he felt that people with money would look at people like him "through different eyes": guided by broad social generalisations, rather than

awareness of local and individual specificities. Another woman in her early forties, sarcastically highlighted the disjuncture between her reality and broader social representations when she remarked, "I think they think we're the most dangerous people in the world." A third resident expanded on this, highlighting the way in which social distance and discrimination can quickly lead to accusations of violence:

> For sure I'll tell you this... If you pay R$3,000 in a building. This building here, close to the community. What vision are you going to have if you're a person who already has more stability, if you earn more money, if you have better quality of life? You might arrive in the supermarket there, I arrive in the supermarket and buy... rump steak, you know, and you buy filet mignon... What point of view do you think those people have of the community? Let's be honest. Damn, they're going to say, "Ah, there they have addicts, they have *bandidos*, they have rapists [...], they have everything". They're going to warn their children, "that area's not good, it's dangerous". But come here, get to know the place, come and see if it really is! *[Male 38, Asa Branca]*

Other respondents reported having heard more concrete examples of condominium residents' views. One knew a woman who had owned a house in Brisa do Mar (the enclosed section of Asa Branca) and had been in a financial position to sell it and buy a condominium property. She confirmed to him that other residents of the condominium had negative views about Asa Branca. Others, meanwhile, had heard negative rumours directly associating Asa Branca with violence:

> They think this is a rough favela ("*favela brava"*), you understand. I've heard that they.. that lots of people talk badly about Asa Branca, but it's not right." *[Female 43, Asa Branca]*

> I'm telling you, it's like, people who live in Rio 2, where they have those buildings… in the condominium… They say bad things about here. The people who have money, they look at us and they're scared. If they came to see, they wouldn't need to be. In Curicica, up there in the houses, there are lots of robberies, here there's nothing like that. *[Female 47, Asa Branca]*

While Asa Branca's residents feel that they are tarred by the powerful and widespread association between favelas and violence – at least in the way they are perceived by the neighbouring condominium residents – such feelings among Tuiuti's residents seem to be more implicit than explicit. A few respondents said they believed that outsiders would perceive the favela as dangerous. One, for example, described her relationship with her ex-husband when they were younger. Although he lived just at the bottom of the hill, he was not allowed to go up to see her because his mother assumed it wasn't safe:

> My ex-husband, the father of my children, when we were growing up, his mum didn't like him coming up to the *morro*. She didn't let him. He's black like me and he only lived there below, but she had this problem, or fear of the *morro*. So I always had to go down to meet him. It's strange isn't it?" *[Female 43, Tuiuti]*

Nonetheless such examples were rare. As was mentioned previously, there was a degree of contention among respondents as to whether Tuiuti's residents are stigmatised by those in the surrounding area. Among those who felt they were, violence rarely figured as a central theme of the stigmatisation. One possible reason for this is that the presence of drug traffickers and a pacification unit mean that this association has been weakened. Another possibility may be that the greater social proximity between Tuiuti and working-class São Cristóvão means that perceptions of the hill are more contextually embedded than the case of Asa Branca, meaning that residents in the surrounding area also feel relatively safe. The third and perhaps most plausible explanation is that residents of Tuiuti and its surroundings place the area within the comparative universe of the inner North Zone that contains several larger favelas with more visible problems of violence and conflict.

8.2.1a Asa Branca: "This isn't really a favela, it's a community"

In Asa Branca, residents grapple with the great disparity they perceive between their reality and the widespread negative perceptions of favelas and favela residents that they encounter in everyday interactions, the media and popular culture. This frequently manifests in effusive statements tying positive attitudes

about the neighbourhood to the absence of drug trafficking and other negative associations. These tend to be implicitly or explicitly constructed around comparisons to constructed notions of what constitutes a 'dangerous favela' – one where violence linked to the drug trade and/or other types of crime are commonplace:

> I think it's really good, because it's peaceful here. There's no banditry ("*bandidagem*"), it doesn't exist, you understand. Just having to live amongst *bandidos* is a big deal you know. *[Male 47, Asa Branca]*

> [Asa Branca is] marvellous! There's no trafficking, there's no robberies, there's no violence, you understand. It's a place that you can walk around at any time. I arrive here at ten to four in the morning. I've never had problems with anything. Not with robberies, nothing. *[Male 54, Asa Branca]*

The second of these quotes came from a resident who, like several others, reached such a view based on personal experience of somewhere more closely fitting the ideal of the dangerous favela. He had previously lived in Cidade de Deus, and, following a separation from his wife, who he claimed was involved with drugs, had gained custody of their two children. Fearing retribution and wanting to escape the influence of his ex-wife's associates he had put his house in Cidade de Deus up for rent and moved into a new house in Asa Branca. He had spent the subsequent eight years in Asa Branca and continued to compare it favourably to his previous situation:

> You can walk around and you'll see. There are people […] hanging out, drinking beer, […] it's all normal. You won't see fights, you won't see murders, no, no. There's no trafficking. Raising a child in a place like this is marvellous. That's why I moved here from Cidade de Deus. Because there I was living surrounded by guns, pistols. *[Male 54, Asa Branca]*

Another respondent who had moved to Asa Branca from a favela in the neighbourhood of Santa Cruz in northwest Rio offered a similar analysis. Although he reported that he had moved primarily to be closer to employment opportunities, he saw the different social context as a major benefit of the move:

> *Respondent [Male 31, Asa Branca]*: "[People here] are more trustworthy. This is a community, there [Santa Cruz] is more favela… *morro*, you understand. You can't trust everyone. When it's a *comunidade*, it's more trustworthy, more secure."
>
> *Interviewer*: When you said here is a *comunidade* and there is a favela, what's the difference for you?
>
> *Respondent*: The difference is that in the *comunidade* there's no drug trafficking, in the favela there is, you understand? It doesn't happen here, because it's a closed *comunidade*, you understand?

This distinction between 'favela' and '*comunidade*' was one that was repeated by other respondents and seems to capture an important aspect of the collective distancing from stigma that Asa Branca residents perform. In their discourses the stigmatised term of favela becomes synonymous with the popular image of an area controlled by heavily armed drug traffickers, and perhaps suffering from other forms of violence and street crime. Interestingly, in both this example and the previous one, the comparison is to large neighbourhoods (Santa Cruz and Cidade de Deus, respectively) that both suffer from high levels of violence and contain favelas, but are actually dominated by non-favela housing. This supports Brum's (2012) claim that, although they are connected, the stigma of the favela is ultimately a social rather than physical construct, and is flexible enough to encompass areas that are not themselves favelas in the technical sense.

The flipside of this process of distancing, in which a kind of favela-ness is ascribed to non-favela areas, is to deny that Asa Branca is really a favela at all. While favela residents across Rio invoke the more favourable concept of *comunidade* to describe their neighbourhoods, in Asa Branca *comunidade* often becomes an opposition to, rather than a softer substitute for, favela:

> This place is a blessing. It's a place blessed by God, you know. It's a quiet, tranquil place. It doesn't have that favela thing, you understand… of banditry, thank God. *[Female 47, Asa Branca]*

Respondent 1 [Male 17, Asa Branca]: [Asa Branca is a good place to live] compared with.. Complexo do Alemão, Rocinha, those places that have drug trafficking. All places have it, don't they, but even so, those places that have shoot-outs, those kinds of things.

Respondent 2 [Female 18]: Because this isn't really a favela, it's a community.

Interviewer: What's the difference?

Respondent 1: The difference is that here you don't have *bandidos*, you don't have trafficking.

Unlike the previous examples, none of the three residents involved in these discussions had lived in or claimed much knowledge of other favelas in Rio. Their perceptions of what constitutes a favela are thus likely to have been primarily constructed based on wider societal perceptions assimilated through media, popular culture and second-hand information, as well, perhaps, as some limited personal experience. In this sense they are as 'disembedded' as the perceptions that newly arrived condominium residents have of Asa Branca. The reference in the second interview exchange to Complexo do Alemão and Rocinha, two of Rio's largest favela areas which were dramatically pacified in 2010 and 2012 respectively and which feature regularly in the news, indicate the powerful influence of the media over such constructions.

8.2.1b Tuiuti: "It's always been calm here"

If Asa Branca's residents react to the stigma of violence by attempting to remove themselves from the favela category altogether, such an option is not available to those living in Tuiuti. Not only does the latter have a long history of drug trafficker control, but, unlike Asa Branca, it also conforms to the popular image of a "*morro*", or hillside favela. Nonetheless, a majority of respondents were still keen to distance their neighbourhood from the comparative pole of the "dangerous favela". In do so, residents emphasise Tuiuti's relative "calmness", even though they continue to locate this comparison firmly within the favela category:

> *Respondent [Male 37, Tuiuti]*: The area's tranquil, it's calm. I won't say that there's nothing bad because that would be a lie, but the area's excellent, it's great.
>
> *Interviewer*: Better than other areas?
>
> *Respondent*: A thousand times better. I think that Tuiuti, there's nowhere better. In Rio de Janeiro, a *morro*, in Rio de Janeiro, better than Tuiuti? I don't think there is one.

One key element of this collective distancing is to attribute Tuiuti's calmness to its tight-knit community. Rather than local security being the product of uncontrollable external factors, residents tend to see it as inherent to Tuiuti's character. It is not simply calm, but, in a phrase repeated again and again in interviews, "has always been calm":

> There's no place better than Tuiuti. It has always been a very calm community. There's no stress, violence, rapes, nothing. *[Female 36, Tuiuti]*
>
> Respondent 1 *[Female 20, Tuiuti]*: There are places that are worse, no? Here is kind of like a gated community. We joke about that. Thank God it is, because these problems for children you have everywhere.
>
> Respondent 2 *[Female 26, Tuiuti]*: That business of shoot-outs and things like that.
>
> Respondent 1: It was never like that, it was never the kind of place to have trouble like that. It's very tranquil here. The children can mess about and play, carefree.

As in Asa Branca, direct comparison with other favelas plays an important part in such constructions. However, unlike Asa Branca, Tuiuti is located in a part of the city where there are numerous large favelas and favela complexes that have more explosive and widely known problems of gang and police conflict. As such, they are more likely to have direct familiarity with these places, and to have experienced the comparison directly. Several respondents listed nearby areas like Mangueira, Jacarezinho or Manguinhos as places where they had felt unsafe and to which they would compare Tuiuti favourably:

> Look, this is a good place, yes. Here, even when it wasn't pacified you didn't see a lot of *bandidos*, armed people. With people who are from other places you see *bandidos*, people with guns… but here it's much calmer, much more tranquil. So I chose this as a place to live. Because I lived in Mangueira and there they had shoot-outs every day, and here they didn't. So I preferred to live here. *[Male 24, Tuiuti]*

While proximity to and direct experience of places more closely aligned to the stigmatised stereotype of the violent favela seems to be a more prominent factor for Tuiuti residents' comparisons, the influence of media framing also seems crucial. As one resident pointed out, not seeing Tuiuti on the television seemed to provide counter-factual evidence that it must be a safe place:

> This was always a calm place, […] even on the television you never saw it. It was only when the UPP came here that it was on television, because a twenty-year-old kid got killed next to the UPP here, when they robbed the police officer.[110] *[Male 56, Tuiuti]*

An important distinction to make, however, is that as much as it may compare itself favourably to the other favelas within its comparative universe, the lurking presence of Tuiuti's own issues with drug trafficking cannot be dismissed altogether. One apparent response to this problem was a tendency of some respondents to soften the language they used when referring to Tuiuti's own drug traffickers. Several residents used diminutives like *bandidinhos* (little *bandidos*) or *carinhas* (little guys) in an apparent effort to weaken the association between the local gang and the violent media stereotype. One resident described Tuiuti's traffickers as "coca cola without the gas", while repeating the local truism that most gunfights Tuiuti had experienced had been spillovers over from Mangueira. Such a process suggests an important relationship between local conditions produced by the complex city, stigmatised representations of favelas, and the degree to which residents of different areas can be incorporated into hegemonic ideological positions like outright opposition to *bandidos*. Compare the softer use of the term *bandido* in Tuiuti, where *bandidos* are undeniably present in the community, to the

[110] This refers to the incident in February 2013 that was mentioned in Chapter 5.

way it is used in its more reified form in Asa Branca, where *bandidos* are deemed to be "somewhere else". One Asa Branca resident seemed to summarise this process when describing what he felt was the misperception that condominium residents had about the community:

> Because they don't come to the community, like I've said, because they don't come here they think that everyone here in a community in Rio de Janeiro is a *marginal*. But it's not true. Ninety per cent… no, one hundred per cent of people here are *trabalhadores*. *[Male 54, Asa Branca]*

The absence of drug trafficking in Asa Branca contributes to the community's self-perception of respectability. On the flipside it seems to push the population towards reproducing hegemonic discourses that reify the category of *bandido* and accept the ideological baggage that comes with this. In Tuiuti's context the term is far less stable, creating a greater space for the adoption of more counter-hegemonic positions with regard to gang and police violence in Rio de Janeiro. One elderly male resident of Tuiuti captured this contestation when he told me "the police are *bandidos* too". As shown by the varied attitudes towards pacification discussed previously, it is too simplistic to describe Tuiuti's residents' views about security as "counter-hegemonic". Nonetheless local conditions appear to make them significantly more contested than is the case in Asa Branca.

8.2.2 Socio-cultural stigma and individual distancing

Violence is not the only accusation that comes attached to favela stigma. Residents of both Tuiuti and Asa Branca also perceive that outsiders make socio-cultural assumptions about them, for example about their lifestyles or levels of education. In the context of the complex city, the substance of these accusations takes a slightly different form in each of the two cases, but in both it broadly revolves around perceptions of favela residents as ignorant, tactless and/or lacking knowledge of how to behave in public places. Such accusations appear to elicit very different responses to the accusation of violence. While many residents who perceive these socio-cultural forms of stigmatisation resolutely resist them, they tend to do so on an individual, rather than a collective basis.

Such a response seems to be demanded by the nature of the accusation itself. Whereas residents fitting the popular image of the *bandido* constitute a minority of the population even in drug-trafficker controlled favelas, socio-cultural accusations are more flexible and expansive and thus threaten to taint more of the population. As a result they seem to promote more individualised, assertive and exclusionary efforts of distancing. However, the individualisation of responses also seems to be tied up with the social diversity of the favela itself. Within every favela access to sources of "legitimate knowledge" – for example, through the education system, the workplace, NGOs, media or simply through informal social networks – is uneven, and those with greater exposure may thus feel that they recognise and even agree with some of the accusations levelled at their neighbours. This suggests that while collective distancing from the accusation of violence is tied up with the neighbourhood's insertion into the security dynamics of the complex city, individual distancing from socio-cultural stigma is more a product of an individuals' position within the broader social structure. While urban space may mediate this structure, it plays a less fundamental role. As a result, and as with the dynamics of network segmentation observed in Chapter 7, similar processes of individual socio-cultural distinction can be observed in both Tuiuti and Asa Branca.

8.2.2a Asa Branca: The aesthetics of disorder

In Asa Branca, socio-cultural stigma primarily revolves around a perception of the neighbourhood as a site of aesthetic, environmental and social "disorder". Unlike Tuiuti, Asa Branca is still growing upwards and lacks a long history of government investment, making the built environment appear somewhat incomplete. Although both communities have problems with waste disposal, the greater presence of waste collection services in Tuiuti means that litter tends not to accumulate to the same degree in its public areas as in Asa Branca's canal. Furthermore the latter's lively commercial sector, street life and, in particular, the nightlife activities on the Rua do Canal contrast strongly with the relatively subdued public atmosphere that predominates in Tuiuti (except at times when large community events are being held). All of these feed into a sense among many residents that outsiders perceive Asa Branca as a "disordered" place.

Whereas Asa Branca's residents unanimously reject the accusation of violence, some seem to sympathise with this accusation of disorder. When asked whether she liked living in Asa Branca, one resident expressed the view that what she perceived as disorder undermined quality of life in the neighbourhood:

> There are things missing for this to be a good place. There are things needing improvement… The visual aspect, the noise, the lack of respect of one person for the other. *[Female 42, Asa Branca]*

Another respondent sided with the view he suspected the neighbouring condominiums residents would have of Asa Branca:

> I'm telling you, I have this point of view myself, I think that those people there will have that view. It's the same thing. "Ah those people are messy, disordered, they don't behave properly. They play music at the time they want." *[Male 38, Asa Branca]*

In both cases the respondents implicitly identify a set of acceptable socio-cultural and aesthetic norms that prevail in the condominiums and other formal areas, but which are perpetually contravened in the community. The fact that they recognise and observe these standards, allows them to exempt themselves from association with such disorder. However, unlike the rejection of the accusation of violence, they deny the accusation of disorder individually, without defending the community as a whole. This affiliation to an external standard presents Asa Branca as failing in its quest to become a respectable neighbourhood:

> They've upgraded it, they paved the streets, put in water, Light[111] has arrived, things have improved. But do you really think the people in the buildings are going to want a community here? […] Sometimes in the community, as I was saying, there are lots of Maranhaenses[112], lots of people from outside, who like to play *forró*… I think like this… I'm not against *forró*, I'm not against getting a bit wild for someone's birthday, I'm not against parties, I'm not against anything, on the contrary I'm all for it. It's just that arriving somewhere with

[111] Light is Rio's privatised electricity company. Some Asa Branca residents pay for a direct connection, though most continue to have pirate '*gato*' connections.
[112] People originating from the Northeastern state of Maranhão.

> music playing… it should be loud enough for me to hear, but not so loud that it bursts my eardrums. A good atmosphere? Great! But when you arrive somewhere and the noise is loud, banging. Sitting close to that? You're going to go and sit further away. It's the same thing with the people in the buildings. You're feeling inconvenienced by the noise… they're going to send the police to turn it down. It inconveniences people. *[Male 38, Asa Branca]*

This resident ties what he sees as Asa Branca's disorder to the looming threat of removal many others also believed had been triggered by the speculative, elite-oriented development of the surrounding region. Not only had other nearby favelas been threatened, if not actually removed already, rumours had also circulated that Asa Branca itself was under threat. Estate agents giving tours of condominium properties had allegedly been telling prospective buyers that the favela would be removed. A resident who worked as a cleaner in a condominium apartment had heard such a rumour first hand:

> There's a girl whose house I worked in who is scared of here [ie. Asa Branca]. […] She said, "That's going to disappear". She stood in the window and pointed, "You can see it there, that's going to go". And I said, "It's going to go? Well you know more than I do then!" It was… "Look at the ugly *comunidade*". All these beautiful buildings, and look at this horrendous *comunidade*. Damn, she didn't know I lived there, because I was only listening. And when I told her she got all uptight, you understand. *[Female 43, Asa Branca]*

As this implies, the fear of removal seems to be very much intertwined in the aesthetic and environmental as well as the social rupture created by the expansion of gated condominiums to the edge of the favela. Asa Branca has not only grown and become busier itself in recent years, but the disorder this is alleged to have created now stands in stark contrast to the intensely regulated environment of the condominiums that border it. This incongruous scenario (although simply a reiteration of the *morro-asfalto* divide that marks other parts of the city) seems to weigh on the perceptions some residents have of the aesthetics of the favela and the behaviour of their neighbours. This clash of perceptions about the built environment, seem to fit a Lefebvrian model of urbanisation (see Lefebvre 1991;

Kipfer 2012). The dominant capitalist process of speculative development in the region has produced a hegemonic ideal that denigrates the built and social environment of a favela like Asa Branca. This then becomes tied up with the politics of favela removal, as not only condominium residents and politicians, but also some members of Asa Branca begin to see the community as "out of place", or an aesthetic blight on the area (see Kipfer 2008).

Although the accusation of disorder tends to provoke individualised responses, the built environment itself also seems to offer a basis for a more collective, though still exclusive, form of distancing. While the majority of new condominium blocks to the south were built for the elite market, there is also a clutch of eight blocks built by the federal house-building programme *Minha Casa Minha Vida* (*MCMV*). One male respondent in his mid-40s explained that he felt the majority of new residents in those blocks were likely to be upwardly mobile former North Zone residents, some of whom may have previously lived in favelas, and believed that these residents might prove to be as intolerant of Asa Branca's supposed disorder as the wealthier condominium residents. Another respondent offered a rather surprising account of an interaction with a former Asa Branca resident who had managed to secure an apartment in one of the *MCMV* blocks:

> She said with a straight face, "I don't like that favela there". I didn't say anything so as not to get into an argument, because that's what I'm like. *[Male 54, Asa Branca]*

For these new condominium residents, urban space may provide a means of socio-cultural distancing from favela stigma that has little to do with their own personal observance of dominant socio-cultural norms. In this way, the control of space and effective suppression of the signs of disorder appear to hold out the possibility for low-income groups to distance themselves from favela stigma.

This seems to be central to the symbolic relationship between the main area of Asa Branca, and the gated section of Brisa do Mar. As outlined in Chapter 6, homeowners in Brisa do Mar do not possess land titles and the area is officially considered to be part of Asa Branca. Furthermore, census data shows that socio-

economic and occupational differences with the rest of the community are small,[113] and anecdotal evidence suggests that the difference in rental prices is also not significant. Nonetheless, The two sides were formed through different processes of occupation, which give them a very different appearance. Brisa do Mar was subdivided into large, ordered plots and sold simultaneously by the putative owner of the land (see Image 25). By contrast, the rest of Asa Branca was settled through a series of invasions with smaller plots and a more piecemeal process of construction, giving it the more haphazard appearance that is typically associated with favelas.

Image 25. Brisa do Mar's larger houses and more regulated streets (source: Catalytic Communities)

These physical differences have been supplemented by organisational innovations by Brisa do Mar's residents. The area has a single gated entrance with a small pillbox, which is attended 24 hours a day by a porter and characteristic of those found in Barra's elite gated condominiums (see Image 26). The porter and a secretary are paid for by a monthly fee of R$40, which all residents must pay. This contrasts strongly with the situation in Asa Branca, where, as explained in Chapter 7, the residents' association has found it difficult to enforce its own monthly fee. This has made it easier to prevent the kinds of problems of littering found in the main part of Asa Branca (See Image 27). As described by one of Brisa do Mar's porters, the control exercised over space extends to preventing children from the

[113] To the extent that they are, these seem to be more the product of age than social class.

main part of Asa Branca play in the street, despite the fact that children from Brisa do Mar go to play with their friends on the other side. According to him, "The residents don't accept it […], they think they just come here to destroy the place."

Image 26. The entrance to Brisa do Mar, with gate and security box (source: Catalytic Communities)

Image 27. A sign written on a wall in Brisa do Mar saying "Littering Prohibited" (source: Catalytic Communities)

Control of space and suppression of disorder manifest in a distinct symbolic position for Brisa do Mar relative to the rest of Asa Branca. One resident who owns a clothing store in Asa Branca, but lives in a rented apartment in Brisa do Mar described the difference she perceived:

> God yes, it's a different atmosphere. Definitely. It doesn't have noise, it's more tranquil. If I could I'd buy a house there. […] I think they're more organised. They take more care with how their houses look. *[Female 45, Asa Branca]*

This aesthetic distinction feeds the sense of a distinct identity. The symbols of order and exclusivity – the gate, the pill box, the absence of playing children in the street – allow residents to distance themselves from the perceived disorder of the favela and more closely align themselves with the dominant 'gated' aesthetic of urbanisation in the region. This echoes Brum's description of the relationship between the various sections of the Cidade Alta complex in Rio's North Zone, which are tied up in relational processes of identity formation between their respective residents. In both cases, at least at a very localised scale, aesthetic and organisational differences seem to ascribe social meanings that are scarcely, if at all, supported by actual social differences. As one respondent complained of the way Brisa do Mar's residents treat the rest of Asa Branca:

> They say that that is a condominium and we are the *favelados*, we're the little poor people ("*pobrezinhos*") and they're the rich ones. *[Female 47, Asa Branca]*

It seems that such acts of sub-community collective distancing are destined to remain contested, however. In the absence of meaningful legal and social differences between the two areas, the purported claims of Brisa do Mar's residents to be separate ring hollow for many. As one respondent who had family members living in Brisa do Mar commented:

> The name there is "Brisa do Mar" [in a mock posh accent][114] and here is a favela. My cousins say this, "Oh, I'm going to the favela". What do you mean you're going to the favela? This is also a favela, just one that's in disguise! *[Female 43, Asa Branca]*

8.3.2b Tuiuti: Not everyone who lives in the favela is a favelado

In Tuiuti the socio-cultural associations that come with favela stigma are of a related, but different nature to the accusation of disorder. The favela is highly

[114] *Brisa do Mar* means "Sea Breeze" and is typical of the kind of names given to upmarket condominiums.

consolidated and faces no risk of removal, and although residents occasionally make comparisons with wealthier areas of the city, the greater remoteness of these from their daily lives means they do not constantly loom over perceptions of the neighbourhood. Nonetheless, many residents report feeling heavily stigmatised by wider society, including by residents of surrounding formal areas. The socio-cultural forms of stigmatisation they face seems to be less associated with neighbourhood disorder, and more associated with a personified stereotype of a favela resident: the "*favelado*".

Although, as we saw earlier, some respondents denied that Tuiuti faces discrimination from residents of surrounding areas, others believe very strongly that they do. One factor that may shape such differences, and which was posited by a few interviewees, is the extent to which social networks connect individual favela and non-favela residents. Both the extent to which non-favela residents discriminate and the degree to which favela residents perceive they are discriminated against are likely to be shaped by the intensity of their individual relationships across this divide. One resident who believed there was a great deal of discrimination highlighted this point:

> There are people who have friendships with people in the community, who already know it, but [in general] it is very, very discriminated against. People really like to discriminate. […] There are people who live right here below who discriminate. Discriminate, you understand. They don't come here, up the hill. *[Female 53, Tuiuti]*

An important aspect of the stigma residents feel is directed towards them is that it is based on preconceptions rather than meaningful social differences. Several respondents emphasised the similarities in social condition between São Cristóvão's favela and non-favela residents:

> There are people here who live better than they do. But just because they live here they have that preconception. There are people here who live well. There are people here who have everything, everything in their homes. Everything of

> the best quality in their homes, you understand, that lots of people in the street don't have. *[Female 53, Tuiuti]*
>
> *Respondent [Female 24, Tuiuti]*: They [people in the surrounding area] think everyone who lives on the hill is a *favelado*, you know. They think that you arrive in a place and that means you live in a different way. The people here on the other side of the Marechal [Road] stare when there's an event or something, you know. Everyone is together, but some people stand out more.
>
> *Interviewer*: Because they think they're different?
>
> *Respondent:* "They think they're better than us, but I don't think they're better at all. It's not like we're in Copacabana. They'd like to be, but we're the same. They do their shopping on the Luiz Gonzaga (Road) just like us."

Such examples suggest a disembedding of perceptions of what it means to be a favela resident, similar to the disembedded association between Asa Branca and violence in the eyes of the neighbouring condominium residents. While non-favela residents with friends in Tuiuti (or any favela, perhaps,) are likely to be aware of internal differences, others are deemed to associate all favela residents with the ideal type of the *favelado*.

The term *favelado* rarely cropped up in interviews in Asa Branca, but were a frequent theme in Tuiuti, suggesting a connection between the context of the North Zone and dominant stereotypes about favela residents. While relatively amorphous, the term seems to subsume a range of socio-cultural characteristics, including (but not limited to) a lack of formal education, inarticulacy, weak attachment to the labour market and/or involvement in informal or illicit economic activities (though without equating to a fully fledged "*bandido*"). It may then extend to more superficial features, such as a preference for funk music, a particular style of dress, or simply giving the appearance of poverty.[115] One respondent offered some insight into what constitutes a *favelado* in the popular imagination:

[115] It is clearly also a highly racialised term, almost exclusively applied to people with black or brown skin (although it certainly is not only used by whites).

> Look, I for one think it's like this, that the majority of people who live outside don't know the community very well, don't know what people's day to day is like. It's easy to judge, but it's difficult when you coexist, when you live with… not everyone who lives on the hill… in the community… is a *favelado*, who doesn't know how to express themselves correctly. There are people here, God, who… how can I explain? …who from every ten words that come out of their mouths there will be fifteen or twenty swear words. So that's what I think. And outside [there are] lots of people that think, who live outside, that we don't know how to behave, how to dress, that we don't know how to speak well, that we don't know… how can I say… to go to a place and know how to converse with people from other places. *[Male 24, Tuiuti]*

As this quote suggests, the spectre of the *favelado*, and the anxiety of being identified as such, tends to promote individualised rather than collective responses. This appears to be because the very slipperiness of the term gives it an expansive quality that, as the word itself implies, constantly threatens to engulf all favela residents. Tuiuti's residents appear to feel relatively confident in distancing themselves from the more clearly defined figure of the *bandido*. Those who have no direct involvement in the drug trade or other forms of violence are able to place themselves comfortably outside the category to the extent that they can feel secure enough to adopt varying attitudes towards those who do inhabit it.[116] By contrast, the term *favelado* seems to carry a more accusatory tone for many residents of Tuiuti.

Individual forms of distancing tend to emphasise the personal attributes that can counter the accusation of being a *favelado*, with "good education" (in both a formal and normative sense) being central among them. This may extend to a more collective defence, where respondents argue that others in the community also have these qualities, for example:

> For a community, there are people here with a high cultural level, people who go to university, people who have graduated. I think it's changing here… There

[116] The well-known exception to this is young dark-skinned men, for whom, as *auto de resistência* (death at the hands of police) rates tragically testify, the category of *bandido* has a similar tendency to expand.

> are lots of people who have the means to live in another place, but stay here.. Because they were born and raised here, got married, built their homes. There are people who have very basic homes, but others with big nice homes who have stayed here. *[Male 54, Tuiuti]*

However, these seem to be limited to bounded networks of "non-*favelados*" rather than the population as a whole. That is to say that there is no attempt to deny the presence of *favelados* in the favela:

> They [outsiders] think that the people who live on the *morro*, everyone who lives on the *morro*, are people who don't have education, people like that, you understand. In truth it's not right, it's wrong. But it's a form of discrimination here that's very annoying. Because here there are good people too, people with education, I know very well how to behave in other places. I think it's very sad, the reality here they think is different from their reality. *[Female 40, Tuiuti]*

In what appears to be a related process, this positive bounding of networks can also lead to a negative, more intensified drawing of boundaries against those who fit the mould of the *favelado* label and threaten to stigmatise others by association. One respondent drew this distinction in particularly stark terms:

> People tar everyone with the same brush. They don't differentiate. Because here there are lots of people who have good education, who have good schooling, who have been to university, who like to study. And there are also people who don't have education, who were born to live here. But the people who don't live in the community don't differentiate. *[Female 52, Tuiuti]*

As proposed in the earlier discussion of network bounding, this suggests that broad social constructions of respectability and its opposition are able to reach inside the neighbourhood and restructure its internal relations. They do so by exercising uneven and contested, but nonetheless substantial, influence over the construction of individual and collective identities.

8.3 Internal boundaries and hegemonic schemas

Favela stigma and the accusations that accompany it clearly place an onus on residents to perform uncomfortable acts of distancing. However, it would be reductive to see stigma as the only, or even primary, source from which identities are formed. While they may perceive themselves as being stigmatised as favela residents, they will inevitably at times play other "roles" in which they are not stigmatised. As Goffman (1963) – who provides the theoretical basis for Wacquant et al.'s (2014) conception of 'territorial stigma' – notes:

> The lifelong attributes of a particular individual may cause him to be type-cast; he may have to play the stigmatised role in almost all of his social situations, making it natural to refer to him, as I have done, as a stigmatized person whose life-situation places him in opposition to normals. However, his particular stigmatising attributes do not determine the nature of the two roles, normal and stigmatised, merely the frequency of his playing a particular one of them. And since interaction roles are involved, not concrete individuals, it should come as no surprise that in many cases he who is stigmatised in one regard nicely exhibits all the normal prejudices held towards those who are stigmatised in another regard. (Goffman 1963, p. 164)

In light of this, it becomes necessary to explore alternative evaluative systems on which favela residents' identities might also rest. Placing greater emphasis on these may allow residents of stigmatised places to feel rehabilitated in the eyes of their neighbours and even wider society. That is to say that as powerful as stigma may be, it must inevitably exist in a context of broader social, ideological and moral frameworks that offer a variety of different possibilities for individual and collective identification. With this expanded understanding, territorial stigma becomes just one of several vectors along which meanings may be generated and people defined.

Naturally this creates further complications at the analytical level. If through network bounding or in their individual distancing from stigma, for example, residents are not simply distancing themselves from something negative, but also moving in a positive direction towards identifications with which they feel more comfortable, how are the latter to be understood? As has been discussed,

Bourdieu's class-infused understanding of cultural capital can help guide us towards an answer, but alone it not seem fully equipped to account for social distinctions within Rio's favelas. This final section will propose a model for how boundaries form within the favela, arguing that this involves two separate evaluative schemas.

Despite the precarity of state presence in both Tuiuti and Asa Branca, there are important routes through which hegemonic conceptions enter the favela and can be internalised to varying degrees by residents. These constitute reference points for "legitimate knowledge" that become the basis for processes of *socio-cultural distinction*. However, this hegemonic schema tends to exclude a large part of the population who are unable to sufficiently master the requirements of such a form of distinction. Nonetheless, there also exists a deeper, *moral-cultural order*, based around more fundamental and contextually embedded principles such as supporting one's family and practising non-violence. These principles are able to embrace a large part of the community, but still ultimately exclude some who are unable to achieve this form of distinction. Like the process of network bounding with which they are linked, these structures surrounding identity formation seem to be present in both Tuiuti and Asa Branca, suggesting they are general features of favela life, rather than context-bound phenomena that are liable to vary across the city.

8.3.1 "A lack of education": Legitimate knowledge and socio-cultural distinctions

During my many long conversations with community leaders, NGO workers and representatives of state agencies in both Tuiuti and Asa Branca discussing the main challenges in each area, one theme arose again and again: education. The head of Asa Branca's Kardecist Church, the only NGO that is active in the favela, offered a common view when he told me "the problem of Brazil is the problem of education", citing Brazil's poor performance in international educational league tables.[117] A social worker at Tuiuti's Social Assistance and Reference Centre (CRAS) made a similar observation when discussing the effectiveness of the *Família Carioca*

[117] This fits into a broader pattern in Brazil. A comparative international study found Brazilian elites far more likely than those of other countries to identify low levels of education as the main obstacle to national development (Reis 2008).

programme that she administered.[118] She felt that lack of integration with schools and, in particular, the inability of parents to meaningfully support their children's education undermined the programme. In her words, "Programmes don't solve poverty, only education, qualifications [ie. for parents] can do that". As will be discussed below, the principles of the *Bolsa Família* conditional cash transfer programme are contested, but putting aside questions of its effectiveness, there seems to be a clear hegemonic consensus in Brazil about the centrality of education for solving the country's social problems.

Such discourses are frequently reproduced by favela residents themselves, particularly when discussing their neighbours. As seen in the way Tuiuti's residents in particular distance themselves from the stigmatised figure of the *favelado*, the ability to identify a person's "lack of education" is crucial to this socio-cultural process of distinction. The terms '*educação*' (education) and '*educado*' (educated) are slightly ambiguous in that they can, sometimes simultaneously, refer to both an individual's manners *and* their actual knowledge and observance of 'legitimate' socio-cultural norms.[119] However, while negative use of the term in the first sense to denote rudeness or brashness can be (and regularly is) directed at anyone, including those belonging to wealthier social groups, the second usage seems to be overwhelmingly directed at other favela residents. One resident of Asa Branca offered a clear example of this latter meaning:

> Coexistence here is very difficult, especially in the community. […] The people don't have a lot of culture, it's a lack of schooling, a lack of development projects, to improve their education. It's rubbish on the ground… Just because I live in the community I have to see things like that?! *[Male 41, Asa Branca]*

Although this quote echoes the efforts of individuals to distance themselves from favela stigma, the identification of others' lack of legitimate knowledge need not necessarily take the form of an accusation. An example from Tuiuti bears this out.

[118] *Família Carioca* is a municipal conditional cash transfer (CCT) programme design to supplement and reinforce the federal *Bolsa Família* programme. Parents who attend parent-teacher meetings, ensure pupil school attendance and help their children with homework are entitled to a monthly stipend.
[119] I am grateful to Nicholas DeGenova for making this observation.

Following pacification, the arrival of Light, Rio's electricity provider, had caused a sudden uncomfortable adaptation for households who now had to pay for previously pirated electricity. This had left some in arrears after the first month. In a joint interview two sisters took different views on the question of whether those who found themselves owing money to the electricity company were morally culpable, but both regarded it as the result of a lack of legitimate knowledge:

> *Respondent 1 [Female 41, Tuiuti]*: It's like this, people need to learn to use their electricity, because they don't use it properly.
>
> *Respondent 2 [Female 35, Tuiuti]*: They don't even know how.
>
> *Respondent 1*: They do know.
>
> *Interviewee 2*: Here on the *morro* they don't know!
>
> *Interviewee 1*: It's that they don't want to [use it properly].
>
> *Interviewee 2*: Like a child, the same as a child, I think like this, if you've never had something, like, you've never been monitored to have something, you know, when you're monitored, you don't know how to do it.
>
> *Interviewee 1*: No, but look, there are people who, say… if you're not in the room and the light is on… you have to turn off the light! "Ah no, the government will pay for me, I'm not paying." That's what they do, isn't it?
>
> *Interviewee 2*: Yes, that's what they do (laughing). But it's because they've never been charged!
>
> *Interviewee*: It's a lack of education!

The question of legitimate knowledge also emerges through the recurrent trope of self-improvement. Among several residents (though almost exclusively those in relatively higher-skilled occupations), the desire to study and the ability to identify and follow a career trajectory was seen as an essential skill that others in the neighbourhood tended to lack. Often this was framed around an inability to defer gratification and plan for the future, for example:

> I want more. I want better things. […] I want an atmosphere… a place with a better atmosphere, with people more concerned about the future. *[Male 29, Tuiuti]*

> There are lots of people here who don't really want to work, that's the truth. They're people who have, like, a mentality to see things… to not see tomorrow, to only see today. "Ah, today I have this, so I'm going to drink, I'm going to spend it," and not think about the future, like, "Jeez I could go to university, I could think about graduating." *[Male 38, Asa Branca]*

A variation on this theme, that was offered by others, was an emphasis on deferring marriage and children until later in life, permitting women in particular more time for study and career development:

> I think a lot of people here aren't well raised. There are people here of my age who already have three kids, and I think that's wrong. I think you need to sort out your future, your career, before you start to have kids. *[Female 19, Asa Branca]*

> People here are very switched off, man. They're in that state of mind where they don't want to do what it takes to improve themselves, improve their lives. Like study more, do other courses. Because the majority of kids leave school early, the girls have kids early and stop studying because of the kids. […] And the boys, the men, they're the ones who got the girls pregnant, and so they have to go and work, go to work in any old thing. *[Female 46, Tuiuti]*

Even for those residents unlikely to chart a dramatic upward trajectory in the labour market, some felt there were opportunities in lower-skilled areas that people were not taking advantage of. Here the socio-cultural framing of work as self-improvement remains, but begins to mix with a more moral framing of making an effort to improve oneself:

> The difficulty here is the lack of will amongst the people. [...] Someone gets offered a place on a course, but to do it you have to go and do an exam at SENAI which people don't have. So it's a lack of will to want to evolve. It's not a lack of opportunity to evolve, it's wanting to evolve. Because there anything

> you want to do a course in you'll find. And then what do you have to do? Make an effort! *[Female 46, Tuiuti]*

A female resident of Tuiuti, mentioned previously, who worked as a recruiter for government-run training courses, put forward a similar attitude. She described the story of a resident from nearby favela Bairrera do Vasco who had arrived from the Northeast of Brazil and was largely illiterate. In a discourse that I heard frequently in both Tuiuti and Asa Branca, she detected a stronger desire for self-betterment among poor newly arrived migrants than among Cariocas who took such opportunities for granted:

> *Respondent [Female 43, Tuiuti]*: It's like this, I saw a desire in her… It's not "ah you have to help me", she made it clear that she was interested in studying. She said that she came from the Northeast… so she hadn't studied, if you go there you will hear that same story lots of times.[120] The people come from the Northeast because of the conditions there. They don't have work, they don't have anything, it's dry […]. So the people come and…
>
> *Interviewer*: And you think they arrive with more will ("*vontade"*)?
>
> *Respondent*: Exactly. They take advantage of the opportunities that we have, and even though we're here we don't see that… Ah "the government is doing it" [ie. running courses], good, the government is doing it, so "I'm going to get on and do it to benefit myself." […] I like that vision, I think it's cool.

These examples, as we shall see in the next section, begin to blend in with other more moral forms of distinction. However, the conception of work as being about self-realisation rather than purely about income seems to carry the mark of legitimate knowledge production as promoted by NGOs and government-linked agencies like SENAI. Furthermore what distinguishes these as primarily 'socio-cultural' rather than moral distinctions is the fact that they are mainly framed around whether others possess the necessary knowledge (*knowing* that you should "want to evolve"), rather than the moral fibre, to make good decisions. This seems to give the concept of work as self-realisation a weaker ideological and

[120] Barreira do Vasco, like Asa Branca and unlike Tuiuti, has a large Northeastern population.

psychological force in the favela context than in the US inner city, for example, where even if you are poor a failure to strive for the "American dream" can be seen as a mark of moral failure (2010). This makes sense in a city and society whose extreme levels of socio-economic inequality make claims of meritocracy implausible.

It is worth noting that socio-cultural distinctions have a certain relative or "positional" quality. Individuals with different levels of legitimate knowledge can, to some extent, assert their own respectability by identifying their superior knowledge relative to others. However, for the most part such a system seems to exclude a majority of the favela population. For those who *have* had more exposure to and thus been able to more effectively master the discourse of legitimate knowledge (perhaps having spent more time in the education system, for instance) and especially those who have achieved relatively higher positions in the labour market, these socio-cultural reference points provide a powerful alternative system for personal identification. By demonstrating legitimate knowledge an individual's association with favela stigma can be drastically weakened, perhaps to the point of weakening the subjective experience of stigmatisation. This contrasts with the view of favela stigmatisation as always placing overwhelming pressure on individual identity, and forcing any resident, no matter what their other attributes, on the defensive.

8.3.2 Morality and ideology at centre and periphery

8.3.2a Patricia's story

Many favela residents may be unable to demonstrate the legitimate knowledge required to achieve socio-cultural distinction. However, this does not mean that "submission" and "recalcitrance" to stigma are the only options that remain for preserving some kind of dignified individual identity. Indeed, as will be discussed, an extremely powerful alternative moral-cultural order holds out the potential not simply to rehabilitate favela residents, but also to challenge both the categorical stigmatisation and the dominant socio-cultural order that usually subordinate them.

Bourdieu has suggested that morality is a kind of residual category that those who are excluded from other fields through their lack of capital embrace out of necessity (see Lamont 2010). Such a view not only downplays the force of morality as an independent source of social positioning, but also misses its cultural and historical specificity. As Lamont has observed, moral frameworks and moral boundaries emerge in historically contingent ways, drawing on resources provided by national and local culture, religion, the state, and non-state ideologies (Lamont 2000). The following story of a resident of Tuiuti illustrates how a contextually embedded moral framework that contrasts with that of the mainstream can offer a positive basis for identification under the difficult circumstances that many favela residents face.

In Chapter 6 I introduced the story of Patricia,[121] who worked as a street trader selling tickets for the illegal *jogo do bicho* lottery. At the age of 49, Patricia is a short, slim black woman and lifelong resident of Tuiuti, who has worked hard and honestly (albeit at times illicitly) to provide for her family since she was a teenager. To reiterate, Patricia began her career working as a secretary and later, by chance, an analyst at a diamond cutters'. When the company closed during Brazil's economic crisis of the late 1980s out of desperation she went to work in the *jogo do bicho*. She later left again and spent several years working first in a pharmaceutical factory and then in a factory producing fans. Ultimately, alone and with children (and later grandchildren) to support, Patricia settled on the best paying option and returned to the *jogo*.

When asked about her employment Patricia was initially slightly reticent, laughing nervously and saying that she worked "*na contravenção*" a catchall term for something officially designated as illegal. Seeing my confused expression she assured me that she wasn't a drug trafficker and described her work in the *jogo*. Although we knew each other well by the time we conducted the interview, Patricia was aware that elite and official perspectives would deem her work as unrespectable, and even immoral, and that I as an outsider might be inclined to see

[121] Pseudonym

it similarly. Seeing that I was relaxed with what she had told me, she went on to elaborate upon what the work involved and it quickly became clear that for her and generally within the universe in which she lived, her work involved no moral transgression. Quite the contrary, by helping her to support her family, it allowed her to achieve a far more important form of moral distinction under difficult circumstances.

In fact, I would argue that Patricia, despite working in the illicit economy, perfectly fits the ideal type of a *trabalhadora* (worker), at least as it is understood by other favela residents. This status as a *trabalhadora* is further emphasised by her attitudes and other circumstances in her life. Like many residents I encountered in Tuiuti Patricia loves American soul music and, having never previously had the opportunity to study English, jumped at the chance when I began teaching classes there. In the few months that I taught her she was an enthusiastic and committed pupil, despite having difficulties (compared to some of the younger students who had more experience of English) in getting to grips with the language. After a long day's work she applied the same determination she gave to other spheres of her life to learning a difficult new skill.

One evening Patricia arrived late to class (the only time she ever did), almost in tears. Quite openly she told me and the rest of the class that her son was addicted to crack and had gone missing, and that she and other members of her family had been trying to track him down.[122] This came as a surprise to me because of Patricia's own innocence, perhaps even naivety, regarding drug use and her abhorrence of violence – both of which had come across clearly in previous discussions we'd had. In the eyes of wider society, Patricia's son is a *bandido*, associated with the world of crime and deserving of the moral retribution from the state that such a categorisation warrants (see Misse 2009). For other favela residents he is a *viciado* (addict), likely to be seen as moral failure deserving exclusion from the community. For Patricia herself the distinction would be somewhat different, however. In wider society she would be tarred by her

[122] They did eventually manage to locate him, alive and well, the following day.

association, through her son, to the world of drugs, not to mention her own illicit employment. However, within the moral universe of the favela she is regarded as an upstanding resident, a *trabalhadora* and an unfortunate victim of circumstance. Her desperate attempts to help and protect her son, while unable to understand the world in which he has become embroiled, is an object of sympathy rather than of judgement.[123]

This extensive examination of Patricia's story reveals some important aspects about the normative moral order of the favela. Similar to examples presented by Feltrán (2011) and Telles (2009), it suggests that in favelas and other poor neighbourhoods the mainstream, officially sanctioned moral order is largely subordinated (although not necessarily rejected in its entirety) to one that has far more relevance to daily survival. On the surface this observation appears to resemble Rodman's (1963) concept of the 'value stretch', whereby the poor profess adherence to mainstream values but then abandon them due to the difficulties of observing them in practice. However, the moral dimensions of favela life are both more contested and, paradoxically, also more fixed than this formulation implies.

As discussed in Chapter 3, favelas residents' lives are riddled with 'frontiers of tension' (Feltrán 2011) – externally demarcated and inconsistently policed lines of formality, legality and societal legitimacy. As noted by Fischer (2008), favela residents have also historically reappropriated dominant discourses to imbue them with more contextually relevant meanings. These contestation models describe the tense dialogue between dominant discourses and local contextual factors in shaping favela residents' varying views on important themes like education, work, and the law. These contestations are highly visible in Tuiuti and Asa Branca today, as previous discussions of stigma and socio-cultural distinctions should have made clear. Nonetheless, such models risk underplaying the coherence and continuity of a normative moral order within Rio's favelas. In fact the discourses of residents in both Tuiuti and Asa Branca suggest that although they interact with mainstream constructions, crucial moral reference points are in fact generated at the periphery

[123] It should be noted that if Patricia were deemed to be a *favelada* rather than a *trabalhadora* her situation might be viewed with less sympathy.

itself. These core principles are rooted in a culture that emerged through historical struggle, and which has been reproduced and transformed according to the shifting challenges of favela life.

8.3.2b The moral-cultural order of the favela and its political consequences

Two central tropes surfaced again and again in both Tuiuti and Asa Branca during extensive discussions about personal relationships, the neighbourhood, the city, and Brazilian society. While this does not necessarily mean that they constitute universal traits of favela culture across Rio de Janeiro, the regularity and passion with which they are evoked at least suggests that they have a central place in many favela residents' personal identities. The first of these themes, which was touched upon previously with regard to the role of networks in job finding, is the value of hard work. However, unlike the rather restrictive view of work as a career path of form of self-realisation, a broader, more inclusive conception that embraces residents like Patricia presents it as a difficult but necessary means of sustenance for family life. In this version, work is not to be praised for its glamour, but, on the contrary, for its drudgery (see also Fischer 2008, pp. 98-106; Zaluar 1985, p. 145). The second moral touchstone, implicit in the above discussion of collective distancing from the stigma of violence, is a very deep commitment to the practice of non-violence under challenging circumstances. Expressions of the value of hard work and non-violence are not empty slogans that residents profess to follow but then fail to observe in practice. Rather they are moral – indeed existential – imperatives rooted in family and community histories and everyday challenges.

Despite being more inclusive than the dominant socio-cultural order outlined above, these moral schemas are not, so to speak, "victimless". Indeed as the earlier discussion of network bounding and exclusion suggested, they are central to the drawing of boundaries within the favela. Those deemed to fall short of these moral standards occupy at best an ambiguous relationship within the community, and at worst become estranged from it. Zaluar (1985) makes this point with regard to drug traffickers, who may hold an elevated social status because of their superior capacity for violence, but are viewed (including often by themselves) as morally

inferior to the *trabalhador*. Those who fail to provide for their families due to perceived personal character flaws, meanwhile, can lose any kind of status at all (Arias and Rodrigues 2006).

These moral systems of evaluation interact unpredictably with dominant political ideologies, with sometimes surprising results. For example, I observed considerable resentment against recipients of *Bolsa Família* (and *Família Carioca*) stipends in such cases where these residents were deemed to not be spending the money appropriately.[124] The following quotes epitomise such a position:

> That girl I was just talking to was all like "your hair is horrible". She's all made up and beautiful, but her kids look like they hardly eat. She gets *Bolsa Família*, but most of it goes on her, on clothes, on paying installments on her mobile phone. I spend all my money on food, on my kids. My cupboards are never bare, there's always biscuits, yogurt… *[Female 33, Tuiuti]*

> No-one's against *Bolsa Familília*. Lots of people need it. The problem is when the girls who receive it keep having kids who they can't afford to look after. Or lots of times people don't even spend the money on their kids. You see their kids with hardly any clothes on and they're having barbecues in the square. *[Female 53, Tuiuti]*

> For me *Bolsa Famiília* should be for people in the North East, in the *sertão* [the arid interior] where people have nothing... Where there's droughts, where there's hunger. In Rio if you earn the minimum wage it's not a lot, but it's enough to survive. For me there should be no *Bolsa Família* in Rio. *[Female 45, Tuiuti]*

Brazil's right-wing political parties and media oppose the expansion of the *Bolsa Família* programme claiming that it promotes dependency and, in an argument more unique to Brazil, has evolved into a vote-buying strategy by the dominant

[124] This sentiment seemed to be far more common in Tuiuti than Asa Branca. Although it was not possible to get comparative data on levels of claims for the two communities, it is likely that this is due to the higher level of unemployment in Tuiuti. Connected to this, anti-*Bolsa Família* sentiment may be related to individual attempts by Tuiuti's residents to distance themselves from the figure of the *favelado*.

Partido dos Trabalhadores (*PT*) (for an academic elaboration of this thesis see Hall 2012). It is noteworthy that the respondents who made extensive critiques of what they saw as abuse of the *Bolsa Família* programme, did not reproduce any of these arguments. Instead these were framed around what was perceived as an impermissible severing of the necessary link between hard work and family survival.

Although this example seems to fit Wacquant et al.'s (2014) model of 'lateral denigration', or the displacement of stigma onto others in the neighbourhood, others demonstrate the independence such locally embedded moral schemas have from the pressures exerted by favela stigma. For example, respondents also engaged in 'upward critiques', comparing themselves favourably to wealthier social groups by highlighting their comparative lack of hard work or family orientation, their corruption, and the hypocrisy of their support for forms of state violence whose true consequences they do not understand. In this way they closely resemble Lamont's (2000) "dignified working men", by placing emphasis on moral rather than economic or socio-cultural criteria that subvert the dominant social hierarchy, without necessarily adopting counter-hegemonic political views.

The ambiguity of these upward critiques became visible in June 2013, when huge protests erupted on the streets of Rio de Janeiro and across Brazil. Originally organised in opposition to an increase in bus fares, the protests quickly spread and the complaints expanded to encompass police brutality, failing public services, government corruption and over-spending on mega-events. I was approaching the end of my fieldwork at the time the protests erupted, and so I had the opportunity to ask residents of Tuiuti and Asa Branca for their views. The responses were remarkably consistent. Very few informants declared any intention of attending a protest, but invariably they expressed support for the basic demands. There was widespread consensus that the Brazilian state failed to deliver for the majority of citizens, that the cost of living had been squeezed, and that too much money was being spent on the World Cup and Olympics. The political class were roundly dismissed as corrupt and frequently described as *bandidos*.

However, there was a key distinction between the views I heard among favela residents and those common within the protest movements and on the social media sites where these circulated. Although heavy-handed police repression of non-violent early protests led to widespread outcry, subsequent demonstrations invariably descended into running battles between protestors and police. The mainstream media, which had initially supported the protests, began to demonise the protestors as "*vândalos*" and to equate the masked "black bloc" protestors with the criminal underworld. Beleaguered Governor Sérgio Cabral pushed hard on a doctrine of zero tolerance towards violent protestors, presumably sensing in this an opportunity to reverse his collapsing poll ratings. Perhaps surprisingly, given their sympathy with the demands of the protesters and the anti-political mood, such attempts seemed to find fertile ground among the favela residents I spoke to, who invariably qualified their support for the protests with the requirement that they be non-violent:

> I agree with the demonstrations, but I think that breaking traffic lights, throwing stones at every wall, destroying the city… they're going to spend more money rebuilding the city and that's more money that we don't have […]. So it's like this, I'm half in favour and half against the demonstrations… I'm against the vandalism. *[Female 34, Tuiuti]*

This argument – about the costs of repairing the damage caused by protestors – was one that was frequently made on the right-wing *Globo* and *Rede Record* news channels. By contrast, coverage and comment on social media tended to attribute the violence to aggressive policing. While favela residents widely use social media, these views seem to support Garmany's (2009) argument that traditional broadcast media continues to play a key role in shaping their sense of what constitutes good citizenship. However, it is not sufficient to argue that favela residents simply absorb and unquestioningly reproduce hegemonic ideology. Indeed it appears that such arguments resonated not because of sympathy for the police confronting the violent protestors (who were viewed as equally bad), but because the violence of protestors was seen as gratuitous. The following quotes from residents in Tuiuti capture this view:

> *Respondent 1 [Female 44, Tuiuti]*: As long as they're peaceful that's fine, but when there's this business of people demonstrating and fighting with police it turns to trouble […]
> *Respondent 2 [Female 23, Tuiuti]*: The ones causing the trouble are from the street. It's not the *trabalhadores*' fault!
>
> I don't agree [with the violence]. I will never agree. And especially because the majority of people doing all that stuff are people who have a level of culture above the average. *[Male 54, Tuiuti]*

For those who face the everyday risk of violence and must constantly seek non-violent solutions to the challenges they face, the behaviour of violent protestors is seen as callous and, in the words of one respondent, "ignorant". These residents' views are not the direct product of a hegemonic ideology, but the cultural manifestation of pervasive insecurity and extreme inequality, in a city where some are forced to live with the shadow of violence hanging constantly over them.

8.4 Conclusion: Identity, the neighbourhood and urban hegemony

This chapter has argued that favela residents' attitudes and identities are diverse**,** complex and yet anchored in a range of frameworks that are tied in different ways to the unequal relationship between centre and periphery. The first framework revolves around stigma, defined by Goffman as an attribute that is "discrediting" within the context of a particular social relationship (Goffman 1963, p. 13). Stigmatisation functions through the circulation of disparaging stereotypes about favela residents, which are originally constructed by powerful actors (eg. social elites, politicians, agents of the state, media etc.) but widely reproduced by the population at large. Although these stereotypes seem to be rooted in general forms of class and racial discrimination, they take a specific form in discourses about favelas, in particular by associating their residents with violence and a lack of culture and education.

Given that favela stereotypes are built upon sensationalised representations, those whom they target are often able to perform highly plausible acts of distancing. In response to the "accusation" of violence, residents of Asa Branca and Tuiuti tend to

distance themselves *collectively* by insisting that their neighbourhood does not conform to the violent stereotype. By contrast, they tend to respond to the accusation of "a lack of education" in highly *individualised* ways. In both cases, by distancing themselves from stereotypes either collectively or individually, however, favela residents are forced to implicitly acknowledge the validity of the accusation with regard to favelas more generally.

The more individualised forms of resistance to stigma bring us to the second framework shaping identity formation, which I call a "socio-cultural" order. Wacquant et al.'s (2014) discussion of 'territorial stigmatisation' suggests that individual distancing represents an entirely negative reaction to stigma by seeking to displace it onto others. However, there may be more positive reasons for this to occur. Social diversity within favelas and uneven access to different sources of "legitimate knowledge" (eg. through education, formal employment, the media, civil society organisations etc.) inevitably produces varying levels of cultural capital within a favela population. As such, favela residents may subjectively and sincerely identify with "mainstream" constructions of legitimate behaviour and disapprove their neighbours for failing to observe these. In this way socio-cultural forms of distinction may be seen as tied to processes of stratification, albeit not in the clearly demarcated and directly reproducible way assumed by Bourdieu's (2000) understanding of class-based 'cultural capital' in the French context.

Although accessible to some, the socio-cultural order tends to exclude a large proportion of the favela population who are unable to demonstrate mastery of legitimate knowledge. However, I argue that there is a third "moral-cultural" order, which is constructed around core principles such as hard work and non-violence and which confers a highly valued form of moral distinction on a larger part of the favela population. This framework may be seen as rooted in a historically constituted favela culture, though it has emerged in constant dialogue with dominant structures and discourses (eg. Fischer 2008, pp. 98-106). This gives it the appearance of being subordinate to a hegemonic ideology aimed at pacifying and depoliticising excluded groups. However, this would be to underestimate the independent strength of this framework. Indeed, the set of ideas and principles it brings together are, under

some circumstances, capable of cohering into distinct and at times counter-hegemonic political positions.

It is important to note that these different frameworks are not mutually exclusive, but instead coexist as a repertoire of different systems of interpretation and identification. Indeed, individual residents may draw upon one or more of them at different times or when discussing different issues. My aim in identifying and isolating them is not to subdivide the favela population into clear groups, but to demonstrate the ways in which the identities and discourses of favela residents are fluid and composite, but at the same time anchored in different aspects of the unequal relationship between centre and periphery.

In the case of stigma this relationship is largely symbolic, while the socio-cultural order rests primarily on structural factors shaping varied trajectories of social reproduction. The moral-cultural order, meanwhile, although firmly rooted in everyday favela life, is strongly linked to the ideological relationship between centre and periphery and the dimensions of power and contestation that characterise it. These three layers can be seen as different *expressive* components of the assemblage of the favela category. The edges of this assemblage are highly blurred and its internal configuration leaves considerable room for individual maneuvring. Many residents may successfully distance themselves from favela stigma, while some may even be able to demonstrate a clear mastery of "legitimate knowledge". However, the seeming impossibility of favela residents achieving these feats without reproducing favela stigma theselves and/or being ideologically co-opted speaks to the extraordinary resilience of the favela assemblage and to the immense difficulty of resisting its brutalising logic.

9.0 Conclusions

9.1 Tying the strands together

This thesis has attempted to answer the question of what role structural, urban and neighbourhood-level factors respectively play in shaping social conditions in favelas. The evidence from Tuiuti and Asa Branca supports the widely held view (eg. Perlman 2010; Pero et al. 2005) that there are severe *structural* constraints that affect favelas and their residents at a general level – that is, regardless of the geographic context of the favela and the specific circumstances of the individual. These include the legal and often physical precarity of the favela as a form of housing, structural barriers to educational and occupational advancement, partial and inconsistent forms of state presence, and the ability of armed state and non-state actors to operate in favela territories with impunity. While all of these conditions may be present in some non-favela areas, they are *defining features* of the favela category and therefore mark it, to some degree at least, as distinct. In Delanda's terms, they act to *territorialise* the favela assemblage, by sharpening its borders and increasing its homogeneity. As such, these factors may be seen as exercising a gravitational pull that sustains disproportionate levels of poverty, exclusion and vulnerability in these areas.

Nonetheless, these constraints have not prevented important aspects of structural change in favelas over recent years. As noted, these include a notable reduction in poverty levels, increased household incomes and consumption, and, to a lesser extent, progress in terms favela residents' educational outcomes and entry into higher-skilled occupations. These trends can be observed across the working classes as a whole and relate to a range of social, economic and political factors. They could thus be interpreted as constituting a "rising tide", whereby favelas experience improvements in absolute terms, but remain relatively disadvantaged. However, there is much evidence to suggest trends towards convergence between favelas and non-favela areas (Neri et al. 2010). This would imply a powerful *deterritorialising* process, weakening the favela assemblage by blurring its borders with other low-income areas. As such, the role of structure is somewhat ambiguous.

It is clear, at least, that favelas should not be considered as "repositories" of the poorest and most excluded, as analysis along the Wacquant's (2008) lines might imply.

This contradiction is somewhat explained by the distinctiveness of housing dynamics in Rio de Janeiro and especially its favelas, where people are not as efficiently "sorted" across urban space as in the cities of the Global North. That is to say that the poorest urban residents are not necessarily sorted into favelas, and upwardly mobile favela residents are not inevitably sorted out. Two factors contributing to this are the high level of owner-occupation in favelas, which produces significant inertia in processes of residential sorting, and the still low levels of marketisation of housing in many favelas. Another is the greater malleability of the built environment (eg. the ability for verticalisation, lack of planning regulations), which allows residents to expand their homes to accommodate growing households, at least for a while. A further reason is that constraints to everyday mobility (eg. low rates of vehicle ownership, high levels of traffic, patchy public transport networks) place a premium on location for access to employment, amenities and social networks. These factors encourage many upwardly mobile favela residents to remain in place, particularly if they live in more central areas, rather than move into formal housing that is likely to be far more peripheral. As such, although they begin as a *residual* form of housing populated by the very poorest, favelas are not necessarily condemned to remain that way.

The role of housing in permitting structural transformation to occur within favelas raises the question of what role is played by *urban process* as opposed to social and economic *structure* in shaping conditions in favelas. In simple terms, whereas structural change can be seen as affecting favelas in general, urban processes are inherently tied to space and may therefore cause differences to emerge *between* favelas. As noted in Chapter 6, there are small but noteworthy (and perhaps growing) differences between Tuiuti and Asa Branca in terms of housing dynamics and labour market outcomes. Whereas market logic has deeply penetrated the allocation of housing in Asa Branca, leading to increased residential *selectivity*, it remains relatively weak in Tuiuti. However, this divergence does not yet appear to

have produced clear differences in terms of the social composition of their respective populations. In terms of employment outcomes, meanwhile, whereas Tuiuti's population faces significant levels of unemployment, an abundance of low-skilled jobs in the surrounding region makes this less of a problem in Asa Branca. This distinction has important consequences for residents' quality of life and, at the margins, for levels of poverty. However, beyond this difference the socio-economic profiles and income levels of the two populations follow broadly similar patterns. This suggests that in terms of housing and employment/income dynamics structure still tends to take primacy over urban process in the case study areas.[125]

Such is not the case for the urban processes of state intervention and territorial competition between armed groups, which both lead to significant disparities *between* favelas. As discussed in Section 4.2.2, the relationship between the state and favelas is complex and subject to a range of factors that lead to varying levels of investment and distinct kinds of intervention in different favelas. Some of these factors – such as the role of agglomeration, "visibility" to policy-makers, and the neoliberalisation of governance – tend to reinforce a centre-periphery dynamic, leading more central favelas to receive greater attention (though not always with positive results, as recent favela removals attest). These dynamics benefitted Tuiuti in the 1990s when it was upgraded through the *Favela Bairro* programme, and have reached Jacarepaguá in the last few years through neoliberal policies tied to the delivery of the 2016 Olympics. However, the fact that Asa Branca accessed its recent upgrading through the traditional route of clientelist networks shows that mechanisms that operate with far less spatial regularity are also important in determining favelas' access to the state. They also reveal that actors operating at lower spatial scales – in this case politicians and to a lesser extent favela residents' associations – can sometimes play a key role in determining conditions within the neighbourhood.

[125] This conclusion might not hold for a comparison between a favela in the South Zone, where incomes (FIRJAN 2010) and house prices (Perlman 2010b) are significantly higher than average, to one at the urban periphery (see also Pero et al. 2005; Ribeiro 2000).

The role of local actors is perhaps even more important when it comes to questions of security and violence. Rio's system of territorial competition between armed actors obligates its participants to observe certain norms of engagement in order to hold and profit from the control of territory. In highly contested areas of the city this often means zero tolerance policies towards potential rivals and residents who fail to observe the "rules". However, where conditions permit, local drug trafficking groups, militias and, indeed, *UPP*s may exercise significant discretion in their management of relations with residents. In cases where armed groups are highly *embedded* in the local community, as seems to be the case with Tuiuti's drug traffickers and Asa Branca's local "militia", this can make them somewhat more responsive to resident demands. As such, residents may find themselves able to exercise a degree of informal influence over these groups and to reduce the uncertainty that accompanies their presence in the neighbourhood.[126] This might perhaps be conceived as a perverse form of 'collective efficacy' (Sampson et al. 1997) specific to the Rio de Janeiro context. This scenario should not be romanticised – these relationships are maintained under the threat of violence and resident needs are ultimately subordinate to these groups' strategic objectives. Nonetheless, local conflict dynamics and the behaviour of local armed groups can lead to very meaningful differences in objective conditions and subjective perceptions of security between different favelas.

Despite having some residual influence over armed groups, residents on the whole seem to be largely disempowered in terms of their ability to determine the general social conditions of the neighbourhood. Nonetheless, informal social network processes can help them to deal with some of the challenges these pose. There are significant levels of social exchange in both Tuiuti and Asa Branca, which have important impacts for many residents' quality of life. However, these exchanges are subject to processes that, once again, prove to be heavily constrained by forces outside the neighbourhood. Material scarcity in the community tends to encourage better-off residents to withdraw, or at least heavily regulate, their exchanges so as

[126] It is ironic that the bipolar security order that has emerged in Tuiuti since pacification appears to have *reduced* resident influence over security conditions, albeit with the threat of outright violence apparently diminished.

not to see their resources rapidly depleted. Similarly, potential referees must typically consider their own, often weak, positions and carefully weigh up the "reliability" of others before helping them to find employment. These processes of "network bounding" are tied up with broader patterns of *boundary formation* in the neighbourhood, in which diffuse societal constructions of legitimacy that tend to exclude many favela residents are frequently mobilised. These different dynamics support the claims that both externally generated economic conditions (eg. González de la Rocha 2001) and socially constructed differences (eg. Smith 2005) play an important role in shaping social networks in low-income urban neighbourhoods.

The kinds of distinctions that bound residents' networks can also be seen as contributing to broader processes of identity formation. Indeed, whether they are discussing important social and political issues or more mundane aspects of neighbourhood life, it is argued that favela residents draw on a repertoire of socio-symbolic frameworks that in different ways are rooted in the unequal relationship between centre and periphery. The first of these frameworks revolves around stigmatisation, which favela residents believe they are widely subject to. Although they are often successful in distancing themselves from the "accusations" that accompany favela stigma, this usually comes at the cost of accepting its underlying rationale. Another framework involves socio-cultural distinctions, whereby residents who can demonstrate mastery of legitimate knowledge evoke mainstream norms while often, at the same time, decrying the failure of their neighbours to observe them. A third "moral-cultural" framework is constructed on core values such as hard work and non-violence, and appears to be deeply embedded in a favela culture moulded out of historical and contemporary struggles. In different ways these discourses express an ongoing, asymmetric dialogue between the everyday context of the neighbourhood and hegemonic constructions that play a powerful *expressive* role in territorialising the favela assemblage. Though they rarely appear to converge into consensus among residents that could be described as "counter-hegemonic", the autonomous positions that these discourses often

produce suggests the neighbourhood exercises a degree of agency in shaping resident subjectivities.

To summarise, these perspectives on the material, social and representational dimensions characterising contemporary favela life can be broadly integrated into an urban social complexity model. This proposes that processes and actors interacting across different scales produce the commonalities and differences observed within and between favelas. Higher-level social, economic and institutional factors exert primary influence over the production of social conditions in favelas. However, some aspects of recent trends of transformation and diversification are tied to urban processes that also lead to differences between favelas. Some of these processes empower more local actors to influence conditions in ways not recognised by top-down models. At the same time, resident social networks' and discursive frameworks provide a degree of agency in responding to these social conditions individually and collectively. However, these also prove to be heavily influenced by higher-level factors. In particular, powerful socio-symbolic frameworks draw residents into dialogue with mainstream constructions, effectively forcing them to reproduce inferiorising narratives about favelas. This suggests that even as the material axis of the favela assemblage has been significantly deterritorialised, its expressive dimension continues to invest the favela with a distinct and powerful social meaning.

9.2 Future lines of enquiry

A first question raised by this research concerns the theoretical literature on cities emanating from the Global North. As argued in the literature review, neighbourhood effects approaches have weakly theorised the city and thus left themselves exposed to powerful critiques. On the other hand, alternative models tend to imply a total rejection of analysis at the scale of the neighbourhood. As this research has argued, in Rio de Janeiro higher-level structural and urban factors exert primary causal influence over conditions in different favelas, but some degree of agency also exists within the neighbourhood – through intermediate power brokers, social networks, and locally embedded discourses that have the potential

to generate independent political positions. It may be that such dynamics are unique to the cities of the Global South, where the state and formal economy extend less evenly across urban space. However, this is unsubstantiated and deserves greater exploration. In fact, I suspect that the entrenched and polarised positions of critical/structuralist and neighbourhood approaches respectively have undermined the possibility of a more rounded debate about the place of the neighbourhood. It may be that bringing together the insights of political economy approaches with the greater sensitivity to scalar interactions and complexity offered by assemblage theory could chart a way forward. Indeed the value of such modes of analysis may increase as factors like immigration and welfare state retrenchment alter the social and ethnic geographies of many cities in the Global North.

With regard to Rio de Janeiro itself, the research raises more specific questions. While I believe my case studies have offered an alternative perspective on conditions and current transformations of favelas in Rio de Janeiro, they only scratch the surface of variations that exist across the city's favelas in terms of location, size and integration into the urban processes I have identified. For example, very large favelas and favela complexes, where key institutions and social networks are more likely to be contained within the favela, may have fundamentally different dynamics to smaller favelas where residents are, in a sense, "closer" to the formal city. Furthermore, more peripheral favelas, such as those in the West Zone or the Baixada Fluminense, may display a greater regularity in terms of their marginalisation from different urban processes than those like Tuiuti and Asa Branca where impacts are highly uneven. While I believe a complexity approach can be applied to the city as a whole, it may be that in some parts of the city more straightforward formal/informal or centre/periphery analyses retain greater applicability. By extension, this may also be the case in cities that are comparable to Rio de Janeiro but characterised by more classic centre-periphery structures, such as São Paulo. On the other hand, considering growing social diversity and persistent issues of weak governance and violence in informal and peripheral settlements across the region, I believe that an urban complexity framing is likely to have wider relevance.

Returning to Rio de Janeiro, there is a further question mark over the implications of various aspects of my approach for non-favela areas, particularly those, such as *conjuntos habitacionais* and *loteamentos*, that share many traits with favelas. It may be that where channels of state presence are more formalised, local power brokers like politicians and armed actors have less influence over the construction of local opportunity structures and that, therefore, more conventional political economy approaches to understanding local conditions will suffice. On the other hand, as both state neglect and drug trafficker and militia presence in many non-favela areas attests, such a straightforward distinction cannot be drawn. This raises the question of how some such areas become vulnerable to these conditions – in a broadly conceived sense, "favelised" – and others do not. It may be that a complexity approach can contribute to such a discussion, by highlighting the role of spatial factors in processes of favelisation. This is likely to be tied up in the varied ways in which housing is allocated in these different types of neighbourhood, and the degree of residential selection that this introduces. However, as indicated by Brum's (2012) study of the Cidade Alta complex, it will also relate to neighbourhood identities, and the socio-symbolic processes that lead initially "formal" neighbourhoods to come to be seen as favelas.

Another question in this area concerns the way that identity-formation in non-favela areas compares to those observed in Tuiuti and Asa Branca. Given the discourses observed among my respondents, it is likely that those living in non-favela areas are likely to also draw on favela stigma when assessing their own neighbourhoods, and to formulate positive place and personal identities by placing themselves firmly outside the favela category. Anecdotal evidence from speaking to residents of the Minhocão housing project at the edge of Tuiuti and of the neighbourhood of Curicica bordering Asa Branca suggests that such distinctions are indeed prevalent. On the other hand, the intensity of relations across these apparent divides implies that favela stigma does not impede the construction of affective bonds in cases where social proximity brings residents on either side into regular contact. Research with residents of low-income, formal neighbourhoods could shed light on how evaluations of favela residents are made by non-residents.

For example, it could reveal whether they tend to hold different attitudes towards favela residents who achieve what I have described as "socio-cultural distinction" through consistent demonstration of legitimate knowledge, and also of how this is reconciled (or not) with constructions of favela residents based on stigmatised stereotypes. It might also help to reveal the extent to which the formal working classes are implicated in the construction of hegemonic discourses that reinforce favela differentness and underpin state policies, particularly in the security domain.

This leads on to a final possible line of enquiry, which would be to observe urban processes and the construction of hegemony from the vantage point of the institutional and symbolic "centre". I have, in passing, touched upon a range of institutional actors that impact upon the lives of favela residents either directly or indirectly, such as politicians, the police, public sector agencies, civil society organisations and the media. Analysing these institutions from the inside would reveal a great deal about how they reach decisions on how to frame their interventions and where to mobilise resources, thus offering important insights into their role in the production of inequality and urban social complexity. An institutional perspective could also help us to understand how hegemony is constructed and enacted by key opinion formers. While it is clear that favela residents are politically disempowered by clientelism, there may be more subtle ways in which discourses that carry weight within favelas are incorporated into the construction of systems of hegemony. For example, is the frequent idealisation of the *trabalhador* in the discourse of politicians and media outlets consciously used to create a wedge between favela residents (and within the wider working-class population) in attempt to lure them into supporting aggressive security policies? Such a question highlights an important limitation of the kind of research conducted for this thesis: that as much as we might learn about urban inequality from analysis of the periphery, this will inevitably remain incomplete if we cannot access the view as seen from the centre.

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11.0 Appendices

11.1 Appendix 1: Interview Schedule (Portuguese)

1) Introdução

Obrigado por tomar o tempo para participar nesta pesquisa. Antes de começar vou explicar um pouco sobre o projeto e como a entrevista vai funcionar. Estou conversando com os moradores de (Asa Branca/Tuiuti), e também de uma outra comunidade no Rio de Janeiro. Os temas principais da pesquisa são as histórias familiais, as rotinas cotidianas, as relações pessoais e as percepções sobre a comunidade e algumas das mudanças que estão acontecendo aqui. Na verdade, vai ser mais uma conversa do que uma entrevista.

Durante essa conversa, tudo o que você me disser é completamente confidencial. Qualquer informação sua que eu usar na publicação final permanece anônima, por isso não se preocupe, pois ninguém terá acesso ao que disser. Se em qualquer momento você não quiser responder a uma pergunta ou se quiser parar a entrevista, à vontade e não tem que dar nenhuma razão. Se estiver de acordo, vou gravar a entrevista porque isso vai me permitir a escutar outra vez depois e ter certeza que entendi tudo o que você disse. A gravação será mantida em um local seguro, e ninguém mais vai ouvir. Tudo bem para você? Você tem alguma dúvida ou pergunta antes de começar?

2) História pessoal / circunstâncias atuais

Então, primeiro eu gostaria de saber um pouco sobre sua história familiar e situação atual...

Há quanto tempo você mora nesta casa? Onde você estava morando antes? Por que você se mudou para cá?

E onde você foi criado/a? (*Se aplicável:* Quando você se mudou para o Rio?) Onde você estudou? Com quantos anos você saiu da escola? E o que você fez depois?

E agora você tá trabalhando? (*Se sim:* Qual é o seu trabalho? Há quanto tempo você está fazendo isso? O que você fazia antes?) (*Se não:* O que foi o último trabalho que você fez? Quando/por quanto tempo? Porque você parou?)

Você é o proprietário da sua casa, ou você aluga? (*Se aluga:* quem é o proprietário? Como foi que você descobriu sobre a vaga aqui?)

Quem mora na sua casa? O que fazem os outros moradores? *(Solicita para onde eles trabalham/faz quanto tempo ou onde as crianças vão à escola)*

Você tem outros parentes que moram no bairro? (*Se sim:* Eles chegaram no bairro ao mesmo tempo de você?) Você tem parentes que moram fora do bairro? (*Se sim:* Onde? Com que frequência você vê eles?)

Você é membro de alguma organização política, comunitária ou religiosa? Qual/onde é? Com que frequência você vai lá?

3) Práticas espaciais

Agora eu gostaria de saber um pouco mais sobre sua rotina cotidiana...

Onde é seu local de trabalho? Como você viaja ao trabalho? Quanto tempo leva para chegar? O que você acha da viagem?

Onde você faz suas compras de comida? Onde você compra outras coisas, por exemplo roupas, bens domésticos?

Você frequenta os shoppings (e quais)? Porque / por que não? Você usa lojas dentro da comunidade? Porque / por que não?

O que você faz com seu tempo livre? (*Dar Lista 1)

Em uma semana típica, que percentagem do seu tempo você passa fora do bairro? Fazendo o que? Que outras zonas da cidade você 'conhece bem'?

4) Intercâmbio social

E agora vou perguntar um pouco sobre suas relações com seus parentes, amigos e vizinhos...

Para começar, como você ficou sabendo sobre a vaga do seu trabalho atual? *Solicita se foi através de um amigo/parente, um anúncio, uma organização etc.*

Será que alguém lhe ajudou a conseguir o emprego? Quem/como é que eles ajudaram? (*Se não fosse parente:* Quem é a pessoa? Como você conhece ele/a e há quanto tempo? Por que você acha que ele/a estava disposto/a a ajudar você?)

Se você quisesse achar um novo emprego, o que você faria? (*Se menciona uma pessoa particular:* Porque ele/a? Como ele/a poderia ajudar?

Você já ajudou alguém conseguir um emprego? Quem? Por que você estava disposto a ajudar ele/a? Você faria o mesmo para qualquer conhecido ou somente para amigos/parentes?

Agora, você pode olhar para esta lista de favores e marcar a frequência com que você faz/recebe cada favor e para/de quem? (*Dar Lista 2)

Quando você faz favores para outras pessoas, você espere algo em troca? O que?

5) Percepções da comunidade

Ok, e para acabar quero fazer algumas perguntas sobre suas opiniões sobre a comunidade...

Você acha que aqui é um bom lugar para se viver? Por quê?

Você acha que em geral as pessoas desta comunidade são confiáveis? Porque/porque não? Mais ou menos que em outros lugares?

Existe algum lugar dentro da comunidade onde você se sente inseguro (ou onde você não gostaria que seus filhos fosse)? E quanto fora da comunidade?

O que as pessoas de fora pensam sobre esta comunidade, na sua opinião? Por quê?

6) Mudanças atuais

Finalmente quero te perguntar sobre algumas mudanças que estão ocorrendo agora na comunidade...

Nos últimos anos, você acha que a comunidade melhorou, permaneceu igual, ou piorou? De que maneira? Por quê?

O que você acha que são os principais desafios enfrentados pela comunidade hoje?

a) Perguntas específicas para Tuiuti

O que você acha da UPP? Desde a instalação da UPP você se sente mais seguro/a? Porque (não)? Como tem sido sua experiencia de interação como os policiais?

Desde a chegada da UPP você notou algum crescimento nos preços? *(Se sim: De que? Que tem sido o impato no seu orçamento familiar/na sua vida?)*

O Tuiuti fica perto da Maracanã e da Zona Portuária, duas das áreas que estão em obra em preparação para a Copa do Mundo e ás Olimpíadas. Você acha que os moradores aqui vão se beneficiar de algum jeito desses eventos esportivos?

b) Perguntas específicas para Asa Branca

As obras recentes na comunidade tem melhorado sua vida? Como? Quem você acha é o responsável? Deve mais ser feito ainda?

O que você acha das mudanças no entorno da comunidade, em particular os novos condomínios? Você já teve algum contato com os novos moradores? O que é sua percepção deles?

E você tem notado a presença de novos moradores dentro da Asa Branca? (*Se sim:* O que você acha deles?)

Você já usou no onibûs Transoeste? (Se sim, o que achou?) Você sabe algo das novas linhas – a Transolimpica e e Transcarioca? Você acha que vão ter um impato grande na sua vida?

Você acha que a longo prazo as mudanças relacionadas às Olimpíadas vão melhorar ou piorar a comunidade, ou não ter nenhum impato?

11.2 Appendix 1: Interview Schedule (English)

1) Introduction

Thank you for agreeing to participate in my research. Before we start I'll just quickly tell you a bit about the project and how the interview will work. I'm doing some research with the residents of *(Asa Branca/Tuiuti)*, and also in another community in Rio de Janeiro. The questions are mainly about people's personal histories, their daily routines, their relationships and their feelings about the community and some of the changes that are taking place in it. Actually it will be more like a conversation than an interview.

During the conversation, everything you say to me is completely confidential and any use I make of the information you give will be anonymised, so no-one will know what you have said. If you don't want to answer a question or want to stop the interview at any moment you can do so and you don't have to give a reason. If it's ok with you I'm going to record the interview because it will allow me to listen again afterwards and make sure I have understood everything you have said. The recording will be kept in a secure place, and no-one else will listen to it. Is this ok with you? Do you have any questions before we start?

2) Personal history/circumstances

So first I'd like to know a bit about your family history and current situation…

How long have you lived in the neighbourhood? Where did you live before? Why did you move here?

And where are you from originally? *(If applicable:* When did you move to Rio?*)* Where did you go to school and until what age? What did you do after you left school?

Do you work? (*If yes:* What is your job? How long have you been in your current job? What did you do previously?) (*If no:* What was your last job? When was it and for how long? Why did you leave?)

Do you own or rent your current house house? (*If rents:* Who is owner? How did you find out about the vacancy?)

Who lives in your house? What do the other members of your household do? *(Probe for where they work and for how long; where children go to school etc.)*

Do you have other family members living in the area? Who/where? (*If yes:* Did they arrive at the same time?) Do you have family members living outside the area? (*If yes:* Where? How often do you see them?)

Are you a member of any political, community or religious organisation? What/where? How often do you attend?

3) Spatial practices

Now I'd like to get a bit more of an idea about your daily routine…

Where is your place of work? How do you get there? How long does it take you to get there? How do you feel about the journey?

Where do you do your grocery shopping? Why do you do it there? Where do you buy other things, eg. clothes, household items? Why there?

Do you ever go to shopping centres (and if so which)? Why/why not? Do you use shops inside the community? Why/why not?

What do you do with your free time? (*Give List 1)

In an average week, what percentage of your time would you say you spend outside the neighbourhood? Doing what? Which other parts of the city would you say you "know well"?

4) Social exchange

And now I'd like to ask a bit about your relationships with family, friends and neighbours…

To start with, how did you hear about the vacancy for your current job? *Prompt if it was through a friend/family member, advertisement, organisation etc.*

Did someone help you to get the job? Who/how did they help? (*If not a family member:* Who is the person? How do you know them and for how long? Why do you think they were willing to help you?)

And if you wanted to change job, how would you go about it? (*If they mention a person:* Why them and how would they be able to help?)

Have you ever helped someone else get a job? Who? Why were you willing to help them? Would you do the same kind of favour for anyone you know, or just for friends/family?

Can you look at this list of favours and tick the frequency with which you do or receive these favours and for/from whom? (*Give List 2)

When you do these favours do you expect anything in return? What?

5) Neighbourhood perceptions

Ok, and to finish I'd like to ask a few questions about your opinions about this community…

Do you think this is a good place to live? Why?

Do you think on the whole that people in this neighbourhood are trustworthy?

Why/why not? Are they more trustworthy than in other neighbourhoods? Or less?

Are there any places in the area where you feel unsafe (or where you wouldn't want your children to go)? What about outside the community?

What perception do you think non-residents have of the community? Why?

6) Current changes

Finally I'd like to ask you about some changes that have been taking place in the community…

In recent years, do you think the community has improved, stayed the same, or got worse? In what ways? Why?

What do you think are the main challenges facing the community today?

a) Specific questions for Tuiuti

What do think think of the UPP? Since the arrival of the UPP do you feel safer? Why (not)? What has your experience of interaction with the police been?

Since the arrival of the UPP have you noticed any increase in prices in the area? (*If so:* On what? What has been the impact on your family budget?)

Tuiuti is near both the Maracanã Stadium and the Port Zone, two of the areas that will receive major works associated with the World Cup and Olympics. Do you think residents here will benefit in some way from these sporting events?

b) Specific questions for Asa Branca

Have the recent urban upgrading works in the community improved your life? How?

Who do you think is responsible? Does more still need to be done?

What do you think of the changes surrounding areas, in particular the new condominiums? Have you had any contact with the new residents? What is your perception of them?

And have you noticed the presence of new residents within the Asa Branca? (*If yes:* What perception you have them?)

Have you used the Transoeste yet? (If so, what do they think?) Do you know about the Transcarioca and Transolímpica BRT lines? Do you think they will have a big impact on your life?

Do you think in the long term the changes related to the Olympics will improve or worsen the community, or have no impact?

11.3 Appendix 3: Leisure activities survey (Portuguese)

Lista 1. Atividades de lazer (assinale tantos quantos se apliquem)

1) Ficar em casa e ...

a. Assistir televisão ☐

b. passar tempo com a família ☐

c. Conversa com os vizinhos ☐

2) Ir para a casa de um amigo / parente ☐

Onde? _____

3) Ir ao parque ou à praia ☐

Onde? _____

4) Ir a um bar ou restaurante ☐

Onde? _____

5) Ir ao cinema / teatro / museu ☐

Onde? _____

6) Participar numa atividade desportiva ou artística ☐

O que? _____

Onde? _____

7) Participar nas atividades de uma organização ☐

Qual? _____

Onde? _____

8) Usar computador/internet ☐

Onde? _____

8) Outra atividade ☐

O que? _____

Onde? _____

11.4 Appendix 4: Leisure activities survey (English)

List 1. Leisure activities (tick as many as apply)

1) Stay at home and …

a. Watch television ☐

b. Spend time with family ☐

c. Chat with neighbours ☐

2) Go to the house of a friend / relative ☐

Where? _____

3) Go to the park or the beach ☐

Which? _____

4) Go to a bar or restaurant ☐

Where? _____

5) Go to the cinema / theatre / museum ☐

Where? _____

6) Participate in a sporting or arts activity ☐

What? _____

Where? _____

7) Participate in the activities of an organisation ☐

What? _____

Where? _____

8) Use the computer or internet ☐

Where? _____

8) Other activity ☐

What? _____

Where? _____

11.5 Appendix 5: Social exchange survey (Portuguese)

Lista 2. Formas de assistência

Favores que eu faço para outras pessoas...	Frequentemente	Às vezes	Raramente	Nunca	Não applicável
1) Emprestar equipamentos pequenos (por exemplo uma ferramenta, um utensílio de cozinha)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2) Dar uma carona	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3) Levar as crianças para a escola	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4) Cuidar das crianças	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5) Ajudar/cuidar de uma pessoa doente (por exemplo visitar, pegar um remédio da farmacia)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6) Emprestar mais de R$50	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7) Ajudar alguém com uma obra na casa	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
8) Fazer outro tipo de favor	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

O que? _____

Favores que as outras pessoas fazem para mim...	Frequentemente	Às vezes	Raramente	Nunca	Não applicável
1) Emprestar equipamentos pequenos (por exemplo uma ferramenta, um utensílio de cozinha)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2) Dar uma carona	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3) Levar as crianças para a escola	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4) Cuidar das crianças	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5) Ajudar/cuidar de uma pessoa doente (por exemplo visitar, pegar um remédio da farmacia)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6) Emprestar mais de R$50	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7) Ajudar alguém com uma obra na casa	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
8) Fazer outro tipo de favor	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

O que? _____

	Qualquer pessoa que eu conheço	Qualquer amigo	Somente amigos bons e parentes	Ninguém
9) A quem você estaria disposto a emprestar um equipamento pequeno?	☐	☐	☐	☐
10) Para quem você cuidaria as criaças por algumas horas?	☐	☐	☐	☐
11) A quem você estaria disposto a emprestar mais que R$50 se precisasse?	☐	☐	☐	☐
12) Quem você ajudaria com um projeto de construção importante?	☐	☐	☐	☐

11.6 Appendix 6: Social exchange survey (English)

List 2. Types of assistance

Favours I do for other people ...	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	Not applicable
1) Lend small items (eg. tools, kitchen utensils)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2) Give a lift	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3) Take children to school	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4) Look after children	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5) Look after someone who is ill (eg. visit, collect medicine from the pharmacy)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6) Lend more than R$50	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7) Help someone with a job on their home	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
8) Do another kind of favour	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

What? _____

Favours that other people do for me ...	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	Not applicable
1) Lend small items (eg. tools, kitchen utensils)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2) Give a lift	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3) Take children to school	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4) Look after children	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5) Look after someone who is ill (eg. visit, collect medicine from the pharmacy)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6) Lend more than R$50	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7) Help someone with a job on their home	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
8) Do another kind of favour	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

What? _____

	Anyone I know	Any friend	Only a good friend or relative	No one
9) Who would you be willing to lend a small household item to?	☐	☐	☐	☐
10) Whose children would you look after for a few hours?	☐	☐	☐	☐
11) Who would you be willing to lend more than R$50 to, if they needed it?	☐	☐	☐	☐
12) Who would you help with a job on their home?	☐	☐	☐	☐

11.7 Appendix 7: Raw data for social exchange graphs

Social assistance given and received – Tuiuti

		Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	Not applicable
Social assistance given	Lend household item	16	5	8	1	0
	Look after children	9	5	6	10	0
	Help someone ill	4	17	8	1	0
	Lend R50+	0	8	11	10	1
Social assistance received	Lend household item	6	11	8	5	0
	Look after children	1	3	3	4	19
	Help someone ill	3	19	4	3	1
	Lend R50+	4	11	4	10	1

Social assistance given and received – Asa Branca

		Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	Not applicable
Social assistance given	Lend household item	11	10	4	5	0
	Look after children	1	14	2	12	1
	Help someone ill	7	14	4	5	0
	Lend R50+	4	9	3	12	2
Social assistance received	Lend household item	9	11	3	6	1
	Look after children	2	5	1	4	18
	Help someone ill	6	10	4	8	2
	Lend R50+	1	11	3	15	0

For whom favours are done – Tuiuti

	Anyone	Any friend	Good friend/relative	No one	Blank
Lend more than R$50	3	0	19	7	1
Look after children	3	6	13	7	1
Lend household item	5	8	16	0	1

For whom favours are done – Asa Branca

	Anyone	Any friend	Good friend/relative	No one	Blank
Lend more than R$50	2	1	15	10	2
Look after children	2	3	17	7	1
Lend household item	10	6	11	2	1